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

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URBAN SOCIOLOGY

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Urban Sociology

EGON ERNEST BERGEL

Professor of Sociology
Springfield College

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URBAN SOCIOLOGY

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To
My Mother
Friederike Bergel
in gratitude

PREFACE

Scientific interest in the city is very old but the science of urban sociology is quite recent. What probably is the first book about the city was written by the Italian Giovanni Botero, whose *Delle Cause della grandezza della città* appeared as early as 1598. This book, of course, is now hardly more than a scientific curiosity and it cannot be said that it created a new science. From the seventeenth century on, the city increasingly became the object of scientific research. The founders of political arithmetic and their successors the statisticians, the students of population problems, the economists, and the historians became interested and were joined by administrators, architects, planners, and social reformers. They have produced a literature so extensive that a complete bibliography, if it could be compiled, would dwarf the size of any monograph on the subject. Urban sociology is indebted to these scholars; some of the basic problems have been first investigated by such pioneers as Graunt, Ravenstein, Mayr, Supan, Buecher, Adna Weber, Willcox, and Hurd, but none of their works is truly an urban sociology. Even after sociology had established itself as a new science, its students took rare notice of urban phenomena. The first monograph written on the city by a sociologist, René Maurier's *L'Origine et la fonction économique des villes,* was published as late as 1910 and, as indicated by the title, its author approached the subject largely as an economist. The three early sociological classics—G. Simmel, *Die Grosstädte und das Geistesleben,* 1903; Max Weber, *Die Stadt,* 1921; and R. Maurier, *Le Village et la ville,* 1929—were all only parts of larger works. The real impetus came from Robert E. Park. His article "The City," which heralded the coming of a new era, was first published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1915; yet at that time it received little attention. Sociology was still a general science without much specialization. Indeed, it was still fighting for recognition, which it gained only slowly. The year 1925 marks the turning point. Park republished his article, together with other contributions, in a small book, *The City.* In the following year he and his coeditor Burgess published a similar volume of short, systematically unconnected, but extremely important, articles called *The Urban Community.* The response was remarkable. The first textbook on urban sociology appeared in 1929. Since then the new field has flourished and expanded. As a systematic science (notwithstanding more specialized investigations of great value made abroad), it has been from the first an American

science, and has chiefly remained so perhaps, if for no other reasons, because research possibilities elsewhere are too scarce.

Today the new science, like the cities which are its subjects, has outgrown its own boundaries. Sociology must nearly always rely to some extent on other related sciences. Urban sociology represents an extreme case. We are forced to borrow from history and the other social sciences—economics, social psychology, government, public administration, and theory of social work. We have to deal with such problems as home rule, authority to tax and to incur debts, planning and zoning, building codes, sanitation, sewers, garbage disposal, traffic regulations, seaports and airports, public housing, water supply, school administration, city courts, and a host of other questions. The urban sociologist has to gather information from jurisprudence and criminology, from medicine and hygiene, from architects and city planners, from engineers and builders, from ministers and educators, from real-estate experts and recreation leaders. In addition, we should know all about the cities' past and present, covering five continents and thousands of years of history. That no one can hope to master all these fields is only stating the obvious. The present author is not sure that he has obtained even the necessary minimum of information in the areas outside of his special training and interests. Under these circumstances the problem of writing a textbook is not only a question of limitations in an apparently unlimited field or a question of proper selectivity. If the book is not to be a bewildering array of fortuitously collected data or merely a loosely connected compilation of research, the problem is also one of concentration and emphasis.

There are three main approaches to this problem. The first is the stress on ecology. There is a danger that this kind of approach may unnecessarily narrow the treatment, and experience has shown that it is both possible and desirable to deal with human ecology as a whole, including rural areas. We are indeed fortunate in having several monographs which admirably cover the entire ecological field. The second approach is to treat the subject as the specialized science of the city. I have decided against this procedure too. Not that I am critical of such efforts; I have the greatest respect for them. But the time has passed when the city alone was representative of urban life. This text emphasizes the fact that the city as such is no longer able to fulfill all urban functions. After the city, we saw first the rise of the (politically and legally) independent suburb, then came the metropolitan region with its central city and satellites; now we have had to develop the concepts of conurbation and "rurban" areas, and the 1950 census was forced to introduce the new category "urbanized areas." The process which began with the separation of residence and business within the city did not stop at the city limits. Great numbers of people now work in the city and live in the country, while lately farmers in increasing numbers have moved into

towns and commute to their farms. Modern transportation, universal education, the extension of utility services, and radio and television are—at least in the United States—diffusing urban traits into rural sections so rapidly that it seems no longer advisable to concentrate exclusively on the city.

This, then, leaves the third of the three approaches: to write exactly what the title indicates—an urban sociology. The emphasis is equally on both words: urbanism, following Wirth, is conceived as a way of life rather than as a form of habitat, and sociology as a concern with human beings living together and oriented to each other. To bring the main problems sharply to attention I have focused on man rather than on his visible artifacts, on social actions and social relationships rather than on spatial patterns, on nonmaterial culture rather than on physical objects, on groups rather than on areas, and on social techniques rather than on technology in a narrow sense.

The necessity to avoid unreasonable length and my own scientific limitations account for certain omissions. This book is essentially an analysis of contemporary urban society in the United States. I have tried to sketch some important historical developments and, for the sake of comparison, to refer to European cities as much as possible, but detailed discussion has been omitted. There are, after all, several excellent books available for collateral study. But other material, some of it unpublished or difficult to obtain, has been added. Footnotes have been kept to a minimum; I do not believe that an abundance of annotations is always an indication of scholarship; they are a source of annoyance to the not yet seasoned reader for whom this book has been written.

"It is characteristic of a science in its earlier stages," Alfred North Whitehead once remarked, "to be both ambitiously profound in its aim and trivial in its handling of details." This statement has been recently called to our attention by one of our most outstanding sociologists. No one will quarrel with it, but the warning is less timely today than when it was written in 1916. At that time luxuriant speculation indulged in unfounded hypotheses, displaying utter disregard for facts and a hardly veiled contempt for empirical research. In the meantime we have learned and worked; perhaps we have learned and worked too much. From speculation we have veered to the opposite direction. There is a tendency now to be ambitious in handling details and to stop at trivialities in theorizing. This has led to what David Easton has called "hyperfactualism." The motives deserve our respect; the writers do not want to sacrifice their intellectual integrity by making propositions which are not as demonstrable as a mathematical theorem. But timidity can go too far. Ideas without facts are blind, but facts without ideas are empty, as Kant has taught us. To stop at generalizations which are inconsequential is an admission of failure. To present a bewildering mass of minute data without a meaningful theory is of limited value. Although I lay myself

wide open to attacks, I want to express my belief that an overstatement is better than no statement at all.

Urbanization not only developed a new type of society; it is in the process of replacing all former types. The coexistence of a rural "folk society" and an urban society is now largely a phenomenon of the past. The differences between rural and urban populations are tending to become mere occupational differences; the once dominant rural areas are more and more becoming an urban hinterland. With this perspective in mind, urban sociology can be conceived as the science of modern urbanized society. Its goal would be a general sociological theory derived from an analysis of our own age.

However, nothing even remotely resembling so revolutionary a departure from established procedures has been attempted in this book. I have kept it within the limits of the customary text for a specialized course. But I have tried to link the data with the theories of general sociology. Whenever possible, I have stressed social action, social relationships, and social institutions, underlining the instability and the dynamic character of our society. I have tried to show that urban phenomena have a deeper meaning for the individual, for groups, and for the entire nation than mere statistical correlations seem to imply. Whether I have succeeded or failed is for others to decide, but I do hope that this approach will make the book more interesting to the beginner. On controversial issues I have made my own position clear. As a textbook neither supersedes nor replaces the instructor, the classroom provides opportunity for arguments to the contrary.

We all know that with few exceptions scientific authors have no claim to originality. As scientists we all are, although it seems an odd formulation, the children of many fathers; and while we are working, we must enlist aid and assistance. It is with a feeling of deep gratitude that I thank all those who have helped me in one way or another, some by suggestions and criticism, some by reading and improving parts of the book, some by furnishing material. That I am the only one responsible for shortcomings is not an empty phrase but a recognition of responsibility. It is impossible to mention all who have given generously of their help. My special thanks, however, are due to Professors J. Marshall Miller of Columbia University, Sherwood Fox and Richard Christie of New York University, Edgar Kant of the University of Lund, Sweden, Whitaker Deininger of Dubuque University, Robert Vinter of the University of Michigan, William Palmer of Springfield College, and James Gail Sheldon; Dr. Ernst Pospischil, Chief of the Department of Statistics of the City of Vienna; Scott Bagby, City Planner, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Mrs. Charlotte Christie, Richard Billings, Douglas Deane, and my assistants Don Baldwin and William Holden. The British and the Netherlands Information Services also were very helpful.

EGON E. BERGEL

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Part 1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

DEFINITIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS

Urban sociology deals with the impact of city life on social actions, social relationships, social institutions, and the types of civilizations derived from and based on urban modes of living. As will be discussed later, this impact is considerable; without cities, mankind would have remained on a much more primitive level.

Thus urban sociology is a special study of the influence of environment on man. This makes it advisable to sound a note of warning before we start our investigation. While we have amassed enormous amounts of data proving the far-reaching effects of nonhuman conditions on human life, we must avoid the pitfalls of social determinism or extreme environmentalism which postulate that all social phenomena are products of blind forces over which man has no control.

The great variability of urban life in time and space is ample evidence that the patterns of cities depend on many determinants, of which man is by no means the least important one. Man not only makes himself, to use Childe's formulation; [1] he also makes the cities. Furthermore, he does so in a rational manner, not merely as a tool of an impersonal, irresistible power.

On the other hand, we have no proof that human nature has ever been changed. To believe that a new man was created when cities were founded is hardly a scientific view. Man is endowed with certain traits and no environment can add other traits or make existing traits completely disappear.

But human traits, while they remain what they are, show a great adaptability to different situations. This makes the traits appear to be different when only a specific part of them has come to the surface. Human traits also show a considerable variability as to intensity, prevalence, and mode, in much the same way as a melody is capable of a great number of variations.

What environment does is to develop some existing traits to their full potentialities while others become stunted or remain latent. Environmental factors also condition human actions in such a way that they offer, under certain circumstances, easy satisfactions which would be impossible or very difficult to achieve in any other way. Many important human drives are nonspecific, that is, they can be satisfied by various means. Social actions are

[1] Gordon V. Childe, *Man Makes Himself*, London, 1936.

goal-directed,[2] but the same goal can be reached by different methods, and the goal itself, while serving an identical function, can change its nature so completely that it is no longer acceptable to those who have been adapted to a particular form of goal. For instance, the need for shelter is rather universal. Yet shelter can be obtained by using natural facilities, as prehistoric men did when they lived in caves. A shelter can be the most primitive affair, such as that of the Onas who put up tree branches as a mere windbreak; it can take on many different forms, ranging from a mud hut or a snow igloo to a most elaborate modern house of glass and steel. But all types have the same function: to satisfy specific human wants based on identical human traits.

Ecology. Thus the city, like any other environment, is a conditioning rather than a determining factor. Habitat shows its influence in areas other than human life. Long before sociologists began their research in this field, botanists became conscious of the influence which physical environment exerts on the life of plants. They developed a special branch of their science which they called "ecology." From the botanists the sociologists borrowed the term. Park, "the father of human ecology," was the first to use the word, which soon gained currency. The concept, as subsequently developed by McKenzie and others, has yielded very valuable results. Again, however, a word of caution seems to be in order. Some writers have gone too far in their attempts to establish close analogies between plant and human ecology. The differences between the two areas are much more marked than the rather superficial similarities. Man lives *on* the soil, the plant *in* the soil. This alone makes closer comparison impossible, for mobility is one of the more striking features of man. The plant has no choice of environment. Man not only can change his environment by leaving one place for another but he can (and does) change any site on which he lives. Every human environment is to some extent man-made. In other words, the approach of plant ecology is biological, that of human ecology essentially sociological. As in other fields of sociology, it is a fallacy to depend on biological analogies. There is no full agreement about the scope of ecology. As usual, there are a variety of definitions which do not exactly coincide. Hawley,[3] for instance, regards human ecology as the science which deals with the development and organization of the community; Gist and Halbert [4] call it "the study of the spatial distribution of persons and institutions in the city, and the processes involved in the formation of patterns of distribution." For our own purposes ecology will be defined as the theory of the interrelations between habitat and man.[5]

[2] A term introduced by Talcott Parsons.

[3] Amos A. Hawley, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950, p. 43.

[4] N. P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society,* New York, 1950, p. 95.

[5] "Human ecology centers in the study of relations between man and environment," James A. Quinn, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950, p. 3.

The City. In proceeding to define the city we encounter a difficulty familiar to sociologists. There are very few sociological terms on whose definitions experts agree. And it is the most ordinary terms, all borrowed from common, prescientific language, which defy all attempts at precise, unequivocal definition. The concept of the city is no exception. Everybody seems to know what a city is but no one has given a satisfactory definition.

Like many other sociological categories the city is an abstraction, but the elements of which it consists—residents, structures, means of transportation, installations, and so on—are concrete entities of varying natures. *What makes a city is the functional integration of its elements into a whole.* Yet a city has not merely a single function but rather an assortment of many functions and not all of them are present in every city. Lourdes, for instance, is a city whose primary function is to serve faithful Catholics who seek cures for grave illnesses. Some urban places—for example, the industrial towns recently set up by Russia in Siberia—do not even have places of worship. Yet we suppose that both types have a common denominator which justifies calling all of them cities.

To complicate the situation still more, the functions of the city, or at least the prevalent functions, vary greatly according to time and place. The Venice of 1550 is functionally a different city from the Venice of 1950, although it has remained spatially the same and has even preserved most of its structures. Thus it seems hopeless to find the common factor which characterizes all the cities spread over the entire world throughout their 6,000 years of existence. The most promising procedure might be to search for the negative element, for that which is absent in urban settlements but present in rural areas. A negative definition is admittedly a poor one but it may prove to be the best alternative. To clarify this position we shall briefly review some of the attempts to arrive at a definition.

The city has been defined in legal terms: a place is legally made a city by a declaration, called a charter, which is granted by a higher authority. This definition is very clear but otherwise unsatisfactory. It is an explanation ex post facto. A place is not a city because it has received a charter; the grant of the charter is recognition that a place has become a city. The definition disregards the fact that many Eastern cities have never had a charter and that in the West the legal distinction between cities and rural places evolved at a rather late date.

Another equally simple approach is provided by statistics. The U.S. Bureau of the Census considers as cities all "incorporated places" of 2,500 or more inhabitants. This method meets the needs of statisticians but offers little sociological insight. The arbitrariness of this kind of definition is revealed by the fact that the United States census has had to alter its criterion from 8,000 inhabitants to 4,000 and finally to the present figure. To meet other difficulties the census has had to include additional urban develop-

ments, such as "unincorporated towns or townships or political subdivisions." There are also substantial international variations. Most European countries follow the example set by France in 1846, requiring a population minimum of 2,000. This figure was approved by the International Bureau of Statistics in 1887. It has not been universally accepted, however, since Egypt, for example, still sets the minimum limit as high as 11,000.

It is obvious that a place does not become a city by merely increasing from 2,499 to 2,500 residents; it is equally obvious that a place of 2,500 and one of over 1,000,000 people must have more in common than a mere figure if we are justified in calling them both cities, as distinct from rural settlements. Finally, we find in the European East (and elsewhere in the Old World) large peasant settlements which are quite definitely rural in character but have a much larger population than many places classified as urban.

For similar reasons definitions based on the density of population rather than on mere numbers have to be rejected. It is impossible to state at what density a settlement changes from the rural to the urban type. Some villages are rather thickly settled while some urban sections represent a residential vacuum. The "City" of London has practically no inhabitants and the borough of Richmond, which is a part of New York City, has a much lower density than the neolithic European pile dwellings which possibly housed as many as 1,300 persons on less than 30,000 square yards. The density of cities varies as much as from 10 (Australia and New Zealand) to 333 (Paris) per square hectare.

For these reasons attempts to arrive at an exact minimum figure of density which signifies the urban character of a settlement are rarely made. Walter F. Willcox [6] tried to arrive at a numerical definition by investigating the density of Tompkins County, New York. He proposes the following figures: density of less than 100 per square mile constitutes "country," density from 100 to 1,000 "villages," and density above 1,000 "cities." His proposition is only tentative since he has analyzed only one American county. As Willcox himself realizes, conditions in other counties might be different. But if the density varies from area to area while the cities maintain their character, the validity of the measurement collapses, since a yardstick must not vary. Willcox is forced to add a nonnumerical characteristic, that of occupation. According to his own definition, he regards a district as rural only if "presumably agriculture is the only occupation," while cities are places "in which there is practically no agriculture." He remarks, "The fundamental difference between country and city is the difference between agriculture and the group of other occupations." With this statement the present author fully agrees. In this case density is a result, a dependent variable, and not

[6] "A Redefinition of 'City' in Terms of Density of Population," in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community,* Chicago, 1926.

a constituent element; it does not determine the urban character of an area but is determined by it. Only the factors of size, number of residents, and density can be expressed by precise figures, and all other criteria are by necessity less distinct. Consequently, authors in search of these criteria often become vague and convey either too little or too much.

Others have defined a city as a place which has become so large that people no longer know each other. Sombart [7] calls this a "sociological" definition. For very small cities the statement is patently incorrect. In big cities face-to-face contacts are more numerous than anywhere else in the country; for this reason Sorokin and Zimmerman correctly consider greater number of contacts as an urban, not as a rural, characteristic.

Since the quest for a single criterion has met with no success, some authors —notably Sorokin and Zimmerman, Maunier, and Sombart—hold that a proper definition must consist of a combination of factors: "multiple" or "compound" definitions. Maunier's own solution, however, is hardly satisfactory. According to him, a city is a "complete society whose geographical base is particularly restrained for the size of its population or whose territorial element is relatively meager in amount compared to that of its human element." [8] This formula is only an elaborate way of defining a city as a habitat of great population density. Since it fails to explain at what degree of density a settlement changes from rural to urban, the definition loses its usefulness.

Sorokin and Zimmerman are much clearer. They assemble eight characteristics in which the urban world differs from the rural world. They are (1) occupation, (2) environment, (3) size of community, (4) density of population, (5) heterogeneity or homogeneity of the population, (6) social differentiation and stratification, (7) mobility, and (8) "system of interaction" (i.e., number and type of contacts). Some of these characteristics have been discussed above. Heterogeneity is more characteristic of large than of small cities, more of American cities than of those in other countries. However, Fort Scott, Kansas, or Pendleton, Oregon, are not markedly more heterogeneous than the rural areas which surround them. The cities of Spain, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Albania, and New Zealand are as homogeneous as their countrysides. There are also a number of small urban places which show little mobility, for instance, in the Dakotas, Mississippi, or Vermont. At times, especially after the Reformation and during the Industrial Revolution, rural areas showed a considerable degree of mobility. The early American immigrants were largely rural, moving from European to American farms.

[7] W. Sombart, "Staedtische Siedlung," *Handwoerterbuch der Soziologie,* Stuttgart, 1931.

[8] Maunier, *L'origine et la fonction économique des villes;* also "The Definition of the City," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 15.

Stratification, on the other hand, is distinctly an urban feature. Yet we hesitate to include it in a definition because class differences are the results of urban organization rather than a constituent element.[9] This leaves for consideration the occupational differences which the present author regards as decisive. *Thus we shall call a city any settlement where the majority of the occupants are engaged in other than agricultural activities.*

The previously noted shortcomings of such a negative formulation are, however, merely linguistic. Language has no antonym for farming. The advantages of the definition may excuse the unsatisfactory formulation. In the first place, this definition is precise; there can be no doubt whether a place is to be classified as urban or rural. It is valid for all places and for all regions. It explains why certain settlements are grouped together, regardless of their size and of numerous other differences. Finally, it concentrates on the factor which originated urban life and from which all other characteristics distinguishing urban from rural society are derived.

The definition needs some elaboration. It does not imply that agriculture is necessarily banned from the city. In former times some types of agriculture have been carried on in nearly all towns. Even today townspeople raise vegetables, plant fruit trees, or keep chickens in their back yards. Springfield, Massachusetts, has a commercial piggery. The City of New York operates a sizable farm in the Bronx. There are numerous vineyards within the city limits of Vienna.

It also happens that farmers whose presence is not essential in the off season or whose farms are in proximity are town dwellers. In Montclair, New Jersey, an exclusive residential suburb, the 1940 census listed 5 farmers, 115 employed in agriculture, and 4 in forestry. In early antiquity the full-fledged member of a city often owned land which provided his livelihood. But this did not constitute the reason for his living in the city. He was there for nonagricultural purposes.

In some parts of the world we still find an unusual form of human settlement: "artisan villages" where all residents are engaged in the same craft. Another case: fishing villages are neither rural nor entirely urban in character but represent a special category. Fishing, as a specialized kind of food gathering, is much older than the domestication of plants and animals and is thus prerural in character. Fishing villages existed in Europe before the advent of neolithic times, for instance, near Muge, Portugal. Some of our

[9] Stratification, however, is not entirely absent in rural areas. In many European sections the peasantry shows a distinct clan structure (compare the review of Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* by E. Linpinsel, in *Koelner Vierteljahrshefte,* vol. 9). Where the manorial system was established, the class structure —lord of the manor, supervisors, servants, yeomen, and serfs—is quite evident. Even in America there is a class distinction between the gentleman farmer and the dirt farmer, the large-scale business absentee farmer and the small family farmer, the big farmer and the sharecropper, the owner and the agricultural laborer.

primitive contemporaries still live mostly on what the sea yields. But their settlements cannot be placed in the same category as, for instance, Salem, Massachusetts, whose residents became millionaires by fishing. The difference is obvious: one group literally lives on fish; for the other group fishing is a commercial enterprise. Thus we shall consider all communities, prehistoric or extant, as nonurban if their activities are mainly consumption-centered. If these activities are oriented toward a market, the settlement is urban in nature, for a market is one of the basic features of nonagricultural activities. Without organized exchange of goods and services the urban dweller would have nothing to eat.

Community. Because of the "confused nature of his vocabulary," says MacIver,[10] the sociologist ascribes to the term "community" various meanings. Sometimes it is used to denote a common habitat or the totality of all persons living in the same area. But frequently the term indicates more than merely a locality or its residents. Kingsley Davis,[11] for instance, stresses what he calls "social completeness." Accordingly, he defines a community as "the smallest territorial group that can embrace all aspects of social life. . . . It is the smallest local group that can be, and often is, a complete society." MacIver and Page [12] approach the problem from a somewhat different angle, emphasizing relationships rather than social organization: "The basic criterion of community . . . is that all of one's social relationships may be found within it." We can indeed speak of a "community" if the common habitat creates positive emotional ties between all residents or at least all groups of residents. The establishment of "consensus," the feeling of "belonging," is of considerable consequence. If all groups have friendly feelings toward each other, cooperation is promoted and the community can fulfill all its functions. In this instance we speak of the complete integration of a community. Since a well-functioning community furthers cultural achievements and improves living conditions, we seem justified in attributing a positive value to integration. If, on the other hand, consensus cannot be established, tensions between residents or groups of residents are bound to arise; antagonism tends to disrupt cooperation and the function of a local community cannot be fulfilled. There is danger of disintegration or at least of lasting hostility. By calling such conditions "pathological" we ascribe to them negative values. As in medicine, pathological indicates a failure to function properly. The results are either feelings of discomfort or, as the extreme consequence, decomposition.

Urbanization. Difficulties also exist with regard to the definitions of the now widely used terms "urbanization" and "urbanism." Sometimes they are

[10] See "The Nature of Community," in John A. Kinneman (ed.), *The Community in American Society,* New York, 1947, chap. 1.

[11] Kingsley Davis, *Human Society,* New York, 1949, p. 312.

[12] R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society,* New York, 1949, p. 9.

used synonymously. Queen and Carpenter [13] make the following distinction: ". . . urbanism we use to identify the phenomenon of city residence; urbanization we use to identify the distinctive way of life typically associated with city residence." Wirth [14] uses the terms in exactly the reverse sense. Niles Carpenter [15] prefers to give no definition at all. For the purposes of our discussion urbanization will be considered as a process and urbanism as a condition or set of circumstances. Thus urbanization is conceptualized as dynamic, urbanism as static.

In defining the nature of the urban form of society Niles Carpenter [16] makes the following preliminary statement: ". . . in an urban society the city dominates the scene." In this laconic form the statement can be challenged. In some sense the city always dominates the scene because it is the center of political organization, the market toward which both rural and urban economic activities are oriented, and the place in which cultural activities are concentrated. The dominance of cities, of which we so frequently speak, is a problem in itself. As a rule, we find a state of mutual interdependence which makes it very difficult to find out whether the city dominates the country or vice versa. There is no clear-cut correlation between urbanism and dominance of the city. In ancient Egypt, an overwhelmingly rural society, the cities were politically dominant because the peasants had no political rights and the military power of the rulers was concentrated in the cities. In modern America the situation is less clear; it is well known that the farm bloc exerts a political influence far in excess of the numerical strength of farmers. North Dakota, a rural area with only thirteen towns, none of which has more than 39,000 inhabitants, has the same number of votes in the United States Senate as New York State.

The crucial point, it seems, is not the dominance but the preponderance of urban life. At earlier stages or in simple societies cities were the exceptions. They harbored only a small minority of the population. Whatever political power the cities exercised, the peasants were largely left to themselves and lived in cultural separation. There was a sharp contrast between the very small segment of the people in the city and the rural society which formed the bulk of the nation. This situation lasted for a long time; there were only a few cities and their population remained more or less stationary. Several times changes could be observed but they did not last: from the fifth century B.C. Greek life became increasingly urbanized, but after the death of Alexander the Great the cities declined. Imperial Rome witnessed the rise of its capital to a metropolis and the emergence of many smaller towns. But with the fall of the empire Rome was reduced to a small town and the

[13] Stuart A. Queen and David B. Carpenter, *The American City,* New York, 1953, p. 29.
[14] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1938.
[15] Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* New York, 1932, p. 18.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 19.

Western world again became an agricultural society in which cities played a very modest role. After the passing of the Dark Ages cities began to become more numerous and to assume greater importance, notably so in Italy. There was no catastrophic decline this time but after initial gains, notwithstanding some exceptions, the growth was arrested and the West, like the rest of the world, remained preponderantly a food-producing, rural society. The final change, usually connected with the Industrial Revolution, came with the dawn of modern times, first in England, then on the European continent and in the United States, more recently in South America, India, Indonesia, and China. The population began to shift from the country to the city; numerous new urban settlements arose and old towns gained in size and population. Simultaneously, more and more people changed from farming to urban occupations. As a result, the cities have gained at the expense of the rural areas. In some countries, for the first time in history, the farm population has become a minority.

We shall call urbanization the process of transforming rural into urban areas; this process has a profound effect on the economic composition of the population: the farm population decreases; at least proportionately, the urban population gains.

Several attempts have been made to measure the degree of urbanization. The simplest method is to determine the ratio of city dwellers to the farm population. But difficulties arise from the different definitions of urban communities in various countries. Ireland, for instance, classifies as urban all places with 1,500 or more inhabitants and thereby reaches an urbanization index of 37.6 per cent, while 51.6 per cent of the population is engaged in nonagricultural work. Mexico, classifying only places of more than 2,500 as urban, has an urbanization index of 35.1 per cent (only slightly less than Ireland) but only 22.2 per cent is not engaged in farming. One must also take into account the fact that the degree of urbanization is not clearly correlated with the size of cities. Mexico, although less urbanized than Ireland, has one of the world's largest cities; Greater Mexico City, with 3,053,588 inhabitants, surpasses Dublin, with only 506,051 residents.

In spite of the difficulties mentioned above, it can be stated that at least ten countries are now primarily urban.[17] If we concentrate on urban areas, these countries rank as follows:

[17] The figures in the text are adapted from Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "World Urbanization," in *Reader in Urban Sociology,* Glencoe, Ill., 1951. The authors derived their figures from the *Demographic Yearbook, 1948.* Sweden, Ireland, and Panama have an urbanization index of less than 50.2 per cent but were included for the sake of comparison. Germany does not appear in the list although it is heavily urbanized. It was omitted only because the present political split does not permit the procurement of sociologically significant figures. Reliable statistics concerning the urbanization of Soviet Russia are not available.

1. United Kingdom
2, 3, and 4. Denmark, Belgium, New Zealand
5. United States
6. Canada
7. France
8. Sweden
9. Ireland
10. Panama

If we consider occupation as the criterion for urbanization, the order changes as follows:

1. United Kingdom
2. Belgium
3. United States
4. Union of South Africa
5. Canada
6. New Zealand
7. Denmark
8. Sweden
9. France
10. Ireland

The discrepancies between the two lists indicate the difficulties in approaching the phenomenon of urbanization in a merely numerical way. It should be clear that the reasons for urbanization in Great Britain, Belgium, and Sweden must be sought in the extensive industrialization of these countries. Conversely, the Union of South Africa, Canada, and New Zealand became urbanized because the masses of immigrants refused to take up farming. Ireland gained her urban surplus from her own rural regions but not on account of widespread industrialization; the landless children of farmers flocked to the cities because there was no room for them in rural areas. If we focus on urbanization as a type of civilization, Ireland, and to a lesser extent Canada, New Zealand, and Denmark are not characteristic examples of this type. They rather represent a society in which urban and agricultural life are balanced and blended into a special and perhaps only transitional type.

The history of urbanization in the United States may be illustrated by some data. The report of the National Resources Committee [18] states "The outstanding factor in the urbanization of the United States is the speed with which it has progressed." This is not quite accurate, for colonial America, from the time of the first settlements to the Declaration of Independence, was overwhelmingly rural. Afterward the farmers outnumbered the urban population for 150 years. When the first census was taken in 1740, only 5.1 per cent of the population was classified as urban. There were only twenty-four cities, inhabited by 201,655 persons. In no city did the population exceed 50,000. The change from an urban minority to a majority occurred as late as 1920, when the urban population reached 51.2 per cent. Only the last generation has been preponderantly urban in character. Twenty farmers provided food for one city dweller in 1790. In 1950 the census classified 96,028,000 persons as urban, 31,092,000 as "rural nonfarm," and only 23,577,000 as "rural farm." Now one farmer can supply six nonfarmers with food. The

[18] *Our Cities,* Washington, 1937, p. 31.

number of urban places has risen to 4,270 and there are 231 places exceeding 50,000 inhabitants.

Urbanism. Following Wirth,[19] urbanism is now generally regarded as "a way of life." What constitutes this particular mode of living is rather difficult to say. Wirth outlines "a limited number of identifying characteristics of the city." He mentions the heterogeneity of the city, the high degree of dependence of urbanites upon others, the segmental character of urban-social relations, and the sophistication and rationality of city dwellers. Wirth perhaps overstates his case. Some cities are very homogeneous. A farmer specializing in cattle breeding is as dependent as an owner of a city restaurant. It is true that many urban relations are segmental, superficial, and anonymous, but nearly all people in the city have at least as many total, personal, and emotionally meaningful relationships as farmers; the masses in the city can hardly be called sophisticated; rationality, finally, is mainly a matter of economics and technology. The modern farmer is as rational in his methods as are city people. The enthusiastic support for various totalitarian movements, revival meetings, and spontaneous riots have taught us that the urban masses can be as irrational as any other group. Yet it is true that all the factors mentioned by Wirth play a greater role in urban than in farm life.

The real difference, it seems, lies in the specific character of "dependence." Wirth points out that "nowhere has mankind been farther removed from organic nature than under the conditions of life characteristic of great cities." The farmer depends primarily on nature, over which he has no control: sunshine and rain, frost and snow decide whether he will prosper or suffer. The behavior of his fellow men is of little importance to the self-contained farmer and is secondary even if he produces for the market. Prices today are rarely fixed by barter between individuals; the farmer receives the "market" price which is determined neither by him nor by his customer.

Contrariwise, people in the city do not depend on nature, or at least they are seldom aware of it. They depend on men, on social relationships. What other people do determines whether they can buy or sell, obtain or lose employment. They succeed if they can induce human beings to use their services. The farmer is primarily interested in the behavior of nature; the city dweller in the behavior of men. Psychological insight, the knowledge of how to handle people, is one of the greatest assets in urban life; so are "connections." The success of the farmer rests mainly on his technical ability; success in the city without the ability "to get along with others" is almost impossible.

In addition, the city incessantly subjects its residents to a multitude of stimuli which demand a quick response. Consequently, city people are conditioned to swift reactions while farmers tend to react more slowly. This has led to the erroneous belief that farmers are less intelligent; actually they

[19] *Op. cit.*

only have more difficulty adjusting themselves to urban conditions. As a consequence, the city has promoted different sets of attitudes and behavior patterns which we call "the urban way of life."

But urbanism is more than a specific state of mind. Above all, it is a stage of civilization. All higher civilizations are unmistakably urban civilizations. Only the city provides the opportunities for specialization which is the prerequisite for a full development of arts and sciences and their applications. In this sense urbanism has gone through several phases. Preurban civilizations are usually called "folk societies." They represent highly traditionalized forms of social life; their social control by informal means is very strict, they are very conservative and changes meet with resistance. When the first cities arose, different patterns of life were evolved. Society became more dynamic; legal rules, enforced by public agencies, replaced in part informal social control. Tradition became weaker and nonconformism grew stronger. For a long time folk society and urban society coexisted but in unmitigated contrast. The peasants refused to adopt urban modes of life and the people in the cities regarded the peasants as primitive and inferior. The next phase brought a gradual encroachment of urbanism upon folk society. The trend gathered momentum when universal obligatory elementary education was introduced, in many instances over the protest of the peasants. The common knowledge of reading and writing narrowed the cultural gap between the rural and the urban masses. Some of the differences have already disappeared. In more advanced countries the farmer has replaced the peasant. Elsewhere the process is slower. The rural population still preserves its own dialect and at least some of its mores. But even so, folk society is on the decline. Folk costumes, folk songs, and folk dances are mostly preserved for sentimental reasons. There can be no doubt that in the end urbanism will be victorious. Modern transportation has brought the farmer close to the city. Modern means of communication—newspapers, radio, and television—have equalizing effects. The self-contained farmer is now an exception. The modern farmer produces for the market and, what is perhaps more important, has become a specialist. For the first time in history the farmer has to buy agricultural goods in quantity. The last phase has not been reached but it is clearly in sight. Urbanism will no longer be confined to the cities; it will replace the traditional folk societies.[20] Farmers will live in less densely populated settlements but farming will indicate only an occupational difference. As such it will be carried out like any enterprise in the city. The urban way of life will finally be the only mode of living.

[20] For a thorough discussion of all aspects of folk society see the various writings by Robert Redfield: "The Folk Society and Culture," in Louis Wirth (ed.), *Eleven-twenty-six: A Decade of Social-science Research,* Chicago, 1940; *The Folk Culture of Yucatán,* Chicago, 1940; "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1947; and *Primitive World and Its Transformation,* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1953, especially chaps. 1–2.

Part II. HISTORICAL APPROACH

Chapter 2

THE RISE OF THE CITIES

1. The City of Antiquity

Preurban Modes of Living. For at least 500,000 years, perhaps even a million years—in any case for the major part of human history—man was without a fixed habitat. Yet the peoples of the Old Stone Age were probably not restless vagabonds drifting from place to place. Quite possibly real nomadism did not develop until the domestication of animals and the need for large pastures. As do some of the other primates, earliest man may have roamed through limited areas while only the surplus population moved to other places in search of food. Entirely shelterless, man first learned to live in caves or later in pits which he dug with primitive tools.

In this earliest period man merely gathered his food. The limited supply of "wild" food permitted only a very small number of persons to exist in comparatively large areas. Even today most primitive groups live in small units of about fifteen to forty families. Under such conditions communities in the modern sense could not emerge.

The situation changed little after man learned to hunt. Only under very auspicious circumstances did a more sedentary life become possible, and agglomerations approximating settlements arose in scattered spots where people lived on fish rather than on meat.

The Old Stone Age came to an end with what Gordon Childe has so aptly called "the neolithic revolution," when man found out, among other things, how to domesticate plants. Once man adopted agriculture he had to stay near his fields. Indeed, we find everywhere in the Neolithic era the traces of permanent human settlements. Village civilizations began in the New Stone Age. The village (quite different from its modern American namesake that represents a late and specialized development) was a community of peasants farming the same area. Initially these settlements were necessarily small. The low productivity of primitive agriculture permitted only a few to be supported on relatively large areas of cultivated land.

With some changes and modifications, the peasant village as it developed in the New Stone Age has remained the basic form of rural settlement and of peasant life for the majority of the peoples of the world. North America

is one of the major exceptions, for the American farmer has always preferred to live in comparative isolation. Consequently, American rural life as well as rural-urban relationships have always differed considerably from the patterns prevailing elsewhere.

The Origin of the City: A Tentative Hypothesis. The first cities originated in the metal age. Possibly the coincidence is not fortuitous.[1] The introduction of metallurgy had a consequence which has been noted by Margaret A. Murray,[2] among others. She points out that the users of metal arms had military superiority over the users of crude stone weapons. Neolithic peasants who did not know how to make weapons from copper, bronze, or iron were easy prey to invaders armed with metal weapons. The aggressors frightened their more primitive victims, to whom they appeared as gods or demigods,[3] into subjugation. The conquerors then moved into the territory of the peasants, who became their serfs. The overlords, to secure their rule, selected settlement places such as islands or, preferably, hilltops, which dominated the countryside so that both attack and defense were facilitated. In brief, it is postulated that the first cities were permanent army camps established in the area of a vanquished population.

Some scholars hold, on the other hand, that the first cities were primitive villages [4] that gradually grew into urban centers. However, there is no evidence that any neolithic village ever became a city simply by an increase in population. For reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, expansion of rural communities in primitive times was limited. Many indications seem to prove that the first cities were not larger but in fact smaller than existing rural villages. The sites of such different places as Ur, Lutetia, and Vindobona were so small that they could scarcely have housed more than the military leader, the high priest, their households, staffs, and the elite guard. Moreover, the location of many cities on hilltops and similar sites made it difficult for peasants to reach them with heavy burdens and doubtless discouraged working people from living there.

[1] The following discussion expounds a hypothesis which is far from being proved and still less generally accepted; it should therefore be regarded as controversial. Compare the different approach by Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* New York, 1932, pp. 2 ff.; and Ralph Turner, *The Great Cultural Traditions,* vol. 1, chaps. 3–4, "The Rise of Urban Cultures in the Ancient Oriental Lands."

[2] Margaret A. Murray, *The Splendor That Was Egypt,* New York, 1949.

[3] The annalists of Sumer report that the kings "descended from heaven" (Leonard Woolley, *Ur of the Chaldeans,* London, 1929, p. 18), and the leaders of the Greek invaders are described as heroes, that is, demigods.

[4] "No doubt they started as neolithic villages which developed in one way or another into walled cities, some of which became the capitals of great empires." (Stuart A. Queen and L. F. Thomas, *The City,* New York, 1939, p. 19.) The wall was not, however, an exclusive characteristic of a city, for villages were frequently fortified. "The city is neither the only nor the oldest fortress." (Max Weber, *"Die Stadt,"* p. 520, in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* Stuttgart, 1924.)

What actually happened in one country after the emergence of the metal age has been admirably described by H. G. Creel: [5]

A ruling, fighting class gradually separated itself out from the general neolithic population. As fighting became more common, and neolithic and early bronze-using people began to make raids on each other, it was necessary that some of the men of each village should specialize on defense and on fighting.[6] *Perhaps whole settlements sometimes found that it was easier to set up as warriors, and let the people around them work for them, than to labor in the fields.*[7] The chiefs and their groups of warriors, no doubt, provided the farmers with "protection" whether they wanted it or not, and in return for that service they took a share of the peasant's crop. The size of that share was fixed by the warriors, since they had the power to fix it and the peasants were helpless.

There is ample evidence that this is no isolated instance. Margaret Murray [8] assures us that in an ancient Egyptian city "the change was due to a hostile invasion." Similarly, in ancient Mesopotamia the Sumerians descended from the east or the northeast upon the "plain of Shinar," conquered the neolithic peasants living there, and founded Ur (possibly the oldest of all cities), Uruk, and other places. "In all probability, of the two races which inhabited together the lower valley the Sumerians were the City dwellers and the non-Sumerians lived in such open and low-lying villages as we found at 'Ubaid.' " [9] In Crete the Aegeans were invaders, probably from Asia Minor; they founded Phaistos and Knossus.

The Greeks, who came to the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor in several waves, founded Athens, Miletus, and many other famed cities; [10] the Romans founded Rome after they had pushed south from the Po Valley. Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos were built after the Phoenicians arrived, apparently from southern

[5] H. G. Creel, *The Birth of China,* New York, 1937, pp. 278–279. The passage quoted refers to the conquest of China by the Shang dynasty (fifth century B.C.). The Shangs were invaders. "Perhaps they were a border people, relatively few in numbers, who established a rule over the ancient Chinese peasantry. They were, it can hardly be doubted, 'bronze-using aristocrats'—rulers, fighters, landlords, and priests, all in one. *The process of their emergence was probably not greatly different from that which produced similar groups in other early centers of urban culture.*" (Turner, *op. cit.,* p. 410. Italics added.)

[6] The present author disagrees only with the assumption that the aggressors were specialized soldiers within the same group. That assumption makes it difficult to explain why only one part of the same group was in possession of metal weapons. In all historically known cases aggressors were foreign invaders.

[7] Italics added.

[8] *Op. cit.*

[9] Woolley, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

[10] "The Greek polis, it must be emphasized, was a product of warfare. Its founders were warriors, organized in clans and tribes, who as an armed minority erected a fortress, from which they exercised power over a peasant population. . . ." (Turner, *op. cit.,* p. 454.)

Arabia; similarly, the Canaanites moved into what is now Palestine from Arabia or Mesopotamia. The list could be extended to show that practically all the early cities whose origin can be traced arose as a result of military invasion and not because of the gradual development of a primitive village. Available historical evidence thus tallies with the founding legends about cities as different and distant from each other as Memphis, Troy, Carthage, Rome, and Tenochtitlán.[11]

While the earliest cities were essentially strongholds from which overlords controlled vanquished peasants, they differed from the medieval castles of feudal lords which served the same purpose. The ancient cities were sovereign political entities whereas most feudal lords owed allegiance (in principle, at least) to a more powerful lord. The terms "city" and "city-state" were initially almost identical. The cities, to be sure, had their rural hinterland, but its inhabitants were mere subjects. (At a much later time the Spartans still considered aliens not only their slaves, or Helots, but also the more mildly treated Metoeci.) As a consequence the city dwellers had a privileged legal position. In Rome the ruling classes were so strictly kept apart from their subjects that a *civis Romanus* was even married by a procedure different from that for "gentiles." Not until almost one thousand years after Rome was founded was it decreed by Caracalla, A.D. 212, that only one law should govern all inhabitants of the empire. Even today the linguistic imprint of the old distinction still remains. We distinguish the full-fledged "citizen" from the "alien," although in most countries the majority of these "citizens" do not live in cities. Similarly, "politics" is derived from "polis," the Greek word for city.

Functional Changes. Political domination of an area was the reason for the birth of the city but not for its continual existence. We have dwelt at some length on this initial stage, for it provides an excellent example of complete functional change.

This change in early cities was due to two quite different factors. Once the political rule of the early city was firmly established, it began to grow and to assume additional functions. When the rulers—or the ruling groups—were reasonably certain that their reign could not be challenged, the army camp became a palatial residence. Invariably, temples were erected for the gods who had bestowed victory on their followers. The palace and the temple needed auxiliary buildings for guards and staffs and for storage. Thus the nucleus of the city population consisted of the entourage of the kings, the clergy, and their staffs. Soon craftsmen were added, who furnished weapons as well as civilian supplies. Once they were able to produce more than the palace and the temple needed, the city became a market, a place where urban products were exchanged for rural commodities.

There were three main types of markets: the local market, the regional

[11] For the latter see Friedrich Ratzel, *Voelkerkunde,* Leipzig, 1888, vol. 3, p. 647.

market to supply a larger area, and the "international" market for trade between countries. International trade existed before the rise of the cities, as evidenced by the "amber route" and the many finds of foreign wares in paleolithic places. But such trade was restricted to goods which could be easily transported over a great distance (amber, precious stones, or small tools). Larger amounts of staple goods could not be exchanged until the development of efficient methods of transportation, for the lack of good roads was a major problem. Shipping, on the other hand, remained the fastest means of transportation until the invention of the railroad in the nineteenth century.

Consequently, shipping centers developed much earlier than other types of trading places. The necessity of obtaining metals from abroad increased the importance of international trade.

As occupational specialization increased, the population of the cities became stratified into an aristocracy—secular and priestly—and its staff, a class of merchants, a class of artisans, and a class of the poor made up of free men without regular means of subsistence, such as army veterans or younger brothers without an inheritance, and farmers within the city eking out a meager living cultivating small lots. At the bottom were the slaves who provided domestic services.

As the cities grew in population, another development produced a much more radical change: the cities, after having subdued the peasants, began to wage war against each other. The result was the eventual disappearance of the independent city-state. Those cities which were conquered lost their main political function; the few dominant city-states which emerged acquired new political power and a changed function. Thus the city-state was replaced by the territorial state. The only country which successfully resisted this trend toward unification was Greece; there the city-states retained their sovereignty, only to lose it to foreign conquerors. In fact, Greece did not become a national state until 1829. But in the Afro-Asian area (the birthplace of the cities) the territorial state arose very early and other countries followed the pattern. We should remember that the greatest empire of all time, finally ruling the larger part of the known world, called itself Rome to the very end, reminding us that the most powerful realm originated as a city-state.

2. The Medieval City

The Dark Ages. The split between the two Romes separated the European East from the West. The former continued as the Byzantine Empire and soon became static. Those of its cities which survived became primarily administrative centers of a highly centralized autocracy; their citizens were demoted to subjects and the towns went into a sleep from which many have never awakened. With the exception of Constantinople, which continued its international trade, the cities decayed and the politically powerless citizens never

became "burghers" (in the sense of the urbanites of the western half of Europe). They remained public servants, artisans, shopkeepers, and poverty-stricken beggars.

The rise of Islam created another cleavage among the areas bordering the Mediterranean. After an initial splendid period in which Saracen cities by far surpassed the Christian urban settlements, the Oriental world, with its intense dislike of trade, decayed and its cities lost their significance. The citizenry had even fewer commercial opportunities than those of Byzantine cities, for in the Near East commerce was largely carried on by Greek, Armenian, and Jewish "foreigners" who could not participate in communal affairs.[12]

Meanwhile the Western world had witnessed the disintegration of Rome and the birth of feudalism. The peoples of the "Great Migration" came mostly from preurban cultures. Incapable of following the Roman patterns, they destroyed the urban civilization and replaced it with feudalism, which was essentially agrarian in organization. Unlike the ancient conquerors, the medieval invaders did not found city-states. They did not build cities but wrecked them and, instead, erected castles, widely scattered over rural areas. Thus they kept the peasantry under their sway. Three hundred years after the fall of Rome, the realm of Charlemagne—the only great medieval empire —had no capital and the emperor no permanent residence. The cities of old which were not completely destroyed shrank into insignificance. In Carolingian times Rome, which once had harbored nearly a million people,[13] had declined to less than 20,000 inhabitants. Some cities, e.g., Vienna, even disappear from historical records for several hundred years. Another indication that the cities had become almost completely insignificant is that since medieval times we have referred to a political entity as a "country," a word which also denotes a rural area.

Urban Recovery. With the waning of the Dark Ages the cities rose again. While some of ancient fame had disappeared and others failed to regain their old importance, many new cities emerged, especially in central and Eastern Europe. The reasons were quite similar to those which made the cities of antiquity grow: crafts and trade became more and more important.

The trend toward urbanization showed considerable regional variations. In what is now Russia, Kiev apparently grew out of a rural settlement which a Slav prince, Kij, transformed into a fortress. Novgorod (which means "new town") seems to have been founded as a trade center on the old commercial route from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The origin of Moscow, which is mentioned for the first time in 1147, is more obscure. Since it was not fortified

[12] For lack of space the somewhat different development in the Far East and in India cannot be discussed here; some of these Oriental cities were magnificent but scarcely influenced the urban patterns of the modern world.

[13] The estimates of various authors differ greatly; the lowest figure is 250,000.

until 1156, it may have started as a trading station on the Baltic–Black Sea route. Other urban settlements arose in Vladimir, Rostov, and Suzdal. Almost three hundred years before Moscow is mentioned by the chroniclers, the Scandinavian Varangers, who combined war, trade, and piracy, had seized Kiev and Novgorod. Again the political importance of the early city became obvious. A handful of adventurers gained ascendancy over a whole countryside simply by capturing two cities. Their head, Rurik, finally founded the first "Russian" dynasty. But then came the Tartars (1228), and urban life, which had scarcely begun, was again on the wane.

In the rest of Eastern Europe the situation was only slightly more favorable for urbanization. Raids and invasions from Avars, Magyars, Mongols, and later Turks made trading precarious; the rural Slavs showed so little inclination for commerce that the feudal rulers invited foreigners to set up trade. Some commercial towns were founded by immigrants from Western Europe, and even up to the Second World War the cities of the East had a large population of Germans and Jews from Western Europe. Even so, the urban settlements in the East grew slowly.

In the West the cities gained in numbers, population, and influence more rapidly than in Eastern Europe but found themselves involved in the struggle between the kings and their feudal lords. As a result, there were variations in the rate and type of urbanization from country to country.

In Italy the history of ancient Greece repeated itself. No single ruler was strong enough to unify Italy; in the absence of a strong territorial power the city-states came to life again, one of the more fascinating phenomena of medieval history. Byzantium, the popes, the German emperors, the Saracens, the Normans, France, Spain—each tried to conquer all of Italy. All failed, and since no central power prevailed, many cities became their own masters. One of them—Venice—finally emerged as a world power, and her dominance lasted for eleven hundred years. Not all the cities became legally independent, but the lack of a national authority, the necessity that each city maintain its own armies, and the power to grant or withhold aid in the incessant wars gave each of them power far in excess of their numerical strength and, usually, a large degree of autonomy as well. Cities multiplied—the number of urban places in this comparatively small country is amazing—and, despite internal strife, continuous warfare, brutal persecution of defeated factions, and repeated sacking and burning, they flourished and produced one of the great civilizations of all time.

In Germany, too, a central power failed to develop until relatively recently, but petty rulers succeeded in establishing smaller principalities. Some cities, however, gained great independence and assumed the position of at least semisovereign city-states. Cologne, Treves, and Mainz—ruled by princes of the Church—were among the seven electors who chose the emperor. The

members from the Hanseatic League and Frankfurt became distinct political units. A somewhat similar development occurred in the Lowlands, where some of the cities gained considerable power (Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, and others).

In the remaining parts of Europe the cities grew in number, population, and importance but their political influence was limited (with the major exception of London). While the other British cities profited little from the struggle between the king and his barons, London early gained so much power that—a very rare occurrence in early feudal times—the king had to negotiate with the much-despised merchants of the City. London was a party to the pact known as Magna Carta. That the proud traders considered themselves peers of the aristocracy is symbolized by the fact that, from the fourteenth century on, the mayor of London assumed the title of "Lord." The title still survives although the political privileges are gone and even the political power has waned.

Urban Conditions. Medieval Occidental cities, so unlike in many other respects, had one common feature: the "citizens" were free. They were neither serfs nor slaves, an exceptional condition in a world where the large majority of the population were kept in some form of bondage. On the other hand, liberty, even freedom of movement, was still restricted. Political rights were few, and in many countries the urban population had to be content with some precarious kind of local autonomy. Realization of the importance of trade grew steadily. For the most part this resulted only in the granting of certain nonpolitical privileges, usually bestowed on individual cities, and then not on all of them. Nevertheless, cities lacked real political power and the dynasties did their best to curtail the existing rights of cities.

In medieval times the cities had a system of stratification which differed greatly from current social structures. In many but not all cities the upper group consisted of an urbanized aristocracy, frequently titled. Those noblemen spent at least a part of the year in town and left the supervision of their estates to their stewards. The second stratum—or in the absence of the noblemen, the first—consisted of the merchants. Next came the craftsmen, the members of the guilds. Next lower in rank were the journeymen while servants, peddlers, and landless beggars without fixed occupations were at the very bottom of the class system. Political rights were never extended to the last two groups. There was an almost incessant struggle for power among the three upper groups.

The stratification of occupational roles in Florence may serve as an illustration. First in order of importance were the *nobili,* the "old" aristocracy, who ruled over the city until 1282, when the people deprived them of all political rights. The second class was called *arti maggiori* and consisted of the judges, notaries, bankers, merchants, clothmakers, and furriers. The third

class was called *arti minori* and comprised dyers, wool combers, washermen, smiths, and gem cutters. The master craftsmen within this class went by the name of *popolani nobili* while the journeymen were called *minori artifici*. Those of lower status had neither formal legal rights nor even a class name.

3. The City in Modern Times

From Feudalism to the Industrial Revolution. Towns and cities continued to grow and their composition changed considerably. In the first place, both the professions and the crafts became much more differentiated. Second, administrative advances led to the need for personnel with specialized functions, bureaucratic groups thus made their appearance. Finally the Protestant countries faced a new problem after the Reformation: the monasteries and nunneries which had served as a refuge for the unemployed and unemployable had disappeared, and masses of illiterate, unskilled, and destitute people filled the cities which were threatened by the thronging masses. On the other hand, members of the upper urban groups became increasingly aware that their activities contributed much to the growing wealth of the country but that an idle aristocracy dissipated this wealth in a vicious way. Although the *bourgeoisie* was frequently more intelligent and better educated than the arrogant noblemen, members of the aristocracy occupied all major political offices and their children were privileged to receive military commissions.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century revolutionary changes took place. The French Revolution broke the political monopoly of king and aristocracy, although more than one hundred years elapsed before the *bourgeoisie* became completely dominant.

The Industrial Revolution, which despite its name was a gradual process, led to the solution of one set of problems but created another one. The tremendous increase in production gave jobs to many who had been unemployable before. The "mob" disappeared as the real industrial proletariat, slowly becoming class-conscious, emerged. The workers began to outnumber the rest of the urban population but remained disenfranchised and unprotected. The miserable working conditions transformed large areas into dismal slums, a process aggravated by speculators who hastily erected cheap, ugly, and unsanitary tenement houses.

Since industrialization largely destroyed the old crafts, the bankrupt artisans had to join the ranks of the proletariat. It was a long time before the process was arrested and partly reversed. Newly arising services have permitted a limited number of workers to become independent proprietors of garages, filling stations, repair shops, diners, tourist cabins, and similar establishments. Professional sports have provided additional occupational opportunities for some who might otherwise be working in factories.

While this process is still in a state of flux, certain changes are quite definite. Here are, in brief, some of the main features of the city which have been altered:

1. To the already existing types of cities another has been added: the industrial city which is a child of the nineteenth century.

2. The fortress city, which sheltered a restricted number of people behind its walls while the rural area was ravaged, has gone. The protection of a privileged settlement crumbled with the walls. Modern fortifications aim at the defense of a whole country and not of just one city.

3. Both the political privileges of cities and the political discrimination against them have been abolished. City and country have the same political rights. Political privileges within the city are similarly a thing of the past. Despite occasional gerrymandering, universal suffrage has ended the hegemony of any upper class.

4. Politically, cities are now only administrative centers with local autonomy. Their actual political influence depends on the composition of the entire nation, particularly on the extent of urbanization.

5. The class structure of the modern city is no longer based on legal distinctions. Legal equality coexisting with differences in group prestige, status, and economic conditions causes tensions formerly unknown.

The nobility which formed the upper stratum both in antiquity and in the Middle Ages has died out and with it the aristocratic forms of urban life (palaces, private parks, large staffs of servants). But the mob, or the subproletariat, also has shrunk to insignificance. The modern industrial worker is relatively well educated and conscious of the dignity and value of his work. Crime and vice, though teeming in the cities, are no longer the concomitant of a social class.

Soviet Patterns. As far as a person outside the Russian orbit can judge, the Soviet city does not differ from the patterns discussed above. The Russian city has a historical and cultural background identical with other countries. The Russian cities emerged at a very late date—perhaps four thousand years after the first European urban settlement in Crete—but not much later than the first towns in East Germany. In general, Russia has followed Western patterns at a slower pace. Before the advent of Communism, industry was still in its infancy and a sizable class of true "bourgeois" industrialists had not materialized. The Russian cities before the Revolution were similar to those of Western Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with businessmen sparsely represented in the middle and upper classes. The nationalization of all enterprises thus had less effect than a similar step would have had in the West. The accelerated industrialization under Communism has increased the number of factory workers as well as the number of office employees and managerial personnel. As a result there is at present no basic difference between Russian and Western cities with the exception that those

in Russia have no proprietors of business. The latter group, however, is numerically small even in countries with private enterprise. There is general agreement that class differences in Russia have not disappeared. Russia, too, has political and administrative leaders, professional men, a managerial group, office workers of all types, and a highly stratified class of laborers in industry.

Even in America salaries and wages make up approximately 70 per cent of the national income; the income of farmers hovers around 20 per cent. This leaves only 10 per cent for business and professional men, and even the total elimination of both groups could not effect an essential change of the urban framework. This explains why there is no fundamental occupational difference between urban life in Russia and elsewhere.

The American City. The American city was never burdened with the cumbersome heritage of feudal times. The American settlers moved into a country largely uninhabited; the Indians were partly in the hunting stage, partly in that of crude agriculture. Urban settlements did not exist.

The reason for the founding of most American cities was (with a few irrelevant exceptions) invariably economic. American cities are, and always have been, concentrations of business activities. None was built primarily for defense or attack.[14] There has never been a tendency toward the rise of a city-state, nor has there ever been a differentiation of political rights for urban and rural areas. Even in early colonial times the rule of the king was not strong enough to form a substantial political, military, or bureaucratic class above the traders. Until the disappearance of the frontier the country did not produce a substantial rural population surplus to flood the cities. Perhaps of greater importance, America has never had a peasant class, with its tradition of serfdom. The rural population of America was made up of farmers of the same ancestry and background as that of their town-dwelling kin. The absence of a titled nobility, the very late appearance of a sizable bureaucracy, and the absence of trade guilds simplified the patterns of the American city.

But with the growth of the United States problems arose which are either unknown or of little significance in Europe. These problems (which will be discussed later on) stem from three main sources. One was the introduction of slavery, followed some centuries later by the emancipation of the Negro. Although he finally gained freedom and legal equality, he has not yet been satisfactorily integrated into the social life.

The second problem comes from large, unselective immigrations which have changed the composition of the urban population and brought foreign groups —not individuals—into this country. The culture, education and traditions, religious and moral values of these groups do not always conform to the standards established by the early colonists. Since most of the immigrants

[14] The few early "forts" were actually trading posts with precarious protection against Indian raiders.

who came after the War between the States went to cities rather than farms, the change created a contrast between country and city which did not exist before.

The third source of difficulties arises from the closing of the frontier, in conjunction with an almost unbelievably rapid growth of the city. The cities have grown at a faster pace than has the technical ability to provide satisfactory living conditions. The only adequate method of coping with this difficult task has been large-scale standardization and simplification which has made American cities so similar that it is scarcely possible to distinguish one main street from another.

Just as America knows no nobility and no peasantry, it also knows no proletariat in the European sense. In fact, the term is hardly used. Factory workers and farmers do not differ essentially in their life style, habits, or outlook on life from the urban middle classes. Even the differences in income are small, sometimes nonexistent. Perfect equality, to be sure, does not exist in America or elsewhere. But a distinct tendency toward equalization is unmistakable, perhaps more so to the observer who comes from abroad than to the native-born American, who suffers from having to keep up with the Joneses.

Part III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Chapter 3

THE PATTERNS OF TWO WORLD CITIES

1. Manhattan, New York

Origin and Growth. In 1609 Henry Hudson, a Britisher in the service of the Dutch, discovered by chance the estuary of the river which now bears his name. He realized that the area offered excellent opportunities for a port and a trading station. His report motivated the Dutch West India Company to found a settlement at the southern tip of Manhattan (1612). It was named New Netherlands, later New Amsterdam. It was a very small place, extending from what is now Bowling Green to Wall Street. The administration was in the hands of "governors." In 1626 Governor Peter Minuit bought the entire island from the Indians for $24 and an equal amount in trinkets.

In 1664 the Duke of York wrested the town from the Dutch. The name was duly changed to New York and the British ruled it until the end of the Revolutionary War, except for one year when the Dutch again took over.

The early inhabitants seemed to have prospered financially but the population increased very slowly. When New York came under British rule, the population was not more than 1,500,[1] increasing to 2,500 by 1673. One hundred years later the population had climbed to 22,000 and the city extended to the vicinity of Grand Street. It had become an important place and the First Congress of the United States convened there in 1789. When the census of 1790 was taken, the population of New York had risen to 33,130. In 1820, when London had already passed the million mark, New York harbored no more than 123,000 persons.[2] The real upsurge came in the following fifty years. In 1870 the population numbered 1,478,100. In 1950 the population of Manhattan had climbed to 1,936,540. It is now the most densely populated place in America; the density amounts to 88,025 persons per square mile as compared with "only" 25,000 persons per square mile for New York City as a whole. As the U.S. Bureau of the Census remarks, this gives to each resident a share of 320 square feet, or the square surface of a living room 16 by 20 feet.

[1] Although not meeting the statistical requirements for a town, it already was a distinctly urban settlement.

[2] Compare the population figures by boroughs (Table 1).

Location. New York owes its importance to a combination of fortunate geographical factors. Halfway between Boston and Washington, it dominates the northern part of the Atlantic shore. In contrast to other Atlantic ports, an almost unobstructed hinterland makes it accessible to the Great Lakes.

Table 1. Population Growth of New York

Year	Manhattan	Bronx	Brooklyn	Queens	Richmond	Totals
1790	33,131	1,761	4,495	6,159	3,835	49,491
1800	60,515	1,755	5,740	6,642	4,564	79,216
1810	96,373	2,267	8,303	7,444	5,347	119,734
1820	123,706	2,782	11,187	8,246	6,135	152,056
1830	202,589	3,023	20,535	9,049	7,082	242,278
1840	312,710	5,346	47,613	14,480	10,965	391,114
1850	515,547	8,032	138,882	18,593	15,061	696,115
1860	813,669	23,593	279,122	32,903	25,492	1,174,779
1870	942,292	37,393	419,921	45,468	33,029	1,478,103
1880	1,164,673	51,980	599,495	56,559	38,991	1,911,698
1890	1,441,216	88,908	838,547	87,050	51,693	2,507,414
1900	1,850,093	200,507	1,166,582	152,999	67,021	3,437,202
1910	2,331,542	430,980	1,634,351	284,041	85,969	4,766,883
1920	2,284,103	732,016	2,018,356	469,042	116,531	5,620,048
1930	1,867,312	1,265,258	2,560,401	1,079,129	158,346	6,930,446
1940	1,889,924	1,394,711	2,698,285	1,297,634	174,441	7,454,995
1950	1,960,101	1,451,277	2,738,175	1,550,849	191,555	7,891,957

Source: United States Census, 1950.

The port is one of the best in the world. Sheltered from the ocean, hundreds of ships can dock at the same time. The Hudson River is navigable by seagoing vessels for many miles beyond the city limits and the world's largest liners dock in mid-town New York.

Manhattan is an island shaped in the form of an irregular triangle. It is surrounded by the Upper Bay to the south, the East River (which despite its name is part of the ocean) to the east, the Hudson to the west, and the Harlem River connecting the Hudson with the East River to the north. Today twenty bridges, seventeen ferries, and twenty underwater tunnels link Manhattan with the mainland and surrounding islands.

The area comprises 22.2 square miles; this is an extremely small space for a big city and leaves no room for expansion. When the island became too crowded to house all who worked on it, the surplus population had to look for "bedroom" towns. This is an unusual situation, for most American cities have no practical limit to their spatial growth. Not only is the island small; it is also extremely narrow—its greatest width is 2.3 miles, its length

13.4 miles. This makes it appear like a very long but small sack (bulging at 14th Street, where it is widest).

The island—apart from a few hilly spots—is almost flat, slowly rising from sea level. It consists of solid rock, which has both advantages and disadvantages. The rocky foundation—in contrast to the sandy or marshy ground of most shore cities—makes building safe and it is possible to erect skyscrapers only a few feet away from the Atlantic. But explosives have to be used for all underground work, which makes the construction of subways and subterranean passages an expensive enterprise limited to minimum essentials.

The longitudinal trend has been artificially accentuated by the location of Central Park, which separates the east and west sides of the city and restricts cross-town travel. The main business sections are located in the southern part of the island, while most of the residential sections are generally north of 60th Street. This saddles Manhattan with an unequaled transportation problem. In the morning almost a million people (not counting those who live elsewhere) have to travel in the same direction to a concentrated area and in the evening the process is reversed. This unparalleled traffic flows through a few avenues and is mainly served by three subway lines. A ten-car subway train can transport 1,000 persons, but because 25,000 people work in a single large skyscraper, twenty-five trains are needed for those who work in one building. From this it can be seen that the layout of Manhattan is exceptional rather than typical. If the geographical position and the facilities for a world port were less advantageous, the old Dutch trading post might never have become the core of the largest settlement of men.

Downtown Manhattan: Shipping Center, Financial District, Syrian Quarter, Civic Center. From what we can learn from old etchings, Manhattan once looked very much like any Old World town on the seashore. But the city has been thoroughly transformed. The New Yorkers of the last century had little regard for their past. Unlike Boston, Manhattan is no shrine city and has very few venerable landmarks. Nothing is left from the Dutch era and all that survives from colonial times is St. Paul's Chapel, the cemetery of Trinity Church, Fraunces Tavern, and a tiny Jewish cemetery.

Only the southern part of Manhattan still has the narrow streets which seemingly grew without a plan. As in old times, all streets have names. But soon the maze is replaced by a strict geometrical order: a huge rectangle, divided like a checkerboard into equal blocks. All thoroughfares from north to south are called "avenues," those from east to west "streets." Avenues and streets are given numerical designations, though later most avenues (for no discernible reason) take on names again. Broadway, the longest street in the world, stretches north from the Battery to the city line (and beyond). Slightly askew, it does not run parallel to the avenues but crosses most of them. The numbers on avenues start at the southern end; street numbers

begin on both sides of Fifth Avenue, which is the dividing line between the "West" and "East" side of the same street. The regularity of the system and the simplicity of numbered streets make orientation very easy but permit few variations. Most city blocks look like reproductions of a single model.

Generally speaking, people work in the area from South Ferry to 60th Street and live north of it. But there are exceptions, as in the southern parts where some of the older residential sections still survive. The enormous size of the residential area makes it impossible to ban all business from it. Convenience stores, warehouses, garages, and even offices are found closer to living quarters than in smaller American cities. The American main street has as a rule only one-storied shops or office buildings, but no apartments. Manhattan's main street, Broadway, is too long; offices 10 miles or more from the downtown area are not wanted. But land values and taxes are so high that the rent from stores alone is insufficient without additional rental income. Thus, beginning about 65th Street, Broadway is lined with buildings which have stores on the ground floors and apartments above. This mixture is very exceptional and contrary to American standards, but the lack of space is so great that the apartments from 72d to 116th Streets command rather high rentals.

The southernmost and oldest section of the city is divided into several visibly different parts. The first is devoted to shipping and all its ramifications. South Ferry is the natural center from which the piers branch off into the Hudson and the East Rivers. The area between Whitehall Street, Broadway, and West Street is filled with offices of shipping lines, forwarders, import and export firms, and related establishments. To the east—in approximately the very small triangle of Cedar Street, Pearl Street, and Broadway—we find the concentration of economic power, the financial district. The part of Wall Street which belongs to it is exactly three blocks long. Abruptly the palaces of wealth give way to dismal, dilapidated buildings leading to the Fulton Fish Market on the East River. This is not exceptional. Lombard Street, London, which once controlled the wealth of the world and still is the second most important financial center, is equally short. Besides banks, brokers, and the Stock Exchange, there are several other exchanges, the United States Subtreasury Building, the offices of corporation lawyers, as well as the branches of many insurance companies (mostly in Nassau Street). One block north of the district is Maiden Lane, where dealers in diamonds and precious stones once did their business. It is said that the police used to shoot at sight any stranger entering the district. Times are less turbulent now and the peace is hardly ever disturbed. Across Broadway, Maiden Lane changes its name to Cortlandt Street and its function to a center for radios and other electrical appliances. Back to the south, St. Paul's Chapel, the oldest church, built in 1764, the rebuilt Trinity Church, with its venerable graveyard, look oddlv out of place and remind us of the time when the

"gentry" still lived there and the people of New York were mainly Anglican. In the background the American Stock Exchange has a more modest building where lesser stocks are traded. The rest of the area is the "Lower West Side," an example of an irrational combination of business and residential sections. From the Battery to Canal Street the Hudson piers serve as a "break of transportation" for unloading perishable consumer goods, fruits, vegetables, butter, and eggs. All those who deal in these commodities and the longshoremen who unload the goods concentrate here, but for no discernible reason the shops which sell fireworks are also in this district, which in addition has a shoe jobbing center and a wholesale textile market. Squeezed between Broadway and West Street is the Syrian Quarter, which includes Turks, Armenians, and Greeks. The touch of the Levant is accentuated by stores which cater to the taste of eastern Mediterranean people. As might be expected, the whole Lower West Side is a slum in urgent need of rehabilitation.

The scene changes quickly if we turn eastward. Once more crossing Broadway, we reach the Civic Center, stretching from Park Place to Worth Street, filled with a score of public buildings: City Hall, the Municipal Building, New York State and United States government offices, city, state, and Federal courts, and the police headquarters. The latter also built a jail there, the Tombs. The adjacent less dignified streets are lined with offices of firms furnishing bail for those who have been arrested and of lawyers who specialize in police cases.

The area described approximately coincides with New York as it existed at the time of the Declaration of Independence. Today it represents a strange antithesis of splendor and squalor. The residences of wealthy merchants have given way to dilapidated, dismal "apartment houses." The once modest offices of the Dutch and British merchants have been replaced by the world's tallest and most luxurious buildings. The rent for one floor in a Wall Street skyscraper is higher than the combined total income of tenants living in a building in the Syrian Quarter.

The financial district is the birthplace of the skyscraper in New York. The need for office space and the excessively high land value suggested the erection of taller buildings; the underlying granite assured the builders of the prerequisite solid foundation. This combination led to the emergence of one of America's most original contributions, the only new architecture in almost one hundred years, a triumphant combination of art and function. It seems odd that the country of the "wide, open spaces" should suffer so from lack of room that it had to build vertically rather than horizontally. Although skyscrapers have been called with some justification "the new Gothic," the American character of the style is unmistakable. With a few exceptions the style did not spread abroad for several reasons. The Old World cities have slowed in their growth and the period between the two world wars found business shrinking rather than expanding. A more decisive reason was the high cost

since skyscrapers need excavations and expensive building materials. Poorer countries cannot afford the resultant high rents; even most American businessmen are unable to maintain such costly offices. For these reasons there are limited opportunities for skyscrapers. New York has two skyscraper areas: the financial center and the mid-town district from 34th Street to 59th Street. Some large American cities have only a few or no skyscrapers (Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington); while smaller cities have none.

Bowery, Chinatown, Little Italy, Lower East Side, Greenwich Village. Nothing better illustrates the extremes so characteristic of city life than the proximity of pride and shame—the magnificence of the Civic Center and misery of its neighbor, the Bowery. A combination of adverse circumstances created this extremely squalid area. Two noisy thoroughfares carry enormous cross-town traffic over the Brooklyn and Manhattan bridges. Two still noisier elevated lines ran day and night, although one is now gone and the second is to be demolished. They converged on Chatham Square, which is overshadowed by a fantastic maze, the iron structure supporting the "els." Even the poorest fled and left the place to those beyond hope of recovery. Chatham Square, the entrance to the Bowery, is reached from the City Hall by Park Row. This dingy, dark street specializes in novelties and the less artistic but noisier kinds of musical instruments; it also harbors some pawnshops and cheap lodginghouses. The Bowery stretches from Chatham Square for fourteen blocks to its end at East 4th Street (where it continues as Third Avenue). The Bowery is not a typical slum since no families live there; it is the haunt of men without homes, without friends, and without work. Destitute, mostly too old for regular jobs, diseased, chronic alcoholics or drug addicts, these people offer little hope for rehabilitation. The police have solved one problem: the Bowery is no longer the gathering place of brutal criminals, although fences, petty thieves, and similar offenders still meet there with the beggar, the tramp, the homeless, and the feeble-minded. More than 10,000 are arrested yearly for drunkenness. The city is planning to set up a rehabilitation center at Hart Island but it is difficult to keep vagrants in institutions, and there is great doubt that the majority of them can ever return to normal life. The Bowery is lined with saloons. Flophouses offer sleeping facilities for a few cents, but many men prefer to spend the little money which they have begged from passers-by on liquor and to sleep in doorways under the el or even in the gutter. There are also some missions whose doors are mercifully open all night so that at least a few find shelter there. The costs of policing the area, of maintaining jails, of property destruction by alcoholics, and of deterioration of land values in the adjacent areas amount to many millions yearly.

Chinatown is bounded by a small triangle bordered by the Bowery, the Civic Center, and Canal Street. Here in a few blocks 12,000 Chinese live,

crowded into small rooms from the basement to the roof. Possible rebuilding of the area meets with heavy resistance because the picturesque scenery attracts many sight-seers who patronize the numerous restaurants and the shops, which sell ivory Buddhas and similar souvenirs. Chinese motion-picture houses, churches and clubs, and billboards in Chinese give the impression of an Oriental town. This is mostly a façade; not all the Chinese in New York live there and the majority are much more Americanized than some other cultural groups. The feuds among the Chinese tongs, once rampant, are over, and the community is fairly well integrated.

Crossing Canal Street we enter Little Italy. The Italians, though many of them live in other sections, concentrate in three areas of Manhattan; one is the Italian part of Harlem, the second, Greenwich Village, and the third and most interesting, Little Italy just north of Chinatown. Its main thoroughfare is Mulberry Street, the majority of whose residents were born in Italy while the rest are second-generation Italians. Again the area is small and crowded: a rectangle formed by Canal Street, the Bowery, Spring Street, and Centre Street. Businesses and residences are not separated. The homes look dingy, but anyone familiar with living conditions in Italy is aware that the housing facilities are better than those which these people had in their homeland (to say nothing of the household equipment—refrigeration, running water, etc.—of which they had none). This reveals a major urban problem in New York City. Immigrants live in housing which, according to American standards, is below the permissible level and thus the neighborhood deteriorates. But these quarters are still highly superior to those existing in the home country of the immigrants, who thus enjoy living conditions which seem to Americans unbearable. Moreover, as the immigrant is poorly paid, he cannot afford to live in more satisfactory but more expensive quarters. The result is the emergence of slums.

Little Italy displays, in spite of its squalor, an undeniable charm. Colorful shops—groceries with a picturesque array of fruits, vegetables, and sausages; cheese stores, showing an infinite variety of delicious dairy products; inviting cafés, attractively decorated restaurants, bookstores, barbershops, and candy stores animate the scenery and mitigate the drab look of the buildings. There are many festivities, the greatest being in honor of St. Gennaro, the patron saint of Naples. For a typical *festa* the streets are closed to traffic; there are processions, masses, and prayers. At night the illuminated streets transform the entire district into one huge social gathering. Mulberry Street is lined with open-air stands selling all kinds of Italian food to be eaten on the spot; bands play on estrades; merry-go-rounds mounted on trucks change the place into an Americanized version of an Old World fair. Life seems easy and problems are nonexistent.

This genuine gaiety masks the fact that the area is characterized by such

symptoms of urban disorganization as destitution, family disorganization, and a high crime rate. It should be recognized, however, that the palliatives of city planning, slum clearance, and the provision of material facilities would not solve the problem, since they might well destroy the coherence of the existing community without effective integration into the larger American community. Until immigrant groups are willing to blend with the dominant cultural ethos—and, of equal or greater importance, until they are accepted without discrimination—they can be expected to be, at the best, well-housed marginal people.

This point is further illustrated when we cross the Bowery and enter a quarter where we find squalor without glamour: the Lower East Side. It comprises an area of 2 square miles; the approaches to the Brooklyn Bridge, the Bowery, Third Avenue, 14th Street, and the East River form its boundaries. For more than one hundred years this district has housed the poorest immigrants, those who were most unwelcome, thoroughly neglected, and for the most part left to their own devices. For a long time destitute Irish immigrants, coming to this country during and after the time of the potato famine, formed the bulk of the population. After the mass exodus from Ireland had stopped, after the initial discrimination against the Irish had ended, and the newcomers had obtained more remunerative positions, they moved to better sections. This was at the time when Eastern European Jews were fleeing from the pogroms to America. Since then the Lower East Side has been preponderantly but not exclusively Jewish. A sizable number of Italians and Spaniards now live there and not all the Irish have left.

These poverty-stricken Eastern Jews pose a problem different from that of other cultural groups living in slum conditions. Since his religion demands daily reading and interpretation of the Bible, the Orthodox Jew, however destitute, is literate and has a high regard for education. Even if he had only a poor formal training, he tries to give his children the best possible education. Consequently, the children are better prepared to obtain more advantageous positions and move out of the slums. Since the immigration of Eastern Jews virtually stopped in 1914 and is not likely to be resumed on a large scale, it is safe to predict that the Lower East Side will cease to be a ghetto in the not too distant future.

On the other hand, a complete integration of the remaining Orthodox Jews can hardly be expected. The resistance of established American groups is too strong to permit full acceptance. Equally strong is the opposition of the Orthodox Jews toward making the necessary adjustments. Their ritual, which applies to almost everything in daily life, dietary rules which prevent commensality, religious objections to mixed marriages (which, to be sure, are mutual), the observance of the Sabbath, and extreme conservatism create different cultural traits which raise a very effective barrier. This situation will

not change before the older generations have passed away. This is one of the best illustrations of the strong influence which religion exerts on nonreligious fields.

These immigrants, who were neither expected nor willing to achieve complete integration, were faced with a problem of accommodation which they solved for themselves by radical isolation. They lived in their segregated quarters, spoke their own language, read their own newspapers, formed their own clubs, and frequented their own recreation facilities. They patronized their own stores, which in turn bought mainly from their own jobbers and middlemen. They seldom found jobs outside the fur and garment business and thus had only Jewish employers. The self-employed usually had their small shops near their homes. They had only casual contacts with the gentile world; the area was less attractive to visitors than other foreign quarters and so they were left to themselves. They did not compete socially for prestige and therefore did not suffer from overt discrimination. If they encountered unfriendly attitudes, they remembered that their situation in Russia, Poland, and Rumania had been worse. The main problem was poverty, unemployment, and their concomitants: undernourishment, disease, and poor housing conditions. They found consolation in prayer and conscientious observance of their ritual obligations which, they believed, would bring their due reward. Although they suffered economically, their community relationships were good, their family life was exemplary, and divorces, suicide, and alcoholism were practically nonexistent.

With the second and third generation the situation changed. The children went to American schools, became acquainted with American institutions, read English books and newspapers, and had more contacts with the outer world. They became critical of the orthodoxy of their parents but they were unwilling to abandon completely their traditional and cultural heritage. In moving up the social ladder and out of their segregated area they encountered resistance, discrimination, and hostility. Since their faith had begun to waver, they no longer found comfort and compensation in religion. Rapid secularization usually results in the questioning of mundane social justice and the challenging of the existing social order. The individual in transition becomes personally insecure, since he has rejected the values of his childhood and is not completely accepted by those with whom he identifies himself.

In some instances the people from the Lower East Side find a constructive solution: philanthropy, arts, and sciences give an opportunity in a creative way to compensate for suffering. The children of the Lower East Side contributed to these fields far more than their proportionate share. However, such sublimation has been attained by only a small minority. Others have become more or less personally disorganized. The Lower East Side has furnished a sizable number of criminals. Others, incapable of making suitable

adjustments to a difficult situation, fail in their private lives. They become inmates of mental institutions or live on the fringe of insanity; their suicide and divorce rates are extremely high.[3]

Still others feel the need to take an active hand in changing the world. Whatever field they select, they become radicals: Marxists, nationalists, internationalists, innovators of artistic styles or scientific theories. They project their own unrest on the outside world. This frequently complicates the problems of minority groups. Because the radical activities of these extremists are more conspicuous than the constructive efforts of the majority of the group, the already existing suspicion and resentment toward the whole minority group are increased.

The problem of the older generations of the Lower East Side poses in the long run fewer difficulties than in many other slums. Poverty has been fought by social legislation, by unions which have done an excellent job in the garment industry, and by philanthropic institutions which take care of the sick and aged. The rise of social work in America is closely connected with the Lower East Side, where settlement houses, boys' clubs, and other group work agencies are numerous.

Housing projects have alleviated one aspect of the problem. Governor Smith, Vladeck, Lillian Wald, and Jacob Riis Houses, Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village have rehabilitated large parts of the area and the composition of the population has partly changed. The process has been accelerated by an exodus of residents. The area which once harbored more than 500,000 people lost 250,000 from 1920 to 1930.

The problems of the younger generations are much more difficult to solve. The solution lies not in rehabilitation of an area but in a nation-wide reorientation of attitudes. This discussion has been intended to demonstrate that not only each slum but each generation of slum residents has different problems and that slum clearance means more than the establishment of sanitary living conditions.

The last distinct section south of 14th Street is Greenwich Village. Actually it consists of three rather different parts. One, with Bleecker Street as its main thoroughfare, bordering Little Italy, is another Italian settlement. At the opposite end, on both sides of Fifth Avenue, which begins at Washington Square, we find one of the most exclusive and expensive residential sections, where some of the established old upper-class families still live. This is not the only instance of a high-class residential section being boxed in by slum areas. Other examples are Stuyvesant Square (between First and Second Avenues, East 15th and 17th Streets), Gramercy Park, a few blocks to the northwest, Tudor City (East 42d Street and First Avenue), Beekman Place

[3] There are no statistics as to the religious affiliation of the insane, the divorced, and the suicides in America. The statement is based on newspaper reports, communications by lawyers, physicians, and other observers. Compare also Durkheim's study on suicide.

(First Avenue and East 51st to 53d Streets), Sutton Place, on the approaches to Queensboro Bridge, and the East River section around Carl Schurz Park. This also indicates that destitute neighborhoods do not necessarily cause deterioration of an adjacent section, since these "luxury apartment" areas have actually pushed back the surrounding slums in some cases. The social distinction, which (sometimes snobbishly) is ascribed to a neighborhood, is the determining factor.

The third part of Greenwich Village poses as a Bohemian quarter, although many artists and writers who once lived there have left. The reputation which still clings to the district has been put to commercial use. On the main street of this "Bohemia"—West 8th Street—we find many stores selling art supplies, jewelry, pottery, and other works of applied art. Artists of sometimes dubious merit try to sell their paintings in open-air shows. The major business attractions are the numerous night clubs, cabarets, and restaurants, which attract many customers whose nightly noisy behavior is a characteristic of this district.

We have reached 14th Street, the northern boundary of downtown Manhattan. Once the main business street of New York, where the leading retail firms had their stores, it now caters to low-income groups.

Mid-town Manhattan. This area consists of several business and residential sections. Broadway and Fifth Avenue are mainly stores and offices; other avenues are mixed. The main business area is situated between Fourth Avenue (Park Avenue above 42d Street) and Seventh Avenue, thus separating the East and West Side residential sections of various types. The business district starts at Union Square (at East 14th Street and Broadway), with retail stores at 14th Street, and continues with diversified office buildings to Madison Square at East 23d Street, where the fur and the garment center begins. The latter continues to the Times Square district at West 42d Street and Broadway. The wholesale flower market is located between West 26th and 28th Streets on the Avenue of the Americas (formerly Sixth Avenue). From 34th to 59th Streets Fifth Avenue becomes the shopping center for the well-to-do, where jewelers, dressmakers, milliners, and others display their merchandise. Madison Avenue follows suit, while the lower part of Fourth Avenue specializes in secondhand bookstores.

Broadway and its side streets from West 34th to 50th Streets are the amusement center of New York; its heart is at Times Square, where a concentration of neon lights literally blinds the visitor. Almost all legitimate theaters are found here, in addition to numerous motion-picture houses, shooting galleries, and a variety of less attractive amusements. Fittingly, the motion-picture distributors have their offices at the film center on West 44th Street and Ninth Avenue. Beyond this section Broadway changes to an automobile-sales district (from West 50th to 65th Streets).

Near the northern end of the district, West 57th Street, between Broad-

way and Fifth Avenue, is a center of exclusive art shops (with frequent exhibitions) and piano stores.

Around the two railroad terminals—Pennsylvania and Grand Central—large hotels provide accommodations for visitors. The railroad terminals, in contrast to many other cities, provide excellent solutions for a difficult city problem. All trains arrive underground. The terminals are impressive buildings which make the neighborhood more attractive. In other respects the business sections have many obnoxious features: traffic congestion, noise, uncleanliness, and frequent display of second-rate mass-production goods. A notable exception is Rockefeller Center, between Fifth Avenue and the Avenue of the Americas, West 48th to 52d Streets. This, the world's greatest enterprise in commercial building, is unique. The sixteen buildings, carefully planned, combine functionalism at its best with originality and beauty of style.

With the exception of the financial district in Wall Street, business is now concentrated in mid-town, where we find the second aggregate of skyscrapers. Not all are office buildings, like their predecessors in lower Manhattan. Some are hotels, hospitals, or research centers; the United Nations Building is one of the latest additions.

None of the large mid-town residential areas meets modern housing standards, save some small enclaves on the East Side (Stuyvesant Square, Gramercy Park, Tudor City, Beekman Place, and Sutton Place). Other East Side sections were once among the city's worst slums: the "gashouse district" (East 14th to 27th Streets) and Kip's Bay and Turtle Bay (East 27th to 59th Streets). The neighborhood of gas tanks and the abattoir center (East 42d to 46th Streets and First Avenue) did much to make living in these neighborhoods undesirable. While the area is still unattractive, improvements have been made since the old slums were demolished to make way for new facilities at Bellevue Hospital and the United Nations.

In contrast, Chelsea on the West Side (14th to 30th Streets), has deteriorated. Once the home of the wealthy, it subsequently became a middle-class district, predominantly Irish in character. During the last decade an increasing number of Greeks and Puerto Ricans, both in the low-income bracket, have moved in and there has been conflict between the various groups.

North of Chelsea, from West 30th to 50th Streets, we find a most dismal area implied by its name Hell's Kitchen. Once a hiding place of gangsters, the section has been cleared of crime, but dilapidated buildings with cold-water flats and insufficient precautions against fire still remain. A mixed population, largely Greek and Italian, live here under miserable conditions.

Uptown Manhattan. This area stretches from 60th Street to the Harlem River. Central Park divides the southern part physically as well as socially. It consists of five main areas. The rectangle formed by Fifth Avenue from East 60th to 100th Streets to Lexington Avenue and back to 60th Street

forms the most desired residential section. For forty blocks Fifth Avenue becomes "Millionaire's Row," accompanied by the equally fashionable Park Avenue, running parallel two blocks to the east. Between the two, Madison Avenue is a mixture of expensive stores on the ground floor and offices and apartments on the upper floors. Park Avenue also provides offices for leading doctors (like Harley Street in London). This arrangement is a rather exceptional feature in Manhattan; elsewhere the rich decline to live close to offices. However, although both Fifth and Park Avenues have the highest-priced apartments, many of the socially prominent families no longer live there. The two avenues now consist almost entirely of apartment houses, interspersed with hotels, hospitals, museums, and houses of worship and are no longer exclusively residential. The old palaces of multimillionaires are mostly a thing of the past. The "socialites" live in the side streets off Fifth Avenue in their mansions, with private gardens in the rear. An equally expensive residential section is the afore-mentioned Carl Schurz Park area on East End Avenue.

The remaining part of the East Side, bordered by 60th Street, Lexington Avenue, 96th Street, and the East River is known as Yorkville. In its southern part it houses a mixed low-income population; between East 71st and 75th Streets it becomes "Little Bohemia," with a Sokol House, Czech restaurants, and a preponderantly Slavic community. Around East 79th Street the Hungarians have their quarters. But the largest part of Yorkville, with East 86th Street as its center, is a middle-class German colony, with its many restaurants and clubs, its own physicians, storekeepers, and organizations. Above East 96th Street the area deteriorates quickly into a slum.

On the West Side the district between 72d Street and 120th Street is inhabited by well-to-do people lacking in social recognition but comfortably living in expensive apartments. The Columbia University district, however, between 110th Street and 120th Street, has scholarly prestige.

Central Park West, although lined with luxurious apartments which few can afford to rent, is distinctly "inferior" to Fifth Avenue across the park. The same is true of Riverside Drive, which, with its view of the Hudson River and the Palisades, an always cooling breeze, and less noise and dust, is possibly the most beautiful street in Manhattan. When first developed, the steel magnate Charles Schwab built a pompous French castle there and the "Drive" became very fashionable. But soon the *nouveaux riches* moved in, the "blue-book" aristocrats left, and with them went the high social prestige of living there. It is still a fairly high-rental section but it carries no social prestige.

Along Broadway and its side streets from West 120th to 135th Streets residences are replaced by various business establishments. Farther to the north the Washington Heights area, with its Inwood appendage, stretches to the Harlem River. In its lower parts (up to West 168th Street) it has a

mixed middle- and low-income-group population, with many Spanish families around West 135th Street. The upper part—West 181st Street is the main thoroughfare—is inhabited mostly by Jewish middle-class people, but there are also many Irish.

The large area north of Central Park between Broadway and the East River is known as Harlem. Nothing remains of the Dutch but the name. Today there are three Harlems: Italian Harlem (from East 96th to 125th Streets between the East River and Lexington Avenue), Spanish Harlem to the west, bordered by Fifth Avenue and Lenox Avenue, and Negro Harlem, which constitutes the rest of the area.

Italian and Spanish Harlem are equally miserable slums; the poorest of all immigrants, many of them without steady employment, all underpaid, live here in shabby flats overcrowded with lodgers. This is perhaps the most neglected area in Manhattan, though recently some housing projects have partially alleviated the situation.

Negro Harlem is a city in itself. Not all of it is slums. Some streets are much superior to adjacent white areas. Edgecombe Avenue, where many wealthy Negroes live, is lined with de luxe apartments, many with penthouses. The main problem stems from the fact that the area is too small to house all the Negroes who cannot find accommodations elsewhere. The result is overcrowding with all its effects: delinquency, vice, and family and personal disintegration. The situation is desperate even for the well-educated Negro who holds a responsible position or is a professional worker. He cannot find suitable quarters at a reasonable rent and usually is not able to pay the excessive rent of a tolerably good apartment.

An "Atypical" Settlement. Manhattan displays certain characteristics of the American city, but neither its pattern nor its population composition is typically American. As the main gate to the United States, as the greatest of all immigration centers, as one of the world's biggest ports, as the largest international city it presents features absent in the "typical" American city.

The checkerboard pattern, with streets bearing numbers rather than names, is indeed a peculiar American trait, stemming from practical considerations. The traffic problem, which partly results from this spatial arrangement, is also American rather than international. The relatively recent date of most buildings is American too; elsewhere the houses have to last longer.

But the typical American home, the one-family frame house with its front yard set back from the sidewalk and its small garden in the rear, is completely absent. Both middle- and low-income groups, which elsewhere in America usually have their own homes, are forced to live in apartments. The old one-family brownstone houses are usually converted into flats. One-family houses, mostly on the East Side, are almost entirely the prerogative of wealthy families.

FIG. 1. View of larger part of Manhattan. Foreground, Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town, replacing slums, exemplify successful rehabilitation. Bottom, old Lower East Side tenements. The blur at the top right (near UN Building) comes from excessive smoke of industrial plants, which ought to be relocated. (*Courtesy Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Picture credit: Thomas Airviews, Bayside, N.Y.*)

The pressing need for space has made it impossible to separate residential sections as strictly as is the custom elsewhere in the United States. Bus lines go along Fifth Avenue, while generally Americans insist, even at their own inconvenience, on keeping all traffic save private cars off the streets of better residential sections.

The differences become still more obvious if we examine the composition of the population. There is no race, no nation, and no religion which is not represented in New York.[4] Although mass immigration has been at a virtual standstill since 1930, more than three-fifths of New York's population are still of foreign extraction; when those of mixed parentage are added, it is obvious that the older American families have become a minority. It has often been pointed out that New York is a German, an Italian, an Irish, and a Polish city larger than all or most of the cities in the homeland of those immigrants. The old American stock is practically absent. Although they still represent practically the entire upper class, and fill high positions in banking, insurance, and heavy industries, they do not live in the city. They have moved to Long Island, Westchester County, New Jersey, or Fairfield County, Connecticut.

The situation with regard to religious groups is similar. Exact figures are not available but the Catholics, mostly Irish, Italians, Poles, Spanish, Czechs, Hungarians, and, partly, Germans, are a large majority in New York City, although Catholics account for less than 20 per cent of the total population of the United States. Jews, only about 3 per cent of the American population, are the second largest religious group. They account for almost one-fourth of all the people. The ratio would be still more unfavorable to Protestants if it were not for the Negroes, who probably represent the largest single Protestant group in New York. Minorities as a rule have a tendency to concentrate in larger cities. This partially explains why the religious and ethnic composition of New York differs from that of the United States as a whole.

2. Paris, France

Location, Origin, and Growth. Paris is situated in the northeastern part of France. We note that Paris, like most capitals, is eccentrically located. A city need not be the geographical center to dominate a region. Control of the main routes is more important, and Paris meets that requirement better than any other place in France. The life veins of France are her great rivers: the Rhone, Garonne, Loire, and Seine. All roads connecting these rivers lead somehow to the Île-de-France, the Paris Basin, where the traveler may turn to the Channel and England, toward the Rhine and Germany, to the Atlantic Coast, or to Italy and Spain.

[4] For practical reasons the figures given in the following discussion sometimes refer to New York City rather than Manhattan.

Shortly after the Seine becomes navigable the river begins to meander, and its loops provide natural fortifications. Some 130 miles from the estuary a small river island offers an additional opportunity to control the waterway and the land routes crossing the Seine. This little island was the site of the oldest settlement which finally became Paris. There can be no doubt that the Parisii, a branch of the Gauls, selected it to dominate the surrounding region and not for protection. The island is so small that it could shelter very few persons. But no one could cross the river or sail upstream or downstream without permission of those who held the island. Most likely it was initially an armed camp, with a house for the leader, a place for worship, and barracks for troops.

Its earliest historical mention is a report of its capture in Caesar's memoirs. The Romans subsequently selected it as a fort. They built a *palatium* for their military leaders, which in due time changed to a castle of the Frankish rulers and later became the royal palace, a part of which still exists. The Romans probably also built a temple for Jupiter at the site on which Notre-Dame now stands.

It is certain that the larger part of the population lived on the banks of both sides of the river and not on the island itself, since parts of the Gallo-Roman settlements are still extant while others have been unearthed. We also know that the town had a flourishing trade because the Roman emperors bestowed privileges upon a corporation of shipping masters (*nautae*), later in medieval times known as *marchands de l'eau,* and who became the leaders of the Parisian citizens.

In Roman times Paris grew in importance; many Roman rulers lived there and Julian Apostata was proclaimed emperor by his troops in Paris. During the Frankish period the city suffered from neglect and from raids by the Normans. Paris again began to flourish after Hugh Capet assumed the throne. It was the capital of the country which arose from the Treaty of Verdun. But it was hardly ever a permanent royal residence. Although the kings built two palaces in Paris, they preferred life outside, since the city's population showed more liking for independence and rebellion than the kings wished.

Today, after the decline of Berlin, Paris is again the leading city on the European continent. It is, however, the smallest in area of all great cities, covering less than 20,000 acres. The greatest distance between points within Paris is less than 8 miles, which means that practically every point is within walking distance. The population of Paris proper passed 1,000,000 in 1850 and is now 2,800,000, but metropolitan Paris, with its many suburbs, houses more than 3,500,000.

The patterns of Paris result from a combination of factors. Geographical features initially influenced the arrangement; the river suggested a development along its bank; the slight elevations in the north (Montmartre) and the

south (Butte St. Geneviève) retarded the expansion to some degree, which explains why the city's east-west axis is the longer. Large forests to the east (Bois de Vincennes) and the west (Bois de Boulogne), for a long time hunting grounds for the aristocracy, hindered the expansion.

The north-south axis of Paris is still formed by the route devised by the Romans, although increasing traffic forced the building of parallel streets. What is now the Rue St. Martin and the Rue St. Jacques was the old Roman road. The transversal streets are more or less determined by the river, since they parallel its main course.

Early in the eleventh century the city was walled. The circular shape had a decisive, lasting influence. To reach the gates the streets had to be radially arranged, like the spokes of a wheel. Since the city always outgrew its fortifications, the walls had to be torn down and rebuilt farther away from the center. Whenever the walls were razed, the empty circle became a thoroughfare, a "boulevard"; the name preserving the memory of the former bulwark. Thus there are, in addition to the north-south and east-west communication lines, three large circular streets which gird the city with three concentric rings.

After several revolutions in which Parisian rebels set up barricades, Napoleon III combined strategic purposes with city planning. His ideas, executed by Georges Haussmann, culminated in the building of large radial streets which permitted troops to reach any point of the city in the shortest time and enabled the army to keep all sections under effective fire.

These new wide avenues (e.g., the Boulevard Raspail) cut across all streets, circular, transversal, and longitudinal. At the point at which they meet, squares are found. Paris boasts many such "squares," although the name is deceiving; some are round—Round Point; others form an oblong rectangle—Place des Vosges; while the Place St. Michel is a semicircle. The Étoile is starlike, while the Place de la Concorde is a wide open space; the Place Vendôme is an octagon, and the curious arrangement of the Place de l'Opéra defies any brief description.

From these squares streets branch off in various directions. As many as twelve streets lead to and from the Étoile; others such as the Place de la Bastille, de l'Opéra, de la Nation, and Denfert-Rochereau have only slightly less. This helps to decentralize traffic and eases congestion.

The numerous new streets and the growth of Paris during the prosperity of the second half of the nineteenth century led to the erection of many buildings in the eclectic style of the period. They still dominate large parts of the city. Paris in its architecture is not a modern city. The functionalism and radicalism of modern builders do not appeal to Parisians, whose artistic tastes at all times showed moderation. (The small Rue Mallet-Stevens, where a series of experimental buildings has been erected, is a rare exception of modernism.) But Paris has great respect for its past and carefully preserves

its historic landmarks. For the perfect integration of past and present and for the preservation and continual use of historic buildings Paris deserves great praise.

Cité. Since early medieval times Paris has been divided into easily distinguished areas called "quarters." The nucleus of Paris, the little island called *Cité* ("city") has always been reserved for the political and religious leaders. Here the kings had their castles and the archbishop had his residence. The kings have departed, the castle has been rebuilt, though the old structure is partly preserved and the king's chapel, the Sainte-Chapelle, one of the marvels of Gothic style, still stands as it has stood since 1248.

Across the street we find one of the oldest hospitals in the world, though the building is modern. Its name Hôtel-Dieu reminds us that in medieval times only the church took care of the sick. To the church belongs the remaining part of the island. Here is Notre-Dame de Paris, begun in 1163. The cathedral, due to its insular position, stands at the lowest elevation in the city. This is unusual for as a rule the cathedral is on the summit and towers over the city. The dominant position of the church is characteristic of most European cities, including those which later turned to Protestantism (St. Paul's in London, Geneva, Basle, and Zurich).

Because the island is so very small, the people of Paris live on both sides of the river. The Seine divides Paris into two unequal parts. Since the Middle Ages the right bank has been called "Ville," while the left bank has been named "Université," indicating marked differences in activities. The right bank, initially the seat of the river merchants, has become the financial and commercial area, and the international center for all foreigners who come to Paris for business, social affairs, or amusement. The left bank stresses noncommercial aspects. It was the seat of the old aristocracy and is now that of the diplomats. It is the center of all church activities which once dominated the entire cultural life. Although largely secularized, cultural life still concentrates on the left side with the Sorbonne, the Institut de France, and other educational institutions.

The Right Bank. The tourist usually pays his first visit to the district of the "grand boulevards," the inner circle where the oldest walls stood. On the right bank the ring begins at the Seine and the Place de la Concorde, forms a large arc consisting of the Rue Royale, the Boulevards des Capucines and des Italiens, continuing with boulevards of lesser fame until, as Boulevard Henri IV, it again reaches the Seine, which marks the southern boundary. The entire semicircle consists of at least four very different quarters. The sight-seer restricts his curiosity to the western part, whose fashionable appearance contrasts oddly with the more easterly sections.

The "fashionable" part consists of an assortment of hotels, restaurants, and cafés. It is also the shopping center for the wealthy, particularly rich foreigners. There are a great number of theaters, among them three of world

fame, the Opéra, the Opéra-Comique, and the Comédie Française. There are also numerous night clubs. In addition, the area is a financial and business center, with offices of leading firms, the Stock Exchange, and the Banque de France. It is also a very diversified residential section, containing de luxe apartments as well as quarters for the middle and lower classes. But everywhere—between buildings of the last decade, between amusement and business establishments, in the midst of a ceaseless flow of vehicles and pedestrians, and a bewildering display of goods appealing to the appetite or vanity of men and women—there is an array of beautiful churches and palaces, of monuments and fountains. Here one finds the National Library, the Louvre with its priceless collections, the Garden of the Tuileries, and many old houses, carefully preserved for centuries. The observer will note that great pains have been taken to fit the new into the old, that every single building tries to conform with the character of the street, and that extravagant deviations are as carefully avoided as is tiresome monotony. While many nineteenth-century buildings show lack of originality and imagination, there is very little which offends the eye; neon lights and other harsh means of advertising are kept to a minimum. In particular, the outward appearance of office buildings hardly varies from that of residences.

What remains of the inner semicircle can be roughly divided into three main parts: the market section, the Marais, and the Quartier du Temple. All three strike the casual visitor as being extremely dirty; low-income Parisians are not too much concerned with cleanliness in their streets.

The first section is dominated by the gigantic central market, Les Halles Centrales, consisting of ten iron structures with 2,500 stalls. The amount of garbage, dead fish, rotten vegetables, sawdust, wood shavings, and discarded boxes and crates which litter the streets during market time is bewildering, but the food sold is clean and of prime quality. Around the market we find all possible combinations of urban land use. Residences, in this section mainly for poorer classes, restaurants, cafés, and shops mingle with the Central Post Office and the sister of the Stock Exchange, the Bourse du Commerce. Again we find in a somewhat neglected area one of the greatest old churches, St. Eustache, renowned also for its music, and, at the bank of the Seine, big department stores and two theaters.

The adjacent quarter, the Marais, as indicated by its name, was once a morass. After it had been reclaimed, it became the seat of the nobility during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The quarter is filled with old palaces called "hôtels," some of extraordinary beauty. But the aristocracy lost interest in the quarter and it began to decay. The dukes and princes left; shopkeepers and small traders moved in; many of the old *hôtels,* badly in need of repairs and inhabited by lower-middle-class people, have been converted into repair shops and small stores selling all kinds of junk. This is the darkest spot in the administration of Paris. Yet those who appreciate art

are still fascinated by the abundance of masterworks which even dirt and neglect have not destroyed. Fortunately some of the buildings have been put to public use and, well kept, preserve their untainted beauty (e.g., Hôtel de Soubise, now the National Archives; Hôtel Carnavalet, now the Museum of the City of Paris). There are also, on the fringes of the quarter, the City Hall of Paris and numerous old churches. In addition, the quarter preserved in its original state the magnificent Place des Vosges.

The situation in the adjacent quarter, the Temple, is similar. Once the seat of the Knights Templar in France, it now harbors the same type of repair shops and dealers in secondhand goods as its neighbor, the Marais.

The second ring between the great and the "outer" boulevards can be divided into three unequal sections. Farthest to the east are mainly nondescript living quarters of the poor, the least attractive part of Paris. Again tenement houses, stores, eating places, and workshops are located in the same section. In addition, we find here in the Rue du Faubourg-St. Antoine the seat of the ultraconservative furniture industry, which still provides Parisians with imitation period pieces. These eastern parts continue without perceptible division into the third zone of semicircles until the city limits are reached. If anything, these sections house still poorer people. To improve the situation the remarkable park, Buttes-Chaumont, has been built, and the famous cemetery, Père-Lachaise, provides an air reservoir for this crowded area.

The center of the middle ring, approximately between the Boulevards de Magenta and Malesherbes, is primarily a middle-class residential section, gradually improving from east to west. But apartments are interspersed with offices, shops, eating places, and hotels. Three large railroad stations, theaters, and night spots are in proximity to a dozen churches.

The rest might be subdivided into three rather similar sections. The Parc Monceau is a quiet, expensive residential quarter around an aristocratic park dating from prerevolutionary times. The adjacent part is again a mixture of modern houses and old aristocratic homes, both used for high-priced apartments and hotels, mingling with offices, restaurants, and some of the best stores. Separated by the Champs-Elysées, the last section—the Quartier Marceau—is one of the most expensive residential parts of Paris. Again high-class apartment houses are adjacent to de luxe hotels and restaurants. There is also a great number of churches, while the Seine embankment is lined with museums.

The Champs-Elysées—the gala avenue of Paris—is in its lower part a park which conceals two theaters and the palace of the President of France; the upper part displays familiar features, luxury shops, restaurants, cafés on the ground floor; offices and, though now rare, expensive apartments on upper floors.

The last ring—between the outer boulevards and the city line—is mostly

residential in character, although stores, restaurants, and (to the east) some industrial establishments are frequently present. Generally the farther eastward a district lies, the poorer are its people.

The center of the area is Montmartre. In former times this hilly region (300 feet above the Seine) was settled by gardeners who supplied Parisians with vegetables. The cheap attics were rented by artists who enjoyed a splendid view over the city. In the evenings they used to meet in nearby cafés, providing their own entertainment. This attracted not only visitors but businessmen who quickly converted amusement into money. The place became crowded, the rents rose, and the artists left; Montmartre, however, retains its amusement center with its many theaters, cabarets, dance halls, and night clubs. In the midst of this, the venerable Church of St. Pierre and the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur remind us that Paris is not only a gay but also a religious city.

West of Montmartre the sections house mostly modest middle-class families, with facilities gradually improving until we end up in Passy (between Avenue Foch and the Seine). This quarter, with Marceau as eastern neighbor and the Bois de Boulogne to the west, is the home of the very rich. Once entirely rural, it now contains the most fashionable apartment houses and a large number of upper-class one-family homes. Stores and offices are rare, although there are some hotels, expensive pensions, and restaurants. Doctors and other professional men have offices here without anyone being afraid that privacy might be disturbed.

Île St. Louis and the Left Bank. Before turning to the left bank, the small island of St. Louis—east of the Cité—has to be mentioned. It consists only of a few former aristocratic *hôtels,* now rented by wealthy and distinguished people who want a quiet and retired life.

The left bank also shows the arrangement of three concentric circles. The first ring represents the area between the Seine and the Boulevard St. Germain. This was once the main quarter of the high nobility. Their town houses still stand but few aristocrats can afford to live there. They rented or sold the palaces to foreign embassies, which find the proximity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate convenient. The Institut de France and several educational institutions are also located in this section.

The eastern part of the second ring is widely known as the Latin Quarter. It includes, besides the Sorbonne and several other university buildings, the Botanical Gardens, the Panthéon, a Roman arena and relics of a Roman bath, many old and beautiful churches, innumerable hotels and boardinghouses for students, again cafés and restaurants, bookstores and hospitals. To the west the Latin Quarter shades gradually into a more tranquil section consisting of three quite different parts. One is the area of the Palais du Luxembourg (now the seat of the upper house, the Senate) and its garden, mirror-

ing the elegance of times long passed. The princes are replaced by elder statesmen, while the garden belongs to lovers, dreamers, and children. The area around the Odéon, one of the great theaters, is peopled by academicians, professors, and writers who discuss their problems in the quiet cafés. The rest is dominated by the Church of St. Sulpice, which is the center of a Catholic quarter, and many stores sell religious articles and vestments. Catholic bookstores and the Institut Catholique are located here. All this makes the area a secluded, sedate enclave amidst a secular world.

As we move again westward the situation on the right bank is duplicated. The residential sections improve more and more and provide living quarters only for those who can pay high rents. These are the areas on both sides of the Dôme des Invalides, which again include, in addition to expensive modern apartment houses, some great artistic monuments (Hôtel des Invalides, Ecole Militaire, and the Eiffel Tower), the Rodin Museum, a railroad station, and several churches. As in Passy and Marceau across the river, stores and shops are less numerous.

The third and last belt also is strikingly similar to its counterpart on the right bank. The western part belongs more to the middle classes, the east end to the lower classes. The center is a replica of Montmartre: the Quartier Montparnasse. When some artists left Montmartre, they found similar conditions—above all, inexpensive ateliers—in the Montparnasse area. The amusements became quickly commercialized, the rents rose, and many artists left. Today Montparnasse is chiefly another amusement center, abounding with big cafés, cabarets, night clubs, restaurants, and hotels. For some reason, the intellectual foreigners who stay for some time in Paris prefer Montparnasse and gather there in the cafés. The nearby Rue de la Gaité is more neglected by visitors and serves as an amusement center for those Parisians who cannot afford to spend much money for entertainment but enjoy the less spectacular and very popular variety shows there.

Ecological Differentiation. As in all other cities, certain trades and professions tend to concentrate near one another. The "haute couture," the houses of Paris fashion, have their business in the Rue de la Paix, near the Opéra. They are joined by the leading jewelers. Art dealers and perfume makers are located in the Rue St. Honoré, some of the leading department stores in the Rue de Rivoli. Automobiles are displayed in the Champs-Elysées, where film distributors also have their offices. The famous open-air book stalls line the left bank of the Seine. Pet animals are sold on the Quai de la Mégisserie. But the concentration is never extreme. Paris has not one "rialto" but at least four amusement centers, besides several theaters scattered over the city. Excellent hotels are in every section except in the poorest quarters. Some leading educational institutions are on the right bank. The richest live in at least five sections and the poorest in some central parts as well as in the outskirts.

Ecological Distribution of



FIG. 2. Despite a marked tendency toward specialization a citywide dispersion of activities is evident. There is no strict separation of business and residential districts. Only the seventh and the sixteenth arrondissements are free from commercial establishments

Occupations in Paris



and industry, but government offices and embassies are concentrated in these two upper-class residential sections. (Adapted from the guidebook *Le Guide Michelin Paris,* 1954–1955, by permission of Michelin, Puiseux Durin & Cie, Paris.)

Although Parisians joke that the people on the left bank are entirely separate from those on the right bank, this is not true. Thirty-three bridges span the Seine at short intervals, and pedestrians as well as vehicles cross incessantly from one side to the other. The river is the life artery of Paris.

The residential sections of Paris, like those of all other large cities, are differentiated along class lines: upper-, middle-, and low-income groups live in different quarters. Although Paris contains more foreigners than any European metropolis except London, there are no "natural areas." A very small ghetto of Eastern Jews is found in the Temple quarter and poor Italian immigrants tend to concentrate near the southern fringes. These are insignificant exceptions. Paris knows no restrictions and no segregation. Negroes and various Orientals live everywhere, according to their taste and means.

3. Interpretation

General Remarks. Paris, like New York, has its own individuality; yet it also displays certain traits which it shares with most cities of the European continent. The descriptive approach enables us to compare patterns which seem to have sociological implications, to find similarities and differences, and to draw some tentative theoretical conclusions.

It is obvious that the framework of the city—spatial as well as social—is not haphazard. The typical American city is undoubtedly more simple and clear in organization; nonetheless, the Continental cities, with their greater variety and deviations, show essentially the same meaningful arrangement. A city is neither a mere agglomeration of buildings nor an aimless concentration of people. Cities are arranged according to a meaningful system; this system is rarely planned but is the result of factors inherent in urban life. This is what Burgess rightly calls the "essential orderliness of the city." Yet an order can be established in many ways and we cannot expect identical patterns under different conditions. Some differences are easily explained by the fact that American cities are younger but grew faster than European centers.

In Europe royalty and nobility left their imprint on urban life; America created her own institutions, including the modes of urban life, or she inherited (and transformed) them from the founding fathers who came from Great Britain. English customs show a certain deviation from Continental habits and the results are apparent in the British Isles as well as in the United States.

Differences in Location. The choice of a city site in Europe was influenced, if not dictated, by strategic consideratons. From the viewpoint of a modern city planner, Rome, with its seven hills and marshy riverbanks, is one of the worst possible sites; strategically it was an excellent selection. The case of Paris is not much different. Consequently, many European cities have build-

ing problems; their streets have to follow the whims of the landscape, are sinuous, and necessitate detours. The growth of the city sometimes is seriously hampered by the natural obstacles which led to its founding.

No American city's growth has been impeded by having to comply with strategic considerations. The settlers were always free to select the site on which it was most practical to build. The typical American city is on level ground, with ample opportunity to expand in all directions. The streets can be as wide, straight, and regular as is deemed advisable.

Another difference is the relation of the city to its river. In former times proximity to a stream was an asset. The river was the main source of drinking water (Parisians still have to drink filtered Seine water) and of water for all other purposes. Since water had to be carried or pumped, it was an advantage to live near the river. Water transportation was also desirable becaues it was inexpensive and less complicated than transport by horse-drawn vehicles.

Americans had free choice of places where drinking water was obtainable from wells. The early settlers quickly moved from Charlestown to Beacon Hill in Boston when they discovered wells on a more convenient site. Also, American cities have long been threatened by catastrophic floods, leading settlers to avoid a neighborhood too close to a river. (For the same reason Vienna remained essentially a city south of the Danube; the district across the river did not expand before extensive measures against inundations were taken late in the nineteenth century.)

Thus American cities are "river-shy." The Hudson is the border of New York, the Charles of Boston, the Delaware of Philadelphia, and the Potomac of Washington. To cross a river is somewhat of an inconvenience, and pedestrians avoid it if they can. If expansion finally reaches the river, the water still forces a political division as in Boston and Cambridge; Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis and East St. Louis; Minneapolis and St. Paul. But the Thames flows right through London; so does the Seine in Paris, the Tiber in Rome, the Limmat in Zurich, the Spree in Berlin, the Elbe in Dresden, the Moldau in Prague, the Manzanares in Madrid, and so on.

Spatial Patterns. Since most European cities were walled, they have the shape of a circle; the city could be entered or left only through a few gates. This influenced the pattern of the main thoroughfares and the connecting streets, which still have a tendency to radiate from or converge toward the center.

American cities (with the exception of the older ones like Boston or lower Manhattan, which still show some European affinities) steadily expanded in blocks. Thus they are square-shaped or rectangular, the streets are straight and meet connecting streets at right angles. The blocks are of equal size, which gives the familiar gridiron or checkerboard pattern and permits distinguishing the streets by mere numbers or letters which facilitates orienta-

tion. Undoubtedly this streamlining makes cities monotonous, but the practical advantages are enormous, except for the traffic problem.

In monarchical times the ruler used to live in the very center of the city, which gave it a prestige unknown in America. The nobility liked to live close to the monarch and the rising upper classes soon followed suit. Thus the center of the city became the most distinguished and most expensive residential section. For several reasons the prestige of the center is diminishing but it still exists. Even in London, which comes closer to American standards than Continental towns, the most exclusive areas—Belgravia, Mayfair, and Kensington—are near Buckingham Palace. In Paris the best residential sections are near the center; even Passy can be reached from the Opéra in a few minutes.

The concentration of commercial activities in the heart of the city has had different consequences in America than in Europe. In America the development led to a very strict separation of residential and business districts. Although we have seen that Manhattan differs in this respect, Americans generally dislike living in a mixed business and residential area or even near the business districts. The most desired residential areas are on the outer fringes of the city or even beyond the city limits. On the European continent the outskirts—with exceptions—are either the living quarters of the poorest group or are used by industry. The concentration of industrial production close to the center of the city—a frequent occurrence in America—is very rare in Europe.

In general, continental Europeans still work six days a week from eight o'clock to six o'clock or even later. At noon they interrupt work for two hours to take their main meal with their families. This practice necessitates proximity of office and residence and discourages a strict division between business and residential areas. The farther the home from the office the less desirable the location, and rentals increase in residential areas from the outskirts toward the center, while the situation in America is frequently the reverse.

Americans take their main meal after work and are satisfied with a light lunch at noon. They usually work five days a week and leave at a relatively early hour. They often spend two hours or more daily for transportation; they find compensation in the greater comfort of their homes, which had to be built on the outskirts where space is ample and land prices reasonable.

One-family Homes versus Apartments. Perhaps the most consequential difference between urban life in continental Europe and the United States is the phenomenon of the one-family home. The frequency of such homes in America occurs because it is possible to build them at a distance from the center. In Europe, in larger towns, only the richest—and not all of them—live in single dwellings. The middle and the lower classes live in apartment houses.

This American characteristic is related to the following factors:

1. The traditional Anglo-Saxon esteem for the home as a "castle," for privacy, independence, and the equally traditional desire for a home with a garden and flowers
2. The availability of timber in sufficient quantities
3. The availability of inexpensive lots
4. American technical resources permitting the quick establishment of rapid transportation facilities as soon as a new area is developed
5. The fact that most American families can afford a car

As a result, American cities have large "garden" areas, consisting of one-family dwellings. In continental Europe—despite great propaganda for the garden city—the middle and lower classes live in congested areas and one-family dwellings for workingmen are infrequent.

Class Character. There is, however, one feature to which all cities in the world conform: the class division of upper-, middle-, and low-income residential sections. This division is based upon a simple criterion: the cost of housing. Areas with high land values permit only the erection of buildings commanding high rents. Those for more expensive apartments frequently exceed the total yearly income of the lowest economic classes who have to live where rents are within their means.

The desirability of an area, which determines its land values, is based not only on objective but also on irrational factors accounting for "area prestige." Examples have already been cited. To some extent a group gives prestige to an area at the outset until the process is reversed. For example, Beacon Hill was once the "right place to live" because the proper Bostonians lived there; then living on Beacon Hill gave the upstart the prestige which he so badly wanted. But if too many outsiders move into a preferred district, its prestige wanes. Thus Riverside Drive in New York "lost face," and the aristocratic Marais in Paris became a slum. While objective advantages persist, the changing population alters the prestige, land values, and character of an area. These changes are rarer and slower in Europe than in America, with her extreme mobility, her heterogeneous population, and her rapid urban growth.

Population Composition. The impact which the composition of the population exerts on the city patterns constitutes another important difference between America and Europe. The population of Europe is almost exclusively Caucasian; the race problem does not exist. In those cities in which Negroes do live they have no difficulty in finding housing accommodations; in most cases it would be impossible to provide separate quarters for a few Negroes.

Most European countries are also nearly uniform in terms of nationality. In countries with mixed population (e.g., Switzerland or, formerly, Austria-Hungary) the cities are often inhabited by a single national group or the

various nationalities have been accustomed to living together since time immemorial. There are some exceptions; Eastern Jews always lived in ghettos and some remnants of them survived in Western cities. But these special cases do not alter the general patterns of the cities which know no segregation.

As a rule, residents of European cities know foreigners only as individuals but not as groups. This has far-reaching consequences with respect to the attitudes of the established groups as well as those of the newcomers and with respect to social relationships. If an alien comes to Paris with intentions of staying, he has a twofold choice. He can remain a foreigner, in which case he usually retains the citizenship of his mother country. He is then a guest and, as such, not a participant in communal affairs. He might be a welcome or even a celebrated guest like Rossini, or just an *émigré*, like the many Russians who came to Paris after the rise of Communism, or even an undesirable guest, of whom the police try to rid the city. But he remains always a foreigner. If there is a large number of aliens, they sometimes form "colonies"; there is an American and a British colony in Paris. This only emphasizes the desire to retain the old ties abroad without establishing a special community within the country in which the foreigner lives. The foreigners remain socially separated but not spatially segregated.

If, on the other hand, the alien wants to become a citizen, then he knows that he has to change (as far as possible), that he has to adapt himself to different conditions, and that this is expected of him. He does not intend to retain old ties, still less to live according to institutional standards unknown in the country of his choice. He will not even try to change in small ways the life patterns of his adopted city by an ostentatious display of foreign customs. The result is quick assimilation. The foreign names of many leading Frenchmen—Mazarin, MacMahon, Niel, Haussmann, and Bartholdi—prove the effective work of this melting pot; of course the absence of mass immigration facilitates the process. Thus Paris—and all other European cities—have no hyphenated citizens; there are no Irish-French, Italian-French, or German-French, while in America the existence of mixed groups has become institutional, is reflected in spatial segregation, in racial and cultural conflicts, and has become one of the major problems of urban life and community organization.

Part IV. SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY

Chapter 4

THE LOCATION OF CITIES

Theories

Many years ago Sir Flinders Petrie, the eminent archaeologist, pointed out that the cities of ancient Egypt (and of Mesopotamia) were approximately 20 miles apart. He explained this phenomenon in terms of the prevailing conditions for transporting wheat to urban centers: [1] "Supplies could be centralized up to ten miles away, beyond that the cost of transport made it better worthwhile to have a nearer centre." To assume that the only or the main reason for the existence of a city is its function as a storage center is clearly untenable; yet geographers still display a tendency to explain the location of urban sites in terms of their functions as service centers.

An elaborate scheme of this type was offered by a German geographer, Walter Christaller.[2] His basic assumption was that a given rural area supports an urban center which in turn serves the surrounding countryside. There are smaller towns for smaller areas and bigger cities for larger regions. This concept permitted Christaller to build up an integrated system of cities according to their size. If this theory were correct, the cities in a given area would have to be evenly spaced. This is exactly what Christaller claims, at least for Western Europe.

McKenzie,[3] it seems, was inclined to accept a similar viewpoint, at least for some periods in the process of American urbanization. His remark "During this period of population dispersion the city was for the most part the child and servant of expanding rural settlement" emphasizes the service function of an urban place with regard to its immediate neighborhood.

Christaller's views, conceiving a city as a central place within a rural area, have been introduced in America by another geographer, Edward L. Ullman,[4] although with considerable modifications and reservations.[5]

[1] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Social Life in Ancient Egypt,* London, 1923 (2d ed., 1932).

[2] *Die Zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland,* Jena, 1935. A somewhat similar scheme, now entirely forgotten, was proposed as early as 1841 by J. G. Kohl, *Der Verkehr und die Ansiedelungen der Menschen in ihrer Abhängigkeit von der Gestaltung der Erdoberfläche.*

[3] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community,* New York, 1933, p. 4.

[4] Edward L. Ullman, "A Theory of Location for Cities," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 46, 1941.

[5] "The central-place theory probably provides as valid an interpretation of settlement distribution over the land as the concentric-zone theory does for land use within the cities." (*Ibid.*)

But the theory is patently at variance with the facts. Whether we examine the distances between larger cities or the general distribution of urban settlements, we find no regularity in spacing. There are forty urban places in Washington State; three have a population in excess of 100,000. Of these, Seattle and Tacoma are 36 miles apart, Seattle and Spokane, 320 miles.[6] Similarly, Washington, D.C., is only 36 miles from Baltimore to the north but 110 miles from Richmond to the south.

Ullman[7] admits the vulnerability of the scheme for larger places: "In highly industrialized areas the central-place scheme is generally so distorted by industrial concentration in response to resources and transportation that it may be said to have little significance as an explanation for urban location and distribution." But he claims that the "theoretical ideal appears to be most nearly approached in poor, thinly settled farm districts—areas which are most nearly self-contained." Such areas hardly exist in America. Let us examine regions which come closest to Ullman's requirement: Kansas and Nebraska. Neither state is poor nor self-contained. Each consists of huge rural areas where agriculture is mostly carried on by farmers who still produce a substantial portion of their own food.

Table 2

	Area	Population	Urban places
Kansas	82,276 sq. mi.	1,801,028	64
Nebraska	77,237 sq. mi.	1,315,834	36

To support the central-place theory some correlation between the number of urban places and either size or population of a region must exist. There is none. Kansas is only slightly larger than Nebraska; it exceeds the area of the latter by 6.5 per cent. Its population is 40 per cent higher. It has 77 per cent more urban places.

The central-place hypothesis has been discussed at some length because it is the only existing theory which employs a single principle as determinant of location. As the monistic explanation proves to be unsatisfactory, we must look for a theory of multiple causation.

The problem involves at least three factors:

1. Nature, namely, the geographical properties of a site
2. Culture, namely, the social organization, the technological level, and the economic system of a given society
3. Function, namely, the main purpose which is served by a particular urban settlement

[6] There is no urban place of comparable size east of Spokane before we reach Duluth, Minn. (air distance approximately 1,200 miles).

[7] *Op. cit.*

Since these three factors, which in turn consist of many elements, are independently variable, we have to anticipate irregularity rather than systematic arrangements of urban sites and disparity in time and space rather than uniformity. Both expectations are borne out by facts. An inspection of any inhabited region shows an uneven and asymmetrical distribution of cities; it also shows that the distribution changes, sometimes within a brief historical period.

Nature

To some extent a city represents the endeavor of man to free himself from that domination by nature which in the earliest stages of human life determined his habitat to a very large degree. The more technology progresses, the more successful are man's attempts to defy nature. But there are limits beyond which it is either impossible or inadvisable to go. We have reached a stage which allows us to build bases in Arctic regions and stations in deserts, but for all practical purposes polar areas, arid land, swamps, tropical jungles, steep and high mountain slopes will always be unfit for ordinary urban settlements.

Man has learned to adapt the land to his needs but he uses his ability only if adaptation is necessary or advantageous. It is reasonable to avoid obstacles. It is equally reasonable to make use of favorable locations, so frequently offered by nature. Only when land becomes scarce and population grows in density will less desirable places be selected for urban settlements.

In the United States there is a marked preference for plains and low altitudes, while hilly and elevated places are infrequently chosen for sites of cities. After 300 years of settlement the mountainous parts of the East, although of moderate height, are still sparsely populated. When the frontiers expanded, the settlers, pushing westward, "jumped the Rocky Mountains," and went to the Pacific Coast. The four Mountain states, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, comprise approximately 14.4 per cent of the land area of the United States. If cities were evenly distributed within the United States, these four states should have 540 urban places. Actually there are only 91, and none has a population of 100,000 or more except Denver. Yet these very regions are the most healthful parts of the country, their beauty is unsurpassed, and rich mineral resources—gold, silver, copper, manganese, etc.—would suggest the establishment of large industrial enterprises. Though modern transportation has made the region easily accessible, its growth is very slow.[8]

That the desert regions of Nevada and Utah, of Arizona and New Mexico, as well as the dust bowl of the Dakotas, discourage settlements needs no explanation. But low fertile plains are not necessarily the sites of cities. As

[8] In exceptional conditions cities are sometimes located on high plateaus, e.g., Mexico City, La Paz, Bolivia

mentioned above, the Prairie states have less than their proportional share of cities. Kansas, a perfect plain with an area of 82,276 square miles, has less than half the population of mountainous Switzerland with only 15,737 square miles, and considerably fewer urban places. The world's largest lowlands, the Eurasian plains, the Missouri-Mississippi Basin, and the South American pampas were among the latest to be chosen for urban places.

The first cities arose in certain river valleys—the Nile, Euphrates, Tigris, and Indus—or on the seashore. The early American settlements followed these patterns rather closely. The cities were located on the coast or followed the Charles, the Connecticut, the Hudson, the Delaware, the Susquehanna, the James, the Santee, the Savannah, and the lesser rivers. Later the shores of the Great Lakes gained similar preference. All five American cities with a population exceeding 1,000,000 are located on the seashore, or have direct access to it (Philadelphia), or are lake ports. The same is true for seven of the thirteen cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000. Of the remaining six, Houston, Texas, is only a short distance by canal from the Gulf of Mexico, Minneapolis–St. Paul and St. Louis are on the Mississippi and thus connected with the ocean; Washington, D.C., is a special case. This leaves only two real inland cities of larger size: Cincinnati and Pittsburgh. The building of the Erie Canal through a region which offered no serious obstacles to highways shows clearly the preference for water over land transportation, which in turn explains why shores and navigable rivers are favored as urban localities.

The central-place position is indefensible because it is at variance with the facts. The most important cities in America and elsewhere [9] are not located in the center of a region but at its periphery. To mention only a few outstanding examples, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, Chicago, El Paso, Seattle, Portland, Oregon, Portland, Maine, and San Francisco dominate entrance and exit but not the center of their areas.

To understand the crucial role of transportation we have to keep in mind that cities are above all primarily places of exchange between cities rather than simply between rural and urban areas. Without a well-functioning system of large-scale transportation, no urban place except small local towns can exist. Until very recent times, and to some extent even today, water transportation proved to be superior to land transportation for the following reasons:

1. Waterways are a free bounty of nature. To build highways is a costly, often difficult, enterprise. In earlier times the construction of large roads was dependent on the existence of forced labor. We have to remember that during the entire colonial period contract labor was very scarce in America.

2. River boats are less hampered by inclement weather; it became pos-

[9] Madrid, Prague, and Moscow are the most noteworthy exceptions.

sible to keep the roads clear in winter only after motorized snowplows had been invented.

3. Before railroads were built, boats provided the fastest means for transporting commodities.

4. Even in present times it is frequently more economical to transport certain goods, e.g., coal, oil, and wheat, in water vessels.[10]

5. With some exceptions (certain European countries, traffic between United States and Canada) international trade always relied on ocean routes to such a degree that sea lanes were artificially created if they did not exist, e.g., Panama Canal and Suez Canal.

Just as throughout history a country which controlled the sea was superior to even bigger land powers, so urban places with commanding river and ocean positions have a distinct advantage over inland cities.

But goods have to be brought to and from rivers, lakes, and seashores; it is obviously advantageous to locate a city where land and sea routes meet. Cooley's famous "break-in-transportation" theory is based on this consideration. Ratzel [11] advanced similar ideas at an earlier time but Cooley [12] gave a more detailed and elaborate account. Carpenter's [13] contribution to the same topic also has to be mentioned. Except on the ocean, goods travel continuously over only short distances. Transportation is usually carried out in stages and stops have to be made for various reasons. Men and beasts of burden must rest, engines need fuel, and some perishable goods and livestock demand attention and treatment on prolonged journeys. Whenever travel comes to a halt, we can speak of a break in transportation. The break may be due to technological or economic reasons.[14] The former might be a mere stop for food, sleep, refueling, or repairs. As long as horses had to be changed, these stops were rather common; they are now rare. Stops occur most frequently if some adjustments in the mode of transportation have to be made: from truck to train, from train to boat, or vice versa.

Thus we are likely to find urban settlements (1) where a country road meets a highway; (2) where a highway branches off into several main arteries; (3) at the crossroads of the main communication lines; (4) if serious obstacles have to be overcome; ascending mountain passes or crossing a river; or (5) at lake and seashore, as well as river, ports.

Clearly, in many of these cases it is nature, not man, which determines the

[10] We still speak of "shipping" goods regardless of the means of transportation, which should be a reminder that in the past water transportation was the most important method of transport.

[11] Friedrich Ratzel, *Anthropo-Geographie,* Leipzig, 1882, p. 155.

[12] Charles H. Cooley, "The Theory of Transportation," in *Sociological Theory and Social Research,* New York, 1930.

[13] Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* New York, 1932, pp. 42–49.

[14] Cooley calls the first type "mechanical," the second "commercial."

location of the settlement marking the break in transportation. Until fairly recently man had little control over the position of harbors or the points where rivers become navigable; mountains have to be crossed where passes make transport less inconvenient. Until modern times bridges could be built only at certain places. Even the man-made routes, country lanes as well as main highways, usually follow the path designed by nature.

The "natural" locations—harbors, river courses and crossings, mountain crests and passes are not arranged in a discernible order; this explains in



Fig. 3. Map of the United States showing state capitals and largest cities in each state.

part the irregularity in the distribution of urban sites and the impossibility of devising a rational scheme of location valid for all regions.

Nature also determines the site whenever man depends on specific gifts which again are scattered at random over a country. Mining towns and oil cities have to be built near where metals and oil are found; recreation and health centers are located at spas and in regions with an agreeable climate and pleasant scenery. Bathing resorts depend on suitable beaches and winter sport areas on locations fit for skiing.

However, it would be an overstatement to declare that nature dictates the location. It simply suggests a site and man accepts the suggestion for his own convenience. Within considerable limits he has a choice of existing opportunities. For instance, Boston, Salem, Provincetown, and Nantucket are all fishing places within a small area. There was no necessity to develop all four ports. Cape Cod and Cape Ann have a number of other bays which qualify

for fishing ports as well as Provincetown and Gloucester. The final decision as to the exact location of a settlement and its use is left to man.

Culture

In the earliest stages of mankind land was almost exclusively the source of food supply. The more a civilization advances, the more diversified becomes the potential use of land and also the more specific its actual use. It is equally unreasonable to build large cities on first-rate wheatland (for instance, in Kansas) as to use the stony area of Manhattan for fruitgrowing. As man has become more adept at transporting, storing, and preserving foodstuffs, urban places have become to some extent less dependent on their immediate rural neighborhoods. For breakfast a resident of Washington, D.C., will have orange juice from California and cereal from Indiana; the bacon was processed in Chicago but the pig came from Iowa and so did the ham. The coffee was shipped from Brazil and sugar from Puerto Rico, but the eggs and milk were delivered from nearby rural Maryland. He could get his dairy products, fresh vegetables, and other perishable commodities by means of refrigeration cars from practically anywhere in the United States, but that would mean an unnecessary increase in price.

With the exception of some special cases, mostly military in character, urban places cannot entirely dissociate themselves from supplies to be furnished by a rural neighborhood.[15] Under modern conditions the consequences are not too far-reaching; it is well known that until the middle of the last century experts considered land west of the Mississippi unfit for settlement. The recent rise of urban towns in Siberia also shows that it is now possible to overcome serious obstacles.

As has been discussed in a previous chapter, the city is a child of the metal age. But before the advent of the machine age, metal was used in such small and easily transported quantities that the place of the mine determined only the residence of the miners. Only after the rise of big industries with their mass consumption of metals did mining centers also become industrial centers. Damascus, for instance, once famous for its steel blades, is far away from iron mines. But Essen in the Ruhr Valley, so rich in coal and iron, became a large city only after the advent of the industrial era.

The factors which make a certain location desirable are subject to change. Correspondingly, urban centers may shift their location if they discharge

[15] A thorough discussion of these conditions may be found in a somewhat outdated essay by Johann Heinrich von Thuenen, *Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalökonomie,* published 1826 to 1863. While some of Thuenen's contentions are no longer valid, it remains true that for perishable goods a city still depends on deliveries from adjacent farms; consequently, sites in a region unfit for dairy and vegetable farming generally do not qualify for urban settlements.

only a single function. The steel cities in the United States provide an interesting example which has been expounded by James E. Rogerson.[16] Originally steel production was concentrated in the Pittsburgh-Youngstown area, where iron and coal were readily accessible. But the geographical center has been moving to the north and to the west. In 1951 the Pittsburgh-Youngstown area was still the largest steel center but the region produced only about 40 per cent of the total national output. Other steel centers have emerged. At present steel is produced in some 250 communities in thirty states, some as far away from the Pennsylvania–Ohio region as Oregon, Utah, and Florida. California is now among the first ten steel producers in the United States. What made the Pittsburgh area lose its monopoly? The dispersal of the steel industry is certainly due to "natural" factors, namely, the exploitation of new sources of iron, coal, and other raw materials. Yet this explanation is insufficient. Steel is produced for the market, and markets change their position independently. America's population shifted to the West and the new areas needed steel for railroads, housing, and new plants. The concentration of the automotive industry in Michigan provided the steel mills with their largest customers far from the Pittsburgh center. Conversely, steel consumption in Pennsylvania has fallen. The Second World War accelerated the westward expansion of steel production because arms had to be produced at, and to be shipped from, the West Coast. But Rogerson predicts a reversal of the present trend, a shift back to the East for the following reasons: the defense program in Europe, greater dependence on foreign raw materials shipped to Eastern ports, increasing reliance upon export markets to be reached from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Thus even production centers depend for their location as much on "cultural," that is, economic conditions, as on nature.

Not only the knowledge of metallurgy, and the level of its technical development, but also the entrepreneurial spirit of a nation counts. Thus Damascus concentrated on the production of sword blades but, under the Ottoman rule, which was averse to industrial development, it ceased to be a steel center. Conversely, the rise of so many steel cities in America was comparatively late, and it took considerable time before they became more numerous and more important than their British predecessors. In a similar development the German heavy industry centers overtook their French neighbors which once had been superior. These examples show that even under equal technical conditions a favorable location alone does not create a city or determine its size. The term "cultural" has to be understood in a much broader sense than the technological stage of society.

A militant nation, a country ruled by a belligerent class, will build cities

[16] "Geography of Steel," a technical paper distributed by the United States Steel Corporation, New York, 1952. The use of the material in this text is by permission of the United States Steel Corporation.

on locations which are less inviting to peaceful work but offer an excellent opportunity to dominate an area. For this reason the Etruscans built their hilltop fortresses in what is now Tuscany; for the same reasons Rome was built on its seven hills, although for all other purposes a location closer to the ocean or in the plains to the south would have been preferable. America, characterized throughout her history by the absence of a military class and comparatively secure from aggression, never developed a network of fortress cities as practically all European nations did.

Recreation, a much more pleasing aspect of culture than warfare, can also have implications for the location of an urban place. Primitive groups as well as rural societies spend their leisure time at the place where they live and work. So did the aristocrats who either hunted on their estates or had parties in their castles and parks. But since the nineteenth century the urban population has begun to spend some of its leisure time out of town. Initially existing rural settlements or fishing places were sufficient to accommodate all tourists. But new types of recreation caused the rise of specialized urban places. One is winter sport; its development is too recent for the emergence of urban sites on a large scale. Another—bathing—has already had a visible effect. The cultural connections are clear. Once it was considered improper that both sexes should bathe and bask at the same place. Today beaches have become institutions frequented by large masses and bathing resorts have sprung up overnight. Some of them—as, for instance, on the Riviera in France and Italy—are former fishing towns converted into resorts. Others owe their very existence to the new bathing habits and consist mostly of hotels and other tourist accommodations, restaurants, amusement places, stores, and service stations. Florida and some parts of California provide many examples. In all these cases a specific culture determines the location; in other civilizations the same location would not be selected for an urban settlement.

America furnishes another example of location determined by cultural factors: the site of college towns. In continental Europe all teaching institutions are situated in cities which have preponderantly other functions.[17] In America some colleges have been built where hardly anybody lived before; in due time the college became the nucleus of a new urban settlement, for instance, Pennsylvania State College.

The cultural influence is particularly important if cities are intentionally founded because the choice of the location mirrors culturally conditioned preferences. The reason why Alexander selected the site on which he built Alexandria certainly reflects a cultural setting different from that which made the Pilgrims choose Plymouth. Many American cities founded in early colonial times would be differently located if built today. The colonists had

[17] This is true even for the most famous universities, such as Oxford, Cambridge, the Sorbonne, Bologna, Geneva, and Heidelberg.

to rely on a method of trial and error and sometimes built on sites which later turned out to be inadequate. The Boston settlers soon shifted from Charlestown to Beacon Hill. Manhattan, an ideal location for a small trading post, qualified less well for a future metropolis than the plains west of the Hudson.

Function

A particular function of a city sometimes can be performed only at a certain site. If this function is to be performed at all, the location is determined by nature. Whether the location is actually used for an urban settlement depends on the cultural stage of a society and the demand for specific activities. Fishing places, shipping ports, spas, and mining centers can be set up only at specific sites, but they do not come into being unless demand creates the necessary opportunity.

There are other functions which give man a greater freedom of choice. Though not completely random, there is considerable leeway within a given region for the choice of an urban site. Service centers for rural areas, market towns, distribution centers, and production centers are outstanding instances. The sites of service and market towns seem to support the central-place hypothesis, for they are always centrally located. However, this fact is the effect rather than the cause. Wherever an urban settlement exists, it can always be construed as the center of its surrounding rural region. Each urban place attracts rural customers from the neighborhood and needs deliveries from adjacent farms. Consequently, service centers and local markets can be located within a more or less large range.

Similar conditions exist with respect to production centers, particularly if the raw material has to be imported. Akron, Ohio, became the rubber center by choice rather than by necessity. Perhaps it would have been advantageous to manufacture tires and other rubber products near a port where the material is unloaded, thereby reducing the cost of transportation. Obviously it was still more advantageous to produce tires not too far from the centers of automobile production. It is equally evident that in either case the rubber manufacturers had a choice of several places.

While furniture manufacturers prefer sites close to a lumber region such as Michigan, the actual choice of Grand Rapids was only one of many possibilities. Hollywood, as the center of the motion-picture industry, Danbury, Connecticut, as the center of hat factories, and Lynn, Massachusetts, as a shoe-production center are other examples. In none of these cases has the location been arbitrarily selected, but there was always a choice between several places.

Perhaps the best illustrations are furnished by cities which perform political functions. As a rule the capital is the most important city of a country but it is difficult to decide whether the political function was cause or effect.

Rome undoubtedly owes its rank to the historical events which made the Romans masters of an empire and later led to the successful establishment of the papacy and its claim of supreme rule over Christendom. In the case of London and Paris, the economic hegemony was powerful enough to obtain the political function. The city of Westminster, the seat of the kings, became a part of London, the seat of the merchants. The French kings, distrusting the Parisians, moved out of the city and finally built Versailles, but Paris remained the capital.

As previously mentioned, scarcely any capital is centrally located. London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Athens, Cairo, Oslo, Stockholm, Lisbon, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and many others are far from the center. It seems that an area is dominated from a commanding position near the periphery rather than the central area. This is also true of most of the larger cities which have not become political capitals, e.g., Yokohama, Milan, São Paulo, Toronto, Quebec, Chicago, Odessa, Alexandria, Calcutta, and Shanghai. Apparently the "gateway" position which opens and closes the entrance to an area or connects regions with each other is the most decisive factor in the location of great cities. At least most of the famous cities represent a gateway type.

The capitals of the American states exemplify both the elements of choice and its limits with respect to location. In many instances the capital was deliberately selected and the most important city did not become the capital. Again, the capital frequently has a peripheral location: Topeka, Kansas; Jefferson City, Missouri; Olympia, Washington; Sacramento, California, and others. The political function was sufficiently powerful to make the location a permanent urban settlement but not powerful enough to make the capital the dominant place of the state. Undoubtedly this is in part due to the rather restricted functions of state government, but even Washington, D.C., the seat of one of the most powerful governments of all time, remains a highly specialized urban type. If the government with its many thousands of employees were to move to some other place, the city would lose its significance.

Some further insight is gained by examining the position of cities which have been purposely founded in comparatively recent times. Practically all of them were established with one specific function in mind. In no instance was the choice made in a haphazard way, but sometimes the builders of these cities relied on rather unsound judgment. Some errors were corrected, as in the case of Boston, when the early settlers moved from Charlestown to Beacon Hill.[18] In the case of Alexandria the Nile Delta was the given area but there was a considerable choice of specific sites. The case of Washington, D.C., is similar. There are also instances proving that man can force his will upon nature, although instances of cities which survived adverse natural

[18] For other examples of corrections see Richard Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values*, New York, 1911.

conditions are not too frequent. Valparaiso has "the most unsuitable position" for a large city. "The port is not among the safest and the space for the city is but a shore, 200 feet wide, between ocean and rocky mountain walls." [19]

St. Petersburg owes its existence to the whim and stubbornness of Peter the Great; its location is very unfavorable for the ground is marshy. "By order of the sovereign, no stone house was to be built in the rest of the empire till a certain number had been set up in the new capital. . . . Piles had to be driven for months before there was any foundation for the city. In this task all were employed, even nobles; but the main burden fell on the peasants. They were taken by forcible recruitment from their squires." [20] That such cases depend on the availability of forced labor and low building costs scarcely needs to be mentioned.

History also provides examples of cities which after thorough destruction rose again on the same site. Troy, which was rebuilt ten times, is the best-known example. On the other hand, many great cities have completely disappeared: Ur, Nineveh, Tyre, and Persepolis. Of some, such as Tartessus, no trace is left. Still others, e.g., Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, fell so utterly into oblivion that it was a surprise when their remnants were excavated.

Thus a certain amount of chance and arbitrariness in the location of some urban places must be conceded.[21] The most recent creation of production centers in Siberia and the various settlements connected with atomic research support this statement. But all these cases are rather exceptional. As a rule, man finds it more convenient to follow the lead of nature than to oppose it.

To sum up: There is no general rule which determines the location of urban settlements. Nature offers certain advantages of which man can avail himself. Whether he chooses a "natural" site depends on the accuracy of his judgment and on the cultural conditions of a specific society. The reasons for selecting a site differ with the function of the city. Sometimes the particular qualities of the site are decisive (fortresses, ports, or mining towns). More frequently the relationship of the site to a larger area is the main determining force. It seems that a peripheral rather than a central location offers the greatest advantage. Communication lines also play an important role (gateways, break in transportation, rivers, and harbors). Certain elements of chance fit no theory. To some extent man has learned to master nature and can locate his settlements despite adverse natural conditions.

[19] Ratzel, *op. cit.*, p. 156. A more modern case is Los Angeles, situated in a remote border part, isolated by mountains and deserts, with practically no rural environment and insufficient sources of water (cf. Queen and Carpenter, *The American City*, p. 69).

[20] Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1944, p. 209.

[21] Ratzel (*op. cit.*, p. 155) was of the same opinion.

Chapter 5

ECOLOGICAL PATTERNS OF THE CITY

The spatial arrangements of rural settlements depend primarily on geographical conditions. The farmer selects a site on the basis of the quality of the land and its suitability for the particular type of agricultural activities which he wants to pursue. This kind of selection may be called "individualistic" because it considers—in principle at least—only the fitness of the isolated farm and disregards the neighborhood. For a number of reasons one farm area may be preferred to other areas, but the farmer knows no "desirable" section in the sense that certain locations within a given rural area enjoy a greater social prestige. Consequently, spatial arrangements are irregular and follow no rules.

In striking contrast, urban settlements form distinct, regular patterns, which can be seen, measured, described, and explained. A city is not a haphazard conglomerate of dwellings; there is a clearly distinguishable spatial order of urban activities. The sectional differences within a city do not arise from "natural," that is, geographical conditions, although these sometimes play a role, but from social considerations which create for each part of an urban place a different evaluation and a different function.

A city is a multifunctional settlement, serving many purposes. A specific place is assigned to every function, thus making the city an integrated whole consisting of different units. The functional assignment is rarely due to legal measures or to a deliberate, concerted action of the community; it is the result of social forces and processes which in turn are conditioned by institutional values, by traditions and customs of a specific culture. Three of these processes are of particular importance: (1) differentiation of functions, (2) class separation, and (3) cultural segregation.

Differentiation of Functions. It is only "natural" that people should live where they work. They still do so on farms and they did so for a long time in towns. The king lived in his castle, the soldiers in their barracks, and the priests in their temples. The workshop of the artisan was a part of his dwelling. In the early times of manufacturing, residence, office, and workshop were frequently in one single dwelling.

Modern industrial development made separation inevitable; improved mass-transportation systems facilitated and accelerated the process. But

technical change alone cannot explain the thoroughness of the process; residences and working places could still coexist in the same section and this, indeed, is often the case outside the English-speaking world. Separation would hardly have become so complete without the Anglo-Saxon preferences for homeownership, for the single-family building, for gardening, for privacy, and for independence. The separation of work and residence is now a necessity; to live as far as possible from office or factory is by no means necessary. People who work in Wall Street must live elsewhere, but that bankers prefer to live in Scarsdale or Greenwich or some other place 20 miles or more away is the result of social forces, institutional values, and preferences peculiar to a specific culture.

The outcome of this interplay of technical and cultural factors is not the functional differentiation of buildings but the functional separation of whole areas: the division of residential and business sections.

The consequences of this split are far-reaching. The life of the city dweller is sharply divided between work and home, while for the farmer both form an indivisible unit. Also, the life of the urban worker is now geared to a schedule over which he has little control; he must conform to office hours and train schedules. Of even greater consequence is the fact that the urban worker can see his family only in his spare hours; family life—still a totality on the farm—is now limited to leisure time. Here lie the roots of the serious problems confronting the urban family.

Once the separation of residential and business areas has become established the functional differentiation continues, based on the principle that not only the quality of the home has to be considered but also the area in which the home is situated.[1] The American idea, with some exceptions, is to live in a one-family house. Bachelors, transients, sick and old people, low-income families, and others are better served by different types of housing: two-family homes, multiple dwellings, tenements, apartment houses, boardinghouses, hotels, and institutions. Each of these types represents functional variations of the same pattern; that these various types are not arranged in a haphazard way but are sectionally separated is the salient point. Moreover, there is a distinct order of succession; the apartment houses are nearest to the business sections; then come the three-, two-, and finally the one-family homes. This order is partly the result of deliberate planning—housing ordinances—and partly caused by differences in land values.

In a similar way business sections undergo a process of functional differentiation and similar types of activities are concentrated in specific areas. Thus we find a civic center and a shopping center, areas with light and others with heavy industries, amusement sections, and so on. The larger the city

[1] The following does not refer to the division into "desirable" and "undesirable" sections. This distinction is based on subjective value judgments and not (or not entirely) on objective facts; it is cultural rather than functional.

the greater the number of subdivisions. Factors which account for these subdivisions are again different land values,[2] location,[3] the advantages which proximity offers to the same type of business, and, in some instances, tradition.

Although the tendency to separate business and residential areas is reinforced by strict zoning laws, exceptions are possible under certain conditions. No residential section can be kept completely free from business. It is feasible to live miles away from one's business, but it is impossible to live without certain services which by their very nature have to be close at hand. No residential section can be too far away from churches, schools, filling stations, grocers, and the variety of shops known as "convenience" or "neighborhood" stores. As every attempt is made to keep these business activities concentrated, the result is the emergence of a secondary business center around the main artery of a residential section. This means a partial decentralization of some institutional activities, of retail trade, and of certain services. Areas which started as sections composed entirely of residences acquire a core or a nucleus of business buildings and, if enlarged, of business streets. We speak then of "polynucleation," indicating that larger settlements are unable to concentrate business activities in one single section. But the central business district is always able to maintain its economic hegemony; the other nuclei are much smaller and limited in their activities.

Class Separation. Another urban feature is found wherever more differentiated social systems exist: the separation of classes. In the large cities of antiquity and in the medieval towns there was a clearly discernible tripartition of living quarters: the palaces of the elite, the houses of the common man, and the huts of the poor. The result was not a functional but a structural differentiation, mirrored in ecological patterns of not only different types of residential buildings but also in different types of residential sections: upper-, middle-, and low-class housing zones.

Class distinction is based on several criteria: location, type, size, quality, state of repair, and "accessories." The location is often but not always determined by objective factors. Stuyvesant Square, although surrounded by run-down buildings, is an exclusive area in Manhattan; Louisburg Square, close to a slum, is one of the most aristocratic quarters in Boston. These sections owe their rank to the prestige which clings to them from former times. If prestige is lacking, people look for other distinctions. A high elevation is desirable. There are good reasons for this preference: there is less smoke and less danger of water getting into basements. Since traffic and industry try to avoid elevations, there is also less noise. But the value which

[2] For example, industries which take up much space cannot afford sites with high land values.

[3] Shipping business concentrates close to piers; department stores tend to be located near transportation centers.

is ascribed to these areas is also social in character: "to live on the hilltop" has become an obsession with the snob. To live next to a park or a wooded area is also a mark of social distinction; houses which border on a park enjoy the objective advantage of fresh air and the social amenity of not having another house across the street, whose window-peeping residents might be annoying.

The evaluation of a water front depends on conditions. If the seashore or lake shore is used for industrial purposes, we find low-class residential sections; if business is kept out, the area is suitable for upper-class housing. Thus the southern part of Manhattan with its piers consists of two slums, the Lower West Side and the Lower East Side, while the northern East Side near Carl Schurz Park is distinctly a section of the very rich. Riverside Drive, although also a high-rental area, carries little social prestige, which indicates that natural factors alone are not enough to create highly desirable sections. River fronts are less in demand by upper classes; they constitute a "flat," and there is often danger of inundation.

Relations to other locations play an important role. Upper-class people, who do not have to punch a time clock and can afford to be late, live away from the main, noisy thoroughfares, but they want their homes at points which give convenient access to highways and are not too far away from the main stops for commuters. Areas which are difficult to reach are sometimes low house-value regions and serve as habitats for those who cannot afford higher prices. Thus we find in the suburbs all three classes, but neatly separated. The middle classes live near convenient transportation points; in Queens, New York, for instance, sections served by the Independent Subway system, which is more modern, represent upper-middle-class areas fetching higher rents than other parts served by the two older subway systems. The upper classes live in more distant areas where a car is a necessity, at least to reach a train. The low-income groups live in-between but always in compact settlements, e.g., Corona or Woodside, Long Island. For this reason we find that the extremes—both the rich and the poor—live farthest away from the center; the rich because they can take their time before they start for their day's work, and the poor because they cannot pay higher rents. But the poorest of all, for whom even the cost of transportation to low-class suburban sections is beyond reach, live close to the main business districts, possibly within walking distance of their working places, thereby saving carfare.

The most undesirable locations are those next to railroad tracks, and sites adjacent to establishments creating noise, unpleasant odors, and smoke: chemical industries, stockyards, freight depots, and piers. Only those who have no other choice live in these areas which invariably become slums.

Types of homes also conform to class structure. The rich live in mansions, town houses, penthouses and other de luxe apartments, and in exclu-

sive residential hotels. The middle classes occupy standard one-family homes, or good but not too expensive apartments. The lower classes live in cheaper one-family homes, apartments, or multiple dwellings, ranging from two to six families. The poorest are herded into tenements, cold-water flats, basement apartments, and shacks.

The size of the home reveals not only class distinction but standards of living which, in general, are higher in urban America than elsewhere. During the last twenty-five years there has been a trend toward class equalization which has not yet come to a standstill. The upper classes have been forced to reduce the size of their homes. In Manhattan no private residence covers an entire city block. The last one was the palace of the steel magnate Schwab, which stood empty for years and had to be razed because it could neither be sold nor rented at any price; the maintenance costs were much too high.[4] Large apartments—fifteen to twenty rooms—are similarly disappearing. The process of shrinking has now reached the middle-class apartments; many people can no longer afford to have a living and a dining room. They are replaced by a combined living-dining "area," dining alcoves, or dinettes, which are actually a part of the kitchen.

Conversely, the sizes of homes for the below-average income groups has increased but the differences are still considerable. Rich people have separate bedrooms for every person, studies, libraries, game rooms, servants' quarters, and guest rooms. The upper middle classes frequently have at least one spare bedroom, while low-income groups often are forced to use the living room as an additional bedroom. The poorest have entirely inadequate quarters, and the necessity for crowding persons of different ages and sexes into the same bedroom and the lack of space for work and play causes some of the most dangerous evils of city life.[5]

That the quality of a house reflects financial conditions needs no elaboration. The state of repair indicates perhaps more than other signs whether a person can maintain his class status. No other part of the family budget is more open to public inspection than the maintenance of a home. This keeps the "marginal man," the person who has a precarious standing in the group to which he wants to belong, under great emotional and financial strain. He may cut "invisible" expenses and make substantial sacrifices with regard to

[4] For the same reason de luxe mansions outside cities are also likely to disappear. Many Long Island estates have been broken up and replaced by one-family homes which are still expensive but within the budgetary means of well-to-do people. Whitemore Hall, just outside Philadelphia, was built for $2,500,000 as late as 1920 by one of the nation's richest men. Set in a park of 300 acres, it had 130 rooms, including twenty-nine bathrooms. In 1944, a time of prosperity, a chemical corporation bought it for less than 7 per cent of its cost—$167,000—to be used as a research laboratory (see *Fortune,* October, 1951).

[5] The size of a home is not indicative of class status if only the number of rooms is considered. What matters is the number of rooms per person.

food or vacation rather than lose face while others, not threatened by social demotion, will neglect their homes rather than forgo ordinary necessities or amenities.

The "accessories" also reveal class status not only for the financial outlay involved but because they indicate the life style which a specific class wants to maintain. There are class distinctions with respect to gardens, ranging from formal ones with expensive flowers to miserable back yards where only weeds grow. There are similar variations in bathrooms (in size, type, and number), in kitchen and laundry facilities, in the existence or nonexistence of finished basements and attics, garages, delivery entrances, screens, awnings, and storm windows. At the bottom are the shacks and cold-water flats, characterized by paper-thin walls, leaking ceilings, and creaking floors. There is still a considerable number of homes which have no running water, no bath, no gas or electricity, even no toilet. Table 3 indicates the extent of these

Table 3. Housing Conditions in Selected American Cities

	No running water, per cent	No electricity or gas, per cent	No toilet, per cent	No bath, per cent
Wichita, Kans.	10.5	3.0	13.3	15.6
Spokane, Wash.	4.4	2.0	3.4	20.6
Fort Wayne, Ind.	1.7	0.3	3.1	19.9
Knoxville, Tenn.	5.0	10.3	9.8	31.6
Bridgeport, Conn.	0.8	0.7	0.8	14.5

Source: United States Census, 1940.

conditions in five cities in 1940. As can be seen, nearly one-third of the houses in Knoxville in 1940 did not have adequate bathing facilities.

The sectional separation of classes rests on several factors. The economic impact of housing is the most potent force. The costs of houses, rentals, and maintenance form an insurmountable barrier between classes. It may be added that this separation is inevitable in any system having considerable income differences; for this reason it exists in Soviet Russia but not in some primitive societies.

One of the main reasons—but by no means the only one—for this kind of class division is the fact that no economic system, past or present, has so far succeeded in providing adequate housing for a price within the reach of even the average income. Edith Elmer Wood [6] has stated the problem as follows: "In our modern industrial civilization, the distribution of income is such that a substantial portion of the population cannot pay a commercial

[6] Edith Elmer Wood, *Recent Trends in American Housing,* New York, 1931.

rent, much less a commercial purchase price, for a home fulfilling the minimum health and decency requirements."

This statement needs two corrections. First, the industrial civilization undoubtedly added to the problem by crowding underpaid workers into urban places, but it also improved the situation for many workers who now enjoy housing conditions better than the large majority ever dreamed of. With the exception of a few comparatively well-to-do peasants, housing conditions in preindustrial societies have been and still are worse than in our own system. The houses of all primitives ordinarily consist of only one room, and even among highly civilized nations, India and China, for instance, the situation is hardly better. Second, an equalization of income would have little or no effect on satisfactory housing. In 1949 the median consumer income in the United States was $2,700; the mean (or arithmetic average) was $3,270 per spending unit.[7] A sound rule of thumb states that not more than one-fourth of an income should be spent for housing (actually many spend less). This means that a complete equalization of income (which is quite utopian) would permit every family to spend a maximum of $67.50 per month for rent, heat, and utilities. Because of rent freezing, which creates an artifical situation,[8] some satisfactory apartments can still be rented at this price. But it is, at the present price level, quite impossible to build any decent and healthy three-room unit, let alone larger units needed for families with more than one child, for a price at which the rent could be as low as $67.50.[9] Without minimizing the importance and possibility of social improvements, it seems clear that the main problem is technological in character; we must improve our building techniques to have better and cheaper homes. Tables 4 and 5 show the existing inequality and class divisions for five cities with a population between 100,000 and 150,000 for the year 1940.

Table 4. Percentage of Owner-occupied Homes

	Value in dollars					
	Under $1,500	$1,500–$3,000	$3,000–$5,000	$5,000–$7,500	$7,500–$10,000	$10,000 over
Wichita	22.8	34.5	25.8	11.2	5.3	0.5
Spokane	2.7	59.6	26.4	8.2	1.5	1.5
Fort Wayne	5.7	24.9	40.5	21.2	4.1	3.5
Knoxville	28.9	35.0	21.2	8.3	5.8	1.0
Bridgeport	4.6	30.5	33.0	19.3	6.9	5.9

Source: United States Census, 1940.

[7] *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August, 1950, p. 949.

[8] This does not imply that rent freezing under given conditions is unsound.

[9] Theoretically, complete equality of income would mean that the rent for an apartment presently priced at $67.50 must go up, since higher-priced homes pay proportionately more real-estate taxes, thereby indirectly subsidizing the less expensive homes.

Table 5. Percentage of Rented Dwellings

	Monthly rental				
	Under $15	$15–$30	$30–$50	$50–$100	$100 and over
Wichita	25.5	43.8	23.0	7.0	0.7
Spokane	22.8	48.1	22.9	5.6	0.6
Fort Wayne	8.5	41.2	39.2	10.0	1.1
Knoxville	43.1	33.8	16.5	5.7	0.9
Bridgeport	9.8	50.4	30.3	8.2	1.3

Source: United States Census, 1940.

The class division in housing reveals more than an ability to spend; it also shows a willingness to spend. The latter depends on the evaluation of goods and services within the possibilities of a given family budget. Even the low-income budget is more elastic than is commonly realized. The difficulty of living within a given budget stems only in part from the task of meeting biological necessities. It is more difficult to live up to class standards, that is, to the social value ascribed to certain budget items. The middle classes have a tendency to sacrifice "invisible" expenditures for the sake of "visible" ones because the latter are subject to control by outsiders. The lower classes prefer the opposite procedure. Unfortunately, accurate statistical data are not available. But there is little doubt that the manual worker spends, at least proportionately, more for food than the white-collar employee. Manual work, of course, calls for more food, but the manual worker also spends proportionately more for liquor, sometimes much more than he can afford. Similarly, expenses for automobiles often are higher than justified. The budget is balanced by cuts in costs for housing and clothing. These are just the items which the middle classes can ill afford to neglect. Consequently, the middle classes spend comparatively more for housing and cut expenses for food, drink, and (more rarely) automobiles. No other group save farmers has a higher percentage of teetotalers than the lower brackets of the middle classes.

The difference in budgeting partly explains why middle and lower classes still live in separate quarters although the income difference is sometimes negligible; in many instances skilled manual workers have higher incomes than office workers but the latter try to live in better districts.

Note on the Function of Class Distinction in Housing.[10] If a social system is firmly established and accepted by all groups, if the class division is strict

[10] Systematically the following remarks do not belong to this chapter. However, it seems convenient to close the discussion of class division in housing with a brief analysis of an important but frequently neglected aspect.

and rigid, and if the differences in life style are so great that the lower classes cannot hope that they will ever reach the standards of the upper classes, the impact of housing on social change is nil. A glance into the past reveals that the gaps between the palaces of the rich and the homes of the middle classes and the huts of the poor were too wide to be bridged. It was impossible to reach standards comparable to those of a higher group in the social scale; besides, to live beyond one's own station was considered illegitimate and was frequently forbidden by law. Everyone accepted his own status, which implied certain standards of housing. Accordingly, housing conditions remained stationary, showing sharp contrasts. For centuries the elite dwelled in luxury, the middle groups in modest comfort, and the poor in squalor; such was the case in medieval Europe, in Russia until the end of the eighteenth century, and in Asiatic countries up to the present.

If the system becomes less rigid and if its justice is being challenged, if the lower groups make economic and cultural advances and gain in self-respect, the situation changes. In the late Middle Ages, for example, rich merchants, aware of their wealth and importance, began to remove the barriers which distinguished their standards from those of the noblemen. The titled aristocracy, no longer sure of their own position, accepted the change more or less gracefully. The house which the "royal merchant" Jacques Le Coeur built for himself in Bourges did not differ in style from the palaces of the counts; similar instances occurred in Flanders, in Holland, in the cities of the Hanseatic League, and in Italy. The result was mainly that the wealthy traders moved up and finally merged with the aristocracy.

In the last three centuries, however, Western society has shown a marked tendency to remove sharp class divisions. There are now gradual shades; the transition is sometimes so imperceptible that it is impossible to tell to which group a person belongs. The concept of a "station" is no longer legitimate; stability has given way to mobility and changes of status occur daily. Under these conditions the upper classes fulfill a function which they did not intend to assume; they set standards which the lower classes try to emulate with at least partial success. This is still a gradual process; tenants in the slums do not try to live in mansions, but each group orients itself to the standards of the next higher group. The result is a total improvement in the housing standards of the entire nation. This has to be understood in terms of sound living conditions rather than in terms of conspicuous consumption; for palatial homes are not the ideal, nor would it be realistic to believe that everyone could live in a palace. But slums, though still squalid, have become less dismal, the homes of the underprivileged more sanitary, and the lower middle classes now enjoy a modest comfort. One hundred years ago only the houses of the very rich had bathrooms; today apartments without bathrooms are rare. It is true that this is possible only because the economic situation of the lower groups has improved and because mass production and technological

ingenuity make it feasible to offer to the masses what once had been beyond their means. But this does not change the fact that the upper classes set the standards which afterward the lower groups try to attain, and that the upper groups introduce the innovations which finally lead to a general improvement. The process is accelerated by modern mass communications. People learn from newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and motion pictures how wealthier groups live, and they try to approximate similar standards. The information is not always sound and the attempts to reach a higher level are not always crowned with success but the general advance is undeniable. As has been pointed out, the result is the gradual disappearance of the extremes, palatial homes and substandard dwellings, and a likewise gradual improvement of the standards between the extremes. The differences have not vanished but are less marked; equalization has neither been achieved nor is it probable that it will occur in the foreseeable future. For reasons discussed above, a perfect equalization may not be wholly desirable since it might impede further improvements. Where perfect equality exists, as among many primitive groups, little improvement has been made.

Cultural Segregation. In the foregoing discussion classes have been considered mainly as economic divisions of society. But the analysis of the factors accounting for the separate residential sections of manual and white-collar workers has already indicated that to approach the problem merely in terms of income and possessions is an oversimplification. While some people, for whatever reason, make substantial sacrifices to live in better quarters, other persons of considerable means—movers, butchers, grocers, dealers in secondhand clothes—sometimes live in rather poor sections. They do so because they share the values of the group from which they come and to which they still belong, though they have moved up economically. They would feel ill at ease in the company of people with distinctly different cultural standards.

A substantial income is one of the prerequisites for the acceptance of an outsider by the upper classes; it can help a family to achieve a higher status, but already established members of the upper strata frequently maintain their status with incomes below the level of their group. Class status is much more cultural and less economic in character than many realize. Class differences are more than mere differences in spending power. Where the Puritan spirit still prevails and conspicuous consumption is abhorred, it is not easy to distinguish the millionaire from the man who just ekes out a meager living; yet they live in different quarters.

Different classes work in the same offices or plants but live separately. Class distinction becomes visible as residential separation; the ecological importance of class difference lies in the fact that different classes live in different areas. Here the economic element returns: the upper classes represent so small a fraction of the population—hardly 5 per cent—that the eco-

logical effect would be negligible if the areas were allotted according to the numerical distributions. But the upper classes take up much more than their proportional space; they occupy a considerable part of any town. Consequently, the density of an urban area increases as the class status decreases.

The ecological importance of cultural segregation lies in the fact that it is by no means limited to class segregation. In American cities, with their aggregation of groups representing a large variety of cultures, segregation has become a most conspicuous phenomenon.

If immigrants move into a culturally uniform territory, they tend to concentrate in some section, usually the least desirable. Poor Italians, coming to Paris, live around the Porte d'Italie, a slum quarter. Czechs, migrating to Vienna between 1880 and 1910, lived in the tenth district, also an area of the poor. But this kind of segregation was frowned upon by the population; it threatened to build up minorities and jeopardized the uniformity of the city. In America, however, cultural segregation has been approved as an institution since the earliest colonial times. Instances of organized immigrant groups, intending to retain their native cultural traits in the foreign country, are numerous. If groups differ in culture, they tend to keep apart, at least socially. The cultural differences become structural differences. The emphasis on structure has its ecological consequences. Structural units have a tendency toward spatial separation.

At present residential areas of American cities are subdivided into sections inhabited by various groups which are culturally different. The cultural differences stem from racial, religious, and national differences. None of the cultural differences are based on inherited biological traits; all of them are acquired. If a group, due to one or more of these differences, becomes socially isolated, it will develep its own culture which is passed on from one generation to the next. The group, becoming aware of its specific character, also develops the typical "consciousness of kind," accompanied by "we-feeling." As a further consequence, the group usually evolves a more or less intensive ethnocentrism; the members of the group are "better," and so are their mores, while other groups are in some way regarded as "inferior," or at least "less desirable," as partners in marriage and business, as neighbors, or as club members.

The preference for the in-group and the latent or overt rejection of outgroups leads toward segregation. But actual segregation depends on several factors, among which the following play the most decisive role:

1. Numbers. No segregation takes place unless the minority is substantial. A small group of outsiders might be socially rejected but spatial segregation will not arise.[11]

[11] Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods,* Washington, 1939, p. 68, makes the following statement with respect to the segregation of Negroes: "Either a large non-white population in absolute numbers or a high percentage of non-

2. Economic position. The lower the income of the minority group, the more likely segregation becomes.

3. Degree of cultural deviation from established American standards. If the minority group conforms closely to these standards, segregation is less likely to occur.

4. Degree of traditional, institutionalized rejection of a minority group. The most significant case is that of the Negro, especially in the South. The segregation of the Negro is the only instance of spatial separation which cannot be overcome without breaking down institutional views of large parts of the population.

5. Class status. Segregation tends to occur more on the highest and lowest levels of the social hierarchy.[12] This is an interesting point because low-class groups are less resentful against the intrusion of outsiders than are upper-class members. But nearly all segregated sections either are low-class sections or the restricted residential zones of the few "old-stock" families.

6. Degree of conservatism. The term "conservatism" is used here in a psychological sense without any political connotations. The more conservative a group, the stronger the desire to retain the existing culture and to reject the cultural system of the majority. The group therefore tries to restrict contacts and spatial separation helps to serve this purpose.

Types of Spatial Separation. There are three main stages or aspects of spatial separation: restriction, concentration, and segregation proper.

Restriction means the exclusion of one or more groups from a certain area. What is commonly called restriction frequently applies only to certain buildings, hotels, restaurants, clubs, swimming pools, and the like and does not cover an entire area. If so, there are no ecological consequences. Even a larger area from which a minority is excluded does not necessarily constitute a cultural unit because people of many origins can still live there together. The closest approach to ecological restriction is represented by the few blocks or "private streets" [13] which a selected group of the upper class is able to keep from being invaded by outsiders. However, in one respect restriction has considerable ecological consequences: the actual exclusion of Negroes from large residential sections. If, as in this case, restriction is practiced on a large scale, the result is segregation. Restriction has its roots in the preference for living with one's own group but it also stresses rejection by other groups.

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white persons in the total population is necessary to produce concentrated (segregated) areas." This is applicable to all minority groups.

[12] The terms "high" and "low" indicate no moral evaluation. They reflect still less the attitude of the author. They simply refer to an existing order of rank as generally accepted by a given society.

[13] In St. Louis, for instance; cf. Queen and Carpenter, *The American City,* New York, 1953, pp. 162–163.

In concentration the desire to be close to friends is prevalent and restriction plays at best a minor role. In particular, immigrants want to live in the neighborhood of their own people for they need their advice and guidance. As in the case of restriction, concentration simply means that a given section shows a disproportionately large number of people of the same origin. Indian Orchard, for example, is a section of Springfield, Massachusetts, where Poles concentrate. There is a greater statistical probability of finding Poles in a block in Indian Orchard than in other blocks. But the area is not Polish; it is mixed. However, concentration may continue until the majority belongs to one specific national or racial or religious group.

Ecologically speaking, there are no sharp divisions between concentration and segregation. One shades gradually into the other. However, strict and complete segregation exists only on a legal basis. In this case the law allots to a minority group a clearly defined separated area; all members of that group must live there and others must not live there. This kind of segregation is unknown in the United States. The closest approximations to this type are the Indian reservations, which as rural settlements have no bearing on this discussion. Non-Indians are excluded from living on the reservations but Indians are free to live elsewhere. The best example of complete segregation was the medieval ghetto,[14] a section where all Jews were forced to live and non-Jews were forbidden to reside.

When there are no legal restraints, the establishment of a segregated area depends on the interplay of three independent variables, namely:

1. The numerical strength of a minority
2. The restrictions effectively imposed by the majority on the minority
3. The intensity of the desire of the minority to retain its cultural identity

or, in other words, its resistance against Americanization

It goes without saying that very small groups cannot establish ecological areas. Where only a few Negroes live, there is no Harlem. Walla Walla, Washington, whose Negro population is negligible in numbers, knows no segregation because segregation is impractical. Thus we find segregated Japanese areas in the West but none in the East, a German section in New York but not in Savannah.

The tendency to reject groups having a different cultural background is a trait of most human beings, but the intensity of the rejection varies not only with the personality of the individual but also with the institutionalized attitudes of the group to which he belongs. Whether this tendency is strong enough to lead to effective spatial separation rests on three main factors: (1) the extent of institutional rejection, (2) the class status of the rejecting group, and (3) the class status of the rejected group.

[14] On the ghetto in former times and its modern derivation see Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, 1928.

Bogardus [15] made explicit the existence of institutionalized rejection patterns in American society. Contrary to what many still believe, Bogardus's study proved that the native, white, old American stock is tolerant; there is no *complete* rejection of any racial, religious, or national group.[16] Only an insignificant number would exclude some groups from this country. But the majority showed definite patterns of spatial rejections. Only the English, Canadians, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, and French were more or less unreservedly accepted as street neighbors. The Welsh, hardly a conspicuous group, were not desirable neighbors to two out of ten people and one-fourth or more objected to Swedes, Dutch, Norwegians, and Danes. All other groups met with a higher degree of resistance, from which we can conclude that spatial restrictions do not become effective unless a group is rejected by more than 25 per cent of the population.

Bogardus did not show the regional variations of institutional rejection. There is no doubt that the rejection of the Negro is much stronger in the South than in the North, though it is sufficiently strong everywhere to make restrictions effective. The rejection of Orientals is much stronger in the West than in the East, while the Mountain regions and the Far West display less institutionalized rejection of Eastern Jews than the Northeast.

Class status plays a twofold role in segregation. The middle classes are most insistent on segregation.[17] The upper classes—as long as they are socially and economically secure—are not threatened by other groups and easily preserve their identity and status without discrimination against any group. The lower classes, having little status to lose and being less sensitve to deviations from established cultural standards, do not mind if foreign elements intrude. The marginal and, therefore, precarious position of the middle classes, and their apparent desire not only to preserve their status but to improve it, accounts for the intensity of their resentment and resistance toward newcomers. Any acceptance of inferior or nontraditional standards endangers their emotional security as well as their social position.

Segregated areas—with the exception of those occupied by Negroes—are usually the residences of low-class members of minority groups. The upper and

[15] Emory S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes,* Boston, 1928; see also "A Social Distance Scale," *Sociology and Social Research,* vol. 17, 1933. Similar conclusions were reached by a different method devised by L. L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *Journal of General Psychology,* vol. 1, 1928.

[16] The study is not quite conclusive; the high rejection ratio of Turks, for instance, is at variance with attitudes observed by other means than the social distance scale.

[17] This does not contradict the foregoing statement that segregation occurs more frequently at the upper and lowest levels. We are now discussing attitudes, not areas. The attitudes of the middle classes do not lead to the establishment of segregated areas; middle-class groups tend to live in mixed sections. But their attitudes are sufficiently effective to keep some minority groups out of the area. This is partial exclusion, sometimes leading to minority concentration in other areas but not necessarily to segregation.

middle classes of these groups might be excluded from some restricted areas but they are not forced to live in segregated sections. Sometimes, though, they live in areas of concentration.

Finally, the desire to retain cultural identity varies from group to group according to the relative strength of institutionalized values and the degree to which the inherited culture differs from American standards. There are some cultural values which an individual does not want to give up, particularly his religion. There are, however, traits which he cannot get rid of even if he wants to, particularly his accent, which always betrays him as an outsider.

The existence of spatially separated cultural areas for whites is largely due to *self-segregation.* Most people who live in segregated areas do so because they prefer to live among their own kind. This preference is based on a variety of motivating forces. There is, first, the rejection of American values. Ethnocentrism, the tendency to regard all other cultures as inferior to one's own, is an attitude by no means restricted to the majority; it is a general human trait. The difference lies in the outcome. Minorities suffer from the ethnocentrism of the majority. The majority cannot be hurt either economically or emotionally by any overt or covert act of discrimination. A contemptible reference to his nationality will hurt an Italian in America; it might enrage him in Italy but he will not feel humiliated; the social situation is reversed.

The longing for emotional security, the desire to avoid hostile or unfriendly contacts, thus contributes to the fostering of segregation. In the case of children segregation decreases the chances of unpleasant experiences. Children are more vulnerable and sensitive than adults and they tend to take ridicule, contempt, and hatred much harder. Children are also more likely to display their antagonism toward other groups overtly and to create group conflicts which most adults avoid. The following passage from John Dos Passos' *The 42d Parallel,*[18] though fictitious, portrays realistically both the cruelty and suffering of children.

> Some evenings, when Mom felt poorly, Fain had to go further, round the corner past Maginni's, down Riverside Avenue where the trolley ran, and across the little river. . . . Across the river all the way to the corner of Riverside and Main, where the drugstore was, lived Bohunks and Polaks. Their kids were always fighting with the kids of the Murphys and O'Haras and O'Flanagans who lived on Orchard Street.
>
> Fainy would walk along with his knees quaking, the medicine bottle in the white paper tight in one mittened hand. At the corner of Quince was a group of boys he'd have to pass. Passing wasn't so bad, it was when he was about twenty yards from them that the first snowball would hum by his ear. There was no comeback. If he broke into a run they'd chase him. If he dropped the medicine bottle he'd be beaten up when he got home. . . . "Scared cat . . . Shanty Irish . . . Bowlegged Murphy

[18] New York, 1937, pp. 7–8. Used by permission.

. . . Running home to tell the cops, . . ." would yell the Polak and Bohunk kids between snowballs. They made their snowballs hard by pouring water on them and leaving them to freeze overnight, if one of those hit him it drew blood.

Segregation, however, although it reduces the number of actual conflicts, aggravates the latent tension between groups by slowing up the process of assimilation.

Economic factors also promote segregation. A segregated area is to some extent self-supporting. Doctors and lawyers more readily find patients and clients among their own people; similarly, the storekeeper whose scanty knowledge of English would be a handicap in other areas is at an advantage if he can talk to his customers in their native language.

Segregated sections, being mainly the living quarters of immigrants, also serve as shock absorbers. By passing through an intermediate step, the immigrant has less difficulty in adapting himself to a new cultural environment and is less socially isolated. The cultural change is less sudden.

While we have seen that there are some advantages in segregation, the disadvantages are patent. Segregation prevents or delays the integration of a community. At best, segregated groups live side by side but not together. The maintenance of cultural and emotional ties with the country of origin and the existence of hyphenated Americans creates misgivings in the minds of the majority and loyalty conflicts in times of crisis.

Adult immigrants often can achieve local segregation as well as a nearly complete cultural separation. Their children, however, are inevitably exposed to American cultural patterns and, as a rule, are quite willing to accept American standards. In many cases this leads to friction between the generations. To a certain extent such conflicts are inherent in the immigrant situation but segregation increases their probability and intensity. The children will want to leave the segregated area; the place and the parents become symbolically connected and both stand for everything which the younger generation rejects.

Because the second generation dislikes the segregated area, and since it is a low-class and slumlike section from which even the more successful immigrant tries to move, ecological segregation of white groups is bound to disappear unless new mass immigrations are permitted, which is unlikely. The segregated areas are ecological representations of a cultural transition which immigrants experience before complete assimilation is achieved. As a rule assimilation occurs in the third or fourth generation. Mass immigration practically stopped with the First World War, though restrictive legislation was enacted later.[19] We can expect that by the end of this century most of the segregated areas will have disappeared or changed to areas of concentration.

[19] The special laws permitting displaced persons to come to the United States in larger numbers have little influence on this situation. Owing to different policies, these immigrants have been dispersed all over the country and only a few have settled in segregated areas.

Because of their numerical strength and the difference in religion which impedes assimilation by intermarrying, sections of concentration peopled by Irish and Eastern Jews may last longer. Mexican segregation also may continue as immigration from that country is not restricted by quotas.

Thus the only lasting segregation which appears probable is that of the Negroes. Even if the present attitude of the majority were to be reversed, assimilation of a minority consisting of 15 million cannot be achieved in a comparatively short time. It is true that several thousands pass the color line every year; it is equally true that more and more Negroes can now live in mixed areas, but the bulk of the group will continue to live in spatial proximity until it has become biologically undistinguishable. An authority like Ralph Linton believes that the process of assimilation will be completed in three hundred years but his views have met considerable opposition. Similarly, Gunnar Myrdal's optimistic outlook is not shared by American sociologists.[20]

[20] See R. T. LaPiere, *Sociology,* New York, 1946, p. 447. For a still more pessimistic view see E. W. Eckard, "How Many Negroes Pass?" *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 52, no. 6, May, 1947.

Chapter 6

DYNAMICS: CHANGES IN ECOLOGICAL PATTERNS

1. Analysis

Ecological Implications of Urban Growth and Decline. In the foregoing chapter urban patterns were described as if a city were a static unit. But cities are always changing. Business expands or contracts, industries move in or out, people enter or leave. There is growth or decline in area and population. Changes in spatial arrangements and social conditions are the inevitable result. These changes alter the appearance of the city but not in a fortuitous way. They show a clearly distinguishable design, a definite order. As there are forces which shape the patterns of a city, there are other forces which change these patterns. These forces are sometimes polar; they coexist yet oppose each other.

For instance, there is always a tendency toward centralization as well as toward decentralization. The business district attracts new establishments of the same kind and the business area expands. With increasing economic activity the population increases and land values go up; so do taxes. Marginal businessmen, no longer able to compete with their stronger rivals, try to cut their expenses by moving to cheaper outlying localities. Similarly, the central shopping center can no longer satisfy the needs of the much larger population: subcenters and "convenience" stores spring up in residential areas, particularly in those farthest from the center. The result is multinucleation or polynucleation, a phenomenon discussed in the preceding chapter. In some cases business displaces residences and the residential areas are pushed toward the periphery. In other instances business recedes or certain areas become more attractive and establishments change their location.

Whether expansion or contraction occurs, the fringes of the business area are affected the most. An expanding business section causes flight from hitherto well-organized residential areas, land values immediately adjacent to the new business area begin to decline, and the whole border district deteriorates. If business deserts some areas, the values do not rise, for the relinquished blocks are not attractive as residences. But poor people may move into buildings hastily remodeled into cheap living quarters and a new slum has arisen. The decline of business areas is more rare than their expansion,

but in either case deterioration of the business-residential fringes is the usual result. In a similar way population growth and decline change the spatial features of a city. Again, decrease of population has been comparatively rare and in the last hundred years rapid urban growth has been the rule. Residential areas have become overcrowded, land values, taxes, and rents have risen, but people continued to move in. The result was at first a mass concentration and centralization of residential sections. But this process changed to or was accompanied by decentralization of residential sections. Three groups contributed to the new development: the upper classes who found it inconvenient to live in, or close to, congested areas, the poorest who could not afford to pay high rents, and the mixed group of all those who could not find adequate accommodations in already densely populated districts. Thus decentralization resulted in the emergence of different types of new residential areas: high-class sections with spacious homes built on large lots, middle-class settlements, especially of the garden-city variety, and aggregations of hastily erected, shabby houses for the lowest income group. The old sections did not remain as they were. A heavy population influx promotes the erection of apartment houses which partly or wholly replace one-family houses. Finally, the whole belt of one-family sections has moved toward the outskirts and beyond. At first the growing city builds additional homes on vacant lots, but many of them are scattered and do not permit any systematic development; the surplus population "spills over" and has to move outside the city limits: the suburb is created. As this process is repeated again and again, the spatial features also change. As long as the city grows in population and size, the richest keep on moving farther away from the center. Fashionable suburbs become middle-class sections and the upper classes build on new, formerly undeveloped land.

The outcome may be summarized as follows: In an expanding city the business centers tend to grow in size thereby dislocating residential areas. At the same time, residential areas show a centrifugal tendency by moving more and more toward the outskirts and beyond the city limits.

Structural Changes. A rise in urban population means more than a simple growth in numbers. The various city groups do not increase proportionately to their existing strength. The increase also changes the class structure and the ethnic divisions.

The changes have usually shown the following trends:

1. The lower classes increase at a greater rate than the upper classes.
2. Within the upper-income groups the *nouveaux riches* tend to encroach upon the established families by moving into their quarters.
3. Large and speedy growth of a city is invariably caused by influx from outside rather than the surplus of births over deaths; the influx is provided either by migrants from other parts of the country or by immigrants from abroad or both.

4. Negroes from the South are migrating in increasing numbers to Northern cities.

5. Because of variations in birth rate, occupational, and other differences, the ethnic groups increase at different rates, causing a shift in the distribution of nationalities.

6. This also affects the religious composition of most of the larger cities. Catholics and Jews tend to gain in proportion, while Protestants become proportionately less numerous.

These factors necessitate or facilitate certain spatial changes. The upper classes decrease in proportion but they can still sometimes remain in their areas. Frequently, however, they move from more centrally located areas to the outskirts. New, often restricted, high-class suburbs arise; generally the new de luxe sections are farther away from downtown than other suburbs. Geographical distance becomes as much a class distinction as social distance. This might be exemplified by Richard Dewey's [1] investigation of peripheral expansion in Milwaukee. He states:

> The clear-cut directional movement of the upper-class migration started with the move to the upper east side of Milwaukee proper, thence to Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, Fox Point, and River Hills. One climbs the social ladder by following this route, as is evidenced by the fact that the persons whose names are listed in the *Social Register* live almost exclusively in the areas named. Fox Point and River Hills have the greatest proportions of population listed in the *Social Register*.

When the richest families move out of an area, low-income groups move in, but they can ill afford to pay high rentals. The solution is found by conversion. One-family residences, once inhabited by middle-class groups, are converted into multiple dwellings, thereby reducing the rent per unit but increasing the income from the entire building. This results in deterioration of housing standards. The flight of middle-class families accelerates; they find a place in a formerly exclusive section, now abandoned by the rich for suburban homes. Or the middle classes, too, settle in suburban developments of a less expensive type. If the trend continues, many sections deteriorate into slums. The situation is aggravated by the fact that many newcomers are immigrants and accustomed to lower housing standards. As they usually have to work for the lowest wages, their income does not permit them to take proper care of homes already in a bad state of repair.

Ecological Dynamics: Infiltration, Invasion, Succession. The change in the distribution of ethnic groups which ordinarily live in segregated sections has its ecological implications. As the section becomes more crowded it can no longer house all those who want (or are expected) to live there. It cannot always expand, because the adjacent sections are often segregated areas,

[1] Richard Dewey, "Peripheral Expansion for Milwaukee County," *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1948.

crowded to capacity. Those who fail to find accommodations must look elsewhere. The ensuing development consists of three stages. The first might be called *infiltration.* One family attempts to find quarters in another section. If it succeeds, a few more of the same group frequently follow. Then the movement gains momentum. We speak of *invasion,* if larger groups of a usually segregated minority penetrate an area heretofore inhabited by other groups. After some time the population change becomes noticeable and the "old" residents take action.

An isolated infiltration might meet with resentment but it is as a rule of no great consequence. In middle-class sections the neighbors will shun newcomers and show that they are not wanted. The newcomers, used to discrimination and in no position to move again, have to endure the unpleasantness. Sometimes more radical steps are taken, either in advance by restrictive covenants which are legally unenforceable, by "gentlemen's agreements," or, if the law permits, by openly advertising that the neighborhood excludes members of certain groups. If these steps are insufficient, people try to buy off the intruders; there are sometimes molestations and demonstrations. Sometimes they succeed; more frequently they fail to achieve their purpose and the invasion continues.

Aside from occasional more serious outbursts, white "invaders" finally remain unmolested. But invasions by Negroes are in many instances met by use of force. People try "to take the law into their own hands" and, by terroristic methods, to prevent Negroes from moving in. A few years ago the white residents of Cicero, Illinois, used violence against a Negro family that already had moved into town and the family finally left. There is little doubt that the riots could have been quelled if the authorities had taken a firm stand. While these methods might have an occasional success, they generally have led to defeat. In all urban places the Negro areas have steadily expanded and Negroes have moved and still are moving into sections where once only white people lived. Similarly, all other segregated groups change locations. The former residents move out, some reluctantly, some eagerly, and the newcomers gain in strength.

If, finally, one minority group is replaced by another minority group in a segregated area, we speak of *succession.* In the process of infiltration, invasion, and succession, a group of lower social prestige always displaces a group of higher social status.

Land Values. These changes also alter land values and the character of an ecological area. That land values are affected by influx of population is a simple corollary of the law of supply and demand. If more people compete for the same number of houses, prices go up—or should go up. An economist might never suspect that prices could go down but sociology provides ample evidence that nonrational factors often motivate actions more effectively than rational considerations.

The dislike of foreign groups is frequently so strong that people are inclined to sell at a loss and move to other quarters. If an outsider appears in a section, his neighbors begin to sell and others soon follow. Sometimes the movement assumes the proportion of panic selling because the owners are afraid that they might suffer still heavier losses if they wait.

After succession has been completed the land values continue to decline. As the successors usually represent a group of lower status and lower incomes, they frequently do not spend as much for maintenance or improvements as their predecessors and the ensuing deterioration decreases the land values. Sometimes the losses are substantial.

The honest proprietors are bound to lose, whether they sell or keep their property. This poses a very serious problem. It is possible to fight segregation and prejudice on religious, moral, and sociological grounds. It is impossible to convince a person that he has to accept a member of a minority group as a neighbor if, as a result of his acceptance, he is bound to lose a substantial part of his legitimate investment, which in many cases represents his entire savings.

On the other hand, this situation promotes the designs of speculators. They buy cheaply at desperation prices; when the new groups arrive in greater numbers, they convert one-family homes into multiple dwellings, charging excessive rents, or they erect inadequate structures on vacant lots. There is hardly any risk involved because the minority population increases and is in urgent need of housing.

The correct evaluation of the situation is obscured by two factors. Even without overt inflation the dollar has a tendency to decline in value, and the decline is reflected in rising prices of goods, including land and buildings.

Second, if the population increases and urban land becomes scarcer, land values must rise. Some of the great American fortunes were acquired by persons who bought land for low prices and sold or built when mass immigration and rapid growth of cities caused a tremendous real-estate boom. But there are countercurrents complicating the situation still further. Notwithstanding inflationary tendencies and increasing scarcity of urban land, houses deteriorate and if, as frequently, a whole area has been developed at the same time and the houses are approximately of the same age, the land values will decline. Moreover, wooden structures are subject to quicker deterioration than brick houses, and land values depend to some degree on the preponderance of one or the other type. However, all these are strictly economic factors, and if they were the only determinants, we must expect values to rise or fall according to supply of land, demand for land, the real value of the dollar, and the state of repair of the buildings. But we witness changes which cannot be explained in economic terms. Land values decrease in some sections and increase simultaneously in other sections while the population grows and demand rises accordingly. The disproportionate rise or decline

of land values in certain areas, not in conformity with the general trend of prices, can be explained only by the coexistence and interference of a nonrational factor: the changing social prestige of selected urban districts.

Since prestige rests partly on institutional values (which are subject to change) as well as on emotional attitudes toward certain places, on historical events, on family traditions, and sundry other factors, it is impossible to find a direct correlation between land values and ecological areas.

With these reservations in mind the following interrelations can be established:

1. Urban land values depend on the use of land rather than the quality of the land.[2]

2. There is a certain order of uses provided all other conditions are equal: (*a*) Business use commands higher value than residential use.[3] This is logical, for business use is a source of earning; residential use, of spending; also business passes the expenses for rent, like all other costs, on to the customers. (*b*) Upper-class residential sections have a higher value than middle- and lower-class residential sections.

We are so used to this evaluation that we hardly realize its economic inconsistency. From the point of view of soundness of investment and profit rate, the order should be reversed. Investments in slum areas are most profitable and in high-class areas most risky. Slum buildings are cheap and thus the initial risk is small. Vacancies at a time of crisis hurt the owner of the high-class apartment house much more because it is more difficult to find new tenants and the loss of rent is substantial. In slums the rents are low and tenants flock in whenever there is a vacancy. Furthermore, slums can hardly suffer from deterioration of the whole area or of the buildings, while in high-class sections the deterioration of the building will certainly lower its value and the deterioration of the area, because of its arational causation, is as unpredictable as its rate. For these and several other reasons the landlords' profits tend to increase with decreasing social prestige of an area.

Yet the land values of residential areas are not determined by the economic rentability of real-estate operations but by the factors which make it an area more or less desirable to the residents. However, location is not entirely irrelevant or subordinate. Location in a community suggests certain uses on which land values and their changes depend.

Again certain regularities can be observed:

1. Some activities are best carried on in centrally located, easily accessible areas. This applies to retail sales either on a large scale or at high prices, for

[2] This is basically different from nonurban places, where the quality of the land (fertility, water supply, oil, ores, or other mineral resources) is sometimes the only and always the main determinant of value.

[3] This can be clearly seen in the cases of mixed uses. A doctor's office in an apartment house fetches a higher rent than a residential flat of equal size.

establishments serving an entire community rather than a mere district, and, to a lesser degree, light industries which need no large plants, sometimes only part of a building.[4]

Consequently, the communication center—the main business district—which is not necessarily also the geographical center, is the area of the highest urban land values. The prices for 1 square foot of land at the corner of Wall Street and Broadway in New York or at the corner of State and Madison in Chicago are higher than for an entire one-family home on a 10,000-square-foot lot in the outskirts. The high land values in the central business areas are determined by "rational," namely, economic consideration; it is the location which yields higher returns and which is "objectively" more valuable. But we do not find, as we might expect by a priori reasoning, a gradual decline of land values in proportion to the distance from the business center. On the contrary, the area immediately surrounding business districts shows the lowest or near lowest values in the entire city. These low values, to be sure, are again determined by economic forces, namely, by the excess of supply over demand. But the lack of demand for space in cities suffering from overcrowding is not entirely based on economic motivation: business does not need the land and residents do not want it. The rejection of land close to business districts is not based on reason but on institutionalized motivation; it is based on the nonrational dislike of residing near business activities. This dislike is not universal and where it does not exist, as in many countries on the European continent, the proximity of civic centers, office buildings, theaters, and the like does not affect the land values of the adjacent areas. The wish to live at a considerable distance from work is based on values which have become institutionalized in American society. In this case the social evaluation of the location and not its economic utility determine the land value.

2. The interplay between institutional preference for distance from the center and lack of space at and near the center makes it impossible to arrive at simple correlations between residential location and land value. Following the economic rule of supply and demand, land values should decrease with increasing distance from the center. To some degree this is actually the case in any city. But in accordance with the institutional preference for

[4] Particularly the apparel industry. This explains partly the existence of the garment center in one of the most expensive areas in Manhattan. If only rational cost computation determined the site of business activities, the production of low-priced mass articles, e.g., underwear, would be carried on where rents are below and not above average. It probably costs more to rent a loft in Manhattan than to operate an entire plant 10 miles away in New Jersey. How long other motives can be stronger than economic forces is an open question. In New England a serious problem has arisen as an increasing number of textile factories have been moved to Southern states where land values (and wages) are substantially lower.

distance, land values should increase with increasing distance; the problem is therefore to find the resultant of the two conflicting trends. In cases of conflict a universal rule can hardly be expected; the following section is an attempt to describe the trend in land values in so far as generalizations are possible.



FIG. 4. Map of a New York City block which has been subject to substantial changes in land values. This block was farm land and surrounded by more vacant than improved lots when it was acquired as the site for the "new" armory of the 22d Regiment, New York National Guard, which moved into its new quarters there in April, 1890. Land and armory had cost the city a total of $520,000.

The "new" armory aged, subsequently was assigned to the 104th Artillery Regiment, and that in turn marched away in 1929, when the city auctioned the property to Max Verschlieser, hotel and Central Opera House owner, for $3,375,000. For 1925 the city had listed it for assessment records at $1,625,000 for the land and $175,000 for the improvements, a total of $1,800,000.

Rosy plans for a new sports arena on the site faded fast when 1929 was gone and the property went into the hands of the Mutual Life Insurance Company, which had a lien of $1,000,000 on the real estate. When the insurance company sold the property in 1944, long after the armory had been removed, there were reports in realty circles that the sale price was $275,000.

In 1941–42 the city assessed the property for a total of $1,550,000, and in 1945–46 for $1,457,500, but in the later year Supreme Court Justice Aron Steuer reduced the assessment to $708,000. For 1951–52, the city assessed the block a total of $1,075,000, only $1,000 of it on the "improvements."

The property was acquired by WOR in 1949. The station has declined to disclose the construction cost of the new TV studio, but within the industry it has been reported as more than $1,250,000. (*Map and legend from the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 16, 1951. By permission of the New York Herald Tribune and Jack Luboff.*)

Besides the fringe between business and residential sections, the proximity of railroad tracks reduces residential land values to a minimum. This scarcely needs elaboration. Conversely, high locations on hills as well as long lakes (unless too close to industral installations) are considered socially desirable and land values tend to be higher than in the adjacent areas regardless of distance. River fronts, on the other hand, are less coveted. Parks and forests increase land values. Segregation or concentration of minorities tends to lower land values regardless of location. Areas inhabited by groups belonging to the social elite tend to increase in value regardless of location. Distance ordinarily influences land values only in connection with other factors, especially use and accessibility of land. Areas which are easily accessible have higher land values; correspondingly, new developments arise mostly along existing communication lines (railroads, bus routes, and main roads). The presence of industrial establishments decreases land values. The use of peripheral areas for upper-class settlements increases land values. As a consequence, the value of land at the periphery is not determined before it has been used. We find at the same distance from the center very low land values if the section is inhabited by low-income groups or if it is being used for industry, while adjacent areas occupied by an elite group show higher values.

3. We find thus the highest values in the business center; there is an abrupt decline in value at its fringe; then the values begin to rise inversely to the distance from the center but only up to a certain point, mostly the end of cheap, rapid intracity transportation. Then the values decline again and their rise depends on the development of better residential suburbs. Where they are absent, the values continue to decline with increasing distance and communication difficulties.

The areas of the highest residential land values are frequently used for apartment houses. To decrease the burden of high land costs the buildings are tall. A skyscraper apartment house can divide the high initial expenses among many tenants. Even so, the high land price tends to decrease the returns, while the cheapest structures in areas with the lowest land values assure the investor of a proportionately much larger yield. This is the danger which threatens to perpetuate the slums.

The sometimes erratic changes in land values and the considerable risks of investments in city lots are illustrated in Figure 4.

2. Theories

Several attempts have been made to find the principles which shape the ecological patterns of the city. To find rules which govern equally the spatial development of all urban settlements regardless of time and location seems a priori a hopeless venture. Research was therefore tacitly or expressly restricted to the modern American city. The uniqueness of the American city was felt

by Ernest W. Burgess [5] when he expounded his own hypothesis with this remark:

In the United States the transition from a rural to an urban civilization, though beginning later than in Europe, has taken place, if not more rapidly and completely, at any rate more logically, in its most characteristic form. . . . All the manifestations of modern life which are peculiarly urban—the skyscraper, the subway, the department store, the daily newspaper, and social work—are characteristically American.

The Concentric-zone Theory. Burgess set out to evolve a theory of dynamics,[6] namely, of "expansion as physical growth," [7] but he arrived at a theory of patterns which apply to any stage of urban development, including a stationary phase.

Burgess gave a graphic representation of his theories in two charts which are largely self-explanatory and are reproduced here as Figure 5. According to Burgess,[8] an urban area consists of five concentric zones. These zones represent areas of functional differentiation and expand radially from the business center.

These zones are:

I. "The Loop" or central business district, commonly called "downtown."

II. The Zone in Transition, "which is being invaded by business and light industry."

III. The Zone of Workingmen's Homes, "inhabited by the workers in industries who have escaped from the area of deterioration (II) but who desire to live within easy access of their work."

IV. "The Residential Zone of high-class apartment buildings or exclusive 'residential' districts of single family dwellings."

V. The "Commuters' Zone" beyond the city limits; within a thirty- to sixty-minute ride of the central business district.

Burgess himself was the first to point out that his proposition was not an actual description but an abstract scheme.[9]

This chart represents an ideal construction of the tendencies of any town or city to expand radially from its central business district. . . . It hardly needs to be added that neither Chicago nor any other city fits perfectly into this ideal scheme. Complications are introduced by the lake front, the Chicago River, railroad lines, historical factors in the location of industry, the relative degree of the resistance of communities to invasion, etc.

[5] Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City*, Chicago, 1925, p. 47.

[6] Burgess's thinking was partially based on a proposition advanced earlier by Richard Hurd in *Principles of City Land Values*, New York, 1905.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 51 ff.





FIG. 5. Graphs representing Burgess's zonal hypothesis. (*From Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie* (eds.), *The City, Chicago, 1925, pp. 51–53. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.*)

The Sector Theory. For a decade the concentric-zone theory was widely accepted with hardly a dissenting voice.[10] In 1937 Maurice R. Davie published a study "The Patterns of Urban Growth," [11] in which he tested Burgess's hypothesis by investigating the patterns of New Haven and comparing his results with those of studies by Hurd, Bartholomew,[12] and Green.[13] He found in New Haven twenty-two different areas whose order seemed to defy any generalization. He also studied the zoning maps of some twenty other cities and reached similar conclusions. Although Davie seemed to accept to some degree "natural areas" and also anticipated some of Hoyt's ideas, his attitude toward a general theory of urban pattern was entirely negative, as he concluded: "There is no universal pattern, not even an 'ideal' type."

Others thought differently. Two years later Homer Hoyt presented his sector theory.[14] This theory was not intended as a rejection or replacement of Burgess's scheme. It was, as Hoyt himself pointed out, a modification.[15] Hoyt's theory was more dynamic in character than Burgess's proposition since constant changes, population movements, expansion of industries, and their effects on spatial patterns were studied.

Hoyt's main contentions were:

1. Industrial areas do not develop around the central business district but along railroad lines and water fronts, or, more recently, near the outskirts of the city. Industrial areas thus expand not in circles but stringlike.

2. High-class areas are not located in the last concentric zone on the periphery but only in one or more sectors; as the city grows, the upper classes keep moving from the center, abandoning areas to the lower classes, which extend their habitats from the center toward the outskirts in areas of a triangular rather than circular shape.

3. High-grade residential areas originate near the retail and office center but tend to proceed along established lines of travel or toward another existing nucleus of buildings or trading center, preferably toward high ground or a long lake, bay, river, or ocean front.

[10] For some criticism see J. A. Quinn, "Methods in Urban Sociology," in L. L. Bernard (ed.), *The Fields and Methods of Sociology,* New York, 1934, and Milla Alihan, *Social Ecology,* New York, 1938.

[11] In G. P. Murdock (ed.), *Studies in the Science of Society,* New Haven, 1937.

[12] H. Bartholomew, *Urban Land Use,* Cambridge, 1932.

[13] H. W. Green, "Cultural Areas in the City of Cleveland," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1932.

[14] Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities,* Washington, 1939.

[15] Homer Hoyt, "The Structure of American City in the Post-war Era," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1943. That there is no inherent conflict between the two theories is also maintained by Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology,* 3d ed., New York, 1948, p. 139.

4. The higher-priced residential neighborhood tends to grow toward the homes of the leaders of the community.[16] Figure 6 illustrates Hoyt's theory. As can be seen, Hoyt still used concentric zones but divided them into sectors.



FIG. 6. Graph illustrating Hoyt's sector hypothesis. Shifts in location of fashionable residential areas in six American cities from 1900 to 1936. Fashionable residential areas indicated by solid black. (*From Homer Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities, p. 115. By permission of Homer Hoyt, Washington.*)

The Theory of Natural Areas. Independent of the zone and sector hypotheses, several authors [17] have stressed the concept of "natural" areas. The term is somewhat misleading, for it refers to human nature rather than to the natural settings of urban settlements. The main point of this theory seems to be that members of the same racial, religious, national, or cultural group have a tendency to live in the same area; thus the proposition is a restatement

[16] Hoyt, *op. cit.*, pp. 166 ff.

[17] Cf. Harvey D. Zorbaugh, "The Natural Areas of the City," in E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community*, Chicago, 1926, and P. Hatt, "The Concept of Natural Area," *American Sociological Review*, 1946.

concerning concentration and segregation.[18] Thus far there has been very little research into the problem of interrelations between particular groups and particular areas. Unless the theory becomes more specific, it explains the structural divisions of a city rather than its spatial patterns. While the concept has its merits, it can be used only to supplement other hypotheses.

The Theory of Symbolical Values. Walter Firey [19] criticized both the zone and the sector theories as well as any attempt to explain patterns in merely economic terms. He based his criticisms on conceptual objections and supported them by empirical research into conditions in Boston. Firey maintained that the Burgess-Hoyt theory did not apply to Boston. He demonstrated his thesis on three areas, the Beacon Hill section, the Boston Common,[20] and the North End.

In the case of Beacon Hill, he showed that the area has remained the residential section of the Boston aristocracy since 1894, although it is adjacent to the central business district and close to a "low-rent tenement area," the West End. Firey showed further that in the North End, Boston's "Little Italy," the original immigrants still remain, although the section has steadily deteriorated and only their children have left for better quarters.

The persistent retention of living quarters despite adverse conditions was explained by ascribing intangible, nonmaterial values to locations. Firey found "a symbol-sentiment relationship" between groups and areas. He suggested an alteration of existing theories in two respects: "First, of ascribing to space not only an impeditive quality but also an additional property, viz., that of being at some time a symbol for certain cultural values that have become associated with a certain spatial area. Secondly, . . . a recognition that locational activities are not only economizing agents but may also bear sentiments which can significantly influence the locational process."

It should be clear that the cases of Beacon Hill and the North End are not identical, although both are instances of self-segregation. Beacon Hill is a choice location because of its prestige; it is the "proper" place for "proper Bostonians" and only for them. The North End is not chosen for its traditions or for the emotional connotations connected with a specific place; the Italian immigrants just happen to live there because they want to live together in any place regardless of its quality. The difference becomes clearer by focusing on the negative aspect. The Boston aristocrats segregate themselves because they do not want to mingle with other groups, hence their frantic efforts, so vividly described by Firey, to prevent outsiders from in-

[18] Zorbaugh (*op. cit.*, p. 233) defines the natural area as a "geographical area characterized both by a physical individuality and by the cultural characteristics of the people who live in it."

[19] Walter Firey, *Land Use in Boston,* Cambridge, 1946; see also "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables," *American Sociological Review,* vol. 10, April, 1945.

[20] Since the Common is a recreation area without buildings, we shall not discuss it.

filtrating into the area. The North End Italians do not object to an invasion; what they want is only to live together with their friends and close to their stores. If other quarters could be provided with similar possibilities of concentration, there would be little emotional resistance. But the aristocrats, although more convenient (and very exclusive and restricted) quarters are available, do not want to give up Beacon Hill. In the case of Beacon Hill the location (or rather the emotions connected with it) determines the character of the population; in the case of the North End the population determines the character of the area.

Firey is by no means the only one to stress the emotional factor in the selection of location. The influence of prestige in creating ecological areas has been pointed out by the Lynds [21] and Hoyt.[22] That prestige is sometimes a stronger force than the advantageous or disadvantageous properties of an area has been exemplified in a preceding chapter of this book by the cases of Stuyvesant Square, Central Park West, and Riverside Drive in New York. A similar instance has been observed by Dewey [23] in Milwaukee. Noting a certain scale of prestige represented by the fashionable suburbs of Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, Fox Point, and River Hills (the prestige increases in that order), he adds that "Wauwatosa, a suburb which in some ways is aesthetically and economically superior to much of Shorewood, does not have the social prestige of the latter."

The Transportation Theory. That the growth of a city and the relative positions of residential and business sections depend on the technological state of communication facilities—roads and vehicles—is only too obvious. Yet no systematic transportation theory has been worked out. A. Weber, Burgess, Hoyt, Quinn, and Ogburn have made contributions toward a theory connecting transportation and spatial patterns. Burgess, Hoyt, and Quinn mention the influence of transportation; Ogburn discusses the future possibilities of decentralization by the use of aircraft transportation; he speculates about the possibilities of arresting the growth of a city by dispersing its industries. This is in sharp contrast to the old pattern in which transportation helped to centralize urban areas and made them grow.

A. Weber made important contributions by pointing out that cities of different sizes need different types of transportation, that the time element (from home to office) plays a decisive part, and that the costs of transportation also determine the distance between residence and working place. His figures—more than half a century old—are now hopelessly outdated. It is noteworthy that Weber was far from exaggerating the influence of a single factor and that he was well aware of the power of institutional values. That

[21] Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition,* New York, 1939, pp. 81–82.

[22] Hoyt, *op. cit.*

[23] Richard Dewey, *op. cit.*

"population is spread out over a larger territory in America than in European cities" is not necessarily the result of modern rapid transportation. Says Weber: [24] "It should rather be said that the American *penchant* for dwelling in cottage homes instead of business blocks, in the fashion of Europe, is the cause, and the trolley car the effect. Philadelphia was the 'city of homes' long before 'rapid transit.' "

The Statistical Approach. Calvin Schmid, who previously examined special urban problems such as suicide and segregation by statistical methods, published an essay "Generalizations Concerning the Ecology of the American City." [25] Schmid investigated ecological conditions by using data from census tract bulletins prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as of April 1, 1940. He took a primary sample of twenty cities, ranging in population from approximately 200,000 to 500,000, and compared his findings with conditions in one larger city (Detroit) and two smaller cities (Berkeley, California; Macon, Georgia). He painstakingly worked out correlations between a large number of variables, paying particular attention to rent, occupation, education, race and nativity, fertility, and age.

His main findings [26] may be summarized as follows:

The ecological structure of the large American city conforms to a consistent and regular pattern in which the socio-economic status of the population is a dominant feature.

The most highly intercorrelating variable is the educational status of the population as measured by median school grade completed.

The social structure of the urban community has an ecological base, that is, the many areas in the large city can be represented by a status-value ranking as determined by such factors as education, income and occupation.

Certain occupational groups tend to segregate in high-income areas, others in low-income areas.

Negroes and the foreign-born white tend strongly to reside in low-income areas.

The ecological structure of the large urban community can be represented by readily identifiable and orderly clusters of indices—clusters that conform to clear-cut and consistent pattern-types.

Ecological pattern-types in the large city follow a recognizable gradation with the "gold coast" at one end and the "slum" at the other.

Evaluation and Synthesis. Close examination shows that all the theories discussed above contain a considerable amount of truth, but that they need some modification. They can be reconciled. What is needed is a theory which correlates and integrates the existing hypotheses—a task yet to be achieved.

There has been some methodological confusion; not one explanation has yet to be given, but two, covering different aspects of ecological structure.

[24] A. Weber, *The Growth of Cities,* New York, 1899, p. 469.

[25] *American Sociological Review,* 1950.

[26] *Ibid.* Schmid calls them specific generalizations or "laws."

First, we have to investigate the reasons for spatial differentiation; second, we have to find the factors accounting for the specific patterns, for the form of differentiated areas. In other words, we have to distinguish between subjective motivations and their objective results.

Also, the American city, although unique in many respects, displays some features which are found elsewhere, e.g., the differentiation of residential sections according to income classes. Clearly the comprehensive explanation must be found in a universal trend, common to all or many societies. But since the American city shows some patterns which radically differ from those in other countries, the explanation must also lie in institutional factors peculiar to modern American society. Hence we cannot accept a monistic concept but have to demand a theory which takes into account the interplay of psychological, economic, cultural, institutional, and geographical elements. There is less difficulty in finding these elements than in establishing their respective weight and their proper order.

We must begin with the separation of residence and business, because it constitutes the primary division on which all further differentiations are based. As the strict separation of working place and living place is not universal, we must look for cultural determinants which can claim precedence over all other factors. The cultural factors have been stressed by A. Weber, R. Hurd, and Firey.

The determinant in this case is the Anglo-American preference for the one-family dwelling, the predilection for gardening, the longing for privacy. These institutions promote the widespread use of timber for building; timber structures imply spacing to decrease fire hazards. Houses cannot be built wall-to-wall. Spacing requires larger lots, and so do gardens. Larger lots mean greater initial expense, which can be decreased by building at a distance from the center with its high land values.

The general preference for the single-dwelling unit explains the relative scarcity of apartment buildings, another feature which is specifically American.[27] It also explains why the American city covers a larger area and generally shows a lower density than European cities of comparable numerical size.

On the other hand, the concentration of certain business types in the center is economic rather than institutional. The central location offers commercial advantages for which business is able and willing to pay; the result is the rise of land values which in turn, as stated above, prevents the building of residences.

[27] "One" does not live in apartment houses, as illustrated by an unpublished case study. A woman, born and raised in Philadelphia, whose parents were in a low-income group, reported: "I fell in love with a boy from New York; this caused an emotional conflict, for in every respect he was what I had learned a person ought not to be: he was a Catholic, a Democrat, and he lived in an apartment house."

Having thus established still vague spatial patterns consisting of a business zone as a core surrounded by residential sections, we investigate the rules according to which the residential areas become differentiated. Again we meet a universal trend; the division of sections according to economic classes. The upper classes live in what is considered the most desirable areas, the middle classes take the next best locations, the low-income earners live in less desirable quarters, and the substandard income groups have to take what is left.

But what is considered desirable rests not entirely on universally accepted criteria but again, in part, on institutional preferences or criteria. The appreciation of hillsides, of areas "off the beaten track," and particularly the emphasis on locations as far away from business areas as possible, must be explained in terms of institutionalized preferences because similar attitudes are not always found in other countries.

In so far as we find a correlation between the types of location and the social, cultural, and economic groups living in these sections, we can speak of "natural areas." However, the existing theories are still too vague. This analysis ends where Burgess started, for it appears almost inevitable to accept his scheme in principle. We have only to ask what modifications should be made.

In the first place, his idea of concentric circles should be altered. The American city is rectangular and not rounded; all sections consist of blocks which form four-sided figures. This, however, is a very minor modification. Second, the Zone in Transition is not entirely a desolate area. Frequently one part of the zone represents a gradual transition from business to residences. The almost imperceptible change occurs in that part of zone II, where stores are replaced by or mixed with excellent hotels for transients, followed by apartment hotels or high-class boardinghouses for permanent tenants such as single young women holding good positions and elderly retired persons, etc. Adjacent to these are the better apartment houses and not, as Burgess's theory demands, workingmen's houses. Consequently, zone III is not entirely occupied by the homes of "working" men. Since the apartment house area in larger cities extends still farther, the same is true of zone IV or the "middle-class zone." Zone V, the "commuters' zone," is much more diversified than Burgess indicates. Here is the weakest point in the scheme. Whether we construe the five concentric zones as circles or rectangles, it is inevitable (and both Burgess's and Hoyt's illustrations bear this out) that the zones increase in area the farther removed they are from the center. This means, if Burgess is taken literally, that the upper classes occupy the largest space, the middle classes a smaller section, and the workingmen the smallest area. Numerically the actual order is just the opposite: the upper classes consist of not more than 5 per cent of the population, and the lower classes outnumber all other groups combined. It is true that with increasing

wealth a family occupies also larger quarters, but if, as in zones III, IV, and V, most families live in single dwellings, the majority, the low-income group, cannot be squeezed into the smallest residential section.

Still less can the upper groups occupy the entire huge area surrounding a city. The more a city grows the larger becomes its circumference, but simultaneously the upper classes decline in proportion to the much more increasing masses. Firey [28] computed from the *Social Register* for 1943 the number of upper-class families in Boston as follows:

Within Boston:	
Beacon Hill	335
Back Bay	556
Jamaica Plain	30
Other districts	41
Suburban towns:	
Brookline	372
Newton	247
Cambridge	257
Milton	202
Dedham	99
Other towns	816
Total in Boston	962
Total in suburbs	1,993
Grand total	2,995

From 1894 to 1943 the group showed a total increase of 1,033 families; 1,933 families had moved to the suburbs; in 1894 only 20 per cent less had lived in Boston proper in a comparatively small area. Two thousand families do not and cannot occupy the enormous perimeter of metropolitan Boston; actually nearly all of them are concentrated in five towns. The rest of the suburban area is used by others. Hence, we have to accept the modifications offered by Hoyt's sector theory but with some reservations. As Burgess's circles are really rectangles, so Hoyt's sectors are also four-sided figures and bear little similarity to "pie cuts." We should speak of sections rather than sectors.[29]

Hoyt is correct in stating that the upper-class areas, when expanding, usually skip from sections near the center to the fringe of the city but only

[28] "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables," *loc. cit.*

[29] Hoyt's chart (see p. 104) shows that not in a single instance did the fashionable residential sections have the shape of a "pie cut"; it should be noted that his graphical presentation is schematic rather than factual. He depicts, following Burgess, all cities in the form of concentric circles; but Boston, San Francisco, or Seattle cannot be fitted into a circular scheme. He also adapts the graphs to his theory more than the facts permit. According to his graph, all high-class areas in Boston are located in the outermost zone. But the two most fashionable areas—Beacon Hill and Back Bay—are close to the core of the business center, and a third zone—Brookline—is between the center and the outskirts.

in selected sections. If the growth continues, the existing sections do not necessarily expand; rather, new sections are developed, still farther removed from the center but along main roads. As a result the outskirts consist either of starlike clusters of relatively isolated settlements or of stringlike elongated sections resembling the tines of a fork.

What happens to the rest of zone V? In some way the development of the city fringe corresponds to the development of the city core but in reverse. The new high-class sections encourage the development of middle-class settlements as close as rising land values permit. These middle-class areas shade off into sections of "workingmen," thus accommodating the growing number of lower-income groups finding no place in zone III. Fringe areas, unfit for residential use with still lower land values, are occupied by industries in need of large plants. Around the industrial areas we find again slums inhabited by substandard earners who eke out a meager living by diversified unskilled work.

Into this scheme—it is only a scheme—the time and transportation element has to be fitted. The factory worker (if there are no shifts) starts at eight o'clock in the morning. Unless he is a very early riser, he will prefer to live rather close to his plant, which is located either in the center or on the fringe of the city. This accounts for the existence of zone III, as well as for workingmen's quarters on the outskirts. The middle classes, mostly white-collar office employees, begin at nine o'clock, which permits them to live up to one hour's traveling time from their office, almost always situated in the downtown district. Thus they can avoid living in the congested zone III, but they cannot live in those suburbs which are not on the main rapid transportation routes. The upper-class groups—consisting of self-employed business and professional men or executives, not tied to a strict time schedule and not working for a fixed number of hours—come to work still later. They also can occasionally stay home for a day, prolonging their week ends. They can afford to live thirty miles or more away. We find, indeed, the most fashionable suburbs farthest removed from the city. Transportation also influences the selection of residences with respect to cost. The poor who can ill afford to pay even for a streetcar or bus must live in the Zone in Transition, with its low-priced slum flats, so he can walk to his working place. The semiskilled worker can hardly pay more than the fare for intra-city transportation. The workingmen's quarters, therefore, do not extend beyond the limits of the one-fare zone of buses, subways, or trolleys. If plants are located in the fringe area, they usually can provide ample parking space, and at least the skilled workers having cars can then live anywhere within an hour's drive.

Because of their precarious economic position, the middle classes have to be most careful in combining the transportation-time-cost elements. They cannot use automobiles, for the central business district where they work

has no parking facilities except a few very expensive parking lots or garages. They cannot live farther than an hour's traveling distance, which makes them prefer suburbs very close to rapid transportation stops. They cannot afford to pay too much for either rent or transportation. Middle-class suburbs cost less in terms of rent than middle-class city places but commuting expenses have to be added. The decision depends on how many members of the family commute. If lower rent, plus fares, exceeds the cost of higher-priced places in the city, the family will live in zone IV.

The Zone in Transition provides quarters for the rest of the population: for transients, visitors to the city, in the hotel section of the zone; for those who live from commercialized vice and crime in the red-light area; for the homeless, the hobo, the "lost men," for the utterly destitute the quarter around skid row, with its flophouses; for the poor minority groups their segregated areas.

We still have to consider Firey's objections. Apart from the case of Boston Common, he has offered a twofold proof. First, that the Italian immigrants remain in the slums of the North End and that only their children move to other quarters. This corroborates Burgess's scheme rather than refutes it. The North End is clearly in the Zone in Transition, where many segregated areas are found. Whether the population remains there for lack of other quarters, or because the people prefer self-segregation which helps them to retain their cultural values, is irrelevant to the formation of ecological patterns. The result is the same: segregated areas in zone II, exactly as stated by Burgess, who was not concerned with motivation.

The case of Beacon Hill is much more convincing. Indeed, a locality with social prestige, based on a three-hundred-year-old history, has an excellent chance to remain a restricted upper-class section. But such conditions are very rare; even Boston has only one Beacon Hill area. Boston is far from being a typical American city. It is much older than most cities. It carefully preserves its historical monuments and it is very proud of its role as the "cradle of liberty." Its population structure is atypical. Boston has what very few American cities have—a real aristocracy whose members can trace their family trees back to the earliest colonial times; these families have stayed on throughout the entire history of the United States and they ruled over Boston and Massachusetts as long as the New England settlers were of their own type: Protestants from the British Isles. These aristocrats, having developed a distinct culture of their own, lost their domain. They have become a hopelessly small minority, outnumbered by immigrants who represent different types of culture. The newcomers wrested political power from the old families and run the city in a way which dismays the rulers of yesterday. The aristocrats stick to what is left to them: the control of banks, insurance, and similar enterprises. They also stick to what they consider "their" territory—Beacon Hill—where their ancestors lived. The emphasis

on the section, with its symbolic implications, rightly stressed by Firey, is a reaction formation resulting from frustration and defeat and aimed at preserving a cultural identity which otherwise might be lost.

This is a unique situation. Places with a long and remarkable historical tradition are rare; outside of New England and some places in the old South they hardly exist at all. Nor is there an aristocracy comparable to the



FIG. 7. Schematic graph combining and modifying the hypotheses by Burgess and Hoyt.

old Boston families. The less numerous aristocratic families who survived in the South remained in the old cultural setup. They have largely retained their political influence and neither religious nor cultural differences cause frustration. While it must be granted that symbolic locations will retain their character regardless of changes in their neighborhood, such locations are so rare that they seldom modify the spatial patterns of American cities.

Finally, the statistical approach has, as always, proved to be an excellent means to test existing hypotheses, to correct inaccuracies, and to rein the unbridled speculations of some researchers; the result is a corroboration of theories at which we have arrived by other procedures but substantial new results have not been derived from this approach.

Thus, the Burgess-Hoyt hypothesis has survived its critics; as a scheme of an "ideal" type, it has been corroborated by several independent investigations: for Rochester, New York, by Bowers,[30] for Milwaukee by Dewey,[31] for Long Beach, Calif., by Longmoor and Young,[32] for Wichita, Kansas, by the present author; [33] it has been supported by such experts as Hawley [34] and Quinn.[35]

Figure 7 attempts to give a rough graphic representation of a scheme based on a modified combination of all theories discussed above.

[30] R. V. Bowers, "Ecological Patterning of Rochester," *American Sociological Review,* vol. 4, April, 1939.

[31] *Op. cit.*

[32] E. S. Longmoor and E. F. Young, "Ecological Inter-relationships of Juvenile Delinquency, Dependency, and Population Mobility," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1936.

[33] Unpublished.

[34] Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950, p. 265.

[35] J. A. Quinn, "The Burgess Zonal Hypothesis and Its Critics," *American Sociological Review,* 1940; recently more reluctantly in *Human Ecology,* p. 136.

Part V. TYPOLOGY

Chapter 7

SIZE, DENSITY, SPATIAL TYPES

Area and Density

Cities differ according to area, size of population, and function. There are definite interrelations between function and population. But extension in space is of no practical sociological consequence. Even the largest cities occupy a very small area both in absolute size and in proportion to the country. On maps they appear as tiny spots. The main exception is Greater London. Its area of almost 700 square miles would cover over half of Rhode Island (1,214 square miles).

There is no clear-cut correlation between area and population. Not even the simple assumption that the area increases with growing population is correct. Nor can we assume that the area shrinks if the population decreases. Vienna's population declined from 1,874,130 in 1934 to 1,760,784 in 1951, but, as a result of incorporation of suburbs, its area grew.

Ordinary statistics concerning the ratio of population to area are not very instructive and may even be misleading. The figures indicating the density per square mile are of little value, for they include large nonresidential parts. Even the density figures for residential areas need elaboration. It is not very enlightening, for instance, to find that Paris and Manhattan cover approximately the same area. For a reliable analysis we have to subtract the areas of waterways, streets, parks, and vacant land, which can be done, as well as the nonresidential area (the latter, because of mixed land use, is virtually impossible). Moreover, Paris has no apartment skyscrapers and few residential hotels and boardinghouses. We could get a better insight if we knew the available space both per person and per family. Even this, however, would not show class divisions and the distribution of living space among the various economic groups. The density figures do not even indicate the intensity of urbanization. The most densely populated regions of the globe are not the most urbanized parts, for example, Java and Egypt.

The actual area and its density depend on a variety of factors which vary even within the same country. Some locations permit virtually unlimited growth (for instance, Chicago); others allow for no expansion (Manhattan). Historical cities (for instance, Boston) have less tendency to ex-

pand than younger cities with little traditon (for instance, Los Angeles). State boundaries hamper growth (St. Louis and Kansas City). Hill towns tend to have smaller areas, while preference for one-family houses accounts for larger areas. For this reason American cities usually cover more ground than Old World places of similar population size.

That area is by no means proportionate to population within the United States is shown by Table 6. Thus it should be clear that neither area nor density can serve as a criterion for a sociological classification of cities.

Table 6. Land Area of Selected American Cities

City	Area, sq. mi.	Population rank
Los Angeles	450.9	4
New York	319.1	1
Chicago	207.5	2
New Orleans	199.4	16
Houston	160.0	14
Detroit	136.9	5
Philadelphia	127.2	3
Dallas	112.0	22
Memphis	104.2	24

Source: United States Census, 1950.

Population

To classify urban places according to the size of population implies more than a numerical distinction. There is an obvious relationship between population and urban functions. Certain tasks can be performed only if a sufficient number of people are concentrated in a space. Population is an element related to specific urban types. The size of the city also has important sociological consequences with respect to social control, social organization, and to certain pathological phenomena (organized crime).

Classification according to size, however, cannot be based on exact figures nor is it possible to make sharp typological distinctions based merely on numbers. The marginal types imperceptibly shade into one another. An urban place can start with almost any number of people and, theoretically at least, there is no upper limit.

The following data show the limited usefulness of mere statistical figures as well as of legal concepts. The United States in 1950 had five incorporated towns with no population: Mecca, Florida; Monte Vista, Florida; Graysonia, Kelso, and Rohwer, Arkansas. The explanation of this oddity lies in legal technicalities. In some states towns are created by filing a petition for incorporation. If the projects fail, no one rescinds the charter. These legal

freaks have no reality. It is much more difficult to decide whether a place exists if some people are actually living in an incorporated area. For example, the census lists towns such as Douglas, Arkansas, with a population of one; Ophir, Colorado, with two; Mercur, Utah, also with two; Marineland, Florida, with nine; Fenwick, Connecticut, with sixteen. We can neither recognize an area as urban because some people live there nor can we establish a minimum figure of residents for a town. The decision hinges on the question of whether the residents perform an urban function. A sanitarium situated in an isolated area might have 200 patients. They do not form a town; they just live together. But fifty persons engaged in various services might constitute a village with all the features of an urban settlement.

It is equally impossible to set standards for the various urban types in terms of absolute figures. Aquileia, once one of the largest cities of the Roman Empire and the seat of a patriarch, is, without a doubt, still a city, although its population amounts to less than 3,000; elsewhere places of similar size might be just villages.

It is obvious that it is possible for the more populous city to perform more functions. With growing size the urban settlement becomes more complex, more differentiated, and increasingly multifunctional. Yet it is not possible to arrive at even an approximate mathematical correlation of size, function, and type. The great world cities already performed practically all their present functions a century ago when their size was only a fraction of their present population. In 1850 Vienna was among the first five cities of the world, not because of its population, which was far below one million, but as the capital of a then large empire whose influence was felt in the farthest corners of the globe. By 1950 Vienna had grown both in area and population, the latter having reached almost 2 million; but in function, in influence, and in national and international importance it has clearly declined. Similarly, Constantinople, once the center of Islam and the capital of the powerful Ottoman Empire, has lost its standing as a world center, although it is still one of the largest cities of the world with more than 1 million people. In the United States, Boston performs more functions than Los Angeles or Detroit, although its population has fallen behind both the other cities. In Scotland, Glasgow, with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, is larger in size than Edinburgh, with only 467,000 inhabitants, but the latter has kept its supremacy.

To repeat: Apparently there is neither an upper nor a lower limit to the numerical size of urban habitats. Strictly speaking, a solitary lighthouse with a single inhabitant already constitutes an urban settlement. The keeper is not engaged in agricultural work but performs a typical urban function: auxiliary transportation services. A less radical interpretation will exclude him, as well as his family, because more than one family is necessary to form

a local community. But an isolated observatory, a remote military base, a primitive trading post, all inhabited by a few persons, are decidedly urban in character. Contrary to popular belief, an urban place may then be less populous than rural settlements which, in some places of the Old World, occasionally have a population in excess of 10,000.

The other extreme is represented by the giant metropolitan areas of the twentieth century. In 1950 the New York metropolitan area housed 12,911,-994 and Greater London 8,346,137 people. In combination, the two cities comprise 1 per cent of the entire world population. Although there are approximately 330,000,000 square miles of land suitable for human habitats, one out of a hundred of the world's population lives either in New York or London. Together the two metropolitan areas cover less than one twenty-thousandth of the earth's inhabitable land. Of the approximately seventy-five independent nations of the world, only twenty-eight are more populous than the metropiltan area of New York, which thus outnumbers the majority —more than three-fifths—of all existing sovereign political entities. The population of both London and New York, as well as that of other large cities all over the world, is still on the increase; it is impossible to say how far the concentration of population can go but there are indications that metropolitan growth is slowing up.

Russia, with her rapidly growing population and an accelerated industrialization (which is still far from its peak), should experience an increase in the numerical size of her largest cities. However, the Soviet government is opposed to mammoth cities for two reasons. One is ideological. Marx disliked the split between city and country, although he stated that the *bourgeoisie,* having created enormous cities, "has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life"; and among the measures which he advocated as initial steps "in the revolution of the working class" are "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country." [1] The idea of abolishing the distinction between urban and rural places is highly utopian, but the proposition of a more equable distribution of cities is quite reasonable if a country is still in the process of developing its industrial resources. Second, the Russian government is promoting the dispersal of new cities (and thereby slowing up the growth of existing cities) for reasons of internal and external security. Groups and individuals, considered as unfriendly to the present regime, can be scattered in the numerous new industrial settlements in the eastern parts of European Russia and Siberia. The fear of air attacks in case of war has also induced the Soviets to favor towns rather than concentration in fewer and larger cities.

[1] Communist Manifesto, Part II.

Size

We can classify urban places according to their size, with the reservations made in the foregoing section:

1. The village
2. The town
3. The city
4. The metropolis

It has been pointed out that a strict mathematical correlation of size is impossible. As an approximation we may venture to state that a village consists of a population of not more than a few hundred persons,[2] and that towns usually have a population not in excess of 10,000. While any place with a population of more than 10,000 may be considered as a city, it is much more difficult to find a suitable numerical lower limit for a metropolis. For the sake of convenience, the more or less arbitrary figure of 1 million will be used to denote the minimum population of a metropolis.

The foregoing distinction is only one of several possible classifications which emphasize the impact of size upon function. A. B. Hollingshead,[3] for instance, classifies the village among rural settlements, thus conforming with the standards of the United States census, and mainly focusing on conditions in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The American village shows such markedly urban traits, however, that its inclusion among the urban types seems justifiable.

The Village. The term "village" is commonly applied to several rather different types. In the first place, it denotes any rural settlement regardless of size. Peasants sometimes live in rather large places but we never speak of a peasant town. Such peasant villages are common in the Old World. The American farmer prefers the isolated farm; consequently, rural villages in the United States are exceptions.

Second, there are "trade" villages. Apparently, from the very beginning of occupational specialization, people engaged in the same type of crafts segregated themselves from other groups and lived together in the same village. As long as some crafts were a prerogative of certain families or castelike groups, the local separation of occupational groups was facilitated and assisted the craftsmen in keeping their techniques a trade secret which was passed on orally from father to son. These trade villages represent a primitive or preindustrial stage. Trade villages are still extant in some parts of Africa and Asia. The caste system in India contributed to their survival

[2] Villages are not listed in the United States census as urban settlements.

[3] "Human Ecology," in Robert E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology,* pp. 98 ff. Hollingshead also distinguishes the village from the hamlet, the latter being still smaller in size. Otherwise the two have practically the same function.

in an otherwise very advanced civilization. Some trade villages have also withstood the impact of modern times in the more remote regions of Mexico.

In contradistinction to these, the American village is basically an urban service center for a small rural area. For a long time the symbol as well as the center of the village was the now almost defunct general store, usually in conjunction with a post office. The general store carried practically every type of merchandise which a farmer needed at short notice. The general store once served as the main source of information for the more isolated areas before the radio and newspaper delivery reached rural sections. In addition to the general store, a village usually consists of repair shops, filling stations, perhaps a grange hall, and similar service facilities. It also houses the rural general practitioner and the veterinarian. Larger villages may have a branch of a savings bank, while some people may, as a part-time job, handle insurance and mortgages. Churches and a consolidated school serve the cultural needs of the neighborhood. Eating places are rare, drinking places, in conformity with American rural mores, still rarer. This is in striking contrast to Europe, where the village inn, or in Great Britain the pub, is the center of recreation and of social control in the community. The village inspires the least loyalty of all types of habitat. People are proud of coming from a farm or a particular region, they like to live in a small town or a big city, but there are few emotional ties to a village, which seems to combine the less attractive features of both rural and urban life without the advantages offered by either. The stagnant cultural and economic situation makes younger and more energetic people leave the village whenever they can. Village life offers neither the security nor the emotional rewards which keep people on farms. The modernization of country life, in particular motorized traffic, which enables the farmer to reach a town in a shorter time than it formerly took him to go to the village, has deprived the latter of many functions which once were its monopoly. Since the village is the only urban type whose existence depends entirely on a small rural neighborhood, it is apparently on its way out.

The Town. The town may be defined as an urban settlement which dominates a rural area of considerable dimension. The emphasis in this definition is on domination. A town is not just an oversized village. The village serves only its rural customers. It has neither political, cultural, nor economic influence over the surrounding farm land. The disappearance of a village may be felt by the farmers as an inconvenience but as nothing more. The disappearance of a town would have much more serious consequences. This does not imply that the relationships between town and rural hinterland are unilateral, for each urban place also depends on its rural neighborhood. The town fulfills all the service functions of a village but these are only a small part of a much larger functional system. The town is, above all, a market where agricultural and industrial products are continually exchanged. This

is the oldest and still the most important function of the town. In addition, the town offers banking facilities, insurance, transportation, legal, and medical services both to its residents and the rural neighborhood. The same is true of its recreational services—hotels, eating places, and various types of amusements. Churches, schools, assembly halls, and the local newspaper serve the cultural needs of both townspeople and farmers. If the town is the seat of the county, it also discharges administrative and political functions. Thus the town represents a complicated system of multiple interactions between urban and rural neighbors.

The actual dominance of the town over its rural environment depends to a considerable degree on the economic situation of the farmers. If they are wealthy, the influence of the townspeople is comparatively weak. Where sharecroppers or dirt farmers prevail, where the education of the rural population is low, where economic conditions make the farmer dependent on loans from the town bank or on an advance from the wholesale buyer or on credit by dealers, the farmers are more inclined to accept the leadership of the town.

To a certain extent rural life extends into the towns. Farmers whose crops demand only seasonal attention, such as fruitgrowers and vegetable farmers, reside in towns, at least for a part of the year, and some businessmen manage to run a small farm in the neighborhood. The town is also chosen by many farmers as a residence when they retire. This helps explain the age distribution in towns, which usually have a higher percentage of older people than the nation as a whole.

Towns frequently show a degree of homogeneity similar to the surrounding farm area but with exceptions. Southern towns, for example, have a large Negro population; the Southwest, Mexicans; northern New England, French Canadians; and southern New England, the Atlantic Coast, and the West Coast have immigrants from many countries. Elsewhere towns are the strongholds of native-born, white, Protestant Americans. For this reason small towns resemble one another much more than larger cities.

The most conspicuous feature of the town is its firm social organization with resultant strict social control. In this respect the town is the very opposite from the familiar situation in the metropolis. Almost all important and many of the less pertinent contacts involve primary relationships, i.e., some degree of acquaintanceship with one another. Younger people have grown up under the eyes of the entire community and their backgrounds as well as their characters are well known. In the older towns, especially in New England, people have intermarried for generations. The smallness of the town facilitates supervision and enforcement of approved behavior patterns. Social control is probably even more thorough in towns than in rural areas where a stubborn farmer might be able to resist community pressure. Many a person has been "run out of town" but farmers are seldom forced to leave.

The town is definitely no place for nonconformists. Institutionalized behavior patterns show rigidity and innovations are accepted only reluctantly. Puritanism is still strong in New England towns. In the Bible belt towns are the bulwarks of fundamentalism. Drinking and gambling meet with disapproval everywhere.

The result is a firmly established community which has a leveling effect on its members. Religious diversity is traditionally permissible but hardly anyone can afford to remain outside a church. Politically, the town adheres to the party for which it has voted since time immemorial but shows a preference for the more conservative wing of the preferred party. Economically, townspeople disapprove of risk and favor solid business, although an occasional rush "to strike it rich" may occur. In accordance with Puritan mores, a display of wealth or conspicuous consumption is frowned upon; the millionaire wears clothing which hardly differs from that of the poor man. Culturally, towns are the guardians of tradition and established values. It has become fashionable to ridicule the town for both actual and imagined shortcomings. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the preservation of mores has an important stabilizing function when people are only too willing to shift incessantly to new standards which are as quickly abandoned as they were adopted.

The change which Sinclair Lewis demonstrated from his entirely negative attitude in *Main Street* to the very positive approach in *Cass Timberlane* indicates that we move toward a more reasonable evaluation of the role of the town in the life of the nation. The ambivalent attitude of the public toward town life is shown by the equally enthusiastic reception of Lewis's bitter accusations and of the glorification of town life which is the theme in Thornton Wilder's *Our Town*. Both authors stress the extremes. Eugene O'Neill in *Ah, Wilderness,* a play set in a small Connecticut town, divided lights and shadows more evenly. His play is perhaps the most realistic description of town life in contemporary America.

But there are at least two serious drawbacks to life in a town: lack of opportunity and extreme conservatism. The activities of the town are dependent on their rural surroundings. All rural regions are constantly losing population. While the United States during the period from 1930 to 1950 increased in population from 122,775,046 to 150,697,361, the farm population fell from 29,450,000 to 24,335,000. Within the last decade the loss of rural customers has been offset by the better bargaining power of the farmers who have enjoyed a hitherto unknown prosperity. But the economic situation of the town is so dependent on its rural environment that the decrease in farm population must at least limit its expansion. Sometimes the towns gain as vacation resorts or from neighboring military camps. Otherwise they can hardly fail to lose functions. There is no room for ventures, economic or otherwise. All attractive positions are taken and, if vacated, pass from

father to son. What is called "the lure of the city" is entirely absent in the drab, monotonous town.[4]

The lack of opportunity induces just the most intelligent, energetic, enterprising, risk-loving young people to leave the towns, which become increasingly places with an overage population, carrying on their daily work in a time-honored way, averse to change. By this kind of negative selection towns became more and more conservative and are in danger of losing contact with a modern world. The result is cultural lag, ossification of outmoded behavior patterns, resentment against larger, successful cities, and failure to contribute a full share to the advance of the nation. C. C. Zimmerman [5] has made a detailed study of a host of towns, all in decline because they were unable to change with changing conditions.

Table 7 shows the stagnant or declining conditions of selected towns for the period from 1940 to 1950. California, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are the only states in which not a single town declined in numbers. A moderate increase, however, is no indication of normal growth. The increase must be larger than the general population growth, for the urban places made additional gains by drawing more than 5 million farmers into cities. Nor do the figures show how much the town population has aged.

The towns are further threatened by an apparent decrease in their traditional functions. The situation is quite similar to that of the village. Modern facilities have brought larger cities close to once-remote rural areas, and the farmer is less dependent on the services of the neighboring town. It has been said that every farmer has two books: the Bible and the Sears, Roebuck catalogue. The mail-order houses, indeed, deliver practically every type of merchandise. If the farmer wants something of above-average quality, he drives to the large city where he has wider choice. With the advent of the radio, the town and its newspaper are no longer the main source of information. In two matters of great importance to the farmer, weather forecasts and market reports, broadcasts are the quickest and most reliable media of communication. It seems that the prospects for future growth of towns are not too bright. In states without larger cities, for instance, Idaho, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Vermont, the population has been increas-

[4] Exceptions occur. The location of Las Vegas, close to the California border, as well as the lax laws of Nevada, accounts for the rapid growth of this type of resort town. Its population increased from 5,164 in 1930 to 24,624 in 1950. How long the town can live on catering to the film world of southern California and well-to-do "residents" waiting for a divorce decree remains to be seen. How limited opportunities arise from new functions is demonstrated by Boulder City, not far from Las Vegas. It owes its existence to the erection of the highest water barrier in the world, Hoover Dam (completed in 1938). Its population, however, rose only from 2,000 in 1940 to 3,900 in 1950. In the similar case of Grand Coulee, Wash., the population fell from 3,659 in 1940 to 2,741 in 1950. Neither town existed in 1930.

[5] Carle C. Zimmerman, *The Changing Community,* New York, 1938.

Table 7. Selected American Cities with Declining Population

State	City	Population	
		1950	1940
Alabama	Carbon Hill	2,179	2,555
Arizona	Bisbee	3,801	5,853
Arkansas	Crossel	4,619	4,891
Colorado	Alomosa	5,354	5,613
Connecticut	Ansonia	18,706	19,210
Delaware	Laurel	2,700	2,884
Florida	Apalachicola	3,222	3,268
Georgia	Buford	3,812	4,191
Idaho	Wallace	3,140	3,839
Illinois	Beardstown	6,080	6,505
Indiana	Bicknell	4,572	5,110
Iowa	Albia	4,838	5,157
Kansas	Fredonia	3,257	3,524
Kentucky	Dawson Springs	2,374	2,560
Maine	Eastport	3,123	3,346
Maryland	Crisfield	3,688	3,908
Massachusetts	Barre	3,406	3,528
Michigan	Bessemer	3,509	4,080
Minnesota	Bayport	2,502	2,638
Mississippi	Durant	2,311	2,510
Missouri	Boone Terre	3,533	3,730
Montana	Red Lodge	2,730	2,950
Nebraska	Auburn	3,422	3,639
Nevada	Ely	3,548	4,140
New Hampshire	Wolfsboro	2,581	2,636
New Jersey	Carlstadt	5,591	5,644
New Mexico	Las Vegas (town)	6,269	6,421
New York	Greenport	3,028	3,259
North Carolina	Boone	2,973	4,504
Ohio	Bridgeport	4,309	4,853
Oklahoma	Hartshorne	2,330	2,569
Oregon	Klamath Falls	15,875	16,497
Pennsylvania	Aspinwall	4,084	4,716
South Carolina	Whitmore	3,006	3,272
South Dakota	Lead	6,422	7,520
Tennessee	Dickson	3,348	3,504
Texas	Cooper	2,350	2,537
Utah	Park City	2,254	3,739
Vermont	Bellows Falls	4,236	3,881
Virginia	Pocahontas	2,410	2,623
Washington	Grand Coulee	2,741	3,659
West Virginia	Benwood	3,485	3,608
Wisconsin	Burke	2,569	3,003

Note: No small town in Rhode Island declined, but the population of Providence fell from 253,504 to 248,674.

Source: United States Census, 1940 and 1950.

ing only slightly. The loss of farm population has been balanced by the growth of the bigger towns rather than by a proportional increase of all urban places.

Much of what has been said above does not apply to "dependent" towns which serve larger cities rather than rural areas. The satellite town and the suburb, which actually, though not legally, are part of a larger urban system, are not affected by cultural lag, decline of rural customers, and loss of functions. They grow or decline with their mother city. The continual decentralization of large cities makes it likely that at least the residential towns will gain in population. The end of this very recent phenomenon is not yet in sight.

Taking a population of 10,000 as an arbitrary upper limit for towns, the 1950 census shows a total of 3,013 urban places with a population of at least 2,500 but not exceeding 10,000 persons. The total population of these towns amounted to 14,610,868, or slightly less than 10 per cent of the entire population. Nearly one out of ten American "urbanites" resides in a town. But all townspeople together outnumber the population of a single area—metropolitan New York—by only 10 per cent.

The City. The city may be defined as an urban settlement which dominates an entire region, both rural and urban. While the lower limit of its size is set at a population in excess of 10,000, this figure is more a matter of statistical convenience than a sharp sociological distinction. Some cities in the 10,000–25,000 population bracket are hardly more than very large towns. The legal nomenclature, based on a charter, is also not reliable. Montclair, New Jersey, is officially a town with a population of 43,927; Carson City, Nevada, with a population of only 3,028, possesses all the sociological characteristics of a small town.

While many of the differences between city and town are differences in degree rather than in principle, the main characteristic of the city is its complexity. The town is already a multifunctional unit but, as a rule, only one function is fully developed while the others remain on a more elementary level. The city is a very complicated system of religious, cultural, political, economic, and recreational activities, with highly stratified organizations; its population is differentiated by origin, religion, status, education, and behavior patterns.

Towns display a large degree of uniformity all over the country. In outward appearance, in social organization, in daily activities they are so much alike that they are types rather than individualities. Everyone who reads *Main Street* or *Our Town* identifies, therefore, the locality with his "own" town and not with Sauk Centre, Minnesota (which he never saw), or Griver's Corners, New Hampshire (which does not exist). Cities, despite intentional widespread standardization, show such marked individual traits that it is impossible to name one city as representing the national type. This is the

source of so much erroneous reporting by superficial tourists. Americans justly protest if a European traveler, having spent two weeks in New York, writes a book about the American city. We know so little about Russian cities because most Americans visiting Russia have seen only Moscow and Leningrad. Oxford and Manchester in Great Britain, Rouen and Nice in France, Florence and Milan in Italy are very different cities and so, of course, are Worcester, Massachusetts; Richmond, Virginia; Portland, Maine; and Portland, Oregon, to say nothing about extreme types represented by cities such as New Orleans, Savannah, Miami, or Hollywood.

Cities represent the most intense concentration of people in space. But there are exceptions, especially in American cities with their stress on the one-family home and garden, plus the necessity to allot large areas to other than residential land use. Thus even smaller cities cover an extensive area.[6] In the towns residents know every nook, every small back alley, and they know each other. In the cities this is no longer feasible. A town planner, with the help of a trained staff, with small-scale maps, detailed census reports, and data furnished by the tax assessor and the building department needs approximately six months to assemble information about a city of 100,000 inhabitants, and that information is still incomplete from the viewpoint of the sociologist. An actual field inspection of all city streets by automobile can hardly be completed in less than three months. The numerical and physical magnitude of the city has important sociological implications. By necessity, no one can know his city except in segments. The town planner, as an exception, may have seen all the streets in a smaller city but he cannot be acquainted with the majority of the residents. Even in the most homogeneous cities there can be no universal cooperation, no full participation in even the most general social activities. One of the best examples of effective community organization is provided by the New England town meetings. In former times these meetings were frequent, practically all male residents attended and voted, all matters of common interest were discussed and decided. Furthermore, in the smaller towns at least, almost every resident could expect to hold some public office once. In these smaller towns the meetings are still held and, though their importance has declined, they still fulfill their foremost social function, namely, community organization. In the cities, however, town meetings no longer exist. Bridgeport, Connecticut, for example, did not abrogate the institution by law. But there is no assembly hall large enough to hold all the voters of a city with a population of nearly

[6] This does not apply to all European cities. The old historical cities, above all in France and Italy, with their narrow streets and overcrowded living quarters, occupy only a small territory. It is less than a four-hour walk across Paris at its widest place. Ravenna, which at the period of Byzantine rule dominated Italy, has an area of only 1 square mile and a population of 30,000. Walla Walla, Wash., with less than 25,000 inhabitants, covers 5.34 square miles.

160,000, and even if there were, there could be no discussion. It would take days merely to count the votes. Thus the city is by necessity incompletely organized. Lack of organization has its corollary in lack of social control. If the informal, invisible but very effective forces of community supervision cease to exist, a special agency to enforce order becomes necessary; hence the emergence of a police force. In a town the policeman's main function is to keep an eye on the stranger; in cities, written legal ordinances supplant the traditional unwritten rules which are no longer obeyed because social disapproval, even boycott, are not sufficient means to maintain order.

The city is also a place of differentiation and thus of differences. The homogeneity of the town is replaced by diversity; the city is, above all, a region of contrasts. Extremes, to be sure, can be found in rural areas too. In colonial times the rich plantation owner lived in functional proximity to his poor slave. In cities millionaires and beggars meet only at street corners; they do not live together. They neither like nor dislike each other, because they do not know each other. These contrasting extremes do not exist in isolation; they form the ends of a continuous line. From the entirely destitute, homeless pauper to the multimillionaire, from the illiterate to the Nobel prize winner, from the powerless voter, disagreeing with all parties, to the most influential politician, we find all possible shades of transition not only in individuals (such cases occur in towns too) but in large groups. Jefferson believed that real democracy could exist only in a rural society; cities are certainly no models of democracy because inequality is one of their most striking traits. In addition, the city consists of a bewildering variety of races, cultures, and classes. The problems arising from this concentration of contrasts, with their inevitable danger of conflicts, are one of the main concerns of applied sociology.

Like the town, the city is also a multifunctional unit, but unlike the town, where one function is generally predominant, at least a group of functions is almost equally important. This is a rule with some exceptions. Washington, D.C. is a city only because it is the capital of the United States. Detroit without its automobile industry and Los Angeles without its motion-picture studios might shrink to towns.

Multiplicity of functions is accompanied by a highly complex differentiation of both men and their institutions. From a one-man unit, for instance, a person who makes cigars without any hired help, or a luncheonette operated by a single family, to factories employing thousands of workers we find all conceivable types of business establishments. There are educational institutions from grade school to universities and postdoctoral research centers. There are political divisions from wards to election districts for state senators. There are religious denominations, some serving a few faithful in a small room or basement, others serving in just one church building, and still others with many churches of various sizes, from those seating perhaps a hundred

persons to the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, which after its completion will be the largest church in the world.

Table 8. City Population, 1950

Size class	Number of places	Total population
10,000–25,000	780	11,962,110
25,000–50,000	246	8,644,050
50,000–100,000	125	8,826,709
100,000–250,000	67	9,822,796
250,000–500,000	21	7,658,654
500,000–1,000,000	13	9,110,922
Total	1,252	56,025,241

Source: United States Census, 1950.

As the man-made institutions differ in importance, size, and activity, so the men who organized them differ in terms of class status, prestige, power, and importance. Thus it is the complexity of men, groups, institutions, and organizations which make an urban place a city. With some reservations it can be said that the complexity accounts for the numerical size and not vice versa. Complex business enterprises, stratified political organizations, and differentiated cultural institutions need people in large numbers and thereby an urban habitat develops into a city. But complexity is also a matter of degree, and the actual differences between complex systems are very great and of considerable importance. It goes without saying that a city with a population of 15,000 and a city with a population of 1,000,000 show as many differences as similarities. In general, we may state that complexity grows with increasing size and that all the phenomena discussed above tend to become more marked, more intense, and more extreme as a city increases in population. In particular, the pathological features of a city increase disproportionately with a growing city. The danger of cultural lag decreases because backwardness is usually the result of arrested growth and stagnation.

While it seems hopeless to find a satisfactory sociological subdivision of cities according to their size, the numerical distinctions made by the United States census are at least useful approximations.

As can be seen, more than one-third of all Americans live in cities, as defined above. However, more people live in towns than in small cities. There are, to be sure, four times as many towns as cities between 10,000 and 25,000. In no bracket is the total population as large as in metropolitan New York.[7]

The Metropolis. The term "metropolis," borrowed from the Greek, means literally "mother city," reminding us of the time when Greek cities founded

[7] It should be kept in mind that the metropolitan area of New York comprises all kinds of satellite cities and towns up to the 500,000-population bracket.

colonies in foreign countries which remained culturally, politically, and economically dependent on their "mothers." Later the word was used to denote cities which had gained supranational importance.[8] Such cities naturally tend to assume very large proportions, but until the second quarter of the nineteenth century their size was not extraordinary and they were few in numbers. In 1500 there were probably only two cities deserving the name metropolis: Rome and Constantinople, with Venice rapidly declining and Paris coming to the fore. In 1800 Constantinople was decaying with the then weak Ottoman Empire. Rome now shared the metropolitan honors with London, Paris, and Vienna. The rise of St. Petersburg and Berlin was already visible but that of New York not yet in sight. In 1820, for the first time in history, the population of one metropolis, London, exceeded 1 million; a century later about fifty cities had a population of at least the same figure.

In classifying all cities with a population of 1 million and over as metropolises, we postulate that cities of this magnitude assume a supranational importance. This was undoubtedly correct for the earliest of these giant cities. However, in recent years accelerated urbanization in still underdeveloped countries, and the rapid population increase of Asiatic nations, led to mass concentrations in cities which passed the million mark without achieving metropolitan character in the sense described above. Bucharest, Osaka, Tientsin, for instance, can hardly claim that their economical, political, or cultural activities influence substantially areas outside their own countries.

The metropolitan character may be manifest in only one aspect, though giant cities by necessity discharge multiple functions. São Paulo is a metropolis only as the world's greatest coffee market and, perhaps, also as a cotton market. Detroit dominates the car production of the world and Los Angeles the motion-picture industry. But the largest cities are not confined to just one field. New York is the financial heart of the world but also an international port, the greatest transportation center, and the seat of the United Nations. Paris is the representative of one of the greatest civilizations, a capital where world politics are made, the creator of fashion, and probably the greatest market for works of fine arts.

It is not necessary that the sphere of influence extend over the entire world but it must stretch over a large international area. Cairo, for example, is mainly a metropolis for the Near East; its influence may become world wide if the Arab states unite and develop their resources. The metropolis attracts continual attention. A revolution might bring Yugoslavia to the forefront of international politics and have decisive consequences for the entire world. But that would not make Belgrade a metropolis. In ordinary times it is just the capital of a middle-sized country and of no greater importance

[8] Metropolis is now frequently used to denote the central city in a metropolitan area. It seems preferable to call the latter "metropolitan center" and reserve metropolis for the largest urban settlements of international importance.

than several dozen cities of similar size. But automobile manufacturers and dealers in every country of the world will always be interested in what the Detroit factories are producing. No coffee merchant can afford to be ignorant of the daily quotations in São Paulo. No statesman can risk disregarding for a single day the events in Washington or Moscow. This has important sociological implications. The actions of professional experts in a given field are always oriented to the situation in the metropolis. Thus we find constant international interaction in all possible forms: cooperation, participation, competition, and conflict. Occasional contacts, even regular diplomatic relations, wars and alliances, or international trade existed long before the first metropolis came into being. But the existence of the metropolis is one of the prime factors which led to the permanent mutual interdependence of the entire world. Thus the metropolis always assumes an international character which is indicated by a large number of foreigners within its borders. They create outposts of their countries; they are representatives, leaders, and specialists engaged in work which is important to their mother country, although the work might be considered as undesirable either by their own nation or by the guest country. London, Paris, and New York always have been centers for political refugees and lately Moscow has been giving asylum to foreign Communists. Moscow is also the international training school where foreigners are trained for propagating Communism or directing party politics in their own countries. American, British, and German businessmen have founded their enterprises in every economic metropolis of the world, unless they are legally excluded as now in Communist-dominated countries. In return, foreigners have their own firms in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, and Paris. In Rome the Catholic Church attracts foreign religious leaders. Paris has its international art colony. Experts such as engineers and scientists are always working in the metropolitan cities of Asia. As American scholars work in Tokyo, it is safe to assume that a considerable number of Russian specialists are now employed in Peiping.

Because of its international character the metropolis is less representative of a country than its smaller cities. It has become a truism to say that New York is not America. The importance of the metropolis rests mainly on the sociological traits which have been discussed above. It would be a fallacy to infer that a metropolis is in every respect a "superior" city. In particular, it should be clear that the cultural achievement of a city does not depend on its metropolitan character. Oxford, Cambridge, Stockholm, Prague, Louvain, Weimar, Heidelberg, Leyden, Geneva, and Florence—to cite only a few examples—are culturally much more important than many giant cities.

Five American cities have a population in excess of 1 million: New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Nine others pass the million mark if the population of their not-incorporated suburbs are added: Boston, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cleveland, Washington, Balti-

Table 9. The Largest Cities of the World

City	*Population*
1. London (Greater London)	8,417,000
2. New York	7,891,000
3. Shanghai	5,407,000
4. Tokyo	5,385,000
5. Moscow	4,137,000
6. Berlin	3,730,000
7. Chicago	3,620,000
8. Leningrad	3,192,000
9. Buenos Aires	3,000,000
10. Bombay	2,840,000
11. Paris	2,800,000
12. Djakarta (Batavia)	2,800,000
13. Calcutta	2,550,000
14. Mexico City	2,527,000
15. Rio de Janeiro	2,413,000
16. São Paulo	2,227,000
17. Cairo	2,071,000
18. Philadelphia	2,017,000

Source: The *Statesman's Yearbook* and various other sources. All figures are approximate; some are based on estimates. The figures for Moscow and Leningrad are based on the Census of 1939 and are therefore much too low.

more, Minneapolis, and Buffalo. In 1950 almost 45 million lived in the metropolitan areas of these cities. In other words, nearly three out of ten Americans live in the pale of a metropolis. The sociological consequences of this giant concentration can hardly be exaggerated.

Urbanization does not necessarily create metropolitan conditions nor does the existence of an overwhelmingly agricultural society prevent the rise of a metropolis. India, China, Brazil, and Argentina are still predominantly agricultural, but we find eleven metropolitan cities in these countries. Conversely, Belgium, the most densely populated and, next to Great Britain, the most thoroughly industrialized European country, has a much more balanced distribution of population and consequently less difficult social problems. Despite the lessening of community ties due to urbanization, cities can be, and in many instances are, well organized. Homogeneous cities such as Basel, Oslo, Copenhagen, and Edinburgh show very few pathological symptoms. But we cannot expect a satisfactory integration of a metropolitan city, with its heterogeneity of races, cultures, and classes, with its inevitable inequality of power, prestige, status, position, education, and wealth. There cannot be a communion of millions. Urbanization and mass society are not identical. It is the latter which characterizes the metropolis and which is the cause of its special problems. The inability to provide satisfactory community life has been a decisive factor in the rise of modern totalitarian systems which, unlike

former dictatorships, derive their strength from the support of metropolitan masses. These amorphous masses, disorganized but longing for the emotional security of an organization, leaderless but yearning for the "great man" who will do for them what they cannot do for themselves, are an easy prey for the gifted demagogues who know how to appeal to masses. Unpalatable as it may be, it is nonetheless true that the private armies of totalitarian parties, recruited mostly from metropolitan masses, are perhaps the best examples of a successful mass organization.

The reasons for the rise of the metropolis have not been fully explored. We may venture a few guesses. Like all great cities, a metropolis grows by migration. The question is: What makes people move into the great urban centers? An examination of existing metropolitan conditions makes it clear that the movement is caused by various factors. In the case of Detroit and Pittsburgh it is obviously industrialization. Heavy industries employ masses and additional masses have to serve both the industry and their workers. But Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, China, and India are agricultural countries with industry playing a secondary role. In the case of Hong Kong and Shanghai it is trade. In the case of Cairo and Batavia the main cause may be overpopulation. But Australia, Canada, Iran, Argentina, and Brazil have a very low population density. The United States and the Soviet Union are less densely populated than countries without a metropolis, such at Holland or Burma.

One of the reasons for metropolitan growth is the ability to support masses. That is the main cause of continuous "metropolization" in the United States. As the metropolis draws people into its orbit, the rural areas eject their surplus population. In countries with backward agricultural methods, with constantly decreasing fertility of the soil (exhaustion or erosion), the peasants, having for generations split their farms among their children, have no more land to give to the rapidly increasing rural masses. One son takes over from his father, the other children must go, and they drift to the cities. They cannot stay in the smaller town where even odd jobs are rare. So they move into the big cities where some find steady employment while others work at casual jobs and the still more destitute live on relief, or as beggars or criminals, the great flotsam of overpopulated countries. This is probably the explanation of the rapid rise of metropolitan cities in the East.

Composite Urban Aggregates. Primeval man needed much space in which to find food but practically none for his "housing," if the term is applicable at all. It is estimated that in the food-gathering stage one square mile is barely sufficient to feed eight people. But the primitives, not yet settled down (they slept in the open, in caves, portable tents, or similar devices), required no space for their ever-changing habitat. In some respects history is an incessant battle of man against space which becomes increasingly more scarce. As time went on, man succeeded in forcing the soil to give a much

higher return which makes it possible for masses to live in small areas. The cities grew and the problem of housing became more and more pressing. The urban dweller, unlike his roaming ancestor, needs much more than just a place to sleep. By utilizing devices, space can be obtained if the population is not too large. With an increase in population, urban space becomes scarcer and the city expands in a vertical direction. It is not sufficiently realized that the tenement [9] or apartment house type of dwelling is a late development, a symptom of scarcity. There are limits even to skyscrapers, however, and the city must expand in area. This expansion is also bound to come to an end. There are geographical obstacles—water, swamps, or hills—there are social, psychological, and economic blocks barring unlimited extension. Finally the city, unable to house all its residents, "spills over." Some people have to live in one place and work in another. The single city is replaced by composite urban settlements which are interdependent and connected with each other. There are at least four types of these supersettlements of complex urban systems: (1) rurban areas, (2) agglomeration, (3) conurbation, and (4) metropolitan communities.

Rurbanization. The term "rurban" was introduced by C. J. Galpin.[10] The blending of urban and rural life is not a recent phenomenon. The urban fringe had always been a composite area where farmers and urbanites intermingled. But now the penetration of the country has become more general. Today several million who work in the city live in rural areas. In many cases the clear division between country and city has disappeared. Beyond the city limits there is a rather large area where farms and urban homes are so mixed that it is no longer possible to speak of an urban or a rural district. These composite regions are called "rurban." The term denotes more than a mere local symbiosis of urbanites and farmers. The facilities which enable the majority of these urbanites to commute to their daily work in the city are also available to farmers who use them freely if less regularly. They buy the city newspaper, deposit their money in city banks, patronize city stores, go to the city theaters. Many farmers regularly attend city churches and send their children to city high schools. Conversely, many city workers raise chickens and vegetables in their back yards and become interested in some phase of farm life. Under these conditions the social distinctions between city and country become more vague and are increasingly reduced to mere occupational differences. As in all rural areas adjacent to a city, many farmers specialize in dairy, poultry, and vegetable produce which they market themselves in the city. The farmer becomes interested in city life and city affairs. Thus the rurban region creates a new ecological type which is not entirely urban but is city-dominated and city-centered. The scenery is rural, in many

[9] Tenement houses existed in ancient Rome, but they disappeared when the population declined.

[10] C. J. Galpin, *Rural Life,* New York, 1918.

cases the majority of the population is agricultural, but modes of life become more urbanized.

Some believe this new type represents the most desirable kind of habitat and that finally the city will be replaced by rurban areas. However, rurbanization on a large scale is hardly possible, though rurban areas may gain in size. Heavy industry employs masses that cannot be spread at random over a wide area. A city can fulfill many of its most important functions only because its population is concentrated. Dispersion makes it impossible to discharge these functions. If extended over a rurban area, some city services such as sewers, paving, lighting, street cleaning, policing, supplying water, and other utilities would become so expensive that most people could not afford to pay for them. The city standards would change to rural standards, which are technically inferior. Extensive rurbanization would probably create more problems than it would solve. The ever-increasing residential symbiosis of urban and rural families motivated the United States census to introduce a new statistical category called "urbanized areas." This category is not quite identical with the concept of "rurban areas" but the difference is of minor importance.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census has given the following definitions: [11]

"Urbanized areas" have been defined for the first time in the 1950 Census. The major objective of the Bureau of the Census in delineating these areas was to provide a better separation of urban and rural population in the vicinity of our larger cities than was possible under the old definition. All persons who resided in urbanized areas on April 1, 1950 are included in the urban population according to the new definition. The effect of the adoption of the organized area concept was to include in the urban population 6,203,596 persons living under distinctly urban conditions in the immediate environs of our larger cities who under the old definition would have been included in the rural population.

An urbanized area is an area that included at least one city with 50,000 inhabitants or more in 1940 or later according to a special census taken prior to 1950 and also the surrounding closely settled incorporated places and unincorporated area that meet the criteria listed below. Since the urbanized area outside of incorporated places was defined on the basis of housing or population density or of land use, its boundaries for the most part are not political but follow such features as roads, streets, railroads, streams, and other clearly defined lines which may be easily identified by census enumerators in the field. The urbanized area boundaries were selected after careful examination of all available maps, aerial photographs, and other sources of information, and then were checked in detail in the field to insure that the criteria were followed and the boundaries identifiable.

The urban fringe of an urbanized area is that part which is outside the central city or cities. The following types of areas if they are contiguous to the central city or cities or if they are contiguous to any area already included in the urban fringe:

[11] U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950, *Population,* vol. 1, pp. XXVII ff.

1. Incorporated places with 2,500 inhabitants or more in 1940 or at a subsequent special census conducted prior to 1950.

2. Incorporated places with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants containing an area with a concentration of 100 dwelling units or more with a density in this concentration of 500 units or more per square mile. This density represents approximately 2,000 persons per square mile and normally is the minimum found associated with a closely spaced street pattern.

3. Unincorporated territory with at least 500 dwelling units per square mile.

4. Territory devoted to commercial, industrial, transportational, recreational, and other purposes functionally related to the central city.

Also included are outlying noncontiguous areas with the required dwelling unit density located within 1½ miles of the main contiguous urbanized part, measured along the shortest connecting highway, and other outlying areas within ½ mile of such noncontiguous areas which meet the minimum residential density rule.

Although an urbanized area may contain more than one city of 50,000 or more, not all cities of this size are necessarily central cities. The largest city of an area is always the central city. In addition, the second and third most populous cities in the area may qualify as central cities provided they have a population of at least one-third that of the largest city in the area and a minimum of 25,000 inhabitants. The names of the individual urbanized areas indicate the central cities of the areas.

Population of urbanized areas—Somewhat less than one-half of the total, and more than seven-tenths of the urban population of the United States was living in the 157 urbanized areas in 1950. Of the 69,249,148 persons living in the urbanized areas, 48,377,240 were in the 172 central cities and 20,871,908 were living in the urban-fringe areas. In the urban-fringe areas, there were 12,949,890 persons living in 859 incorporated places of 2,500 inhabitants or more, 577,992 persons living in 457 incorporated places under 2,500 inhabitants, and 7,344,026 persons living in unincorporated territory. The number of persons in the incorporated places under 2,500 inhabitants and in unincorporated territory—7,922,018—represents the persons in urban territory living outside urban places and, consequently, the net addition to the urban population attributable to the urbanized area delineations.

In population, the urbanized areas ranged in size from the Fort Smith, Arkansas Urbanized Area, which had a population of 50,046, to the New York–Northeastern New Jersey Urbanized Area, which had a population of 12,296,117. The 12 urbanized areas with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants had a combined population of 37,817,068, or more than half the population of the 157 areas. On the other hand, the 3,116,450 persons living in the 38 urbanized areas under 100,000 inhabitants represented less than 5 per cent of the total population in urbanized areas.

Agglomeration and Conurbation. Widespread rurbanization will always depend on the accessibility of the rural hinterland. But the city often grows faster than roads and facilities for commuters. In former times this was the rule. When under these conditions a city can no longer house all its workers, the surplus must live beyond the legal city limits until, sooner or later, the outer circle is incorporated. The city has added to its area. If this occurs simultaneously in two cities which are not too far apart, they will finally

meet and the borders become indistinguishable. The two cities have grown together and now form one unit. We shall call this process agglomeration. The most outstanding example is London. Originally the merchants and the king lived in two different cities: the merchant in what still is known as "the City" [12] and the king in Westminster. That two cities of equal importance are finally united is rather rare, but almost every large city is bound to reach smaller towns and villages which finally are agglomerated. Vienna incorporated at least a score of villages. Brooklyn agglomerated several originally independent towns until it was itself incorporated into New York. Boston agglomerated Charlestown, Dorchester, and Roxbury; Philadelphia, Germantown, and so on. In many cases the smaller places refuse to be legally incorporated as, for instance, Brookline, Cambridge, Newton, and other towns which ecologically have become an integral part of Boston. In the United States resistance against incorporation is rather strong. There are even a number of cases of dissociation: parts of an already existing settlement secede and form a new legal unit. For instance, Montclair, New Jersey, broke away from Bloomfield. The legal status is of little sociological importance. We speak of agglomeration if the city boundaries have become physically indistinguishable and if a substantial part of the inhabitants live in one place and work in the other.

A special case of agglomeration without legal incorporation are the many "twin cities." As noted earlier, rivers frequently are city boundaries in the United States. The settlement which almost invariably arises on the other side of the river from an established site remains legally independent but the twins form an ecological unit. Minneapolis–St. Paul is the most outstanding example. In the case of San Francisco–Oakland–Berkeley we have triplets. Other examples are St. Louis–East St. Louis; Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri; Albany–Schenectady in New York; Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey; Boston and Cambridge; Omaha and Council Bluffs. Maine is a state where twin towns abound: Auburn–Lewiston, Bangor–Brewer, Calais–St. Stephen, Madison–Anson, while Augusta is a rare instance of a town which developed on both sides of a river without legal separation.

Aside from twin cities, agglomeration is most likely to occur when a large city undergoes an enormous expansion. It is bound to reach smaller settlements. Expansion, however, is not always an even growth; cities increase by developing coaxial "tentacles," a phenomenon analyzed by both Hurd and Hoyt. Cities stretch out by expanding along existing main arteries, highways, and railroad lines. By this process the city is also bound to reach other urban places but, to speak figuratively, only with the tip of its finger. The two urban places meet only in one very limited area; everywhere else their boundaries are far apart and can be clearly distinguished.

[12] The king is still forbidden to enter "the City" before he has obtained formal permission from the Lord Mayor.

This development, however, is not limited to the meeting of two urban places. Main routes induce people to settle alongside in a narrow but almost uninterrupted continuous area. The result is the appearance of stringlike settlements; in the neighborhood of already existing towns connections will be made sooner or later. Elsewhere these settlements have no width and sometimes consist only of a single line of houses, which for the sake of convenience become legally part of a town with which they have little in common. In due time these strings of settlements may connect all towns lying along a main route but the thus physically linked towns are still separate ecological units. Commuting between the more distant places of the string is not too frequent and each town is no more dependent on the others than if the connection were nonexistent. This stringlike continuum of urban places is called conurbation. If two cities are of considerable size but still so far apart that actual agglomeration cannot occur, the emergence of conurbated areas is very likely. On the 237-mile stretch along U.S. Highway 1, known as the Boston Post Road, there is a practically uninterrupted line of houses and the motorist passes from the jurisdiction of one town to the next without noting any physically discernible boundaries, unless informed by road signs. But the connected places—among them, Bridgeport, New Haven, New London, and Providence—do not form a single urban unit; there are closer and more frequent contacts with adjacent towns but no greater contact between the more distant places than would exist without conurbation. Similar conditions exist in New Jersey on the routes leading from New York to Philadelphia or from Newark to Caldwell. Conurbation can be observed along Lake Michigan, on U.S. Route 5 between Hartford and New Haven, Connecticut, and at many points along both the Atlantic and the Pacific Coasts. Conurbation is quite frequent along the seashore or on lake fronts; recreation facilities favor comparatively small resort towns which, if an area flourishes, grow in length rather than in depth until they reach the adjacent town. The French and Italian Rivieras, the Channel beaches from Brighton to Hastings in England, from Cabourg to Deauville in France, the northern shore of Lake Geneva from Geneva to Montreux in Switzerland, the North and South Shores of Long Island, and the Cape Cod towns from Sandwich to Provincetown are such examples.

The main feature of conurbation is the mere physical continuity of urban settlements. The density of the urban population in the conurbated strip is very low. The small connecting links differ from the rurban situation where the urban population is scattered along one (or several) roads but are linked to the urban center. Conurbation does not create communities since the connection is physical rather than social. It merely links communities and facilitates traffic but not necessarily group interaction.

Metropolitan Communities. Rurbanization and conurbation are indications of urban growth beyond the legal limits of a city; they represent urban de-

velopments passing the stage of a single unit. They do not necessarily imply functional changes. Neither do such extensions solve the most pressing problem of the large city: sufficient space for a large population surplus and for additional industries. The rise of a metropolitan community is an indication that the mother city can no longer house all those who work and provide all the space needed for additional activities.

The United States census has tried various methods to determine the extent of urbanization. Beginning in 1910 the census set up "metropolitan districts," consisting of at least one city of 50,000 or more and all adjacent or contiguous minor places with a population density of at least 150 per square mile. In 1950 the census changed the criteria and established "standard metropolitan areas." The definition of the metropolitan area is not uniform. Different criteria are used for New England than for the rest of the country.

The advantage of the census method consists in the accuracy of figures. The density of the population, as well as the distribution of rural and urban workers, can be measured. But the disadvantage lies in applying criteria to areas which have as their only common denominator a city with a minimum population of 50,000. Since the smallest metropolitan area—Laredo—comprised only 55,904 inhabitants, and the largest—officially called New York–Eastern New Jersey [13]—12,831,917, it is clear that these areas must differ in many respects. The concept of urbanized area also has its sociological drawbacks, for it contains all types of urbanization, starting with the Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, area, in which only 28.3 per cent of the population live in the central city, and ending with the Beaumont, Texas, area, in which 100 per cent of the population live in the central city.[14]

R. D. McKenzie, who did most of the pioneer research on the metropolitan community,[15] did not give an exact definition of the term, which is perhaps impossible. Instead, he stated certain characteristics peculiar to the type. He speaks of a "supercommunity" which is the "center of a constellation of smaller centers" and which "absorbs varying numbers of separate local communities" and "functions as the integrating unit." [16] He states, "The modern metropolitan community obtains its unity through territorial differentiation of specialized functions rather than through mass participation in centrally located institutions." [17] McKenzie's concept is not one of a supercity; it refers to a region in which one city functions as an integrating force but which is composed of both urban and rural subdivisions. It is therefore not exactly an urban but a mixed area.

[13] Thereby excluding Fairfield County, Connecticut, which is definitely within the commuters' zone of New York.

[14] Of a total population of 93,746, only 31 do not live in Beaumont. In this case we can hardly speak of an urban "area." The neighborhood is obviously quite rural.

[15] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community,* New York, 1938.

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 312–313.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 71.

We may then tentatively define the metropolitan region as a complex system of differentiated rural and urban settlements, integrated and dominated by a large central city. The definition is undoubtedly vague; it lacks the accuracy of the statistical approach but it stresses the factors which are of sociological importance. Although the metropolitan community contains rural areas, it is predominantly urban in character.

The metropolitan community is the most inclusive ecological type of habitat. It comprises and integrates all known forms of human settlements: rural sections, rurbanized areas, conurbations, villages, towns, cities, and agglomeration of cities. It is itself a new type of a supercommunity, large in area and population, complex in functions, effectively organizing groups which once had only occasional contacts. The emergence of a hitherto unknown form of social organization, functioning in what has sometimes been almost a vacuum, is of utmost sociological importance. But the creation of a region, as a social unit, was not performed by the metropolitan community. Regions existed before. It is the situation of the region which favors the rise of the metropolitan community rather than vice versa. The impact of the metropolitan community on what is commonly called regionalism [18] is limited. It can be shown that regionalism, conceived as a kind of cultural separatism and consciousness of a special kind within a larger national unit, is weakened by metropolitan communities. Regionalism is stronger where metropolitan communities do not exist or where they are not very large (in northern New England, the deep South, the Dakotas, Kansas, and Nebraska). Two factors account for this phenomenon. First, large settlements have both a heterogeneous population, consisting of all races and nationalities, and a very mobile population, since its opportunities attract people from every region in the United States. Second, the metropolitan regions are more interdependent than smaller units. Just as the metropolitan community creates more contacts between the residents of the region, so it also creates more contacts between all metropolitan communities. It is the latter which accounts for the now-existing cohesion of the entire nation. By strengthening the ties among the people of a region, the metropolitan community comes into closer contact with other larger units. The point is worth stressing, for it has become almost a stereotype to regard urbanization exclusively as a force of social disorganization.

The central city dominates the metropolitan region but this statement must be qualified. The central city is in no position to dictate. Its dominance stems only from its ecological position and is neither completely accepted nor uncontested by competitors. It is perhaps more correct to state that within the metropolitan area all communities are oriented to and, to a large extent, conditioned by the central city. The dominance is strongest in the economic

[18] On regionalism see H. W. Odum and H. E. Moore, *American Regionalism,* New York, 1938.

field for here the opportunities are most inviting. For instance, the dominance of the central city is obvious in the type of farming carried on within the distance of daily deliveries by trucks. We can be sure to find more than the average amount of poultry, dairy and vegetable farming in the rural environs of a central city. The state laws, by not permitting the establishment of branches by banks with central offices in other states, favor regional banks of considerable financial strength. This makes banks in smaller places more dependent on the few large institutions in the central cities. Department stores which have succeeded in larger places have an advantage in establishing branches in smaller cities. The central city is also the given market for the entire area. If a person is in search of a job and has neither specific plans nor personal connections, he will usually explore the grounds in the central city before he leaves the region. In a similar way, political movements, cultural activities, even recreational practices will be oriented toward the central place, which in many ways serves as the psychological symbol of regional unity. In a poll taken at Friends University, Wichita, Kansas,[19] all students turned out to be enthusiastic supporters of the St. Louis Cardinals, while a similar poll among students of the now-defunct Junior College of Springfield, Massachusetts, showed equal unanimity in selecting the Boston Red Sox as the favorite team. The only reason for this difference in allegiance is the emotional appeal of the regional community. This should not be dismissed as an irrelevant trifle, for it is a revealing symptom of a phenomenon which has important consequences in much more serious social activities.

The central city, however, has no monopoly. That people orient their action to another person, group, or institution means only that they cannot afford to disregard existing conditions. It does not necessarily induce them to conform. In many instances opposition is aroused rather than quelled. In the first place, economic dependence on the region is far less powerful than one might expect. The same technological progress which has drawn the rural hinterland closer to the city made it possible for both of them to become more independent, for the entire nation has become one large market. New York City, by the use of express shipments and refrigerator cars, receives fresh vegetables from practically all regions and the New Jersey or Long Island farmer sometimes finds it impossible to sell a truckload of vegetables because the market is swamped with products brought by railroad from the Carolinas. Conversely, the orange grower in California does not depend on his selling ability in San Francisco or Los Angeles; he caters to the entire nation. Similarly, Vermont turkeys are sold far beyond New England. Where

[19] Wichita itself, according to the census standards, is a metropolitan area but it has no major league baseball team. Besides, the dominance of St. Louis extends far beyond the limits of the census. This illustrates the differences between the statistical approach and a method based on sociological criteria.

mass production is carried out—cattle in Texas, wheat in the Middle West—the dominance of the metropolitan central city is still weaker, for the region cannot possibly consume all that is produced. The same condition exists in banking. The farmer who wants a small mortgage or the small businessman who needs a discount loan for the moderate amount of his commercial papers depends, to be sure, on his regional banks. But if a city wants to issue bonds for 10 million dollars, it is more than likely that the transaction cannot be performed without the direct or indirect participation of banks in New York, Boston, Chicago, or San Francisco. The boy who has graduated from high school and is in search of a job is likely to go to the central city of his region. But the skilled mechanic will probably go to Detroit, the college graduate to one of the places offered through the services of his institution, the trained musician to any great city with permanent orchestras. It is well known that the merchant marine recruits large numbers of seamen from the Middle West. In brief, the metropolitan region offers economic opportunities but only in competition with other regions.

Modern transportation has also ended the monopoly of the regional newspaper. The *Christian Science Monitor,* which is perhaps a special case, is no longer the newspaper of one city but of a nation. New York newspapers, sent by airmail, are available on the West Coast on the morning of publication. The Chicago *Tribune* is regularly read all over the Middle West.

In politics the situation is even more complex. The larger the city, the greater is the difference in population composition between the central city and its hinterland. This makes political antagonism more likely. Indeed, we find that large cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago are Democratic strongholds, while their regions are predominantly Republican. The dominance of the central city is weak even within a party. The leaders of Tammany Hall have never been able to control the Democratic party outside of New York. For a long time Tammany in New York and the Hague machine in adjacent New Jersey were quite independent of each other. Sometimes the influence of smaller places is far greater than that of metropolitan cities. William Allen White, for instance, had great influence in Kansas, although Emporia is a small place. But it must be borne in mind that the dominance of the central city is nevertheless felt because of its decisive voting power. For this reason the vote of New York, Boston, or Chicago quite frequently decides the outcome in gubernatorial and senatorial elections.

The metropolitan region is a fairly recent phenomenon. It is mainly the product of a highly mechanized mass society, creating conditions which never existed before. In particular, it is the result of the inability to perform all urban functions within a single settlement. In some instances an attempt to limit city activities to the city proper would be quite unreasonable. Airports, for example, are often located outside a city. The birth of the metropolitan

region signifies a new stage in the formation of human settlements, which undoubtedly blurs the formerly sharp division between country and city but which also represents the most extensive type of urbanization.

The 1950 census lists 168 metropolitan areas. Of these, 14 have a population exceeding 1,000,000, 17 exceeding 500,000, 23 exceeding 300,000, 94 exceeding 100,000, and 18 exceeding 50,000.

To sum up: In former times city and country were sharply divided. Where the cities were walled, the separation had its symbolic representation. Today the distinction has disappeared. The city limits—though legally specific—are actually blurred, for the city passes imperceptibly into the country. New types of habitat have arisen. The main reason for the change is the fact that the *modern city is no longer able to discharge all urban functions*. The city has ceased to be the only representative of urban life.

Chapter 8

FUNCTIONAL TYPES

Specialization of Functions. The larger the city, the more functions it can perform. It is equally true that the function influences the size. The population of a mining town depends on the number of people engaged in mining operations; of a college town, on the number of people engaged in educational and auxiliary services; of a political capital, on the number of officials, public servants, and so on. If an urban place assumes a certain function, its minimum population is determined. The actual population in excess of the minimum depends on the success with which the function is performed, and on the assumption of additional functions.

The size of Washington, D.C., for example, is determined by a variety of factors. The growth of the United States in area as well as in population necessitated additions to Federal staffs in order to perform the original function of government. Some services increased in magnitude (e.g., the Department of Defense); other functions were added (e.g., the Department of Labor). Furthermore, the city assumed at least two other functions. The first is causally connected with being the capital of a great nation. Washington has become a world information center with newspapers, magazines, press services, correspondents, feature writers, and commentators. The second function is entirely independent from the primary one: the city has become an educational center with a college enrollment of about 30,000.

Accretion of functions can profoundly alter the character of a city. The most outstanding examples are Los Angeles and Detroit. They not only increased in size to supercities but their population compostion and their relationship to the adjacent area as well as their national importance underwent the most drastic changes. Sometimes functions become obsolete and a city decays unless a suitable substitute can be found. Thus Nantucket, on Cape Cod, once a whaling town, became a summer resort, and Salem, Massachusetts, once a leading fishing port, became an industrial town. Some of the more famous places become "museum cities," such as Bruges in Belgium or Venice. Williamsburg, Virginia, is a similar American example.

In other instances the function remains unchanged but technological changes alter size, character, and population composition. Some New England

towns have produced textiles since the earliest colonial times.[1] They started with household manufacturing, shifted to a very simple factory system, until by gradual alterations the modern textile industry evolved. Correspondingly, the colonial textile towns had no factories and no industrial districts with their blighting effects. The work was farmed out all over the district, so that workingmen's zones could not emerge. Work was mostly done by women and children and the existing local labor force was sufficient to support a flourishing trade. The changes in technology, the increasing demand of a growing nation, and the restriction of child labor necessitated the importation of labor from other regions. The low wages paid by the textile industry attracted no native-born male New Englanders who were either farmers or could find more profitable employment. The demand for labor could be met only by people who were willing to work for low wages, namely, immigrants. In the various stages of industrialization these groups were mostly Irish at the beginning of the nineteenth century and were later followed by Italians and French Canadians. The result was the creation of an industrial proletariat, of a class division aggravated by cultural differences, and the transformation of a uniformly Puritan society into a religiously mixed one. In some regions where the textile industry prevails, e.g., Rhode Island and southern Massachusetts, the population is now predominantly Catholic. It is therefore not only the function but also the method of discharging the functions which has considerable impact on the type of a city, its culture, and its ethnic composition.

Functional Classification. All cities are multifunctional. Even the smallest town fulfills at least two different tasks: it serves the surrounding area and its own inhabitants. This is no idle distinction, for the two types of services are entirely different. However, no town exists merely to service its inhabitants. *The functions of a city always transcend its area.* Cities are never self-contained, although primitive rural areas are sometimes independent. A functional classification is therefore not based on the performance of a single function but on the preponderance of specific functions.

McKenzie [2] proposed a general "ecological classification of communities," namely,

1. The primary service community
2. The commercial community
3. The industrial town
4. A type for which McKenzie has no name and which "is lacking in a specific economic base": recreational resorts, political and educational centers,

[1] Cf. Mitchell and Mitchell, *American Economic History,* pp. 73 ff.; also Rolla Milton Tryon, *Household Manufacturers in the United States: 1640–1860,* Chicago, 1917.

[2] R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of Human Community," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City,* pp. 66 ff.

communities for defense, penal, and charitable institutions are lumped together in this category

In other words, McKenzie bases his classification on economic stages: the first is primary production (agriculture, husbandry, fishing, mining, and lumbering); the second, distribution of primary products; and the third, the manufacture of these products. The fourth category is residual, comprising all noneconomic activities.

Later writers [3] have—sometimes with slight modifications—accepted this scheme, which is almost self-explanatory. For technical as well as social reasons people engaged in the same type of work tend to concentrate in the same area. The work has either purely economic purposes or it is oriented toward cultural or political goals. Because of the specializations in our highly differentiated society, each of these categories can be further subdivided. Economic activities concern (*a*) primary "extraction," mining, fishing, oil production; (*b*) conversion of raw materials into other goods, manufacture or industry; (*c*) spatial distribution of goods, transportation; (*d*) social distribution of goods, wholesale and retailing; or (*e*) supplementary services, financing, brokerage, advertising, and the independent professional services of lawyers, architects, accountants, and inventors. Political activities may go on everywhere but they are concentrated in a few capital cities. Cultural activities are either secular or religious in character. The multiple stimuli to intellectual or artistic activities and the greater opportunity to gain attention and recognition in large cities always attract creative writers, composers, artists, and scientists to such an extent that almost every big city has become a cultural center.

A place might assume special religious functions for two reasons. Either the religious activities of a given faith are directed from a given city (Rome, Jerusalem, Mecca, Lhasa, Istanbul under Ottoman rule, St. Petersburg under the czars) or a place has acquired a special religious meaning (Delphi, Benares, all "holy" cities and other places of pilgrimage).

The above classification, though covering the large majority of urban places, is not exhaustive. Recent developments have almost eliminated a formerly frequent urban type and added some others. Because of changing military techniques, the fortress city has practically disappeared. Gibraltar and Singapore are lonely survivors of the type.

More peaceful innovations serve the needs of people who want recreation, seek a place of retirement, or wish to regain their health. Consequently, we have the multivaried resort towns, the "pensionopolis," and the spas. Some of the latter are very old but it has been only in modern times that specific health centers have arisen independently of spas. Rochester, Minnesota, with its Mayo Clinic, is an American example; Arosa and Davos ("The Magic

[3] For example, Quinn, T. L. Smith, Kneedler, and Harris.

Mountain") as places for the treatment of tuberculosis belong in the same category.

Methods of Classification. There are sometimes difficulties in assigning actual cities to a given functional category. Two methods suggest themselves. The first was introduced by Harris,[4] who correctly described it as "a quantitative method of functional analysis." At present it seems to be more or less generally accepted and is officially employed by the United States census. In principle, this method bases the assignment of a city to a functional type on one quantitative criterion: the type of economic activity (occupation and employment) in which the majority of residents are engaged. This procedure offers obvious advantages. Based on figures, the classification is precise, mathematically verifiable, and permits tabulation in the form of statistical series. There are also valuable applications with respect to planning. The economic planner will be able to direct to or divert from cities economic activities and population movements according to existing business trends. The city planner is in a better position to determine the necessary steps for a sound development of resources. The social planner will derive suggestions for a satisfactory community organization from information about occupational distribution.

Yet, as so often, socially important aspects are not always revealed by numbers. There is no positive correlation between quantity and quality. Some of the most significant activities which give a city its specific importance are sometimes carried out by a very small number of people. For instance, the number of persons engaged in banking and related activities is everywhere so small as to constitute only a tiny fraction of the population. Consequently, a quantitative classification knows no financial city. Yet the importance of New York as the financial center of the world cannot be erased by statistical figures, and we cannot afford to disregard an activity on which the welfare of the whole country depends. A similar inadequate result can be found in the actual assignment of urban places as college towns. In Harris's classification—he distinguishes between university towns and towns in which "college instruction is an important but secondary function"—of the famous American universities only the University of Michigan and Cornell University are represented in the first category and only a few others in the second. Thus among others, Logan, Utah, is classified as a university town, while the sites of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, the universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, and California are not mentioned. As Grace M. Kneedler[5] remarked, "Even such a large university as Harvard is only a

[4] Chauncy D. Harris, "A Functional Classification of Cities in the United States," *Geographical Review,* vol. 43, January, 1943.

[5] Grace M. Kneedler, "Functional Types of Cities," *Public Management,* vol. 27, July, 1945.

small part of the economy of the city of Cambridge and does not put that city in the education center class."

The strict application of the numerical principle, indeed, yields such inadequate results that both Harris and Kneedler make several adaptations to arrive at a more meaningful classification. They employ different ratios for different types of function. For instance, Harris classifies cities as retail centers if employment in retailing is at least 50 per cent of the total employment in manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing and at least 2.2 times that in wholesaling alone. For transportation centers the ratio is considerably lower: they must contain at least 11 per cent of the gainful workers, and workers in transportation and communication have to equal at least one-third of the number in manufacturing and mechanical industries and at least two-thirds the number in trades. Still a different ratio is applied for university towns: enrollment in schools of college type has to equal at least 25 per cent of the population of the city. By this method Harris arrives at a total number of seventeen university towns, most of which are only of secondary significance for American education; as noted above, Harris adds to his list thirty-one other towns "in which college instruction is an important but secondary function." In this category Harris lists, for instance, Cape Girardeau, Missouri; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Chickasha, Oklahoma; Provo, Utah; but the universities of world fame, as well as at least ten of the most outstanding educational institutions, do not appear. The functional importance of cultural activities cannot be revealed by a simple numerical method. This is even true for some economic activities. As Grace Kneedler Ohlson pointed out,[6] the largest centers of wholesale trade in the United States (New York, Chicago, and Boston) are not classified by her as wholesale centers. If a foreign international trader should rely only on this type of information and should travel to the United States to conclude some important wholesale transactions, he would find himself in Wenatchee, Washington, where he could not buy anything but apples. Yet according to the author, this town and Wilson, North Carolina, "typify the wholesale city." That statistical methods have their limits is clearly demonstrated by Harris,[7] who included "resort and retirement towns" in his list but bluntly stated: "No satisfactory statistical criterion was found."

Without disparaging the value of quantitative methods, it seems necessary to supplement them by other procedures. While qualitative evaluations are necessarily less accurate than statistical ones, experience shows that there is hardly any disagreement in the actual classification of a town. It is safe to assume that all informed persons will give the same answer to the ques-

[6] Grace Kneedler Ohlson, "Economic Classification of Cities," *Municipal Yearbook, 1948*, p. 35.

[7] Harris, *op. cit.*

ton "What activities characterize such cities as Princeton or Palo Alto, Miami or Palm Beach, Hot Springs or Warm Springs, Youngstown or Pittsburgh?" The qualitative method is able to show the functional role of a city within the framework of the entire nation; it will show the character of a city not in terms of an occupational majority but in terms of a functional specialization which is at least of equal sociological importance. The quantitative approach makes it inevitable that the same city be listed sometimes in several categories. San Francisco appears as a port city as well as an educational center. This shows only that some cities perform several important social functions.

Functional Classification. The following tentative functional classification is based on all considerations discussed above.

I. Economic centers
  A. Centers of primary ("extractive") production
    1. Fishing towns (Gloucester, Massachusetts)
    2. Mining towns (Scranton, Pennsylvania)
    3. Oil towns (Tulsa, Oklahoma)
  B. Manufacturing centers
    1. Large-scale industry (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania)
    2. Middle-sized industry (Milwaukee, Wisconsin)
    3. Small industry (New Bedford, Massachusetts)
  C. Trade centers
    1. World trade centers (New York, London, Amsterdam, Hamburg before the war, Shanghai before the war)
    2. National trade centers (practically all large cities)
    3. Local trade centers (all smaller cities)
  D. Transportation centers
    1. Port cities (San Francisco, Marseilles, Southampton, Bremen)
    2. Inland centers (St. Louis)
  E. Economic service centers
    1. Financial (New York)
    2. Insurance (Hartford, Connecticut)
    3. Diversified: market research, advertising, auditing, storage, distribution (New York)

II. Political centers
  A. Civil political centers
    1. World centers (New York, Geneva, Washington, London, Paris, Moscow)
    2. National political centers (Washington, Ottawa, Canberra, all other national capitals)
    3. Regional political centers (Richmond, Virginia; Chicago; Toronto; Quebec)

4. Local administrative centers (many American state capitals, e.g., Jefferson City, Missouri; Augusta, Maine)

B. Military centers

1. Fortress cities (Gibraltar, Singapore)
2. Bases and training centers (Brest; Toulon; San Diego, California; San Antonio, Texas; Norfolk, Virginia)

III. Cultural centers

A. Religious centers

1. Centers of religious government (Rome; Lhasa; in former times Baghdad and Constantinople as the respective seats of the Caliphate; St. Petersburg during czarist times as the seat of the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Salt Lake City; all seats of archbishops and all Roman Catholic dioceses)
2. Pilgrimage cities (medieval Canterbury; Lourdes; Czenstochow, Poland; Mecca; Benares)
3. "Memorial" cities (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth)

B. Secular cultural centers

1. Seats of higher learning and research (medieval Bologna, Padua, Pavia, Salerno; Oxford, Cambridge, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco; as well as Princeton, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; Amherst, Massachusetts; Hanover, New Hampshire)
2. Economic centers of cultural productions: media of communication such as publishing, legitimate stage, radio, television, phonograph records, motion pictures, and fashion (London, Paris, New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Vienna, Leipzig, Milan)
3. "Museum" cities: (Bruges, Carcassonne, Rome, Venice, Florence and many smaller Italian cities, Cordova, Athens; in the United States probably only Williamsburg, Virginia)
4. "Shrine" cities: (Stratford-on-Avon, Weimar, Boston, Philadelphia)

IV. Recreation centers

A. Medical resorts for incurable, sick, or recuperating persons (Vichy; Wiesbaden; Karlsbad; Saratoga, New York; Atlantic City, New Jersey; Rochester, Minnesota; Topeka, Kansas)

B. Vacation resorts (beach towns on either side of the English Channel, the French and Italian Riviera towns, Monte Carlo, Biarritz, the resort cities of Maine, Florida, California)

V. Residential cities

A. "Dormitory" suburbs (Newton, Massachusetts; Montclair, New Jersey; Beverly Hills, California)

B. Retirement cities (St. Petersburg, Florida; lately a number of California towns)

VI. "Symbolic" cities
   A. This group has no subdivisions and comprises a number of cities differing in many other respects (Rome, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Moscow, Weimar, Potsdam, Boston, Philadelphia). All cities in this category symbolize an idea.

VII. Diversified cities
   A. This group represents a residual category of cities with multiple functions but without distinct specialization (Pendleton, Oregon; Pasco, Washington; Stamford, Connecticut)

The foregoing method of classification permits us to observe certain interrelations between function and structure of urban society and to study the formation of group attitudes conditioned by the performance of typically urban functions. A discussion of some of these aspects follows.

Sociological Aspects of Functional Differences: Fishing, Mining, and Oil Towns. Fishing towns represent the closest approximation of urban settlements to rural areas. Like the farmer, the fisherman is aware of his dependence on nature. The common interest in the weather has a unifying effect. The weather brings good or bad luck to the entire community. However, modern techniques have reduced the hazards of fishing, which has become an ordinary enterprise. Some types of fishing are carried out by large companies but there is still opportunity for the individual fisherman with little or no capital. In principle though not always in fact, every fisherman can still hope to own a boat and to become independent. Fishing towns have, therefore, a rather large number of small proprietors who do not differ too much from employed fishermen with regard to education, living standards, mores, and "life style." Fishing has a tendency to become hereditary; there is very little influx by migration. Fishing towns grow only if processing industries expand or if the town adds new occupational opportunities; in recent years some have gained as summer resorts. The stability may be illustrated by the following population figures of three New England fishing towns:

	1930	1940	1950
Gloucester	24,204	24,046	25,167
Ipswich	5,599	6,348	4,952
Provincetown	3,808	3,668	3,745

Mining towns are the very opposite of fishing places in many ways. No work is more independent of weather than mining and no one is farther removed from the attractive features of nature than the miner. No miner today expects to own a mine. Mining is in the hands of wealthy operators, many of them organized in large corporations. The equality of the fishing town is replaced by striking contrasts which are ecologically expressed by the resi-

dential separation of owners, managers, and technical experts on the one hand and workers on the other. There are also many other distinctions with respect to status, prestige, authority, income, education, and living standards. Class antagonism, of which there is little evidence in fishing towns, is rampant in mining centers. The coal miners were once poorly paid and the slums in which they had to live are still extant. In some countries, for instance, Wales, mining has been the traditional occupation since time immemorial. Under these circumstances, miners have a certain occupational pride and they have developed common folkways. In America one sees little of this.

Oil towns again are different. The search for oil is always going on. Ownership shows a great range of variation. Some oil fields are operated by the nation's biggest corporations; others by smaller establishments; still others by individuals, some of whom are millionaires, while others exploit more modest resources. A poor man can still hope to strike oil and many try their luck. There is no uniform class of operators nor are the individual wells manned by masses comparable to the mine workers. Consequently, the workers cannot be so effectively organized as the miners. Oil town residents thus show less uniformity in behavior and attitudes.

Industrial Centers. In classifying secondary production centers we deviated from traditional terminology in two respects. First, no distinction is made between manufacture and industry. The latter term once denoted production by machines while manufacture literally means "handmade." These former technological differences are of little importance for spatial patterns or social conditions within modern cities. Second, the term "heavy" industry is replaced by "large-scale." Again it is of little sociological consequence whether or not a certain industry produces heavy, usually ferrous, goods. The term "large-scale" emphasizes a more important aspect: that a large number of employees are working for one employer or for a few employers and are working at the some location. The implications for social stratification are obvious. A city of this type will consist of a small number of wealthy entrepreneurs and their executives, and a very large number of factory workers. The former will concentrate in exclusive residential sections and the workingmen's zone must be larger than in cities of other types. Such cities are also very susceptible to business cycles. The workers have become depression-conscious. Being in no position to direct business activities or to share advance information with the management, they expect guidance from their unions. Large-scale industrial towns are the most thoroughly organized and union-dominated. Altogether, these cities have a larger proportion of workingmen, males, and younger people than the national average.

The mass concentration of industry creates special conditions typical of certain modern urban settlements. Nowhere else do we find so complete a separation of work from the rest of a man's life. Many workers are during

their working hours geared to the speed of the assembly line, and confined to operations which in themselves are senseless and devoid of psychological satisfaction; they are reduced to human machines. They want to forget their work as soon as they leave it. Their work permits no individual achievement or personal success; advancement in position is due to seniority or other terms of contract obtained by collective bargaining. Personal relationships with the owner (the corporation being a legal fiction) are nonexistent; contacts with the management are strictly "contractual" in character and, as a rule, made through intermediaries (shop stewards, union agents, and labor-relations executives). The absence of personal satisfaction, with its ensuing disinterest in one's own economic activities in a civilization which puts so much emphasis on the ethical aspects of work, has a profound influence on the character of a city. Thousands of their inhabitants are forced to lead a double life; one during working hours, which is meaningless in itself and furnishes only the monetary means of subsistence, the other when the worker becomes again a person.

In small-sized production centers the situation is different. Again we are confronted with the difficulty of finding a precise definition. Recently the Department of Commerce made certain propositions to classify manufacturing concerns in terms of numbers of employees as an index to measure size.[8] The document classified 452 industries. According to the type of business, the maximum number of employees in small-sized establishments varies from 100 to 2,500. Even within the same industrial bracket the differences are considerable. A manufacturer of motorcycles, for instance, falls into the small-sized category if he employs no more than 750 persons, while industries producing other motor vehicles (or their parts) may employ as many as 2,500 persons and are still classified as small. In the apparel industry a business is considered large if more than 100, 500, or 2,000 persons (according to the type of product) are employed. There are very cogent economic reasons for this procedure, but from the sociological point of view this kind of classification is of little consequence. We shall speak of small-sized enterprises if personal relationships between management and workers can be established because the number of employees is sufficiently small to enable the owner (who frequently is the only manager) to know every employee and to remain in contact with each one.[9] In addition, work is frequently less mechanized, the skill, industry, and intelligence of the individual worker having an influence on his success. Work is more meaningful than on the

[8] James I. Mill, *A Proposed System for Classifying Manufacturing Concerns by Size,* U.S. Department of Commerce, June 22, 1951; see also "Size Classification of Manufacturers. An Answer to the Question: What Is a Small Business in Manufacturing?" *Business Information Service,* November, 1951.

[9] This is facilitated if, as in many instances, there are no educational differences between employer and employee.

assembly line and interest in his work does not necessarily stop when the worker punches the time clock on his way out. Relationships between owner and worker are not formal, legal, and devoid of any human element. This does not imply that relationships are always friendly and satisfactory. Sometimes an employee will gain psychological satisfaction from his work and will establish pleasant emotional bonds with his employer; sometimes a proprietor will pay substandard wages, disregard decency and human dignity, and make life unpleasant for his workers.

It is therefore not so much a function as the mode of performing the function which accounts for structural features. In particular, modern mass production causes concentration of manual workers resulting in a shift from a more evenly divided class division to one in which sometimes the manual workers in factories outnumber the rest of the population. This has implications for the ecological situation as well as for social organization which is threatened by increasing class consciousness and class antagonism. The split between proletariat and *bourgeoisie* is very distinct in continental Europe. It is less marked in the United States for several reasons: free high school education for all narrows the educational gap between classes; considerable mobility—both intrafactory and intercity—has a negative effect on group solidarity; high wages permit living standards identical with or approximating the life style of the middle classes; union policies have always been oriented toward achieving actual economic gains for labor rather than promoting ideological warfare.

Wholesale and Transportation Centers. The functional types which we have discussed above are related to structural differences and lead to ecological differentiation. The same cannot be said of the remaining functional types. The largest wholesale centers in the United States (New York, Chicago, and Boston) have less than 25 per cent of their aggregate employment in wholesale trade. The importance of such cities is mainly based on effects derived from their function, in particular, the dependence of a region, or the entire nation, on the facilities offered by them. Some commodities can be sold almost nowhere except in certain centers. Even those which can be sold elsewhere are dependent on trade centers where the prices of all essential commodities are determined. Standardization has increased the number of these commodities, which now include products which formerly showed great local price variations. The price of onions, for example, is largely determined by the quotations of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The concentration of large-scale industry produces certain effects on labor-management attitudes; similarly, the concentration of wholesale trade in a comparatively few centers has effects on rural-urban relationships. Although the prices of agricultural products are usually determined by the interplay of actual supply and demand, farmers are prone to suspect fraud or pressure if prices are low.

The functional importance of transportation centers rests largely on the

value of their services to the regions, which in turn explain their dominance. Transportation centers dominate an area because they have established monopolistic conditions. Chicago and St. Louis are merely 300 miles apart; the distance between any point at the Canadian frontier and the Gulf of Mexico is at least 1,600 miles; there are no natural obstacles in the Great Plains of the Middle West. Goods could be practically shipped through any part of this region. However, all merchandise not destined for local consumption has to pass through either St. Louis or Chicago, since the movement of goods across the nation is channeled through one or the other city. They qualify as transportation centers because they are typical gateway cities and entrepôts. Transportation centers attract related enterprises: forwarding firms, insurance companies, various kinds of brokers, warehouses, and, above all, traders. Aside from this, transportation centers have few functions of sociological consequence. The population structure will hardly differ from that of cities having other types of commercial activities, the monopoly of transportation causes no resentment between rural and urban groups, and it also creates no specific problems for group relationships within the center.

Financial Centers. One type of functional specialization deserves special attention: the financial center. Again the impact of financing on population structure is negligible. Only 4.5 per cent of the labor force is engaged in finance, insurance, and real estate.[10] Of those working for banks, large numbers are engaged in auxiliary services (bookkeeping, secretarial work, office help) which are similar to, or identical with, office work in other businesses and are not unique in financing. The genuine financial functions are performed by very few; exact figures are not available but in all probability they do not exceed one-half of 1 per cent of the labor force. But as so frequently happens, figures alone are not enlightening. There are 35,000 postal employees in New York City, and they also comprise about one-half of 1 per cent of the city population. They do not influence the social structure of the city. They do not concentrate in space but live scattered over the workingmen's districts. The finance group, as defined above, belongs in its totality to the upper income class, earning $10,000 (before taxes) or more. Only 3 per cent of the United States population belong to this income group.[11] That has important ecological consequences. Financiers tend to concentrate in the few small but very conspicuous selected residential sections, of which they occupy a considerable part. If they do not reside in town, they live in and help maintain the most fashionable suburbs. In other words, the group is, to some extent at least, spatially visible.

The economic function of financing is, to be sure, of prime importance. There is perhaps no other activity so exclusively urban in character. Trading, manufacturing, transportation, artistic, scientific, and religious activities

[10] United States Census, 1940.

[11] Data for 1947 to 1949 from *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August, 1950, p. 949.

can be carried on in rural areas. Financing belongs solely to the city. The financial centers control the currency and credit policies of the nation; the welfare of the country depends on the efficient discharge of that function and thus the importance of financial centers is nationwide, in cases of crises, world-wide. In the United States the control of currency and credit is exercised by the Federal Reserve System and not by individual banks or by the government alone. All cities connected with the Federal Reserve System are consequently primary financial centers. These cities are Washington, D.C., as the seat of the Federal Reserve Board, and the "capitals" of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San Francisco. The financial centers are the seats of various exchanges, where the prices of stocks, bonds, and all essential commodities are determined; in this way the financial centers again dominate the rest of the country which has no direct or immediate control over prices.

High finance holds a monopoly on "big" loans. Only the largest banks, frequently only in partnership, can finance the needs of the United States government, foreign governments, states, big cities, and big corporations. All large bond issues are launched, "floated," and promoted by a very few institutions and individual bankers concentrated in a limited number of cities. New York, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco have almost monopolized that type of "high finance." Former great foreign international financial centers such as Berlin and Vienna have almost disappeared while Moscow seems to have assumed the role of an international finance center for the Communist-controlled world. However, all capital cities have remained national financial centers. London, Paris, Geneva, and Zurich retain at least a part of their former international importance.

As in other instances of functional concentration in space, we observe an ecological identification: "Wall Street" stands for "high finance." But the spatial symbol indicates more than mere function; it also denotes the real or alleged power of the moneyed interests. For many, even in the United States, Wall Street finally stands for New York, thus overstressing a single function of a multifunctional city. Finally, to many foreigners Wall Street symbolizes America. It is obvious that few Americans have any connection with financial operations and that the life of the nation is oriented to entirely different values, but the impact of these symbols must not be underrated. They are very convenient means for a hostile propaganda, since people readily believe in stereotypes.

Political Centers. Political centers represent a concentration of power in space. They derive their functional importance from the fact that they are the places where vital decisions for the nation, sometimes for the world, are made. It is only a corollary that social life, in so far as it is affected by political events, is oriented to the actions of political centers. With the in-

creasing encroachment of political action on every phase of life, and with the assumption of new functions by the government in modern times, the political centers now dominate society more than ever before. A century ago, when czarist autocracy was at its peak, the Russian masses were rarely affected by what happened in St. Petersburg.[12] This is not true of modern Moscow. Similarly, actions in Washington were of little importance to the average American before the turn of the century. Today the daily actions of the ordinary citizen depend to a considerable extent on steps taken in Washington. The masses are affected not only by decisions of such prime political importance as foreign relations, military draft, and fundamental legislative changes, but even more immediately by mere administrative measures concerning such matters as potato prices, the interest rates for installment purchases, the down payment on houses, rent freezing, or the allocation of scarce raw materials.

Most nations have one political center, which is usually the capital as well as the largest city.[13] Several political centers may exist if the nation is deliberately decentralized, if regional differences in population structure promote local political subdivisions, or if the central authority has been so weakened that factions elsewhere are able to influence political life. The size of a country is relatively unimportant. The Roman Empire had only one center, Rome, but when the central power declined, Constantinople rose as its rival. The huge expanse of Soviet Russia has only one center but tiny Switzerland has at least three: Bern, Geneva, and Zurich. The weak Weimar Republic had its official center in Berlin but separatistic forces were sufficiently strong to make Munich a secondary center. The cultural division of Canada accounts for three political centers: Ottawa, Quebec, and Toronto.

The American situation has varied greatly. In colonial times several centers with equal influence coexisted. Much political influence was rural, coming from leading landowners who met at various places. After the Revolution, Washington was primarily an administrative center and political decisions were made in Boston, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, and other cities. They gradually lost their importance, although important political measures are still initiated and prepared in New York. Large cities usually have political power, if for no other reason than their ability to command votes.

In the United States and in the non-European parts of the British Commonwealth there has been a marked tendency to locate the capitals outside the most populous areas: Canberra, Ottawa, Wellington, Pretoria, and New Delhi. In America Washington not only ranks behind the largest cities but

[12] The Russian adage, "Russia is large and the Czar is far away," vividly expresses the fact that even tyrants hardly influenced the daily life of the people in former days.

[13] Rome, curiously enough, was one of the rare exceptions. The city was less populous than Milan and Naples as late as 1930, although it has since gained the lead.

most state capitals have been deliberately chosen for their small size. None of the cities exceeding the million mark is a capital; of the central cities around which the fourteen metropolitan areas with a population of more than 1 million is formed, only two are state capitals (Boston and St. Paul). The most populous states selected comparatively small cities as their capitals (Albany, Harrisburg, Springfield, Illinois, Jefferson City, Sacramento).

The rise of political centers to prominence is rather recent. The city of London overshadowed its political neighbor, the city of Westminster, so that the latter finally lost its identity by incorporation. The realms of Philip of Macedon and of Alexander the Great never had a real political center. Nor had the Ottoman Empire one before the fall of Constantinople. Charlemagne ruled over Europe, traveling from one palace to another. The Holy Roman Empire, too, had no political center.

Political centers derive their main importance from their function; this function is constantly expanding in scope and size and is also becoming more dominant. The changing concepts of the nature of government only partially account for this shift. Regardless of their political philosophy, all influential groups—business, farmer, labor, as well as religious denominations and national minorities—try to achieve through political means what they cannot do without the help of legislation and administration. As policy-making bodies are concentrated in a few political centers, so the forces which make an entire nation move and act are spatially located in a very small area or areas.

There are also rather remarkable structural effects deriving from a singular employment situation. Modern administration requires a large staff. A century ago the number of public employees was small; many functions were discharged without pay or on a part-time basis. In 1940, 5.3 per cent of the total American urban male labor force was employed by the government. The number of government employees tends to vary even within a fiscal year because of various pressures on the government. Despite this, the Federal government is the nation's largest employer. In March, 1948, the executive branch of the Federal government employed 1,964,400 persons; the ten largest cities employed 310,700 (figures as of October, 1946), and the ten largest states, 423,000 (April, 1947).[14] Most governmental employees live in urban areas and most fall in the white-collar category. According to Grace Kneedler Ohlson's classification, eighteen American cities are government centers, because 15 per cent or more of the resident labor force is employed in governmental service.[15] In such cases the spatial arrangement of the city is atypical. Both fashionable and workingmen's sections are smaller and middle-class sections are larger than usual. There is also a different psychological situation. Most public positions are for life; the em-

[14] All employment figures adopted from Orme W. Phelps, *Introduction to Labor Economics,* New York, 1950.

[15] Ohlson, *op. cit.*

ployees do not profit from booms and are less threatened by dismissal in case of a crisis. There are no strikes. Outbreaks of violence in case of labor conflicts, race riots, and public disturbances are unlikely. Centers of administration have more professional personnel, lawyers, tax consultants, and newspapermen, than the average city. Washington, D.C., moreover, has a very large diplomatic corps with staffs, and a considerable number of lobbyists. Altogether, the composition of the population differs from the common urban type, particularly in the lower ratios of manual and factory workers.

Cultural Centers. Cultural activities are nearly always carried out by very small numbers of individuals. We cannot expect the composition of the population to differ markedly from that of other cities. Exceptions are some large institutions of higher learning situated in smaller towns. Grace Kneedler Ohlson [16] classifies cities as educational centers if the total college enrollments exceed 20 per cent of the total population. By this criterion only eighteen cities of over 10,000 population qualified as educational centers in a country with more than 1,000 colleges. Similarly, other cultural centers cannot be distinguished on a merely numerical basis. Indeed, their importance is neither numerical nor structural but rests on their functions. Culture, however, makes itself conspicuous within its setting; churches, museums, artists' colonies, college buildings, and the like, create landmarks; their environs tend to increase land values and to make the area more "desirable."

Cultural activities are represented by a very thin stratum of the population, in many cases less than a small fraction of 1 per cent. This includes not only the very few creative artists, scholars, inventors, reformers, and religious leaders, but all those who help to diffuse existing knowledge by teaching, commenting, and popularizing. Yet on these few people rests the preservation, progress, or decline of any higher civilization.

Therein lies the functional importance of cultural cities, because they represent the places where the activities necessary for the maintenance and the development of higher civilizations are carried out. With the cultural decay of these cities the entire civilization declines or, in extreme cases, disappears. Athens, Rome, Alexandria, and later Baghdad and Cordova, never disappeared as cities and they still exist. But the cultures which they represented have disappeared.

Some religious centers assume an additional function: leadership in all matters which are considered by a particular religion as regulated by religious commandments. This function is less conspicuous in the United States because the social order is traditionally regulated by views which practically all Protestants have in common and no city can claim—such as Canterbury in England—to be a center of Protestantism. But the Catholic Church, with

[16] *Ibid.*

its center in Rome and subcenters in every diocese, is the most thoroughly organized religious body in the world and its communicants receive their religious directives from the center. Religious centers therefore serve as orientation not only for individual behavior but for social actions, particularly in elections if issues are regarded as religious.

Places of pilgrimage differ from other urban types by virtue of having a constant flow of visitors, so a greater number of establishments which accommodate transients are required. This is also true of "museum" and "shrine" [17] cities, as well as of recreation centers. These differ, to be sure, in the personalities of their visitors. The places of pilgrimage draw the faithful, the museum and shrine cities are visited by intellectuals or sightseers, and recreation centers are patronized by holidaymakers and those seeking rest from fatigue or escape from ennui. In addition, recreational centers show a distinct division of economic classes, based on differences in prices for accommodations.

"Dormitories." Like resort places, dormitory cities—essentially suburbs—show a very distinct class division. Their only function is to provide residences, and the prestige and character of a residential section is one of the most important concomitants of class membership and status. The various classes are divided into districts in large cities, but suburbs tend to specialize as living quarters for particular groups. The composition of the population consequently differs according to the suburb. The differences are not only economic and occupational in character but also vary with respect to age and sex divisions. Montclair, New Jersey, an upper-class residential suburb, exemplifies differences in occupation (see Table 10). Upper-class suburbs also

TABLE 10. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN URBAN UNITED STATES AND IN MONTCLAIR, NEW JERSEY

Occupation	United States, per cent	Montclair, per cent
Professional and semiprofessional workers	8.45	16.3
Proprietors, managers, officials	9.05	16.4
White-collar workers	20.00	22.4
Skilled manual workers	14.20	6.5
Semiskilled workers	22.60	9.5
Unskilled workers	20.10	9.9
Domestic workers	5.60	19.0

SOURCE: Figures are adapted from *Statistical Abstracts, 1940;* from the total figures given the numbers of farmers and farm laborers have been subtracted. By this procedure we arrive only at approximate figures. The table is based on the 1940 census because the abnormal housing conditions in 1950 obscure the actual situation. For more detailed figures see Phelps, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[17] The term "shrine city" was coined by Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* p. 49. The distinction was anticipated by Ratzel, *Voelkerkunde,* vol. II, p. 535.

have fewer children, more older people, and more women than the national average.

Retirement cities are just beginning to emerge in the United States. The number of persons retired because of old age is increasing in both absolute numbers and in proportion to the total population. Retired persons formerly depended on their savings (a small group), on their families, or on charity. Social security and pensions have made a large portion of the population relatively independent; they leave the overcrowded, expensive cities and move to less costly places, particularly to California and Florida. Consequently, retirement cities have a larger proportion of old people and of widowed persons and a smaller proportion of all age groups up to thirty years.

Ecological Symbolism. The name of a city sometimes takes on a symbolic connotation. In such cases we do not refer to a city as a habitat but as a representation of an idea, a culture, a religion, an ideology, an era; or it symbolizes specific social conditions and situations. The symbols often imply a value judgment, either positive or negative. Babel stands for idolatry, Sodom for perversion, and both for dissipation. In the United States, New York and Hollywood are by many considered as "cities of sin." Boston, New Orleans, Charleston, or Savannah symbolize specific American subcultures: as symbols they often are used to express either approval or contempt.

Symbols may be powerful social forces. The names of symbolic cities often arouse emotions. Like the cross or the crescent, like banners, flowers, or colors, symbolic cities serve as a rallying force uniting groups or separating them. Sedan, for a long time, served as a symbol of French humiliation. In 1871 Versailles became the symbol of triumph to the Germans and of shame to the French. In 1919 the symbol, and the emotions connected with it, changed to the very opposite. The humiliating connotation which the city had for all Germans was successfully used as a means of propaganda by the rising German nationalistic parties between the two world wars. The split within the German nation was symbolized by Weimar and Potsdam. The former represented the cultural concept of the German nation as set forth by the classics; the latter, the militant attitude of the Prussian tradition. The change of the symbolic meaning and its emotional ambivalence, as in the case of Versailles, are not infrequent. Rome is used as a symbol of the pagan empire and as such is the very antithesis of Christianity; it is also used as symbol for the Catholic Church. "Romanism," in particular, has an anti-Catholic connotation. Jerusalem, although originally a Canaanite city, became a symbol for Judaism and has a positive value for the faithful Jew but a negative one for anti-Semites. But Jerusalem, like Bethlehem and Nazareth, is also a symbol for Christianity. Rome or Jerusalem, then, symbolize the same alternative as Caesar or Christ. Moscow has had several different symbolic functions, although all of them have implied some chal-

lenge to the West. It stood for Eastern Orthodoxy and for the despotism of the czars; it now stands for Communism. As an example of the use of cities as symbols, an exhortation by the Patriarch of Moscow may be quoted. In 1589 he wrote to the czar: "Because the old Rome has collapsed on account of the heresy of Apollinarius and the second Rome which is Constantinople is now in possession of the godless Turks, thy Kingdom, O pious Tsar, is the third Rome. Thou art the only Christian sovereign in the whole world, the master of all the Christians." [18] Although this is historical nonsense, its effectiveness as a means of propaganda cannot be doubted.

Of course this type of function is something which no city assumes on purpose. It is a by-product; nevertheless it is a function which cannot be disregarded. Both on the cognitive level—the connection of ideas with cities—and on the attitudinal level—the link between emotions and cities—we are confronted with a peculiar sociological phenomenon which is urban in character because it has hardly a counterpart in rural areas: the location of spiritual and moral values (positive or negative) in space. Like other symbols, it indicates the essential human desire to conceive abstract entities in the form of visible representations.

Note on Hollywood. Statistically, Los Angeles is a diversified city; [19] it is a wholesale, retail, and transportation, as well as an educational center. Hollywood in particular is a manufacturing center, the motion-picture industry being one of the nation's largest economic enterprises. The tendency to local concentration is nowhere so marked as in the film industry. Automobiles are made outside of Detroit, airplanes at several locations, garments elsewhere than in New York, furniture in many places other than Grand Rapids, but motion pictures are made almost entirely in Hollywood, which has assumed a spatial monopoly. This centralization is found in all countries where films are produced but it has no consequences other than the concentration of studios, workshops, and auxiliary buildings in a limited area which in all other respects forms a part of a greater local unit. Only Hollywood has become a film city in terms of installations and population. This film population, consisting of managers, producers, directors, actors, musicians, writers, publicity men, and literary and theatrical agents gives the city its particular imprint because these people have developed a specific set of behavior patterns and life style which makes them conspicuously different from other urban types.

The "Hollywood style" results from a combination of factors. One is economic: a considerable number of those employed by motion-picture firms receive wages far in excess of that which the legitimate stage, publishers, newspapers, and concert agencies can pay, and also much more than many

[18] "Nationalism," *Slavonic Encyclopedia,* New York, 1949, p. 870.

[19] Chauncy D. Harris, "A Functional Classification of Cities in the United States," *Geographical Review,* vol. 33, 1943.

business executives receive. The Bureau of Internal Revenue formerly published the names of those receiving the highest salaries. The motion-picture stars always furnished the majority of the top earners. A second factor is the background of many movie stars. The great playwrights and actors of the legitimate stage were nearly always persons of considerable intelligence and education: Shakespeare, Molière, Garrick, Talma, Devrient, and Eleonora Duse are only a few examples in the past. Screen stars are chosen primarily for the appeal which they have for the millions of people who go to see motion pictures. This appeal depends to a large extent on nonartistic factors. A number of screen actors do not reach the intellectual and artistic standards characteristic of stage actors. Some of them display the most flagrant conspicuous consumption; they live a life of nervous haste and futile pleasures. While artists frequently have sex mores which do not conform to established standards of society, it is the high incidence of divorces which has made Hollywood notorious. Divorces, to be sure, are very frequent nowadays, but multiple divorces have become a Hollywood specialty. Five or more divorces in succession are not infrequent. This would be nothing more than the atypical behavior of a singular group except for the fact that this group acts as a model for the masses who try to imitate their idols (as far as means permit). The adoration and emulation of theatrical stars has given way to the admiration of screen actors, dancers, and singers. That large groups orient their own ideas of what life should be on the basis of behavior of film stars is a definite danger. It assuredly contributes to certain forms of juvenile delinquency and nourishes expectations which cannot normally come true and causes unnecessary frustrations.

Hollywood has an undesirable function in that it establishes patterns of behavior and sets ideals of expectation that are unrealistic. This results not only from the wide publicity given by a sensational press but also because many motion pictures depict a similarly fantastic life in fictional form. Hollywood is also a cultural center, producing films, that is, a specific form of artistic expression, which is also a form of mass communication. Films could be—but seldom are—used for educational purposes. They can be a medium of propaganda, which totalitarian countries utilize with excellent results. They can be used simply for the creation of a work of art. Unfortunately, great art rarely appeals to the masses and is therefore a poor business proposition. The enormous cost of films does not permit risky experiments. Consequently, motion pictures often meet the demand of the masses to the detriment of artistic values. This would be of secondary interest—the arts flourished long before the films and in competition with tasteless products for mass consumption—if there were no other consequences. But films are a form of mass communication which reaches a larger part of mankind than any other. The effect of speeches is limited to an audience which rarely exceeds a few thousand. Books, pamphlets, newspapers, and radio broadcasts

are restricted in their diffusion by language limitations and other obstacles. Television is still in its infancy. But films are shown all over the world and seen by millions. Foreigners derive their notions of American life from Hollywood films. Motion pictures, whether they portray a life of luxury, the underworld of great cities, or the adventures of the wild West, are usually unrealistic; the foreign observer consequently believes that the American population is a strange mixture of playboys and beauty-contest winners engaged in vapid romances, gangsters terrorizing the nation, plus assorted Hopalong Cassidys who shoot the bad sheriffs. Although Hollywood inadvertently may have assumed a singular function, i.e., informing the world about American life, American institutions, and American values, this function is so poorly discharged that hostile propaganda uses its effect to arouse animosity against the United States. From this point of view Hollywood may have a greater influence on the world than any other city in America.

In any case, Hollywood represents a singular urban type not duplicated elsewhere. It has monopolized one form of mass communication and it has—indirectly—become the most widely known information center about American mores. As with other communication media, the information is not always correct. Inaccurate press reports, radio broadcasts, speeches, and official statements can be rectified upon short notice by the same or an equally effective medium. It is most unlikely, however, that a correction about a misleading motion picture will ever reach the people who saw it.

Part VI. DEMOGRAPHY

A. STRUCTURE

Chapter 9

THE URBAN CLASS SYSTEM

Criteria. We may define classes as hierarchically stratified groups of family units with an ascribed status of social inequality. In other words, classes are forms of vertical stratification; they refer to groups rather than individuals, for the entire family belongs to the same class (with some irrelevant exceptions); children, as a rule, inherit their class status from their parents. In a mobile society like our own it is possible to move from one class to another, which is a special case of social mobility; even in our dynamic system, however, these changes do not occur as frequently as many believe. The only necessary logical requisite of class is status, i.e., the prestige and rank which a system accords to its various classes. But by-products of greater consequence than a mere difference in social rank result from ascribed status. There is hardly a society without some kind of stratification, without differences in positions and prestige. Historically there have been many variations and many different systems of social stratification.

Class in Western Society. The Western class system resulted from the collapse of feudalism. The latter evolved during medieval times and is characterized by *legal* divisions of social groups ("order" or "estate" system). The British system, for instance, began with the royal house, followed by the high aristocracy, the lords (who in turn were hierarchically subdivided into dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons), followed by the lower aristocracy, again subdivided into baronets and knights. Then came the freemen in the cities, then the free peasants or yeomen, and finally the unfree serfs or villains. One automatically became a member of one's father's order by birth (save the knights) and retained the status throughout life unless it was changed by special order of the king. Other Western countries had almost identical systems.

This legal system was demolished when feudalism gave way to modern industrial society, but the new order only destroyed the legal privileges which the upper ranks enjoyed, and abolished all forms of bondage. It did not destroy other distinctions; prestige, in particular, is not subject to legal regulations. The new order established legal equality but it retained social inequality. This antithesis in itself is likely to cause resentment, but the contrast is more marked in America, which is philosophically conceived as a

classless society. The tradition is so strong that some still maintain that there are no class divisions in America. What is true is that the United States never had a legal order system in the European sense although society was far from uniform even in colonial times. The Pilgrims were members of the British lower middle classes; the immigrants who followed them were mostly gentry although they soon dropped their titles. The Southern settlers were primarily the younger sons of aristocrats; although they did not use their titles, they were not equalitarian-minded. The Dutch in New York were very class-conscious burghers. The specific Old World distinctions soon disappeared, but the class system as such persisted, although it underwent certain adaptations to the American situation.

It is sometimes stated that a class system is an urban phenomenon. This is hardly correct. Feudalism, which was a much more rigid system, arose in a preponderantly agrarian society in which cities played a minor role. Conversely, the oldest New England urban settlements, and Philadelphia in its earliest days, showed very little stratification. But rural America in colonial times was quite definitely a class society, with its plantation aristocracy, the middle-class farmer, the poor farmer, and the slaves. As in Great Britain, the distinction between the "gentlemen" and ordinary people was more clearly drawn in the country than in the city. During the period of rapid expansion prior to the War between the States, the Middle Western town had a uniform population and was characterized at best by vague signs of class formation. But it is true that the situation has been reversed. The modern rural population has a tendency to minimize class distinction; everybody is "just a farmer." However, the dirt farmer and the gentleman-farmer do represent class distinctions. Rural areas are not only less stratified but the implications of class status are less numerous and less consequential. The farmer does not want to belong to an exclusive club; his chances of being elected to a political office are neither impeded nor promoted by his class status; his economic position has nothing to do with his class.

While rural areas are not entirely devoid of class features, it is the modern city where the class system appears in its most elaborate form, where class status implies differences in social appreciation, in culture, in political and economic opportunities, and where class antagonism has become a problem. Nevertheless, urban class lines are vaguely drawn; the absence of titles makes an absolutely clear distinction impossible; high social mobility causes many changes both in the general structure of the system and in individual class membership; there are countless cases of marginal men and of almost imperceptible gradations leading from one class to another. In many instances the prestige of a family is purely local and, as we shall see, the class order is modified by extraneous factors, the social importance of which are sometimes greater than class membership. Consequently, it is not always possible to determine a person's class status. Some years ago a magazine conducted a poll

which showed that the overwhelming majority of Americans considered themselves as middle class. Warner and Lunt in their "Yankee City" put 38.33 per cent in the middle brackets and 57.82 per cent in the lower brackets. But it seems probable that, perhaps with the exception of small towns, the percentage of the lower classes is still higher. For the nation as a whole the class system is a pyramid with the lower classes forming a broad base; each higher stratum is much smaller than the preceding, until the tip is reached with the uppermost class probably representing not more than 2 per cent of the population.[1] Although income does not necessarily reflect class status, it parallels it to a certain degree and can be used as a starting point in determining the numerical strength of the various classes. Official figures lump urban and rural incomes together, which complicates matters since rural money income (not real income) is lower than urban income; this puts too many farmers and too few city people into the lower brackets; the figures must thus be revised, which cannot be done without arbitrariness.

In revising the figures we have to consider that poverty is concentrated in cities, which implies an increase in the percentage of the lower groups in urban areas; on the other hand, higher income by itself does not necessarily mean high status. Warner and Lunt found that the upper classes of Yankee City were distributed as follows (in per cent):

Upper-upper	1.44
Lower-upper	1.56

This seems a fair estimate and probably holds true for the percentage of upper classes in urban America as a whole. We may assume that families below the mean income (see Table 11) belong to the lower groups as well as those just above the mean. We therefore set the upper limit of lower-class income at $4,000. If that seems too high, we have to bear in mind that the income of semiskilled and unskilled workers rose quickly after the beginning of the Second World War. If both husband and wife were working, the income of even unskilled workers was higher than $4,000. With reservations, we arrive at the following estimates (in per cent):

Upper classes	3
Middle classes	29
Lower classes	68

Each class can be further subdivided and there are, as has to be repeated, no sharp dividing lines.

[1] The British House of Lords comprises representatives of approximately 750 families in Great Britain, a ratio of 0.0075 per cent. In Boston, with more than 200,000 families, 962 were listed in the *Social Register* in 1943, a ratio of less than 0.5 per cent. The higher Boston ratio reveals a greater concentration of the upper class in urban areas and the less rigid American class patterns; a *Social Register* listing is not quite the equivalent of a British lordship.

Table 11. Income Grouping of Family Units in 1950

Money income before taxes	*Percentage distribution of spending units*
Under $1,000	13
$1,000–$1,999	17
2,000– 2,999	19
3,000– 3,999	19
4,000– 4,999	12
5,000– 7,499	14
7,500– 9,999	3
$10,000	3
All cases	100
Median income	$3,053
Mean income	$3,520

Source: *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August, 1951, p. 933.

However, no single objective criterion determines class status except that at least average income or possessions remove a person from the lowest level. But upper-class people sometimes have low incomes; conversely, some persons, definitely excluded from the upper classes, have very high incomes, for instance, waiters in fashionable night clubs. Nor is wealth alone a determinant. The younger sons of the British aristocrats possess nothing; on the other hand, the owner of a burlesque show can be very wealthy; the same may be true of professional gamblers, loan sharks, or dealers in secondhand clothes. Even position, which is perhaps a better index, is sometimes deceptive; there are definitely low-class types of occupation, but an occupation which is highly valued is not absolute proof that every member is equally esteemed (e.g., lawyers). For that reason Warner, Meeker, and Eells [2] used a combination of factors in order to measure social status. These factors are in the main: (1) occupation, (2) source of income, (3) house type, and (4) dwelling area. The method seems promising and it remains to be seen what the results are if the totality of urban America is studied. The difficulty in any research based solely on objective factors is that the main determinant is an entirely subjective factor, namely, social acceptance. Consequently, a person can belong to the upper class in one country but may not be acceptable in another country. The various studies of Middletown, Yankee City, Elmtown, Greenbelt, Old City, Prairieton, etc., have to be interperted with this view in mind. They demonstrate that the class patterns in urban America are practically the same for every place under investigation and that—with slight deviations for the very special case of Greenbelt—the class criteria are fairly uniform. They portray the local group structure of a community but

[2] W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America: A Manual of Procedure for the Measurement of Social Status,* Chicago, 1949.

the groups in these smaller places do not necessarily correspond to social classes in general. A member of the upper upper group of Prairieton, a place in South Dakota, might find himself in the ranks of the lower middle classes if he moved to Greenbelt. Conversely, a person who had been a leader in Greenbelt may find all doors closed in Prairieton. Local prestige groups may be of more importance than class status in local evaluation. The fewest difficulties are posed by the lower classes. Membership is easily determined: a combination of substandard income, lack of possessions, poor education, no participation in community affairs, and undesirable occupations is characteristic of being "low class." For the upper crust the bluebooks are usually good indexes. Snobbish as they may be, they furnish a clue which is essential for membership: recognition. One cannot be a member of the upper upper class without being accepted. Another indication of acceptance is membership in an exclusive club. In many European countries the Jockey Club was the symbol of aristocracy. In America, where horse racing is viewed with some doubts, other associations, such as the country club, become the symbol of the upper classes. Between the two poles the allocation to a specific subclass is more difficult and often depends on changing factors. Not so long ago a position as a government official was no social recommendation; today one can accept government employment and still retain status in the uppermost stratum.

There are two aspects of class structure which should be clearly distinguished. One is the existence of the system as such. Even those who want to abolish classes implicitly recognize not only the existence of the classes but also their own class position. The second element is the recognition of class positions by the entire population. Somebody is a member of the upper classes because there is general agreement about this fact. While a single individual might erroneously ascribe to himself a higher status, the community will largely agree as to which class he belongs.

Status. Classes are thus essentially groups of unequal social standing; the more serious aspects of the class phenomenon are the consequences of status. This status is, in most cases, "ascribed," i.e., inherited; it is a derivative status based on the position of the "family of orientation." The family status in turn is the status of the father. *Pater prodest et nocet, mater nec prodest nec nocet* [3] is a Roman adage which is still valid. This is a remnant of our patriarchal past which we preserve, as indicated by the fact that children bear their father's name; it is also due to the impossibility of setting up a real bilateral system and of preserving the memory of both the paternal and maternal lines; finally, women are still less prominent in public life and the husband's actions are more subject to social control and evaluation. Women, unless they make a career and establish a special position for

[3] "The father helps or hurts; the mother does neither."

themselves, share the status of their husbands. They can gain or lose status by marriage. Hence women are extremely reluctant to marry "below their station." Warner and Lunt report that the upper-class women in Yankee City prefer to remain spinsters rather than marry a man of lower status. Men retain their class status regardless of their wives' former class, although wives might be slighted if the class difference is too marked. At any rate, the status of a person is primarily determined by his father's status. Status changes are possible, however, in either direction. In this case we speak of an acquired status. We like to think that this is actually the rule and that everybody has achieved the status which he deserves. This thought rests on the equally fallacious belief that a democratic society gives everybody equal opportunity, that the outcome of competition depends only on ability, and that society is able and willing to judge a person according to his merits. The Horatio Alger stories reflect this orientation. Actually, the question "Who is your father?" is at least as momentous as "What can you do?"

Changes in Status. A status can change for better or worse. Loss of status usually comes about through improper behavior, that is, by acts which do not conform to the code of a class. Newspapers recently reported that the scion of one of the oldest families was dropped from the bluebook because he had married an actress who had had several divorces. What is proper differs according to time and place but it has mostly to do with manners, marriage, and occupation. Formerly the titled aristocracy considered practically no occupation except a military commission or a political office, preferably diplomatic service, as suitable. The upper middle classes added business and the professions, the lower middle classes salaried employment, while the bottom was identical with the "working classes," a term which still lingers on, indicating that working was not "high class" in former times. We remember that the sophists in ancient Greece lost prestige because they were the first who dared to ask a fee for instruction.

Movement up the status ladder is possible by achievements. A rise from the bottom to the next stratum is the least difficult. Average education and the acquisition of some skill are nearly always sufficient to secure a lower-middle-class position. To move from the lower to the upper middle classes is much harder since considerable ability as well as substantial success is required and the latter does not always depend only on the former. Society usually recognizes position rather than ability. Positions are awarded in competition where factors other than ability play a decisive role. What is still more important is that in many instances the number of capable applicants exceeds the number of available positions.[4] By necessity, upward mobility

[4] This is correct only for stationary or declining systems. In an expanding society there are usually more positions than applicants. This was the situation in America until the closing of the frontier. Up to that time newcomers from lower classes had no difficulty in moving up.

is restricted. For instance, medical schools take only a limited number of applicants. Formerly no one was rejected because there were fewer applications than positions. Every person able to pass the examinations could move into the upper-middle-class bracket by entering the medical profession. This opportunity is now restricted, and similarly, there are more applicants than can be accepted for almost every desirable position. There is no proof that those who fail to get in are less capable. In any event, they do not move up. In business, of course, success does not depend on admission. But there are other than bureaucratic limitations. With exceptions, spectacular success in business, which "automatically" raises the prestige of the entrepreneur, is not possible without capital investment, and capital is precisely what lower-class people rarely have.

The number of available positions decreases rapidly toward the top of the pyramid but so does the number of serious competitors. Only a very few seriously believe that they can become governors, senators, presidents of big corporations, or reach similar top positions. People are much more optimistic about next-to-top positions. Consequently, the heaviest competition develops among the many applicants for the relatively few positions which yield an upper-middle-class status. As a further consequence, there are many failures.

Movement into the uppermost stratum is extremely difficult. The aristocratic layer of society is so thin that any substantial accretions would change its entire composition. The exclusiveness of the social elite makes contacts difficult, and without contact there can be no acceptance. It requires extraordinary circumstances before an outsider is accepted by the upper classes. Achievements help but alone are rarely sufficient. Money is not a passport to high society. An impoverished aristocratic family might be quite glad if their son marries the richly endowed daughter of a shirtmaker who worked his way up from scratch to a millionaire, but they will not accept the father of the bride in their own society. The term *nouveau riche* is one of contempt and implies rejection. Since Molière's time the *bourgeois gentilhomme* or his counterpart in other societies has been the object of derision. The snob, the upstart is not welcome. His children may succeed where he failed; money has to outlast one generation before the blood of its owner changes from red to blue.

Money alone is neither sufficient for attaining membership in the upper class nor is it indispensable for retaining upper-class status. Not only are quite a few members of the upper classes without possessions,[5] but many penniless noblemen, some of doubtful or exotic origin are willingly admitted into high society only because they bear a title and display supposedly aristocratic manners.

The greatest mobility occurs among the middle classes, who receive those

[5] On this point see Jessie Bernard, *American Community Behavior,* New York, 1949, p. 195.

who move up from the bottom as well as those who descend from the top. Conversely, the middle classes lose comparatively few to the two poles of society. However, mobility even within the middle brackets is mostly gradual and essential changes are not too frequent. The professions, the most preferred channel for upward mobility, are not numerous enough to account for many changes. Only seven out of 100 persons graduate from college and among them the majority come from middle-class families. But a bachelor's degree is no longer a passport to society. While a substantial part may still move from the lower-middle to the upper-middle classes through education, the rise from the bottom to the upper-middle stratum is still difficult and infrequent. The greatest class struggle occurs in the upper-middle bracket, where many compete for the available positions in business, government, and the professions which entail considerable prestige.

Prestige and Position. Upper-class status is accorded to a few top positions but is largely based on the reputation which a family enjoys. Middle-class status stems to a lesser degree from family reputation and to a higher degree from wealth, income, achievements, and position. The lower classes comprise the rest, namely, those without a family pedigree and without personal prestige derived from possessions, income, achievement, and position. To a certain degree individual prestige coincides with education, wealth, income, and position, but the explanation of the family prestige of the upper classes must be found elsewhere.

Despite supposedly weakening family ties, the family in the widest sense of the word still profits or suffers from the reputation of every member. Hence, everybody is afraid of a "black sheep" among relatives bearing his name. Conversely, if a person achieves prominence, the whole family wins distinction. If the distinctions are accumulated through several generations, a family becomes aristocratic. As long as the nobility enjoyed the legal privilege of title to all higher political offices, cause and effect became one; the family distinguished itself by filling the most valued positions and they filled the positions because they were aristocrats. Even in a democratic society the highest positions are more hereditary than many realize. Although father and son became Presidents of the United States only once, other high positions often have been filled with relatives (the Roosevelts, Tafts, Lodges, and Wallaces are a few examples of families that have held high public offices many times). Business and professional positions are still more likely to be inherited. It is only natural that persons who have already achieved prominence are elected to lead in civic affairs such as campaigns for charitable purposes, drives to clean up corruption, and committees investigating community problems; they become incorporators of hospitals, trustees of colleges, honorary chairmen of benevolent societies. Each time their names are publicized, they meet new people who come to know them as leaders. The family prestige is thus the sum total of all distinctions acquired by generations. In this way

the old families become aristocrats. Not all old families necessarily move up into the upper classes. There certainly are many farm families whose American ancestry goes back to the earliest colonial times who never distinguished themselves in the sense discussed above. If they remained simple family farmers, they had no opportunity to gain prominence. For this reason the class system is preponderantly an urban phenomenon. The farmers in a given area have approximately the same education, and their incomes do not vary too greatly. At least the great contrast between the owners of huge estates and the impoverished landless peasant, so characteristic of the European continent, does not exist in America.

Modifications of the Class Structure. The majority of Americans belong to "young" families. This is necessarily the case in a country which has thrived on mass immigration. The American class system is consequently modified by another system of unequally valued groups. If immigrants simply had been the late-comers of the same ethnic stock from which the original settlers sprang, there would have been only one difference: "older" and "younger" families. But American immigrants came in waves from different countries. As it happened, each successive wave brought immigrants more removed from the culture which the British settlers originally brought. The newcomers were not only "younger," they were also "foreigners" in a cultural sense. Most of them were penniless and had a poor education, which disqualified them from the beginning. Even today the foreigner, unless he already possesses recognized prestige (as, for instance, the titled aristocrat) is never admitted by the upper classes and rarely accepted by the middle classes. The immigrant is forced to accept the least desirable positions which already are stigmatized as "low class." But the rejection of the "foreigner," and consequently his status, varies according to the specific evaluation of the culture with which he is identified. As a result, we have a double scale of values: the class order and the order of nationalities according to institutionalized preferences. The existence of the latter has been demonstrated by the previously discussed social-distance scales devised by Bogardus and Thurstone.

In addition to the immigrant there is the Negro, who receives the lowest social rating and the lowest economic position. The combination of both value scales results in a social order in which nonwhites are at the bottom, followed by the "foreigner," that is, the most recent immigrant, followed by the various classes of native whites, up to the elite. This is perhaps the explanation of the already-mentioned fact that the majority of Americans consider themselves as middle-class people. If the "average" American appraises his own position, he finds the immigrant below him and the Negro still lower; so he cannot be low class. Whatever other consequences this fact may have, it undoubtedly strengthens solidarity among the native white Americans and lessens antagonism between the classes.

The Problem of an American Caste System. The coexistence of the two systems and the rigidity of the color line have induced some scholars to speak of an American caste system. Since Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town,* this idea has become widely accepted.[6] The issue depends, of course, on the definition of caste. Warner[7] defines it as follows:

> Caste, as used here, describes a theoretical arrangement of the people of the given group in an order in which the privileges, duties, obligations, opportunities, etc., are unequally distributed between the groups which are considered to be higher and lower. There are social sanctions which tend to maintain this unequal distribution. Such a definition also describes class. A caste organization, however, can be further defined as one where marriage between two or more groups is not sanctioned and where there is no opportunity for members of the lower groups to rise into the upper groups or of the members of the upper to fall into the lower ones.[8]

If this definition is accepted, we do have a caste system in America. However, the paradigm for a caste system is India. Closer analysis shows that the Indian system differs radically from the American one. It is problematical whether the use of the same term for two different concepts is advisable. Without going into too many details, we shall outline the essential features of the caste system as follows: [9]

1. The caste system rests on religious grounds; castes are ordained by divine decision.
2. Also for religious reasons a person must remain in his caste and carefully fulfill the caste obligations or he will be punished by being reborn into a lower caste; correct ritual behavior leads to his reincarnation in a higher caste (double religious sanction).
3. Intermarriage or breach of ritual obligations leads to loss of caste; in extreme cases the person becomes an outcast, an untouchable (social sanction).
4. Caste status is inherited and cannot be changed.
5. The members of a caste (or better, subcaste) have approximately equal status.
6. A specific occupation is assigned to each caste; members of other castes cannot engage in the same trade.
7. The castes are hierarchically stratified in the same way as the classes in a class system.

[6] So many distinguished scholars share this view that Frazier could speak of a "caste and class school of students of race relations" (see E. Franklin Frazier, "Race Contacts and the Social Structure," *American Sociological Review,* 1949).

[7] W. Lloyd Warner, "American Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1936.

[8] The latter statement could be challenged. It is essential to the caste system that one can "lose caste." In fact, this is precisely the sanction which keeps alive the caste system in India.

[9] The classic treatment is Max Weber, *Religionsoziologie,* vol. II, sec. 1; for a discussion see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action,* pp. 552 ff.

8. The caste system is recognized as valid by all castes, including the underprivileged.

If we compare the Indian caste system with the social order in the American South, the similarities are apparently fewer than the differences. First, the American system is not based on religion; on the contrary, it violates the basic teachings of Christianity. It also does not conform to the American creed that all men are born equal, which is held to be a self-evident truth. While the Indian system, because of its religious foundation, has been the most stable in the world—it is probably more than 2,500 years old—the American system always has been unstable. Americans do not believe in mundane reincarnation, with an endless repetition of caste systems but in an eternal hereafter with unsegregated heaven and hell. While they believe in divine reward or punishment, there is no religious sanction against impinging upon the unwritten laws of race relations. Consequently, the American system is an order, unilaterally imposed by a privileged majority upon a minority (while in India the underprivileged are more numerous); the Negroes do not recognize the justice of the order and are constantly fighting to break it down. The identity of caste and occupation does not exist in America; there is a tendency to approximate such a state but only in the sense that certain groups occupy nearly all positions in a trade; for instance, redcaps and Pullman porters are mostly Negroes. But the reverse is not true. There is no position which a Negro cannot hold; they work as manual laborers, in skilled trades, as white-collar employees, as government officials; they are chemists, physicians, lawyers, artists, actors, and writers; they are executives of corporations, college presidents, ministers, and bishops; they hold political offices.

Every specific caste within the caste system has a certain status and every member of the same caste has identical status; exactly the same is the case in the class system. But the members of the alleged castes in America do not have the same status; each group is stratified in classes. George Washington Carver, one of America's foremost scientists, did not have the same status as an illiterate Negro shoe shiner. What the two had in common was subjection to discrimination because of their race.

What we have, then, is the coexistence of two different stratification systems which are largely separated and only incompletely integrated. There is more occupational separation in the higher and more occupational integration in the lower ranks of the two systems. The positions which are least desirable are inevitably filled by members of the underprivileged system. But there is not a single occupation from which whites are banned or which causes loss of caste. The greatest similarity between the American and the Indian caste system is endogamy. But, as we shall see, classes are also endogamous, although to a lesser degree.

The Indian caste system is a single, completely integrated system. The

American system is incompletely integrated and is actually a combination of several systems. This is shown by the fact that "castelike" features which exist in the relations between races also exist with respect to national background and religion when minority groups are numerous enough. There is ecological segregation in natural areas. There is social segregation even in the absence of spatial separation. There is the same castelike tendency toward occupational monopoly. There is, more dimly, a disapproval of intermarriage. But there is also the duplication of a class system, although mostly in segregated areas. That system is, for example, symbolized in the popular, although malicious, distinction between "lace-curtain" and "shanty" Irish. However, each segregated area has its own class system consisting of lower, middle, and upper middle classes. The latter consist mostly of members of the professions serving exclusively their own group, which tallies exactly with the Negro upper-middle-class situation.

Class and Religion. The class situation with respect to religion is somewhat more complicated. There are two main aspects. One is the relative rank of religion in any class system. Religions may be legally equal; but they are not treated as equal in social relationships. Everywhere the established religion is connected with the upper classes. Not all who are members of the leading denomination are upper class, but to be a dissenter sometimes accounts for loss of status. Although legally the United States knows no established religion, socially Protestantism can be regarded as "established."

There is also another class distinction which is clearly visible in America. Generally, orthodoxy and religious rigidity decrease with increasing class position. More specifically, lower classes are more inclined toward bigotry, put greater emphasis on liturgy, are stricter in observance of rituals, and tend to promote practices of emotional religious communications (such as evangelism, revivals, and testimonial meetings). The upper classes prefer either complete but individualistic mysticism or, more frequently, a sober view of dogmatic problems.[10] They prefer ritual simplicity and abhor an appeal to violent emotions. A combination of the two aspects just mentioned leads to class distinctions. Within Protestanism this distinction approximates the following ranking in order of decreasing status: Episcopalians and Unitarians, Congregationalists and Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and finally the various "Holiness" sects and "basement" churches.[11] The organization of the

[10] Not necessarily "liberal" in the religious sense of the word. Modern theologians such as Niebuhr, Barth, and Brunner are not religious liberals but their interpretations appeal only to upper-class people. The same was true in Catholicism with the school of Port Royal, the Jansenists, and the various "modernists," as long as these movements were permitted.

[11] The Episcopal Church, to be sure, has an elaborate ritual. Observance of ritual acts, however, is not regarded by contemporary Episcopalians as the most important element of religion. The high rank of the Episcopal Church is based on tradition; the British

Catholic Church does not allow for divisions but class status is more or less reflected in the relative importance which strict performance of ritual obligation has for individuals. Jewish congregations also show distinct class divisions. Reformed, conservative, and orthodox denominations are clearly related to upper-, middle-, and lower-class status.

Intermarriage and Commensality. The primary manifestations of class are connubium and commensality. Classes are economically integrated but socially separated. They work together but live apart from each other. The class character of residential districts and the ecological aspects of class segregation have been discussed earlier. Spatial residential separation, however, is of little relevance compared with the social isolation of classes. Although people cooperate as long as they are working, they spend their leisure time with members of their own class. To be sure, human relationships do not stop at the class line nor is life within a class always harmonious and peaceful. The most bitter enmities frequently occur among members of the same class. The Yorks and the Lancasters might have had no quarrels with burghers, yeomen, or serfs, but they hated each other and fought one another for thirty years until extinction. Conversely, relationships among members of different classes can be very friendly. Many slaves remained loyal to their Southern masters, who in turn took care of them when they were old or sick. But the relationships between the landlord and his janitor, the gentleman and his butler, the corporation president and his chauffeur, the factory owner and his foreman, are always relationships on the basis of social inequality, while members of the same class are socially on a par. The most friendly banker will not propose his valet as a member of his club.

An acid test is a dinner invitation. A workman might invite his boss to a special occasion, for instance, his wedding. But ordinary invitations would be rejected as improper; a rejection within the same class would be based on disinterest or dislike, but the propriety of the invitation would not be disputed. The same rules apply to invitations to bridge games, automobile rides on Sundays, or private dances, in short, to all merely "social" occasions. If the reason is not social, the case is different; the millionaire might invite a professional, "below his station," to play golf or tennis with him; then the game, not a social meeting, is the reason for the invitation. This is the meaning of the story which is told about practically all famous musicians. A noted pianist was invited to play at a party given by a millionaire. A $1,000 fee was agreed upon. "Of course," the millionaire added, "it is understood that you will not dine with the guests." "In that case," replied the pianist, "the fee will be only $500." The story clearly implies that achievements do not eradicate class lines.

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settlers who were not Puritans belonged to the Anglican Church and were recognized members of the upper classes. The members of the old stock are largely their descendants.

Commensality is but the most obvious symbol and symptom of social intercourse on an equal basis. Intermarriage is more important, for its absence perpetuates the existence of classes as comparatively closed groups. Again we find that class division is a predominantly urban phenomenon. No farmer, however rich and successful, will decline a dinner invitation from his poor neighbor because the latter is not in "his" class. There might be difficulties with respect to marriage, although these are not too marked in the United States. In real peasant societies the question of a dowry is very important—in rural Ireland marriage brokers are still at work—but the reason is not class differences but lack of economic means. If the poor suitor wins the sweepstakes, he becomes acceptable.

Class Control of Opportunities. If class divisions consisted only of social isolation, their importance would be slight. Social isolation, however, has other more serious consequences. First, classes control positions. The popular opinion that job control is the main reason for the existence of classes confounds cause and effect. Peasants or, for that matter, farmers are a distinct class without job control. The peasant has neither positions nor business opportunities to offer; his neighbors do not buy from or sell to him. The old aristocracies—in the Mesopotamian and Greek city-states, in ancient Rome, and in medieval Europe—were in an almost identical situation. The Roman optimates who owned large *latifundia* in Sicily or North Africa did not sell their wheat to each other. The Duke of York does not ask the Duke of Kent to give his son a job. From the end of the Middle Ages to the advent of the Industrial Revolution the job control of the upper classes was limited to military commissions for younger sons and to a few top positions in the civil service. The very fact that they were rich and had a secure income from their landed estates was instrumental in developing the attitude that "a nobleman does not work." Up to the end of the nineteenth century titled aristocrats did not even compete for positions in the professions.

However, for the middle classes connections were and still are a vital asset. Without connections, selling and buying at reasonable prices is difficult. If the would-be seller has "friends," social acquaintances who need his merchandise, his task is much easier. The case of the professions is similar. An attorney, just out of law school, needs acquaintances—his own or his family's—who will give him cases. The most brilliant lawyer cannot prove his ability without clients. The control over opportunities is a result rather than a cause of the social "inbreeding" of classes. It is also not correct to state that the upper classes have a monopoly in controlling opportunities. The control rests on three factors: knowledge of openings, recommendations, and social obligations. If two manufacturers are members of the same club and frequently meet each other, it is very likely that one will know if the other has an opening for an assistant manager. If he recommends his son for the position, a refusal is rather difficult. To indicate that the applicant is lack-

ing in intelligence or competence is nearly impossible for "social" reasons. The "social obligation" becomes more powerful if, in addition, the father of the applicant is a buyer from the other manufacturer. The latter then hardly has a chance to refuse. During the last century the upper middle classes gained control of most of the desirable and rewarding opportunities. This caused a change in the attitudes of the economically pressed upper classes who no longer objected to positions which they had once despised. In Europe aristocrats have turned in increasing numbers to the professions; in the United States civil service positions have become desirable.

Other classes, too, control their opportunities, although the pressure of "social obligation" is weaker and sometimes absent. If a janitor learns that his landlord has bought another building and needs another janitor, the landlord who does not know a qualified person will listen to the recommendation of an employee whom he has found trustworthy. Similarly, many openings for manual or clerical workers are filled by recommendations of their class members. To a certain extent union policies, establishing seniority rights and closed shops, as well as the demand that workers be hired only through union halls, have also had the effect of giving a class control over specific opportunities, thereby excluding other classes. A middle-class businessman who tries to get his son on the police force will encounter more difficulties than a man who belongs to the same class as the policemen and is their "friend." This whole set of class traits—commensality, intermarriage, and control of opportunities—is the result of what we may term "class cohesion."

Class cohesion has considerable consequences. Our own system is officially one of free competition and unrestricted opportunity. We commonly allege that in every case the best man succeeds on the basis of his qualifications or "technical competence." Actually this is not even correct for business deals. Unless the difference in quality of merchandise is striking or the financial conditions are unreasonable, the "friend" has a much better chance than the stranger. Hence, the outsider can succeed only if he sells at lower and buys at higher prices, or works for lesser wages. The outsider will hear nothing of business opportunities, for they become known in the social gatherings of a class to which he is not admitted. Of course there are limits. No one will employ a surgeon to operate on one's child if he knows that the man is incompetent, even if the two are very close friends. If it comes to the filling of a tooth or a similar routine job, the situation may be different. If the chairmanship in the department of physics at a great university becomes vacant, the president will make every effort to get the best man; if the vacancy concerns an instructor, recommendations may be stronger than better qualifications. This is the grain of truth in the saying "It does not matter what you know but whom you know." Of course all this occurs because of social relationships rather than class membership. But the social relationships are nearly always based on class membership. The member of an-

other class is thus, at least, handicapped and often excluded. The case must not be overstated. Competition exists. First, it exists among members of the same class; second, outsiders have a chance either if a class cannot meet the entire demand or if—in more important cases—the superiority of the outsider is too obvious. Thus we have a system of free competition restricted and modified by class cohesion.

Class and Position. Control of opportunities is accompanied by ranking of positions. There is a definite correlation between class and position. A position confers status upon a person because the position itself is indicative of class membership: each position corresponds to a certain class. What determines the class status of a position is largely an institutionalized evaluation. Income and wealth derived from a position are not the decisive factors. The very fact that some positions have a low rank but offer rich pecuniary rewards sometimes creates animosity against the middle classes by financially hard-pressed aristocrats. The Prussian *Junker* had the utmost contempt for the businessman, although he liked to marry his rich daughter. Positions differ according to income, authority, power, prestige, security, and psychological satisfaction. The final rank depends on a balance of all these factors, some of which vary according to periods and culture. There are some positions which are universally regarded as undesirable—such as the menial work of hired men—and consequently are relegated to the lowest classes. Even within a group of positions there is still rank, some of it based merely on "operational" superiority; a college president has a higher rank than a dean but both are members of the same class. Business types, too, have a class connotation. In the United States banking, railroads, and heavy industry rank highest; in Catholic countries where the medieval ban against usury has left its mark, banking is slightly suspect. A secondhand clothes dealer may be a millionaire but he is excluded from the upper classes. The head waiter of a de luxe restaurant can have a princely income, but since it is derived from tips, the upper middle classes will not admit him. Again the urban character of class differentiation is apparent. A farmer does not have a better status whether he raises poultry or grows fruits, whether he specializes in wheat or in cattle. Also the farmer loses no prestige if he does the same job as his laborers, for instance, stacking hay, while in the city the boss is supposed to do work superior to his clerk and, as a remnant of a militaristic past, manual work is considered slightly degrading. As a result of the correlation of class and occupation, the economic groups—unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled manual workers, clerical workers, business and professions, and top positions in industry and politics—closely correspond to the order and subdivisions of classes.

Class and Cultural Patterns. If groups live in social isolation and work in economic separation (notwithstanding the integration of the economic parts), they are bound to develop specific attitudes and behavior patterns

which will distinguish them from other groups. This is, indeed, the case with classes. They are not merely classificatory groups of a given system; they not only differ in rank but they also represent quite distinct cultural units within a culture. Even an untrained observer is able to determine with reasonable accuracy the class status of an otherwise unknown person if he talks to him for half an hour. Expressions such as "just a peasant," "low-class manners," "petty-bourgeois attitudes," "typical aristocrat," etc., indicate that even laymen are aware that class distinctions are more than differences in income or position. In fact, there are so many distinctions that the mere enumeration would fill several pages. Only a few of them will be briefly mentioned here.

There are marked differences in language. Upper classes have a larger vocabulary; they have also a different vocabulary. Certain words are rejected by lower classes as too "high-brow." Conversely, although upper classes also use slang expressions, they use them more sparingly and never seriously. The tabooing of certain words is more rigidly observed in the upper than in the lower classes. The class difference is honored by the lower classes who refrain from using "improper" words when talking to members of the upper classes. There is, moreover, a difference in accent, even in intonation ("He has a cultured voice").

Other differences concern attire. Although dress distinctions, especially with males, have considerably decreased, they have not wholly disappeared. The term "white-collar worker," though no longer quite appropriate, indicates a class distinction in dress. A grocer's wife wearing a mink coat appears grotesque. A gathering of milkmen in tuxedos does not occur.

There are, to be sure, differences due to income or education. Even so, the man who earned a million by selling secondhand clothes will not play polo; he may collect stamps as a hobby but rarely precious china. Furthermore, there are differences in taste. Although taste, as well as the lack of it, knows no class limits, distinctions are obvious. A poor member of the upper classes will not "adorn" his single room with pictures of pin-up girls cut from cheap magazines. The ample display of worthless knickknacks, of tasteless souvenirs from sightseeing places, is typical of lower-middle-class taste. The tastelessness of upper groups, especially the *nouveaux riches,* is revealed by castles built in sham Gothic or incongruous arrangements of period furniture.

Perhaps the most remarkable class difference concerns manners. This is not a question of good or poor manners, of tact or tactlessness. All classes have polite and rude, tactful and tactless people. But it is definitely a matter of refinement. All claims that upper classes are more intelligent, have greater abilities, or better moral standards are without grounds. But manners show, indeed, increasing refinement the higher we move up the social ladder. The upstart reveals himself by his inability to acquire the manners of a class to which he did not initially belong and the social snob becomes ridiculous by

assuming "airs," that is, by his abortive attempts to imitate those whom in vain he wants to join. We may term the whole set of attitudes, behavior, and specific values "life style." Classes differ because their life styles are different. As in so many other instances, this is an urban phenomenon; farmers do not differ from each other in life style. But as an urban phenomenon it is universal. There is no doubt that the Soviet urban society is not classless in the sense that the various social groups have identical life styles.

These differences explain the class cohesion which is more than merely an *esprit de corps*. It is the identity in conduct of life which makes people group-conscious and leads to class solidarity. It also accounts for what Jessie Bernard [12] calls "pervasiveness of class distinctions" namely, its far-reaching implications for the entire life of an individual.

Class Mobility Another aspect of the urban class system is its intense mobility. Farming offers very little opportunity to rise in status. One way is politics, but the farmer has no time to campaign and political positions are few and rarely open. City life is different. The need to choose an occupation makes life problematic and uncertain from the beginning. Even if the "right" choice is made, that is, if a person selects an occupation for which he qualifies and which he likes, he rarely remains in the same position. He changes jobs or his line of business, he advances or suffers setbacks. That implies both spatial and social mobility, changes in location, position, prestige, and sometimes status. In societies which limit occupational choices by legal restrictions or by tradition there is less mobility because there is less opportunity. Such was the case in medieval Europe with its legal estates, with corresponding occupations, and with a guild system.

The breakdown of legal restrictions, the colonization of the New World, and the creation of new opportunities as a result of the Industrial Revolution increased social mobility to an extent hitherto unknown. Simultaneously, attitudes changed completely. In modern urban life there is an unwritten law that a person should have a career. The stress in this formulation is obviously more on gain in status than on objective achievements, more on success than on performance. Achievements tend to become means rather than an end. This indicates certain pathological concomitants in the struggle for better positions. The struggle itself, however, is inevitable in a system which provides no position in urban life without competition. Except for the very few who inherit their fathers' business, everyone has to gain a position which is also wanted by others. The urge to rise and the fear of falling increase nervous tension; anxiety, based on real insecurity, intensifies the danger of neuroticism which is rampant in modern urban life.

The open character of the class system and the selection of candidates for a

[12] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

position through competition have been used both as an explanation and a justification of social stratification. Classes exist because a differentiated system must have an organization consisting of stratified positions. Classes are justified because they bring out the inherent differences in men. The person with better qualifications obtains the better position and rightly enjoys a higher status. The upper classes are not only socially but also in every other respect superior to the lower classes. This theory had its heyday when Darwinism in cheaply popularized form invaded the social sciences. It seems that no modern sociologist supports this view, but popular opinion inclines toward the notion that free competition guarantees equal opportunity, with the result that class division is "natural" and everybody has the position which he deserves.

In the first place, in biology the "struggle for existence" means what it says: to be or not to be. In society it means shoe shiner or bank president; it means struggle for social positions, for which there is no parallel in nature. Second, it is a common fallacy to identify the survival of the fittest with survival of the best. This is not true even in the biological sense. In the struggle between man and the tsetse fly man dies of sleeping sickness and the fly survives. The term "fitness" means nothing but adaptation to a situation. In tropical regions a person has a better chance to survive if he is heavily pigmented. That does not imply that a dark skin has any other advantage than better resistance to the radiation of the sun. In war, as has often been pointed out, the fittest are killed in battle and the crippled, the insane, the weak, and the sick survive. In the armed forces the coward and the shirker have a better chance of surviving than the hero. As we know from the family histories of the Jukes, the Kallikaks, and similar cases, idiots and other biologically inferior persons have an excellent chance of surviving and breeding generations of equally unfit people. What we observe in the decline of any higher civilization is that just the best are eradicated while the mediocrities and "unfit" survive. Even biologically the "best" are not the "fittest." A race horse is less fit to live than a mongrel draft animal.

As we have seen, class status is mostly inherited; even in the most mobile society change of status is rarer than its retention. The opportunities for rising to a higher class status through selective competition are limited. Even in an open system positions tend to become hereditary. The effective class control over opportunities excludes from the start many competitors from other strata. Members of a class have another advantage over outsiders: adequate preparation through favorable environmental influences. They are familiar with the requirements of a position from childhood. The upper groups also enjoy all educational facilities which permit them to develop their innate abilities and intelligence to the limit, while those who cannot obtain all the desirable training are sometimes stunted in their intellectual advancement. This has been stressed by all who favor environmental explanations for differ-

ences in abilities.[13] Jessie Bernard [14] goes so far as to state: "Class has an almost determinative influence on personality and therefore on chances of success in the competition of life." She comes to the same conclusion which has been discussed here: "No wonder that even in our democratic communities social stratification is much more characteristic than upward mobility, and that most young people, contrary to popular belief, remain usually in the social class in which they were born."

Yet a certain amount of mobility exists, and changes in class status occur on the basis of obtaining positions. The question arises whether the position is reached by correct selection through competition or, in other words, whether the competitor with the best qualifications is chosen. If we had a "natural selection," the answer would be unequivocally in the affirmative. Nature, so we suppose, makes no mistake. But the competitive process in society is decided by "social selection," which has only a slight similarity with what happens in nature: man sets—to a large degree arbitrarily—the criteria for a position and man decides who meets the criteria. His judgment sometimes fails him in both instances. There is no possible procedure which will guarantee that the best man will always be chosen. In "Science as a Vocation" [15] Max Weber has pointed out that even in the academic field, although the decisions are made by experts with the best intentions, mediocrities often have a better chance than more qualified competitors. An analysis of the Nobel prize awards shows that in quite a few cases persons of lesser ability have been preferred to outstanding men, although the committee is composed of unprejudiced persons of high integrity. In the arts, time is the only infallible judge. In his famous controversy with Whistler, so great an authority as Ruskin called the now generally admired painting "Waterloo Bridge" a fraud, and an "expert," now forgotten, corroborated the statement in court. All our objective tests are far from perfect. The only tests which are really decided on performance alone are athletic competitions, but here we have natural, not social, selections. The situation is even worse in competition for political office. The selective principle which decides the outcome is the ability to get votes, which is in no way a guarantee that the victorious competitor has any political insight, any real leadership qualities, or any qualifications of a statesman. Thus, neither the expert nor majority opinion are an assurance of correct judgment in competition.

We also find a downward mobility which corresponds to the rise to a higher status. Class cohesion and wealth are frequently powerful enough to keep a person with below-average abilities in the group into which he was born but his children will go down if they also are wanting. As a rule, both rise and

[13] See, for instance, Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?* New York, 1944, pp. 149–150.

[14] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

[15] Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology,* New York, 1946, pp. 129–156.

fall are not "jumps" but occur gradually; the final result shows perhaps after three generations.

In the long run, therefore, the upper classes are bound to gain some able members by upward mobility and to lose some inferior members by downward mobility. The bottom stratum, on the other hand, loses constantly some of its best members and receives failures from classes higher up. This is the grain of truth in the contention that intelligence (and talent) are correlated with class position.

The limitations of selection have advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are more personal. Qualified persons who fail to move up become frustrated and resentful. Their dissatisfaction is a negative social factor, especially if they possess leadership qualities and make themselves the mouthpiece of the discontented. There is no doubt that selection through competition results in greater achievements, but it is cruel to all those who suffer defeat. The advantage of limited selection lies in the fact that the middle and lower middle classes are not totally deprived of their able members. That modern Western society generally has less strict divisions between the social strata and that the gap between the classes is not unbridgeable is partly the result of incomplete selection. Many capable persons have to remain in the class of their birth, thereby raising the general level of all classes.

Evaluation of the Class System. For all the reasons discussed, the class system cannot be considered as "just" or "natural" in the sense that every person is assigned the position and status which he deserves. Equally untenable is the concept of class structure as a sly device to exclude the masses from their due share. The critics of the class system overestimate the importance of status. Although a higher status is desirable to the individual, what it yields is mostly social recognition. His actual abilities remain unimpaired whether he advances or remains at the same status. But society as a whole profits, because competition leads to better performances not only by the victors but by the more numerous defeated. The mere possibility of succeeding makes people seek better education and training and makes them more efficient. While other systems of stratification sometimes have produced higher individual performances, notably in the field of arts, the modern class system has produced a society in which the ability of the masses has risen to a level never attained before. To be sure, progress is not entirely due to competition and mobility but they certainly are major contributing factors. The class system, with all its imperfections and shortcomings, therefore, fulfills a socially useful function.

Chapter 10

RACES AND NATIONALITIES

In spite of many attempts to popularize the findings of anthropology, there is still widespread belief that most persons are of pure race and that all members of a nation belong to the same race. Americans are, of course, aware of their complex origins, but many believe that every nationality which has contributed to the composition of the population is racially pure and derived from a single, unmixed common stock. Actually the opposite is true. All nations are the result of repeated blendings, many of which took place in historical eras, while others can be traced to still earlier periods prior to written history. The discrepancy between fact and fiction fosters biased attitudes of ethnocentrism and out-group antagonism, rationalized by erroneous biological and historical assumptions.

The first censuses of any reliability whatsoever were taken in the last decade of the eighteenth century in the United States, France, and Prussia. When the first United States census was taken in 1790, the country had been an immigration center for more than 180 years and its population composition was more complex than is realized by many even now. Yet we learn very little of demographic interest from the early statistical publications. Even today the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service uses terminology which is at variance with scientific usage. What anthropology considers as race is called "color," while "race" denotes nationality. Thus we find, for instance, white immigrants of German race. Even greater confusion arises since as a rule the immigrant determines his own "race" when he fills out the blank. The data thus obtained on immigrants from countries with a mixed population such as the United Kingdom, Russia, or Austria prior to 1918, are therefore of doubtful value. Moreover, the census makes provision for none but "pure" races and nationalities; mixtures are nonexistent. We do not know how many persons are of mixed Caucasian-Negroid origin, and all persons known to have a Negro ancestor, however remote, are counted as Negro (the American procedure, in accordance with social customs, would have put Pushkin and Dumas into the Negro bracket). Among Caucasians the nationality of the father seems to determine that of the children, regardless of their actual background. The lack of reliable information regarding religious affiliation adds to the existing vagueness.

The actual differences in racial or cultural background are of less sociological consequence than the attitudes of various groups toward each other. Although Paris and Lisbon have a sizable number of Negroes, they pose no problem; the situation is quite different in American cities or in urban South Africa. The local proximity of Czech and Hungarian sections in New York is of no importance whatsoever. In prewar Czechoslovakia it created a social problem of the first order.

While it is true that there is no race and hardly a cultural group which is not represented in the United States, some of these are numerically too small to have a marked influence on the composition of the population. The American scene is largely dominated by the division of white and nonwhite on the one hand and differences between the fully assimilated "one-hundred-percenters" and the not yet entirely absorbed stock of assorted hyphenated Americans. Again our statistical data are not very satisfactory; the census distinguishes between "native white" and "foreign born"; sometimes we get figures, enumerating persons of "mixed native and foreign-born parentage," but without indicating the national differences between the parents. These figures have limited sociological significance. A foreigner who entered the United States as a small child is frequently more thoroughly Americanized than native-born members of strong minority groups who are kept in comparative social isolation. These minority groups are sometimes so powerful that they even absorb foreign elements into their own group rather than help them to become "ordinary" Americans. Thus Eamon de Valera, born in Brooklyn, son of a Spanish father and an Irish mother, became so much identified with the Irish cause and established so few emotional ties to the country of his birth that he finally left America for Ireland. If two nationalities are closely akin, the immigrant quality sometimes becomes irrelevant. It would be hard to decide whether T. S. Eliot is British or American. Under these conditions the following discussion cannot claim quantitative accuracy.

The "Old Stock." Popular notions about the old Americans are not very clear and consistent. According to some opinions, the old stock still forms the bulk of the population; according to others, it has almost disappeared or is entirely diluted. The most frequent mistake is the identification of the history of the evolution of the United States with the history of the settlement of America. That mistake was made by even so eminent a scholar as Henry Pratt Fairchild [1] when he investigated what he believed to be "the primary origin of the population at the beginning of our independent national life." The U.S. Bureau of the Census made a study, published under the title of *A Century of Population Growth,* in which the surnames of the residents of the time of the first census (1790) were reviewed in order to

[1] Henry Pratt Fairchild, *The Melting-pot Mistake,* Boston, 1926, p. 90. Table 12 is taken from the same page.

draw certain conclusions with respect to their national origin. The result is shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Presumable Nationality of the Residents of the United States in 1790

Nationality	*Percentage*
English	82.1
Scotch	7.0
Irish	1.9
Dutch	2.5
German	5.6
All other	0.3

From this Professor Fairchild concluded that "the *American people,* at the beginning *of its national existence* was to a very large extent a racial replica of the British Isles and particularly of England." [2] He further deduced that these English settlers "were Anglo-Saxon and predominantly Nordic," [3] adding (and assuming the existence of Nordic psychological faculties) that the American population "would have been even more Nordic than that of England itself." [4] To begin with, the census study was not concerned with the American people, but with the white population of the United States in 1790. At that time the population was 3,929,214, but there were only 2,810,248 whites. The census dealt only with the whites, which for its special aim was quite legitimate. To exclude 1,118,966 persons—or 30 per cent of the population—from the "American people" is a different proposition.

Second, the assumption that the English are preponderantly Nordic is unwarranted. Since this is a popular notion, the question deserves a brief discussion. The British, like all other nations, are a blend of many different subbranches of the white race. To quote one of the best-informed students of racial origins, Professor Coon,[5] "the racial history of the British Isles is a more complicated matter than one would expect in view of the marginal position of these islands." Coon further remarked that the racial "elements include most of the known branches of the white race; one or more varieties of unreduced or unaltered Palaeolithic man; two varieties of brunet Mediterranean, of which the sea-borne Atlanto-Mediterranean is the more important; the two principal surviving variants of the Iron Age Nordic group; brachycephals of Dinaric or Armenoid type, as well as the composite Beaker type, which is a blend of Dinaric, Borreby and early Corded elements." [6] To this we may add the small-scale infiltrations which must have contributed to the

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 93–94.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 99.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 100.
[5] Carleton S. Coon, *The Races of Europe,* New York, 1939, p. 398.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 399.

racial composition of a then sparse population: the Phoenicians, a mixed, mostly Mediterranean people, the "Romans," namely, occupation forces, recruited from all known parts of the world, and the French-Normans, who were mostly Nordic. In due time the latter formed the "old" British aristocracy, who practically extinguished themselves in the fratricidal Wars of the Roses. Coon further stated that "England, Scotland, and Wales are all fundamentally mesocephalic";[7] therefore the Nordic strain cannot be absolutely dominant, for dolichocephaly and not mesocephaly is one of the outstanding traits of the Nordic race. But we need not depend on either racial history or a mythical race psychology. Hrdlicka[8] has measured the skeletons of the early English settlers and demonstrated that they belonged to all kinds of blends, with intermediate racial types predominating over both Nordics and Mediterraneans. As any unprejudiced observer can see in the areas where the descendants of old English immigrants still prevail, as in Maine, Vermont, the Carolinas, and Georgia, the Nordic type has by no means a monopoly.

This is also congruent with the findings of Hooton's investigation[9] of racial characteristics of living Americans. He found that the simon-pure Nordics constitute only 2.49 per cent of American males; if the near-blond longheads are included, we have an additional 17.0 per cent of Nordics in the United States. It is most improbable that dilution of the old stock alone can account for the fact that Nordics comprise less than one-fifth of the population.

Furthermore, since the census study concerned only the white population of the United States in 1790, it did not include the population in areas which did not yet belong to the United States. First, it did not include Indians outside the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. No one knows how many Indians existed in 1790, but all observers agree that there were more than there are now. Second, not all white Americans lived in the United States. After all, the oldest American city, St. Augustine, Florida, was founded by Spanish settlers in 1564, more than one generation before the first English settlement, ill-fated Jamestown, arose and more than half a century before the Pilgrims set foot on American soil. How many early settlers came from Spain is unknown, but since they covered a territory from Florida to California, they must have come in sizable numbers. If we take the term "early Americans" seriously, the proportion of the English must shrink far below the 70.1 per cent indicated by the census, although the exact ratio cannot be determined.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

[8] Ales Hrdlicka, *Old Americans,* Baltimore, 1925.

[9] Earnest A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape,* New York, 1946, p. 589.

The oldest white settlers fall briefly into four categories: Anglo-Saxons and Dutch in the original thirteen states, French in Louisiana, Spanish in the South and Southwest. This is a very rough preliminary description. The French influence stretched far to the north, as is demonstrated by the name of Des Moines, Iowa. Detroit, founded in 1701, was settled by the French, and some French Canadians must have moved to Maine in colonial times. Moreover, the reference is rather to the country of departure than that of the national origin, and all colonies had settlers from other places than the mother country. Of Boston, we know that the Cabotos were Italians and so, possibly, was Paul Revere; in New York, the governor, Peter Minuit, was German. Spanish Jews came to America almost as early as the Puritans; the first arrived in New York in 1654 and in Rhode Island in 1658. The largest additions came from Germany; in 1790 there were about 160,000 Germans in the United States. The Huguenots and other French amounted to about 20,000 (in the United States of 1790). Racially, all these groups, including Spanish Jews, were the result of repeated mixtures; the Spanish, due to the history and geographical position of Spain, were probably more mixed than all others on account of the admixture of Phoenicians, Carthaginians, "Moors," and other African and Asiatic peoples. The "old American" stock is therefore anything but uniform with respect to race, nationality, and culture.

Among the larger cities in the United States the following are of Dutch, Spanish, or French origin: New York, Los Angeles, Detroit, St. Louis, San Francisco, Milwaukee, New Orleans, San Antonio, Sacramento, El Paso, and Baton Rouge. This is certainly a most impressive record, but to come to a correct evaluation it must be pointed out that none of these cities gained real importance before the Americans of British descent took over.

The common notion that the old stock was limited to Anglo-Saxons is justified by neither historical sequence nor the biological population composition of colonial times. Nevertheless, the limitation is sociologically sound, once we remove from it the connotation of racial uniformity and Nordic preponderance. *E pluribus unum:* Out of the variety of uncoordinated and geographically separated multinational settlements finally arose one nation, one society, speaking one language, acknowledging one basic philosophy. The French, Spaniards, and Dutch were essentially colonists but not colonizers; [10] they remained oriented to their mother country. The British settlers, in due time, became a new nation in a new land. The new land became Anglo-Saxon not because of its "racial" composition but because Anglo-Saxon institutions were triumphant. The Dutch, Germans, and French Huguenots—all Protestants—were easily absorbed and completely assimilated. The Catholic French in Louisiana became isolated and were able to perpetuate a small aristocracy of their own, the old families in New Orleans. But Louisiana, separated from France after the territory was ceded to Spain, was not strong enough to build

[10] On the difference, see p. 242.

a Franco-American civilization and the few aristocratic families are more a local curiosity than a social force. The Spaniards were more numerous. They became citizens of the United States after the Anglo-Saxon character of the country already had been firmly established. They were never accepted as equal by the existing Anglo-American elite and difference in creed led to little intermarriage and their ranks were not augmented by newcomers from Spain.

To sum up: The population of the territory which is now the United States was already very complex in even colonial times, consisting of members of the white, Negroid, and Mongoloid races, and all conceivable blends. The white race was represented by almost all known subbranches; among the nationalities the English, Scotch, Welsh, Dutch, French, Spaniards and, to a lesser degree, the Germans were numerous, but other nationalities were also represented by smaller groups. The settlers from Great Britain succeeded in unifying the country and in assimilating all other white Protestant settlers. The Anglicized amalgamation is now known as the "old stock" and represents everywhere the "aristocracy" of the United States. The upper classes in cities are largely the descendants of the old stock and are very conscious of their ancestry. The existence of an untitled aristocracy and its particular role in the cities contribute substantially to the patterns of urban America.

The Minorities. Not all descendants of the old stock became an aristocracy. In rural areas such as those of New England the population remained largely uniform; the families had settled at approximately the same time so everybody belonged to the old stock. In the frontier areas—towns or countryside—everybody was "new," and it took much time before an elite on the basis of priority of time could evolve. The role of the old stock as an aristocracy developed mostly in the cities on the Atlantic seaboard. That old families form a city aristocracy is a very common phenomenon, especially in places where no titled nobility exists. Thus we find them in elite positions in such places as the medieval Italian city-states (Venice, Genoa, Florence, and many others), in the independent German cities (Bremen, Hamburg and Luebeck), in Flanders (Bruges, Ghent), and in Switzerland (Basel, Bern). In America, however, the role of the old stock was not limited to the creation of an upper-class stratum. The old stock created that specific set of institutional values and behavior patterns which—quite correctly—became known as "American." All those who had different sets of values and behavior patterns were—in this sense also quite correctly—considered as non-Americans, as foreigners. To be sure, a "native" group develops these particular systems of values and behavior, commonly known as "national character," in every country. But usually foreigners are scarce and scattered and so there is little contrast; in America, the largest immigration center of the world, foreigners are a daily occurrence. They are met everywhere in cities (less frequently in rural areas) and to a great extent they live in segre-

gated areas which make them still more conspicuously foreign. Thus the old stock assumed another role, that of a privileged group with high social prestige which successfully claimed a monopoly in "Americanism."

In a country where mass immigrations continued for more than 300 years the terms "old stock" and "foreigners" are bound to become somewhat vague. A person is likely to call another person a foreigner if the latter arrived one month later. Similar attitudes can be observed in the army, where the recruit is treated as inferior until he can give the same treatment to soldiers who enlisted four weeks later. The result is in both cases identical: the foreigner as well as the recruit has to take the most unpleasant jobs. As the immigrant becomes a citizen and more and more Americanized, the antithesis "American"-"foreigner" is no longer tenable and is replaced by the terms "native" versus "immigrant."

The term old stock takes on a still different connotation: it means the totality of those who are so Americanized that they can no longer be linked with another culture and show no alien traces. This includes a variety of disparate factors such as absence of emotional ties to any other country, accent, use of idiomatic expressions, family names, and dietary customs. The implications of acceptance as old-stock American are greater prestige, greater self-assurance and emotional security but not, as some erroneously think, necessarily a better economic position. Many old Americans are in the lower economic brackets although more so in rural, homogeneous areas than in cities.

At any rate, the existence of an old stock and several new stocks created a gamut of ranks by which Americans are rated according to their origin. It also contributed to the split into "100 per cent" Americans and more or less vaguely defined "minorities." There are racial, national, and religious minorities; all have in common a lower social prestige, though in many varying degrees, than the majority.

Whether the term "majority" makes much sense is another question. Marden [11] ascribed a minority status to 16 per cent of the American population on the American mainland but he does not include Italians, Greeks, Syrians, or Roman Catholics. Rose and Rose [12] included Catholics; MacIver [13] included Catholics as well as Southern and Eastern Europeans, and thus these authors arrive at a ratio as high as 30 per cent or more. If we add the minorities in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, and the real "foreigners," namely, the immigrants before their naturalization, the minorities certainly comprise about one-third of the nation. Even this is not a maximum estimate because even second-generation Americans of "preferred stock" sometimes experience some loss of status, dependent on local conditions. An

[11] Charles F. Marden, *Minorities in American Society,* New York, 1952, p. 15.

[12] Arnold Rose and Caroline Rose, *America Divided,* New York, 1948, pp. 60–61.

[13] Robert MacIver, *The More Perfect Union,* New York, 1948, pp. 25–26.

American of Dutch descent reported to the present author that the reputation of the Dutch in his home town was so low that he never referred to himself as Dutch but told people that his parents came from Holland, which seemed to have helped. Another report (the accuracy of which could not be checked) told of a small community in which Norwegians, most of them lumbermen, were the least welcome group. Even the Englishman is not always accepted without reservation. Fairchild [14] remarked, though disapprovingly, that "it is sometimes asserted that the Englishman is one of the hardest of all foreigners to completely assimilate in the United States."

The phenomenon of minorities is too often viewed only with respect to discrimination. A discussion of population composition has to deal with all minorities, including those not subjected to discrimination. First of all, even the most welcome minorities are still considered minorities, that is, as different from the full-fledged American. Second, they are found to retain certain peculiarities as well as at least a modicum of separatism. Even a group as easily assimilated as the Scotch have their special national organizations such as the Order of the Scottish Clans. Third, all minorities bring to this country customs, habits, attitudes, and behavior patterns which differ from American standards and which have to be either eradicated or (through acculturation and diffusion) may become parts of the American way of life.

If we consider as old stock only those white Protestants whose grandparents were born in the United States, and if we further consider that a much greater than their proportional number are farmers or live in nonfarm rural areas, we can understand the paradoxical fact that the majority has become a minority in many of the larger cities. This is a phenomenon which is hardly duplicated in any other country and makes it so difficult to describe accurately the urban population composition in the United States. The situation differs from city to city and even a quantitative description lacks precision because of so many mixed marriages. Another reason for inaccuracy is the fact that foreign extraction alone is not sufficient in many cases to constitute minority qualities. The latter depend on three main factors: (1) the ability to conform, (2) the willingness to conform, and (3) acceptance by the majority.

These factors vary greatly with every individual, and correspondingly we find within a foreign group all gradations from an utter lack of Americanization and a marked minority status to complete assimilation and recognition. (The term "recognition" refers here only to acceptance as an American; a Russian prince often is accepted with deference by "high society" and upper-class parents feel flattered if he selects one of their daughters as his wife.) In other words, a person belongs to a minority if he is not fully accepted as a member of the "native" group and if he keeps emotional ties with groups abroad. Consequently, the Scotch, Scotch-Irish, Welsh, and French

[14] Fairchild, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

Huguenots are not minorities in this sense, particularly as emotional ties with their mother countries, if they exist at all, are mostly sentimental and have neither divisive effects nor political repercussions. To make minorities a relevant sociological phenomenon it is further necessary that their members maintain a "consciousness of kind," that their number is substantial, and that they are spatially concentrated if not actually segregated. From this point of view the group which at present suffers least from discrimination is the most significant urban minority group: the Irish Catholics. They live largely in cities and have become a majority in some cities. It is certain that they comprise many millions but their approximate number cannot be given. Many of them have been totally absorbed by the old stock; on the other hand, they have absorbed, and apparently are doing so now in increasing numbers, individuals of other stock but also of Catholic faith (Germans, Italians, and Poles). The existence of this type of minority, whose members show a marked "consciousness of kind," and a tendency to vote as a body on critical issues is very significant for American urban life.

Minorities also have to be observed from the viewpoint of persistence. Two facts must be sharply distinguished: the continued existence of a minority group and the continued existence of individual families as minorities. This may be illustrated in the case of the Germans. As a minority they are among the oldest, going back to the earliest colonial times. But the descendants of the colonial Germans have become full-fledged Americans,[15] and so did others who came afterward. The existence of a German minority depends exclusively on new infusions from recent immigrants who replace the older generations. This is possible because the process of Americanization is gradual, so new immigrants always find some predecessors. This is more or less true of all white minorities but the speed of assimilation varies greatly according to nationality. Some groups are slower in acculturating, some meet with greater resistance on the part of the majority. In both cases the amalgamation is retarded.

An exact evaluation is hampered by the fact that the nationalities which are culturally more removed from American standards arrived at so late a time that the process of Americanization is still not completed. The adult immigrant can never be fully assimilated. As we now know, the impact of early childhood experiences, even if repressed, is much too powerful. If immigration is an isolated event and the immigrant family is exposed only to the institutions of the new country, assimilation can be achieved in the second generation. In cases of mass immigration and in countries with a composite population, even the second generation will not be entirely removed

[15] The Pennsylvania Dutch are an exception to this rule. But this exception applies to a single rural area where they still live in comparative isolation. Moreover, they are no longer Dutch or German but Pennsylvania Dutch, a particular group with a language and customs of their own.

from the cultural institutions of the mother country. Where segregated areas exist and immigrants of the same nationality form larger units, even the third generation will not be wholly assimilated. In these cases it takes four or more generations. The mass immigration of assorted minorities from Eastern and Southern Europe did not start before 1880, hardly more than two generations ago. The impact of American civilization on these late immigrants is therefore not yet completely visible and statements concerning their ability to become assimilated are necessarily tentative and risky. However, certain observations are fairly well established. They may be summarized in the words of Harry A. Laughlin: [16] "The committee of the Eugenics Research Association . . . has failed to find a case in history in which two races have lived side by side for a number of generations and have maintained racial purity. Indeed, you can almost lay it down as an essential principle that race mixture takes place whenever there is racial contact." Hooton [17] expresses the same idea: "When Cro-Magnon met Neanderthal, one or the other may occasionally have bled, but I think that they surely bred (if the sexes were properly assorted). That is what happened everywhere in historical times when one type of man has encountered another." It certainly happened again and again between Americans and immigrants. Minorities can also retain their identity if they live in separate areas (not merely in segregated sections of the same area) and can continue their own cultural and economic activities. Such is the case with the Basques in Spain and France; this has been the case with the Volga Germans.

In America, however, two minorities—or more accurately large parts of them—have not become completely assimilated after four generations in cities: the Irish and the Jews. It should be quite obvious that in both instances religion is the key, or rather, disparity of religion in a given historical setting. When the Jews were dispersed over the Mediterranean world in antiquity, they found themselves confronted with two alternatives: they could become pagans like their neighbors or maintain their religious identity. Many, probably the majority, became pagan, for of the twelve tribes, ten, according to tradition, are "lost." In the case of conversion the Jews lost, along with their religion, their ethnic identity and became unidentifiable parts of the nation with which they lived. But if they remained faithful, they were socially isolated. Their strict food taboos excluded commensality with non-Jews. For this reason, as well as for many others, intermarriage was impossible unless the pagan partner became a convert to Judaism. This happened repeatedly since the Jews proselytized with great success through several centuries. This partially accounts for the racial diversity among Jews. After Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire the situation changed, since conversion to Judaism became an impossibility.

[16] Quoted by Fairchild, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[17] Hooton, *op. cit.*, pp. 338–339.

The number of Jews who became Christians is difficult to determine although the number was probably small except in Spain. Since Judaism is a religion with an elaborate ritual, the performance of which extends from morning to night, and which is both unintelligible and unacceptable to gentiles, a Jew could not marry a person of another faith without ceasing to be a Jew.[18]

Conversely, the Irish were not dispersed but became subject to British rule in their homeland. As a consequence, they lost their language like the Scotch and the Welsh, but unlike the latter, the majority remained Roman Catholics. Those who became Protestants in their homeland remained Irish because the country was nationally homogeneous. In Ulster, however, with its large-scale immigration of Scottish Protestants, the situation was different. There were many Irish converts to Protestantism who freely intermarried until the Scotch-Irish emerged. The name, however, has mostly a historical connotation, because the Scotch-Irish display no characteristics by which they can be recognized. Identification in countries outside Ulster depends on the memory of the immigrants, on certain family names, and on the adherence to a specific Protestant denomination, the Presbyterian. The Scotch-Irish who came to America in great numbers toward the end of the colonial period have become indistinguishable; they are neither Scotch nor Irish but simply a part of the old stock.

Recognition of the religious factor as a major reason for the existence of a perpetual minority has been obscured by the rise of minority group nationalism. Resistance against assimilation is now ascribed to, and justified by, nationalistic motives. These motives, however, are a social force common to all minorities, and cannot explain the differences in the speed of assimilation, particularly not in the absence of language barriers. What happened was a change in the type of rationalization. The imperative "Do not change your faith for you commit a sin" is simply replaced by "Do not change your faith for you lose your cultural identity." The result is incomplete and delayed assimilation. We then arrive at the following hypothesis: "If a dispersed group differs in religion from the majority, the former tends to retain specific cultural characteristics as long as it retains its religion."

The hypothesis is supported by many examples. The effect which religious differences have on the conservation of special minority groups can be observed in the cities of the Mohammedan world; in places like Constantinople, Smyrna, Beirut, Cairo, and Alexandria the groups keep their identity on the basis of their religion—Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. All the many converts to Mohammedanism sooner or later become assimilated. The Arme-

[18] Only during the last century, when civil marriages became possible, the situation changed legally. But the parents must decide in which religion to bring up the children, which determines whether or not the family will remain Jewish.

nians in Turkey kept their nationality through centuries because they remained Christians. The Armenians in America retain their nationality if they are Eastern Orthodox but lose it within two or three generations if they are Protestant. The study of "Yankee City" has shown that there is a sharp split along religious lines between Armenians even if they are immigrants; they are locally concentrated and economically specialized (shoe industry).[19] Several American case studies have shown that intermarriages in terms of nationality differences are quite frequent if the religion is identical. Although intermarriages between all three faiths occur, the incidence of mixed marriages is greater if both parties adhere to the same religion. A Connecticut study demonstrated that intermarriages between Irish, Polish, Italian, and German Catholics occur frequently although language and other cultural differences are a hindrance. In these cases the Irish are at an advantage. They are the leaders of Catholicism in America; they are not subject to discrimination, and they maintain strong, well-established communities. Consequently, the children of such mixed marriages tend to become Irish rather than Polish or Italian. In this way the Irish grow more numerous and have a much better chance of surviving as a special group than all other Catholic minorities. Conversely, it would be difficult to find examples of Irish Protestants who for three successive generations intermarried only with Irish and thereby maintained their identity. The situation is similar with respect to Jews. Wherever Jews attained equal legal status, some of them married gentiles. If the Jewish partner insisted on the conversion of the non-Jewish partner, the children were brought up as Jews and the family remained Jewish. On the other hand, if the Jewish partner became Christian, the final outcome is unpredictable. It is not always possible to bridge the social distance between the two groups; the children sometimes marry Jews and their families revert to Judaism. If the opposite occurs, the Jewish family finally disappears. However, there is no known case in which Jews became converts to Christianity and whose third generation remained Jewish in culture. When religion changes, the alternatives are between return to the old religion and complete assimilation. In other words, religious conversion has not only religious consequences but is also a preparatory step to complete assimilation and always has been conceived as such both by proponents and opponents of assimilation.

The "Nonwhite" Races

Although all races are found in the United States, some are represented in urban centers only in very small groups. Negroes represent the bulk of

[19] W. Lloyd Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community,* New Haven, Conn., 1941.

racial minorities on the American mainland. In 1950, according to the census, the total urban nonwhite population was 9,389,000 (this figure includes an unknown but certainly considerable number of persons of mixed white-nonwhite ancestry). Of these "nonwhites" only 269,000 are not classified as Negroes.

The American Indian. The oldest of all Americans came to this continent at least 15,000 years ago. They comprise only an infinitesimal fraction of the population, amounting to less than $\frac{3}{10}$ of 1 per cent. Their total number in 1950 was 399,969, but many of them are no longer "pure" Indians. In the absence of reliable measurements only vague estimates can be made, but all experts agree that the majority is mixed. According to some authorities, only 30 per cent are pure Indians. That the remainder is also classified in the same category corroborates the evidence gathered from many other instances that it is not the physical, "real" race which constitutes a social force but the "ascribed" race. Almost half of all Indians are concentrated in three states: Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. The majority of Indians do not live in cities and those who do are neither segregated nor concentrated. Since the time of Pocahontas intermarriages have been socially permissible and "whites" freely admit their Indian ancestry, sometimes with pride. Although Indians who still live on reservations pose grave and unsolved problems, the Indians are neither an urban phenomenon nor a social problem of the city. The same may be said of the other "native" branch of Mongoloids, the Eskimos in Alaska. No real attempt has been made to integrate them into American society and no conflicts have arisen from the lack of integration.

"Orientals." The situation with respect to groups which are racially akin to the Indians—Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos—is quite different. The last two nationalities are so sparsely represented in cities on the American mainland that they do not cause special problems, but they are treated as Orientals like the Chinese and Japanese. The Japanese and Chinese permit us to draw some pertinent sociological conclusions. Both groups are numerically insignificant and are among the smallest minorities: the Chinese number approximately 90,000; the Japanese approximately 130,000. While almost all Chinese live in cities, the Japanese, at least before the Second World War, largely engaged in farming. Both show a tendency toward regional concentration; more than half of each group lives in California. The Japanese, however, settle less in segregated areas. There are no "little Tokyos" except on the West Coast and in Chicago. Thus, although the Japanese are more numerous, they are less conspicuous to the superficial urban observer who—again with the exception of the West Coast—rarely notices the existence of a Japanese minority in his town although he may be well aware of the Chinese.

Partly for business reasons and partly forced by social conditions, the Chinese try to preserve their Chinatowns, of which there were still twenty-

eight in 1940.[20] They also show a marked occupational concentration. They hold a virtual monopoly in the hand laundry business. Almost all those not engaged in laundries either operate or are employed by Chinese restaurants. The number of those engaged in other trades or in the professions is very small. Japanese are much more diversified occupationally. The attitudes of the whites toward Orientals have been subject to sudden changes depending on the competition of the immigrants on the labor market and foreign relations with their mother countries. The opposition of white workers to cheaper Oriental labor manifested itself in many acts of violence and in the total exclusion of both groups from further immigration. The exclusion acts have been repealed by assigning token quotas of 105 Chinese and 100 Japanese per year. Both groups have been subjected to discriminatory laws, especially on the West Coast. Most of these laws have been declared unconstitutional, one of them as late as 1950.

Intermarriages between whites and Orientals have always been very rare in the United States and they are illegal in some states; in 1948 the Supreme Court of California invalidated a state law, prohibiting interracial marriages, on the grounds of unconstitutionality. Yet it is unlikely that the removal of the legal barrier will speed up the racial assimilation in the immediate future. It is more remarkable that Chinese and Japanese show little tendency to marry each other, at least as nearly as can be judged from available information. This reaffirms the theory that different cultures are the real impediment of intermarriage rather than racial distinctions.

Rejection of Orientals is less thorough and the attitudes of the whites more flexible toward them than in the case of the Negro. Segregation is less rigidly enforced; the few instances of intermarriages meet with disapproval but not with the horror which is the usual reaction to a white-Negro marriage. Individuals can achieve a respected status. The resistance against admission to colleges is mild; the "average" white will ordinarily accept treatment by a Japanese physician. Some have established an excellent reputation as scholars or artists. The immense popularity of the Charlie Chan and Mr. Moto stories proves that the whites accept Orientals, at least in fiction, in the role of leaders. Yet this is all of secondary importance. The decisive point for this discussion is not discrimination but exclusion. The Chinese and the Japanese are not accepted as Americans, even if their loyalty is unquestionable; they are excluded from community life. Regardless of their citizenship, they are treated as "foreigners," which is quite different from the case of the Negro who, however grudgingly, is accepted as an American.

A complex social system like American society can ill afford to isolate minorities. The prognosis, however, is not very promising. The Chinese accept their position with passive fatalism; the Japanese show more resent-

[20] Rose Hum Lee, "The Decline of Chinatowns in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1949.

ment but are unable to break through so firm a barrier. Both groups are unbalanced with respect to sex and age. The males outnumber the females in varying degrees but always more than 2 to 1, and those over forty years of age are overrepresented. It seems likely that full integration will never be achieved but that both groups might finally dwindle until their numbers become insignificant.

The behavior of the majority group members in the United States is in striking contrast to the situation in Hawaii. Although it is not true that there are no distinctions in Hawaii, although certain types of discrimination exist, and although the class structure has a haole (white American) elite, Hawaiian society, consisting of native Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Samoans, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Portuguese, Spanish, and white "native" Americans, is a well-integrated unit; all groups participate and cooperate in community affairs. Moreover, intermarriages are so frequent that the "pure" Hawaiians have almost disappeared; the 1940 census gave their number as 21,063 but the 1950 census does not list them. There are now only "Caucasian-Hawaiians" and "Asiatic-Hawaiians." Why, then, is the situation in Honolulu so different from that in San Francisco? The usual explanation offered is economic in nature. The Japanese and Chinese came to America mostly as manual workers. Accustomed to lower standards of living, they were willing to work for low wages, which displaced American workers and threatened to undermine labor conditions. This, indeed, explains the violent reactions of industrial workers. It does not explain why a manufacturer of cosmetics in San Francisco should object to having a Japanese chemist as a neighbor (although he might be willing to employ him at a high salary in his laboratory), while he would have no such objection if he moved to Honolulu. The explanation has to be sought partly in the different situation. The Japanese and Chinese came to this country very late. When their immigration began to take on sizable proportions, the Americans had already firmly established a social system with clearly defined values, attitudes, and behavior patterns. Among them was the idea that America, to use Fairchild's phrasing, is intended "to be a white man's country." (Thus we cannot be surprised that Fairchild, a scientist and neither a businessman nor a worker, supported for noneconomic reasons the Japanese exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924. More surprising is his statement, made as late as 1926, that "the cause of peace and international understanding was to be promoted" by this measure; [21] fifteen years after this prophecy Japan went to war against the United States.) Consequently, the Orientals came to this country as unwanted strangers of decidedly inferior status.

In Hawaii the Japanese and Chinese were no more alien than the white American. The country was neither conquered nor colonized the hard way,

[21] Fairchild, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

as was the mainland. Hawaii joined the United States on her own volition and came into the American orbit by peaceful and gradual means which favored the achievement of coordination with various groups of Oriental immigrants. In America they went into a white man's country (according to the white man); in Hawaii the situation was reversed. However, this is hardly a full explanation. The problem is in need of further exploration.

Mexicans. The group commonly called "Mexican" has caused much confusion, statistical and otherwise. The United States census has repeatedly changed its method of classification, which at different times has been based on country of origin, "race," or language. None of these methods is entirely satisfactory and we still do not know how many Mexicans are permanent residents. A recent estimate, by far exceeding all census figures, puts them between 3,000,000 and 3,500,000, of whom at least 1,100,000 are located in Texas.[22] Very little precise information about their racial antecedents is available. There is a large and gradual variation from "Hispanos," who are supposedly the descendants of the "undiluted" first Spanish settlers to equally "pure" Mexican Indians. It is, however, most likely that the large majority is, though in varying degrees, a blend of whites and *Indios*. Correspondingly, some of them are easily identifiable while others look like other Caucasians of the dark-skinned variety. They are mostly concentrated in the Southwest, particularly southern California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado. Recently large numbers have moved, especially to industrial cities of the Middle West. McWilliams states that 75,000 Mexicans are now living in Lorain, Ohio.[23] As census data are insufficient, no reliable figures can be given as to the urban concentration of Mexicans. A large percentage is undoubtedly rural. Some "Mexicans" come from families who have lived longer in the present territory of the United States than any other settlers; others are arriving almost daily. Some are citizens, some duly admitted immigrants, and some have come illegally. The latter probably comprise several hundred thousand. Still others are living here as what can be paradoxically termed "permanent transients." With a temporary work permit, they move in and out of the country according to the season. Most of them are Catholics, all of them speak Spanish.

Urban Mexicans have minority status. In the first place, they have a specific culture which is basically the folk culture of Mexico. This culture is older than American civilization in the Southwest and shows symptoms of great vitality, strengthened as it is by proximity to Mexico and the incessant stream of immigrants from there. Whatever the evaluation of this culture

[22] Lyle Saunders, "The Spanish-speaking Population of Texas," *Inter-American Education,* Occasional Papers V, Austin, 1949.

[23] Carey McWilliams, *North from Mexico,* Philadelphia, 1949. The figure is taken from Marden, *op. cit.,* p. 145. Since the 1950 census lists only 51,202 inhabitants in Lorain, something must be wrong.

may be—it figures favorably in certain fields such as irrigation methods, pottery, basketry, and architecture—it is alien to Americans, considered as inferior, and for both reasons rejected. The result is cultural and social separation, the existence of a compact group of hyphenated citizens with its inevitable corrolary, double loyalties.

In the economic field a vicious circle works against integration. Mexicans are largely unskilled in factory work, accustomed to low standards of living, poorly educated, hampered by insufficient command of English, and are forced to work for substandard wages. This makes it impossible for them to conform to more normal American ways of life and to move up the social ladder. This in turn promotes rejection and discrimination and prevents Mexicans from becoming integrated into American society. Since the majority is largely Protestant and Anglo-Saxon, the differences in religion and language decrease the probability of intermarriage. Moreover, Mexicans are the only sizable minority group which is increasing; the lower economic status and the less frequent practice of birth control account for a higher fertility rate (partly reduced by high mortality rates) and lawful as well as illegal immigrations bring further additions.

Community relations vary according to region. Outside the Southwest, Mexicans are usually treated like other "low-class" minorities. In the area of concentration, the Southwest, much depends on whether the Mexicans are locally in the majority. Wherever they are a minority, they are faced with social and sometimes even legal discrimination. Residential segregation, exclusion from hotels, restaurants, public facilities, clubs, and segregation in schools are familiar occurrences. Moreover, legal equality does not eradicate tension or even outbreaks of violence, as was demonstrated by the "zoot suit" riots in Los Angeles.

In some counties in New Mexico the Spanish-speaking population is in the majority and the situation is entirely different. There is complete legal equality; Spanish and English are both official languages. The Spanish population has its full share in public affairs and elects men of their own group to political offices. The old American stock, however, enjoys upper-class status, which is not surprising. Marden [24] believes the phenomenon is parallel to the situation in Hawaii. Anglo-Americans moved into New Mexico after the Spanish culture had been firmly established; the movement had the character of a gradual infiltration, the Spanish people were not admitted but admitting.

Negroes. Among all compact minorities the Negroes are by far the largest.[25] There is neither need nor place to discuss the Negro problem in its entirety. The following points are of importance for urban sociology:

[24] Marden, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[25] The Catholics are numerically stronger but they are not a compact minority; since some Negroes are Catholics, these groups overlap.

1. Negroes are the only group that did not come to the United States of their own volition.

2. Prejudice against the Negro is stronger than against any other minority. In many states they are subject to discriminating legislation. In some regions they are excluded from renting or buying homes in many districts, are not admitted to hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, and motion-picture houses. Tacit discrimination, even if formal restrictions do not exist, goes much farther.

3. Negroes are the most Americanized group of all minorities; in fact, they are nothing but Americans. They have no ties with a mother country; they do not even know from what part of Africa their ancestors came. Consequently, they have no friends or relatives abroad with whom they could retain emotional ties. They speak only English.[26] They have the same formal and informal institutions, the same political philosophy and set of values, the same eating and drinking habits, and the same recreational activities as the "native whites." They are mostly Protestant, as are the great majority of the whites. When they form their own associations, they are replicas of those from which they are excluded: churches, educational institutions, and fraternal orders. When they differ in details, there is hardly a significant deviation; the difference is due only to a specialization within the same culture and does not constitute a separate culture, still less a culture which can be found elsewhere. Moreover, Negroes have contributed substantially to the emergence of a specific American culture, which is not true of other minorities. Without the Negro there would have been no cotton economy; nor could the ante bellum plantation life style have existed. The Negroes are also the only minority group which would be content with mere equality; they do not seek special policies, be it in foreign affairs with respect to other countries or in domestic issues, as, for instance, public support for private minority schools.

4. Negroes were initially a rural group, located in the South. They have become largely urbanized, show an increasing mobility, and are now living almost everywhere in the United States. More than three-fifths of the Negro population live in cities, where they are housed in segregated sections and thus make the race problem spatially visible. The process of urbanization gained momentum during the war years; in 1940 only 48.6 per cent of the Negroes were urban; in 1950 the ratio had risen to 61.2 per cent. As the process of urbanization continues, the proportion of Negroes in cities is likely to increase.

5. Since there are no other essential distinctions, the "Negro problem" arises solely from the differences in their appearance from that of the majority group and institutionalized reactions to these easily identifiable racial

[26] Except for recent arrivals from Puerto Rico and the West Indies.

features. The problem appears to be insoluble unless institutionalized attitudes can be altered.

The movement of rural Negroes to the cities and of Southern Negroes to Northern urban places, a process most likely to continue, has considerable consequences. Because of the end of mass immigration, the segregated areas in the city are declining and are bound to disappear since the second-generation immigrants are moving out. The Negroes—at least their majority—cannot do so. The Harlems, which from the beginning have been too small to accommodate the large number of Negroes, become still more crowded as the population increases. Precisely for the same reasons slums will not only continue but inevitably additional areas will become blighted. Finally, it is no longer possible to house all Negroes in existing segregated sections; the fight for new housing places begins and the whole familiar process of infiltration, invasion, and succession is repeated again and again. There already have been some outbreaks of violence as, for instance, in places as far apart as Miami, Florida, and Cicero, Illinois.

The segregation of Negroes shows certain features which are not common to all segregated areas. Restrictive covenants, community pressures, and the like prevent members of other minorities from moving into certain areas. But they always have the opportunity to move to the remaining, invariably larger sections. The existence of natural areas is largely the outcome of self-segregation. There is no doubt that some Negroes would practice self-segregation under all circumstances. At present, however, segregation is imposed upon them.

Racial equality as a reality is frequently alleged to exist by whites but still being demanded by Negroes. The contrast between the fundamentals of the "American creed" and daily practice, between pretense and reality, makes the rebellion of the Negro an especially urban phenomenon since the urban Negro is more educated and thus more sensitive to cultural contradictions. The Negro claims equality in the name of American ideals and as an American. The Negro is, although on a basis of inequality, fully integrated into the American economic system, but satisfactory integration into the social system is denied him. The consequences are obvious. Unsound social conditions create unsound psychological conditions. We may expect a rising number of psychoneuroses, especially persecution mania and other forms of paranoia. The urban Negro, having learned that he gets more concessions if he fights, develops attitudes of hostility and aggressiveness. Walter White, himself a Negro, has pointed this out. Understandable as this is, the results are unfortunate, for the animosity of the whites increases with unfriendly encounters.

Politically, some intellectual Negroes show a tendency toward radicalism; there are also vague racial-nationalistic trends toward a nebulous "Africanism." There exists an element of disruption which splits the urban community

into two camps which are economically integrated but otherwise separated. Much has already been done to improve the situation. The urbanization of the Negro has created in many cities—most of them in pivotal states—solid substantial voting blocs which neither political party can afford to disregard or to antagonize. The Negroes, led by intelligent, well-informed leaders, exert considerable pressure which will succeed as far as success by means of laws or political patronage is possible. The removal of all legal inequalities appears to be a question of time. Political pressure and patronage will achieve a greater number of jobs for Negroes in Federal, state, and municipal offices.

It is more than likely that the rigid spatial segregation will be ended and more and more Negroes can live outside the pale of the Harlems. However, that only means that Negro segregation will become more similar to the existing natural areas of white minorities; it does not indicate the total disappearance of segregated areas; an equal dispersal of an easily identifiable urban minority of 10 million people is highly improbable. Prejudices can be undermined until they cease to be dangerous and acts of violence may no longer occur. But the social cleft will remain much longer; even if relationships become most amicable, they will still be relationships between two different groups which signifies incomplete integration. Even among the most enlightened people, intimate friendships between white and Negro families are rare; there are no indications of a considerable change in the foreseeable future. We have to face the fact that our civilization is "white" in so far as the white skin of its members is a tacit assumption. There are many outstanding Negro actors and singers, but none of them may perform in a Shakespearean play, save, of course, as Othello. If a painter portrays human beings per se, he must paint them as whites; if he paints Negroes, he presents them by necessity as types, as members of another race, although his intentions may be completely friendly and unprejudiced. War monuments present soldiers as white or Negro; if both are presented, the existence of two groups instead of one is indicated. Similarly, advertisements for tooth pastes, apparel, and the like must show a figure of a white or a Negro (the latter is now done in Negro magazines). In brief, his appearance does not exclude the Negro from *equal* participation but from participation *without distinction*. As soon as a distinction is made, the cohesion of the group is threatened. This has nothing to do with the morality, intelligence, or ability of a group; it is a phenomenon of social perception and is very powerful since it is visible and we are therefore conscious of it. One does not see that a man is a criminal; we are aware of his immorality only if he commits an unethical act in our presence or if we are informed of it. The criminal, unfortunately, is not conspicuous; the person of another race, equally unfortunately, is very conspicuous. Marked differences in appearance tend to establish separate groups, thus preventing a unified community. The only permanent solution to the problem lies in the absorption of the minority through complete assimilation. As far as can be

judged from similar conditions at other times and places, this probably will be the final outcome. At present, however, the indications are that this solution is remote. The difficulties in absorbing so large a minority are enormous, but the social forces in a system where the mere suggestion of assimilation causes horror are an even more serious obstacle. There can be no doubt that under present conditions the color question poses the gravest of all the problems arising from the complexity of American urban society.

TABLE 13. NEGRO POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Total	14,894,000
Urban	9,120,000
Rural nonfarm	2,577,000
Rural farm	3,197,000

SOURCE: United States Census, 1950 (preliminary estimate).

B. DYNAMICS

Chapter 11

POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC MIGRATION

Population Growth and Decline

Some Generalizations. Mankind has grown from a few specimens to nearly two and a half billion people. Cities have grown from tiny settlements to giant agglomerations. The growth of the world and its cities has been neither regular nor gradual. There have been declines; cities have shrunk from splendor into insignificance. Some have disappeared forever, although it is safe to say that no large town has ever vanished unless it was destroyed by enemies. Population changes have been thoroughly investigated. Some time ago scholars believed they had found "laws" governing these changes; now we are more modest and speak of tendencies or trends. Various generalizations have been offered. These are usually concentrated on the process of growth rather than on the decline. The latter seems to depend mostly on extraneous factors such as wars, deportations or enforced migrations, mass killings, starvation, epidemics, and other catastrophes which cannot be predicted far in advance.

On a highly generalized level the following statements can be made:

1. Population change depends on the surplus of births over deaths (or vice versa) plus the balance of immigration and out-migration.
2. A higher birth rate is accompanied by a higher death rate.
3. The death rate varies with nutritional standards, sanitary conditions, state of medical knowledge, availability of doctors, hospitals, and drugs; consequently, it even varies within a region. In the Western world and some other areas death rates have been on the decline for at least a century.
4. Birth rates have shown a similar decline and show great variations within the same country.
5. Farmers have a higher birth rate than nonfarmers.
6. Some urban groups have higher birth rates than others; nonwhites in particular, and the lower classes have more children than whites and upper classes.

Closer examination, however, reveals that all these statements are either truisms or are valid only under certain conditions. For instance, it is rather

doubtful that class status, however defined, is actually influencing fertility; more recent studies seem to indicate that education rather than status is more highly correlated with fertility; with increasing education of lower-status groups the birth-rate differences diminish. Similarly, the birth rate of urban Northern Negroes hardly differs from that of urban Northern whites. This is not surprising since Negro people receive a better education in unsegregated schools.

The Growth of Large Cities. It is also difficult to find regularities in the growth of cities. In ancient times there were only four large cities: Rome, Carthage, Constantinople, and Alexandria, and the last two were founded by an emperor's whim at a comparatively late time. During the early Middle Ages Western Europe had no city save Paris whose population exceeded 100,000; the largest cities were to be found in the Mohammedan world: Constantinople, Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus. Europe had six or seven cities exceeding 100,000 at the time Columbus discovered America; a hundred years later the number having this large a population had doubled. During the seventeenth century the number of larger cities remained unchanged; although Vienna and Madrid passed the 100,000 mark, Antwerp, and Messina fell below that figure. But the interesting fact is that the population of the fourteen leading European cities increased about 40 per cent during the seventeenth century while the population of Europe as a whole remained almost stationary. In the following century the population of both Europe as a whole and its great cities increased about 50 per cent, and the number of large cities rose to twenty-two.[1]

While the trend in the seventeenth century showed no correlation whatsoever between the growth of a region and the growth of its cities, the development in the eighteenth century shows a proportional growth of city and country. The spectacular rise of cities in size and number during the nineteenth century is generally ascribed to the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization certainly played a major role, but it is doubtful that one factor alone is a sufficient explanation. Belgium, perhaps the most industrialized country in the world, still had no city as late as 1940 with a million people, but St. Petersburg, a city with very little industry, reached the million mark about 1880.

During the twentieth century the industrial areas in Europe—especially in smaller countries such as Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland—showed a slow but steady growth; some of the least industrialized countries experienced rapid expansion of large cities. Australia, for instance, with a population slightly less than that of Belgium, has two cities in the million class. In fact, the twentieth century saw the rise of large cities in countries with incipient industry at a rate and a speed never observed before, particularly so in

[1] A. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the 19th Century*, p. 447.

Asia and South America. Exactly half of the twenty largest cities of the world are now situated outside of the United States and Europe. In the next class—all cities over 500,000, of which there are now approximately 100—the ratio is the same. It seems that during the twentieth century the giant cities in fully industrialized areas came near to their saturation points, while in countries with incipient industrialization the large cities have grown much faster. Large cities, although few in number, flourished before the Industrial Revolution, indicating that international trade is perhaps more instrumental in creating individual large cities than industry. The trade city seems to grow at the expense of other urban places, while industrial cities add new centers to already existing urban settlements. It is also evident that the political role of a country is in some way linked to the growth of its cities, although no statistical correlation can be found.[2] Yet in the twentieth century large cities have arisen in countries with little political power, for instance, in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Indonesia, Siam, and Egypt. More obvious is the role which the loss of political power plays in the decline of cities, particularly if political defeat is coupled with economic destruction and loss of domestic markets. For that reason Vienna has steadily declined since 1918, while Berlin grew until the end of the Second World War but lost population afterward. Table 14 shows the changing rank of the world's largest cities since 1500; a loss of rank, to be sure, does not necessarily imply a population loss; it only indicates a faster growth of other cities. But it certainly reflects changes in the world situation. In 1900 twelve of the twenty largest cities were in Europe and all twenty were in the sphere of Western civilization (Constantinople may pass as a borderline case). In 1950 only five of the largest cities were European (of which two were in Soviet Russia) and seven are in the Far or Near East. Much of the change is not due to economic expansion and planned urbanization but to the unprecedented population increase in India, Indonesia, Japan, and China, while Soviet Russia apparently attempts to stem urban concentration by decentralizing new industrial developments. It ought to be clear that urban population growth and decline rests on many independent variables: natural increase, economic expansion, political dominance, and control of international trade. Some of

[2] Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities,* pp. 27–28, attributes the most rapid growth of cities after the sixteenth century to the fact that these places had a royal court. That may be correct in the cases of Vienna, Madrid, and St. Petersburg; in all other cases the assumption raises grave doubts. The French kings lived out of Paris whenever they could and finally settled in Versailles, which remained a provincial town while Paris grew. The kings of England, strictly speaking, never lived in London and always preferred Windsor to Westminster. Berlin began to grow long after the Prussian kings had moved in, and Moscow increased after the czars had moved out. Milan, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Dublin were never royal residences, and of course American cities never had a royal court.

Table 14. Changing Rank of Largest Cities for Selected Years

1500

1. Constantinople
2. Paris
3. Naples
4. Venice
5. Milan
6. Lisbon

1600

1. Paris
2. Constantinople
3. Naples
4. Venice
5. Milan
6. Palermo
7. Messina
8. Rome
9. London
10. Lisbon
11. Antwerp
12. Amsterdam
13. Seville
14. Moscow

1800

1. London
2. Paris
3. Naples
4. Lisbon
5. Constantinople
6. Moscow
7. St. Petersburg
8. Vienna
9. Amsterdam
10. Berlin
11. Dublin
12. Madrid
13. Rome
14. Venice
15. Milan

1900

1. London
2. New York
3. Paris
4. Berlin
5. Vienna
6. Chicago
7. Philadelphia
8. St. Petersburg
9. Constantinople
10. Moscow
11. Bombay
12. Rio de Janeiro
13. Calcutta
14. Hamburg
15. Manchester
16. Buenos Aires
17. Glasgow
18. Liverpool
19. Budapest
20. Melbourne

1950

1. London
2. New York
3. Shanghai
4. Tokyo
5. Moscow
6. Berlin
7. Chicago
8. Leningrad
9. Buenos Aires
10. Bombay
11. Paris
12. Djakarta (Batavia)
13. Calcutta
14. Mexico City
15. Rio de Janeiro
16. São Paulo
17. Cairo
18. Philadelphia
19. Los Angeles
20. Osaka

Source: A. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the 19th Century,* and other sources.

these factors are entirely unpredictable and science has the humiliating task of explaining the events after they have happened.[3]

Impact of Urbanization. While attempts to discover "laws" which are valid under all conditions are futile, we are on safer ground if we concentrate on the period of urbanization in the Western world, or roughly the period from 1750 to 1950. During this time the urban population increased more rapidly than the population as a whole. In the first stages of urbanization the cities did not proportionately gain at the expense of the rural population for the latter grew at an equal rate. As mentioned, the first stages of urbanization occurred before the advent of the Industrial Revolution; the tempo of urbanization was much faster in England, Belgium, and Germany than in France and, for a long time, in the United States. To explain this phenomenon only by the urban opportunities added through new commercial and industrial enterprises seems insufficient. Much early industry—especially in textiles—was home industry and the textile manufacturers sent the raw material to the peasants who spun and wove it in their homes with their own spinning wheels and hand looms.[4] It is true that the rural population started to stream to the cities long before there were any opportunities in industry. Governments, afraid of hungry unemployed masses in the towns, tried repeatedly to send them back to the country but to no avail. These uneducated, unskilled masses later formed the huge "industrial reserve army" which plays so important a part in the theories of Karl Marx. Clearly these masses could not have come, as the popularized versions of Marxism maintained, from the relatively few artisans who had been ruined by industrialization. These masses filled the slums of the British cities as long ago as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, nearly 200 years before the first industrial machine was invented.

Rural Surplus. It was not the cities which attracted workers but the rural areas which ejected the surplus farm population. In Great Britain the rural exodus was precipitated because the landed aristocracy, turning to the more profitable wool production, converted agricultural land into sheep pastures. The peasant had no choice but to leave. In Eastern Europe the growth of the cities was delayed because the Russian and Polish peasants were not free to leave; they were serfs and their masters had to take care of them. For similar reasons the slave economy delayed urbanization in the American South. The French Revolution deferred the urbanization of France for exactly the opposite reason: the peasants were freed from servitude but they also divided the large estates among themselves; with more land available, they

[3] This trend, or rather lack of trend, is mirrored in the significant title of a book on city problems: *Cities Are Abnormal* [Elmer Peterson (ed.), Norman, Okla., 1946].

[4] What is called transfer "from fireside to factory" (Broadus Mitchell and Louise Pearson Mitchell, *American Economic History,* Boston, 1947, p. 428) began to develop slowly at the end of the eighteenth century.

were not forced to go to the cities. Here again the situation resembled conditions in the United States prior to the disappearance of the frontier. As long as farm land was available, the rural population did not flock to the cities; they pushed on westward until the entire country was settled; consequently, the urbanization of America lagged behind that of Europe.[5] It seems, therefore, that the initial reason for the growth of cities was the inability to provide the surplus rural population with farm land. We have encountered a problem much older than urbanization; at different times the problem was solved in different ways. When free land was available, the surplus rural population moved into it; the result was spatial expansion of rural areas while the existing population in a given region remained comparatively stable. This occurred in prehistoric Europe when the neolithic peasants, known as Danubians, pushed westward from the Black Sea until they reached the Rhine. Similarly, the colonists of the New World—in the Americas and in Australia—migrated from the shores to points farther away and the few existing cities increased little.

The situation becomes critical when all accessible land is legally taken. The peasants can divide their land as long as the smaller shares can support a family, but the limit is soon reached. In some instances the way out is war. The Great Migrations which caused the downfall of the Roman Empire were largely the movements of peasants who had been deprived of their farms and had turned warriors in search of new land. They neither increased the then existing cities nor founded new urban settlements; they only sacked, decimated, or destroyed them. The result was the decline of a city civilization and its replacement by a basically rural system of feudalism. After several centuries had gone by, the pressure of the agrarian surplus population made itself felt again. The problem was solved in several ways: the mortality rate was tremendous; the growing cities could absorb some of the surplus; monasteries and mercenary armies offered opportunities for other landless peasants. However, some could not be accommodated and had to take to the woods where they lived a much romanticized, precarious life as robbers. The existence of these "outlaws"—similar instances occurred in India and China—proves the inability of both cities and country to take care of the population surplus under primitive economic conditions. The discovery of the New World provided a new outlet until the countries accepting immigrants began to stem the tide of newcomers. The migration of farmers has always created financial problems. The most frugal farmer cannot start without some funds to tide him over until the first harvest is reaped. However, if neither emigration nor land partition is feasible and the birth rate continues to rise, then cities tend to be swamped with the surplus population of the country. This

[5] The comparisons must not go too far; in South America and in the central provinces of Canada farm land is still available (although no longer cheap) but the trend toward the cities is unmistakable.

happened in imperial Rome, in Elizabethan England and, shortly afterward, on the European continent; it happened after the closing of the frontier in the United States, in twentieth-century Latin America, and in the cities of the Far, Middle, and Near East.

Thus the cities grew without being able to support the untrained, uneducated masses who came to them. At the end of the eighteenth century the situation had become dangerous. It was this which led first Malthus and, in reply to him, Marx, to develop their population theories. However, the Industrial Revolution (which had hardly begun when Malthus published his essay *Principle of Population*) solved, for the industrial world at least, one part of the problem by providing employment for the landless masses. The other part was solved by the ensuing Agrarian Revolution, which increased the productivity of farm land to such an extent that a minority of farmers could now support a majority of urban people. The hypothesis that the scarcity of land rather than the opportunities of the cities constituted the primary reason for the sudden urban growth is confirmed by the almost incredible rise of large cities in Japan, India, Indonesia, and China during the last thirty years. While scarcity of land is the prime reason for the growth of cities, it is by no means the only reason. Sometimes people leave the farm because they have no place to stay; sometimes they are enticed by "the lure of the city." Cities are not always flooded with migrants for whom they have no use; they also draw from rural areas because they need workers, at least temporarily.

Industrialization and Creation of New Occupations. The Industrial Revolution started by creating unemployment because machines at first replaced men. But progressively laborsaving devices have displaced fewer workers than have found employment in the new branches of industries and services. Telephone and telegraph, power plants, photography, motion pictures, radio, television, railroads, automobiles, buses, airplanes, and the many chemical industries have provided gainful employment for more people than the cities could furnish in times of prosperity. The same is true of the many services which either were unknown even a short time ago or have grown rapidly, particularly in the fields of commercialized recreation, or establishments such as garages, repair shops, laundries, and beauty parlors.

New professional services have arisen: certified accountants, consulting engineers, psychological therapists, vocational counselors, publicity managers, and public-opinion experts. In brief, city opportunities are still expanding in volume and variety. A number of illegitimate opportunities attract people and add to the influx. The city is the only place for prostitution and other forms of vice. Fugitives from justice frequently find cover in cities and can continue their criminal activities. Cities are also big marriage markets and many country girls leave the farm hoping to find a suitable partner in town. More recently, retired farmers have come to cities in increasing numbers.

Decline of Cities. No large city has ever disappeared except through destruction by an enemy. However, history abounds with examples of cities which have lost their importance and have shrunk in population. Some recovered; the most notable example is Rome, which in early medieval times had become a small town of probably not more than 20,000 to 30,000 people. Peiping has had its ups and downs. Cordova, once the splendid seat of the Moslems in Spain, is now a modest provincial town. Vienna has lost a fifth of its population since 1918. Warsaw has lost an even greater proportion but may regain its former strength. In all these cases the decline has been due to political events. Smaller towns, however, sometimes decline for economic reasons, particularly if they draw their support from one single activity. Small mining towns may entirely disappear when the mines become exhausted; fishing places decline if they cannot withstand the competition of large-scale fishing enterprises from other centers. In the United States, as in other New World countries where urban places were founded by venturesome but not always well-managed groups, we find some instances of towns which failed after a promising start; they either disappeared or are decaying.

All these instances, however, are atypical. During the last three hundred years at least, the world population has increased continually, and during the last two centuries the urban population has grown faster than the rural population. Consequently, the decline of some cities is due neither to a back-to-the-country movement nor to the competition of other cities. Such declines are exceptions which hardly permit generalizations.

Growth and Urban Birth Rate. There is one major aspect which still needs discussion. Apart from the few exceptions just mentioned, cities continue to grow. Yet it is safe to say that in modern times no large city reproduces itself, at least not in the Western world. The birth rate decreases with the size of the city, but even in smaller places it is hardly high enough to account for an increase in population. As in other instances, statistical figures cannot be taken at their face value; cities grow not because of high fertility rates but because medical progress has cut mortality. In earlier times the mortality in large cities exceeded the then much higher birth rates. Miss Buer, who studied the vital statistics of London between 1700 and 1850, shows that during that period about 10,000 more persons died annually than were born.[6] In the long run the death rate of a population with an increasingly large number of older people must rise again and the present excess of births over deaths will dwindle. Statistics do not show how many urban children were born of parents who had migrated to the city from rural areas. Many of these migrants are very young, which explains why cities have a higher proportion of the age group between twenty and thirty-five years than the country as a whole. It also explains the difficulty in getting a realistic view of the real

[6] From Warren S. Thompson, "It Was Not Always So," in Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

reproductive power of urban places.[7] Larger cities fail to reproduce themselves, and the smaller towns are barely holding their own. Since both the number of urban places and their populations are steadily increasing, the growth is due to external causes: migration from the farms and immigration from abroad. Both phenomena will be analyzed in following sections.

Domestic Migration

Migration as a Common Phenomenon. In his earliest stage man must have lived in what may be called comparative stability. When the first human beings left the forests and took to the plains, they did not become, it is safe to assume, aimless wanderers; although they had no homes in the modern sense of the word, they stayed within a limited area from which they drew their subsistence just as animals do.

Two of the most momentous revolutions occurred in neolithic times: the domestication of animals and plants. The first created real nomadism, for it forced the owners of animal herds to move incessantly from one pasture to another. The domestication of plants, on the other hand, literally domesticated man because he had to stay put on his farm. Wherever man turned to agriculture, migrations came to an end but only for those who owned farm land. When land became scarce, the population surplus had to migrate in search of new farms. Although in due time more than nine-tenths of the world population were engaged in farming, stability was never complete. The most varied motives—overpopulation, lack of land, famine, fear of enemies, expulsion, greed, and lust for adventure—repeatedly made people move in search of new homes. From the earliest periods of agriculture until the present time, we can observe irregular cycles of mass migrations and of relative stability. But even in the most tranquil periods a sizable number of people shifted their habitat. In modern times only the most primitive groups, particularly in "areas of retreat" (e.g., the Onas in the Tierra del Fuego or the Eskimos), or on remote islands, show no inclination to move.

Typology. We can distinguish several types of domestic migration. T. Lynn Smith [8] uses the following classification.

1. Colonization and settlement
2. Farm-to-farm migration
3. Rural-urban exchange
   a. Migration from country to city
   b. Movement from urban to rural districts
4. Intercity migration
5. Intracity changes in residence

[7] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 68, who points out this paradoxical fallacy, calls it a "joker."

[8] T. Lynn Smith and C. A. McMahan, *The Sociology of Urban Life,* New York, 1951, p. 293.

The discussion in the present chapter will be limited to rural-urban migration (or vice versa) and migration from city to city.

Migration attracted the attention of students long before the science of sociology evolved. Governments became aware fairly early of the importance which population movements had on the policies they wanted to pursue. Sometimes interest centered on the problem of damming the influx of landless peasants into cities which could offer no support, particularly so in England under Elizabeth I and James I. The mercantilists, on the other hand, later promoted migration to the cities in order to provide trade and manufacturing with ample and cheap labor. Conversely, the physiocrats, notably Quesnay,[9] were alarmed by the depopulation of rural areas and sponsored the first "back-to-the-land movement." The statesmen obtained their information from a science, called political arithmetic, which evolved into modern statistics. Students of economics, human geography, and demography also became interested in the problem. Special studies were made, among others in England by Ravenstein, Longstaff, and Ogle; in Germany by von Mayr, Buecher, Wolff, Hansen, and Ballod; in imperial Austria by Rauchberg; in France by Levasseur, Meuriot, Turquan, Meline, and Usquin; and in the United States by A. Weber.

Ravenstein's "Laws"; Hypotheses of A. Weber, H. B. Woolston, and T. L. Smith. Ravenstein was the first to evolve an elaborate theory of what he called "the laws of migration." [10] He was far less concerned with principles of selection than with trends of direction. The mainstays of his theories are the concepts of "current" and "countercurrent" and the hypothesis of gradual migration. Briefly, Ravenstein believed in a constant population shift in installments. The migrants move, as a rule, only a short distance from rural areas to urban villages, from smaller towns to larger ones. Consequently, the urban population is continually displaced and replaced. However, Ravenstein also admitted the existence of long-distance migration, in which case the migrant proceeds directly to the great industrial and trade centers. He also believed that rural people have a greater tendency to migrate than town people, which could be interpreted as a kind of ecological selectivity. Furthermore, he stated that each main current "produces" a migratory countercurrent which has a compensating effect. Finally, he made at least one real attempt to find a selective principle by stating that females have more migratory tendencies than males. In justice to Ravenstein it has to be mentioned that he concentrated his studies preponderantly on England. Under the conditions which he observed his theory was correct. But these conditions were exceptional rather than typical. At the time of his study the

[9] Quesnay was conscious of the selective character of migration. He stated that the most intelligent and energetic farmers migrated to the cities (in his article "Fermiers" in the famous *Encyclopédie*).

[10] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* London, 1885 and 1889.

full impact of the anticorn laws made itself felt, the country became rapidly urbanized, and industrial centers sprang up everywhere, attracting nearby farmers who were suffering from low agricultural prices and competition by foreign imports. Since neither industry nor trade was monopolized by London, and even better opportunities existed in the textile, steel, and shipping centers, rural migration, indeed, was a cautious step-by-step movement rather than a venture into more distant cities. Under these conditions the prospering large cities attracted not only rural migrants but also the inhabitants of smaller towns, which in turn replaced part of their losses from the surrounding farm areas. This accounts for Ravenstein's emphasis on gradual migration and on a steady shift of migrant groups from smaller to larger places, as well as for his distinction of "areas of dispersion" and "areas of absorption." Similar conditions to those on which Ravenstein based his theories prevail whenever a country experiences an accelerated industrialization and urbanization. This was the case in many of the leading countries of the world until the end of the nineteenth century and, for this reason, Ravenstein's theory was more or less generally accepted. In the United States A. Weber [11] supported Ravenstein with some modification. His own views are condensed in three "laws": [12]

1. The current migration is toward the cities and yet the bulk of migration is for short distances only.
2. The distance travelled by migrants varies in the same ratio as the magnitude of the city which is their destination.
3. The percentage of immigrants increases in the same ratio as the magnitude of the cities, but in inverse ratio with the magnitude of rural communities.[13]

Although the American scene changed considerably during the following decades, Weber's laws were upheld by Woolston [14] as late as 1938. Still more recently (1947) an outstanding expert, T. Lynn Smith,[15] again upheld Ravenstein "with some slight changes in the phrasing." Instead of "laws," he spoke of "principles," restating them as follows:

1. Most migrants move only a short distance;
2. The process of absorption is like this: inhabitants of the immediately surrounding area flock to the city, creating gaps in the rural population which are filled by persons from more remote districts; . . .

[11] *The Growth of Cities in the 19th Century,* chap. 4, especially pp. 255–260. Weber recognized that "with the development of railway communication the volume of direct and long-distance migration to the city has increased."

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 259.

[13] This third "law," as Weber himself points out, was stated by Georg von Mayr, "Die bayrische Bevoelkerung nach der Gebuertigkeit," *Beitraege zur Statistik des Koenigreichs Bayern,* Munich, 1876. Mayr thus takes precedence over Ravenstein.

[14] H. B. Woolston, *Metropolis: A Study of Urban Communities,* New York, 1938, p. 51.

[15] T. Lynn Smith, *The Sociology of Rural Life,* New York, 1947, p. 182.

3. Each main current of migration sets up a compensating counter current, and the process of dispersion is the reverse of the process of absorption; and

4. Long-distance migrants go immediately to the great centers of trade and industry.

It has to be added that Smith concentrated on migration from rural areas to cities and vice versa and that he called these principles "generalizations" which apply to "normal times." "In times of distress all is changed," the cities are no longer "on the receiving end" of migration but send their "backwash" back to the country. Thus Smith avoided a pitfall which trapped his predecessors, at least by implication; they had proposed inflexible laws. Closer examination shows that most of these "laws" are overstatements and some are of debatable validity. Although the writers have done their best to bolster their theories with statistical data, the applicability of the figures can be successfully challenged. Hansen,[16] for instance, presented a theory of "three population stages" based on copious statistical material. According to this theory, there is a steady stream originating in the rural areas flowing through the urban middle classes and ending in the urban proletariat. One of his critics remarks sarcastically: "In part it is quite possible to deduce from the same figures the opposite of Hansen's theories which demonstrates that figures prove nothing." [17] Our statistical data on migrations, although sometimes scanty and inaccurate, cover a period of about three centuries. During this time nearly all conditions for migrations have changed and they are still changing. In 1942 the present author met a woman, then well in her eighties, who as a young girl had migrated from Ohio to rural Kansas. The trek in a covered wagon took three weeks. Today an enterprising migrant can hitchhike any distance in the United States in less than a week or, if he can afford to pay for air transportation, in one day. Clearly, large-scale population movements depend on conditions of roads, availability and costs of transportation; the time element also plays an important role. Distance of migration is less a matter of number of miles than of social accessibility.

In former times migrations were subject to legal restrictions; especially the rural-urban movement was impeded wherever some form of bondage existed. This applied also to the United States with respect to Negroes until their emancipation. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at general rules for domestic migrations which are equally applicable for Negroes and whites. Institutional differences also have a bearing on migratory movements, which may be illustrated by the situation in Bavaria.[18] This German state of 29,336 square miles is only slightly larger than West Virginia and is divided into a northern

[16] Hansen, *Die drei Bevoelkerungsstufen,* 1889.

[17] A. Hesse, "Innerstaatliche Wanderungen," *Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft,* 3d ed., Jena, 1911.

[18] Based on Georg von Mayr, *Die Gesetzmaessigkeit im Gesellschaftsleben,* Munich, 1877, p. 196.

half comprising the Bavarian Palatinate plus a part called Franconia, and a southern half which is Bavaria proper. The people in the north speak a dialect distinctly different from Bavarian. Rural conditions also differ. In the south, notably in the mountainous areas, the peasants live on their farms which are mostly small and are passed on undivided from father to eldest son. In the north the peasants live in villages which provide some opportunities (local trade and services) for the landless children of the peasants and the farms are large enough to permit partition among several children. Consequently, the southern Bavarians show a much greater mobility because the younger children are forced to move on. So far economic conditions provide a satisfactory explanation. But surprisingly, the southern Bavarians display little inclination to emigrate, although they leave the homestead of their parents. But the northern Bavarians tend to go to foreign countries. We thus find a sharp contrast between the north, where emigration is frequent and internal migration rare, and the south, where the opposite conditions prevail. The explanation cannot be found solely in economic factors since they should force southern Bavarians to emigrate in larger numbers. Von Mayr, who pointed out the difference, offered no explanation. We may tentatively suggest that the difference is based on institutionalized patterns of behavior. The southern population, like most people living in mountainous regions, is traditionally conservative and averse to ventures; if they are forced to leave, they migrate only as far as is absolutely necessary. The population of the Palatinate, geographically and historically less isolated, has always been more mobile. Be this as it may, if attitudinal variations and differences in migratory habits exist even within a small area and a comparatively homogeneous population, it ought to be clear that simple generalizations are of only limited validity.

Migrations of Landless Peasants. Lack of land seems to have been the primary reason for migrations in earlier times as is particularly apparent in the population increase in ancient Rome, which finally reached a peak population of possibly 1 million. In ancient Rome, with nothing approximating mass employment in modern industry, with very limited opportunities for artisans, and with a small garrison, these masses could not hope to make a living in the city. Indeed, they had no occupations but lived on doles handed out by the government (and by some ambitious politicians), a situation which was not much different from that in England between 1600 and 1750. The landless peasants had no choice but to drift to the cities where they could at least beg if they found no work.

We may then derive one general rule of rural-urban migration which, it seems, is not sufficiently emphasized by all students of population movements: the availability of farm land determines the minimum migration to cities; not the opportunity of the city but the lack of opportunity in the country is the prime mover, if the peasants are free. The acceptance of this hypothesis helps to explain two phenomena. The first is the relative stability

in the size of cities during feudal times when peasants were not free to move, whereas the cities grew rapidly after the feudal restrictions had been removed. The second is characteristic of American conditions. Ravenstein [19] remarked that "the migratory current from the country to the city is scarcely perceptible in the United States and other newly settled countries." A. Weber [20] insists that this "is not true." His own arguments, for once, are not very cogent but it can be admitted that it was no longer true in 1899. But it had been true as long as accessible farm land could be easily obtained by the rural surplus population. Thus the early growth of the American cities was due mainly to immigration from abroad. Weber's own figures show that as late as 1885 more than one-third of Boston's population (34.44 per cent) were foreign-born, 38.47 per cent were born in Boston (many of them undoubtedly children of immigrants), 11 per cent in other Massachusetts towns, and 16.39 per cent elsewhere in the United States.[21] The urban preponderance of immigrants was in part the result of the unwillingness of farmers to migrate to the cities.

Recent Tests of Ravenstein's Hypothesis. During the last thirty or forty years extensive empirical research in many countries has tested the validity of Ravenstein's and Weber's propositions with conflicting results. There is supporting as well as contradictory evidence. Jane Moore,[22] for instance, investigating Swedish conditions, has shown that the smaller towns serve as transit centers for bigger cities and that the existence of gradual shifts cannot be denied. But there is nothing to indicate that the urbanization of the Pacific Coast followed similar patterns. The masses of migrants who streamed into Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles neither came from surrounding areas nor did they stop on their way from their Eastern starting points to settle temporarily in smaller towns before they went to the big cities. This seems to support Weber's contention that the immigrants increase in proportion to the magnitude of the city but this "law" also does not always apply. Edgar Kant,[23] of the University of Lund, who carefully investigated the migratory movements in Estonia, has demonstrated that "rather the reverse" is true, and that smaller Estonian towns attract proportionally more immigrants than the larger cities. The same can be proved for recent migration trends in the United States. Table 15 shows that for selected California cities smaller places gained percentagewise much more population than the two largest cities.

[19] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* 1888, p. 288.

[20] *Op. cit.,* p. 265.

[21] There is no indication that all persons comprising the last group came from rural areas. At any rate, the rural influx into Boston was very small.

[22] Jane Moore, *Cityward Migration,* Chicago, 1938.

[23] Edgar Kant, "Den Inre Omflyttningen i Estland," *Svensk Geografisk Årsbok,* Lund, 1946 (summary in English).

TABLE 15. POPULATION INCREASE OF SELECTED CALIFORNIA CITIES

City	Population		Increase	
	1950	1940	Numbers	Percentage
Los Angeles	1,970,358	1,504,277	476,381	31.6
San Francisco	775,357	634,536	40,821	6.4
San Diego	334,387	203,341	131,046	64.4
Culver City	19,720	8,976	9,776	108.8

SOURCE: United States Census.

We obtain the same result from a nationwide United States census survey of cities which increased more than 100 per cent during the decade from 1940 to 1950. As can be seen from Table 16 none of these urban places can be

TABLE 16. UNITED STATES CITIES WHICH INCREASED MORE THAN 100 PER CENT DURING THE DECADE 1940–1950

City	Population		Per cent increase
	1950	1940	
Richmond, Calif.	99,545	23,642	321.1
Baton Rouge, La.	125,629	34,719	261.8
Odessa, Tex.	29,495	9,573	208.1
Compton, Calif.	47,991	16,198	196.3
Albuquerque, N. Mex.	96,815	35,449	173.1
Norman, Okla.	27,006	11,429	136.3
Lynwood, Calif.	25,823	10,982	135.1
Euclid, Ohio	41,396	17,866	131.7
Independence, Mo.	36,963	16,066	130.1
Burbank, Calif.	78,577	34,337	128.8
Lubbock, Tex.	71,747	31,853	125.2
Panama City, Fla.	25,814	11,610	122.3
Vancouver, Wash.	41,664	18,788	121.8
San Mateo, Calif.	41,782	19,403	115.3
Biloxi, Miss.	37,425	17,475	114.2
Redwood City, Calif.	25,544	12,453	105.1
Key West, Fla.	26,433	12,927	104.5
San Angelo, Tex.	52,093	25,802	101.9
Fort Lauderdale, Fla.	36,328	17,996	101.9

SOURCE: United States Census.

classified as large and none but Albuquerque, New Mexico, is the largest city of its state.

The attraction of the big city cannot be explained in terms of a single general law but rather by an interplay of opportunity and institutional atti-

tudes. In "normal" times, that is, in periods without sudden and important changes, the larger centers offer more opportunities than smaller places, but in times of changes the old established cities often fall behind other cities in the number of new openings. The initial concentration of the steel industry in Pittsburgh attracted more workers than other cities; the same was true when Detroit became the center of the automobile industry. On the other hand, there are institutional preferences and dislikes. Large parts of the American population do not want to live in big cities and, if they can, they avoid having their residences in a metropolis even if they have to work there. Hence the intensive suburban movement and the emergence of "urbanized" areas beyond the fringes of a town. Just as the largest cities—New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles—are regarded by many as "not typically American," the big city, at any rate, has a low prestige. Conditions are similar in England. The French have opposite values: the prestige of Paris is very high, higher perhaps than that of any other city in the world, while no other French city has ever attained a reputation as a place particularly desirable to live in. The consistent policy of centralization of French administration and cultural life favored Paris at the expense of the provinces. Consequently, Paris is the only French city with a population in excess of 1 million, and this despite the fact that the largest industries are located elsewhere. In Italy, with a slightly larger population than France, conditions are entirely different. Three cities—Rome, Naples, and Milan—have more than 1 million inhabitants each but none of them even approximates the size of Paris. In addition, there are more middle-sized places in Italy than in France. But Italy, split until 1870, never was as centralized as France. Even the prestige of Rome could not eclipse the fame and attraction of Florence, Venice, Bologna, and many smaller places, and we thus find a more even distribution of migrants over the entire country. To a lesser degree the French conditions were duplicated in imperial Austria, where Vienna attracted migrants from the Czech provinces at the expense of the towns closer to the homes of the migrants.

Perhaps the best way to find not "laws" but trends in domestic migrations is to analyze the motives which make people move. The students of migration soon realized that population shifts were not random movements; they were carried out by specific groups; in other words, migration nearly always is selective and it is not too difficult to discover the most frequent principles of selection. A priori the selection is negative in the areas of dispersion. In more ordinary language, people who are not wanted leave. But the people who fail to qualify at the place of their birth do not necessarily qualify for the place of their choice. The migrant might fail again and be forced to move to another place or to return home (the "backwash"). The term "negative selection" does not necessarily have a derogatory connotation; it merely means lack of opportunity for specific persons. Nor does the term "positive selec-

tion" imply outstanding abilities. Under given conditions the most welcome in-migrant is the unskilled worker who is willing to do what no one else wants to do: hard work for low wages.

Let us start with the negative selection in rural areas. As long as the children are young the farmer or the peasant provides room and board but —in peasant countries as a rule, in the United States in many cases—he cannot afford to pay them for their services. The small farm cannot be divided among several children; it will go to one child, usually the oldest son. As soon as the children can take care of themselves they have to move on; there is no future for them on the farm. But those who already operate farms have no reason to leave. This applies to completely settled countries where all arable land is divided into farms which no longer can be split into smaller holdings. The situation is different in countries where virgin land still is available or unsuitable land can be reclaimed or, by removing the remnants of feudalism, large estates can be divided into one-family farmsteads; if this is done, the flow of rural out-migrants will stop. Western Europe, Italy, Greece, Japan, and the United States are, for all practical purposes, completely settled.

Age and Sex. The first selective principle in rural-urban migration is therefore age; for lack of opportunity the rural areas eject their surplus population as soon as they have to support themselves. This explains two things. In the first place, it makes clear why farm areas with a higher birth rate and a higher ratio than cities in the age groups up to nineteen years have a lower ratio than cities in the age group twenty to thirty-four years. Second, it accounts for the "joker" [24] that cities still have a population surplus: the new arrivals, in their most procreative years, balance the birth deficit which otherwise would arise.

The age at which the rural exodus starts varies with existing conditions and established folkways. There have been times when rural children received practically no education, general or vocational; to be a peasant and to be illiterate were almost synonymous. Until recently this was still largely the case in Southern and Eastern Europe. In many parts of Europe obligatory grade school education was introduced over the violent protests of peasants. Wherever the farm population remains on a low educational level, rural out-migration begins at a very early age, usually twelve to fourteen years. The boys are apprenticed, if possible, and the girls furnish the domestic servants for the urban middle classes. In the United States, as well as in the Scandinavian countries, in England, and increasingly so in other countries, the rural population has changed its outlook. Not only are children willingly sent to elementary and high schools but a still rising number of farm children go to college. This delays the time of migration. For this reason the age group

[24] See p. 219, ftnt. 7.

five to nineteen years still shows a higher percentage distribution in rural than in urban areas. Furthermore, it reduces the number of rural-urban migrants. The A. and M. colleges now train a substantial number of rural children for occupations in rural areas: gamekeepers, foresters, managers and supervisors for absentee farmers, government employees in reclamation and soil conservation work; in addition, there are opportunities for ministers in rural churches, teachers in rural schools, country doctors, and veterinarians. Church work was almost the only occupation of which the farmers have always approved without reservations. In solidly Catholic countries the lower clergy still consist mostly of farmers' children. It should be clear that the college-educated rural population does not necessarily migrate by "stages" described by Ravenstein and his followers. Inasmuch as colleges serve as agencies procuring employment for their graduates, the place to which the farm child migrates depends on job opportunity rather than on proximity of the paternal farm or size of the urban settlement.

The second selective principle usually mentioned is sex; this, however, needs some clarification. Sex is not selective in the sense that only either males or females show migratory tendencies. The surplus people have to leave regardless of sex. But it is obvious that the farm in most cases will change from the father to the son rather than to the daughter, thereby indicating a possible larger number of female migrants. The influence of sex is less marked with regard to the factor which causes migration than to the goal of the migrant. The male leaves in search of an occupation, the female in search of a husband. Career women are rarely born on farms. Consequently, girls will migrate as soon as they believe that they cannot find a suitable partner for life in their neighborhood but they are less likely to move to more distant places, at least not initially. However, even the age difference has a tendency to become less marked, since farm girls in increasing numbers go to vocational schools and colleges.

Character Traits. The next problem is whether the rural surplus migrates at random or whether certain personality traits favor migration and thus function as a selective "sieve," separating the suitable from the unsuitable persons. In this form the problem is rather poorly stated, for it is clear that an unsuitable individual—unsuited for farming—is not necessarily fit to work in a city; nor is there any selective process which assures us that some farmers who stay in rural areas are not qualified to do even better in an urban occupation. However, all students agree that character traits are selective. There is less agreement as to the type of traits which favor migration. Some stress biological factors, particularly a supposedly inherited tendency to be energetic and venturesome. It has been held that the Poles who emigrated to this country were not a group representing the typical race composition of their mother country but a type much more racially uniform. Fairchild expressed a similar belief with respect to the early English settlers.

Others—among them E. A. Ross [25]—thought that the most intelligent people migrate, leaving the farms to "bull-heads and suckers." Abundant research has demonstrated that the actual situation is far less simple than a priori speculations assumed. C. C. Zimmerman, after a careful examination of the data furnished by a host of researchers, came to a conclusion which approximates a law: "The city attracts the extremes and the country retains the means." This formula certainly is better balanced than the one-sided, monistic theories; we are inclined to accept this view but with certain modifications.[26] If we admit that those who migrate leave because of lack of opportunity, then the primary selective principle is economic and not personal in nature. The "haves" stay on and the "have-nots" migrate. This reflects more on possessions than on character. Those who have a farm or a farmer-husband are more likely to remain, regardless of personality traits. Even the less attractive girl who will inherit a farm has a better chance to find a farmer-husband than a poor girl of great personal charm. Since farming in the United States remains a desirable occupation and offers reasonable security and good social standing, the incentive to leave is weak. The country therefore seems likely to retain its able people if they can continue to farm. It is true that those who have an ardent desire to take up one of the professions will still migrate and leave farming to others. But the number of those who feel that they can do a very good job as artists, scientists, doctors, lawyers, or engineers is small and the number of those who really qualify still smaller. Since two factors are involved which do not always coincide—the objective ability and the subjective desire—the actual cases can hardly account for large-scale migratory movements and rural areas continue to keep some of their best people.

Intelligence. Numerous studies have been made to determine the role of intelligence as a selective factor with regard to migration, but the data obtained from these studies are debatable, a fact of which their proponents, for instance, Klineberg and Gist, are well aware. Several studies of Southern rural areas [27] seem to indicate that the more intelligent people migrate and the less intelligent remain, thus confirming Ross's belief in an intellectual depletion of the country. But it is doubtful that conditions in Virginia and Tennessee allow generalizations for the entire rural population. Yet some corroboration is found in studies by Gist and Clark [28] in Kansas and by Gist,

[25] E. A. Ross, "Folk Depletion as a Cause of Rural Decline," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* 1917.

[26] Professor Zimmerman, however, thinks that owing to changing conditions, the statement is no longer valid. (Communication to the author, used by permission.)

[27] W. Gee and J. J. Corson, *Rural Depopulation in Certain Tidewater and Piedmont Areas of Virginia,* Charlottesville, Va., 1929; W. Gee and D. Runk, "Selection in Cityward Migration," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1931; and W. P. Mauldin, "A Sample Study of Migration to Knoxville, Tenn.," *Social Forces,* 1940.

[28] W. Gist and D. C. Clark, "Intelligence as a Selective Factor in Rural-Urban Migrations," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1938.

Pihlblad, and Gregory in Missouri, areas much more typical of rural America. The Kansas study, however, is highly inconclusive. The persons investigated were subjected to intelligence tests which showed a mean IQ for rural-urban migrants of 98.26 and a mean IQ of 94.78 for those who remained on farms. A mean IQ of 98.26 indicates no great intelligence. Further, the difference, as the authors themselves point out, is small; indeed, it is insignificant. Again, as stressed by the authors, the tests hardly measure intelligence but experience and background.[29]

Otto Klineberg [30] has shown that on the basis of school grades native New York City Negroes are more intelligent than migrants from the South. Goldstein [31] found the exact opposite when investigating Negro migration to Columbia, Missouri. Taken at face value, this would mean that Negroes migrating to Columbia are more intelligent, those migrating to New York City less intelligent than nonmigrants. But as is now generally conceded, intelligence tests, scholastic indexes, and school grades, especially those given by different persons, are hardly indicative of native intelligence, however useful they may be for other purposes. Recently T. Lynn Smith [32] has been particularly articulate in disparaging assertions of an intellectual rural depletion based on available testing material. There is another procedure which enables us to investigate whether the city deprives the country of its more able persons, namely, to find out the origin of the leaders and the percentage of those rural-born. This method is still far from being conclusive, but it seems more justified to base "elite" claims on achievements in real life rather than on scholastic scores which only show that a person has attained certain theoretical standards, some of which have very little practical consequences. Sorokin [33] has compiled the results of studies in several countries to determine the background of famous persons. J. McKeen Cattell found that of 885 leading scientists, 21.2 per cent were sons of farmers. According to J. S. Fisher, 23.4 per cent of the 18,356 persons listed in the 1922–1923 *Who's Who* were the children of farmers. Both indicate that farms contributed considerably more leaders than we might expect from the urban-rural population ratio. But according to Philipschenko, who investigated the percentage of university students in Petrograd (1923–1924) only 19.3 per

[29] *Ibid.;* also Gist and Halbert, *Urban Society,* pp. 245 ff.

[30] Otto Klineberg, "Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration," *American Sociological Review,* 1938.

[31] S. D. Goldstein, *Social Selections in the Migration and Occupational Choices of Negroes,* master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1944; quoted from Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.,* p. 248. The present author was unable to see this monograph.

[32] Smith and McMahan, *op. cit.,* pp. 310–311, footnote 12; see also his criteria for establishing a satisfactory test.

[33] P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility,* New York, 1927, pp. 440 ff. All data in the text quoted from this source. There are, however, other studies which differ in interpretation, for instance, G. R. Davies, *Social Environment,* New York, 1917.

cent had peasants as fathers, substantially less than the urban-rural ratio in Russia. According to the same source, only 2.1 per cent of the members of the Russian Academy of Science during the last eighty years had peasant fathers. The divergence clearly reveals differences in social conditions but not in intelligence. The American data warrant the assumption that under conditions of equality of opportunity, adequate education, and absence of destitution, farmers contribute rather more than their share to the nation's leaders. Yet this indicates merely that the farm population—migrating or sedentary—is no less intelligent than the city population. The greater proportion of achievement of the American farmers is due less to rural outmigration than to two other factors: the farm population is largely native; the urban population is to a great extent of foreign birth, which is a hindrance to higher achievements.[34] Moreover, the cities are saddled with a much larger proportion of delinquents, idlers, failures, and untrained people. But we still have no proof that all or most of the gifted persons migrate from farms to cities. We might thus tentatively conclude that intelligence and ability are a selective force in rural-urban migration, but to an unknown degree, and that we have no reasons to believe that only mediocrities remain on farms.

What is the situation with regard to the opposite extreme, those with less than average intelligence and ability? No reliable material is available. Common experience tells us that the real subnormal persons rarely leave. Although accurate data are not available, there is good reason to believe that the rural areas have a higher percentage of feeble-minded than cities.[35] Indeed, in some of the most isolated and backward rural areas the mentally deficient are quite conspicuous. The feeble-minded do not migrate to cities; many of them are incapable of doing so, nearly all of them could support themselves in cities only by begging. They remain on the farms, either with their relatives or as farm hands. While the country loses some of the best minds to the cities, it retains most of its mentally deficient.

Moral Standards. The opposite is the case regarding selectivity according to moral standards. To believe that the most honest and upright farmers are more migratory than those with less commendable characters is outright ridiculous. But the opposite is correct: the habitual criminal, the individuals who do not like to work, the professional prostitute, and similar antisocial characters leave the country. The rural areas exert too strict a control and offer no opportunities but the city does. Even the chronic alcoholic who stays on the farm in rural Europe has to leave in America, where total abstention is

[34] This was much more marked in 1923—the time of Fisher's *Who's Who* study—when both a larger percentage of urban foreign-borns and of a native rural population slanted the findings in favor of the farmers.

[35] It is, for many reasons, nearly impossible to determine the number of feeble-minded persons beyond school age. A government study in Delaware corroborates the hypothesis of a higher incidence of feeble-mindedness in rural areas: W. F. Treadway and E. O. Lundberg, *Mental Defects in a Rural County,* U.S. Children's Bureau, 1919.

still the rule in many farm areas. Thus the country is apt to lose some of its best intellects and its worst characters.

Education. Another selective principle is training, but empirical data are scarce. In former times most of the rural out-migrants were, as mentioned above, uneducated and untrained. In moving to cities they swelled the ranks of the industrial reserve army and the "lumpen-proletariat." Since then conditions have changed. Many farmers give their children a college education, as mentioned above. Others receive educational training which qualifies them for skilled work. They are, of course, the most likely group to migrate. On the other hand, there still are large numbers of untrained individuals. They too will migrate if they find no place on the farm. Thus, both extremes, the best trained and the most unqualified, go to the cities.

Physical Fitness. Finally, another selective principle may be mentioned: physical conditions. Again empirical data are lacking. Experience shows that some of our "strongest men" come from the country. If untrained, they qualify for some exacting urban occupations such as movers, stevedores, and construction workers. With increasing mechanization, the demand for unskilled but strong manual workers is falling off. Conversely, those with a frail physique who are too weak to do ordinary farm work, as well as those with constitutional defects such as heart disease, must move to the cities where they can find less demanding jobs. Thus health is more likely to be only a negative selective factor: the country ejects the physically unfit for lack of opportunity but retains some of the fittest.

Intercity Migration. In turning to intercity migration, our empirical material becomes extremely meager.[36] Much of what we can say is based on inferences from situations investigated for other reasons. We venture to suggest the following trends but stress their tentative character:

1. Migration of young people (unless they accompany their parents) is less frequent than from rural areas.

2. People in the "prime of life," that is, between twenty and forty, have a greater tendency to move from city to city than from the country to urban areas. A variety of reasons make this assumption probable. During these years some are able to save enough capital to start a new, more attractive business. They need time to establish connections which bear fruit only in later years. Some occupations are highly mobile; job promotion frequently necessitates a shift in residence. The constant shift in opportunities forces many to follow the general trend.

3. Inasmuch as intercity migration is related to increasing success, it has a tendency to resemble the type called "migration in stages": from the village to the town, from town to city, from city to metropolis. But the evidence that this is the general rule, as Ravenstein stated, is insufficient and

[36] "Studies of intercity migration are, for the most part, still to come." (Smith and McMahan, *op. cit.*, p. 295.)

unconvincing. It is probably the case for young girls with little or no training starting as waitresses or salesgirls, or for boys who try to get their first practical experience as repairmen, mechanics, and garage hands not too far from their own homes. However, the reverse, namely, moving to a town from a city is probably rarer. It occurs in cases of failures. It also happens in cases of modest promotions; a waiter, having saved a small capital, might move from a city to a town to open a little restaurant. More frequently are the retirement cases in recent times; older people migrate from big cities to a smaller "pensionopolis" in Florida or California.

4. The village, however, follows the rural and not the urban patterns and precisely for the same reason, namely, lack of opportunity. Thus the very young are most migratory and migration decreases with increasing age. The males show a greater migratory tendency in villages. Obviously the prospect of inheriting the father's store or shop in the village is less attractive than inheriting the father's farm.

5. In intercity migration distance plays a lesser role than opportunity; particularly if a city is specialized, it will attract migrants from everywhere. An outstanding example is Los Angeles, which draws its migrants from the entire country. The same is true of Washington, D.C., New York, and San Francisco, although New York is no longer so attractive to people from the Pacific Coast and the Mountain States. On the other hand, Boston recruits its migrants almost exclusively from New England, and New Orleans from adjacent areas.[37] The Northeastern and some Southern regions, which at present have no "pull," are most likely to show small-degree migrations in stages.

6. Age is also a selective factor in intercity migration, but the most migratory age group is older than the rural out-migrants. We might suspect that females are less migratory than males, especially in larger cities where it is less difficult to find a husband, while the ambitious males migrate in search of better opportunities. As to intelligence and ability, opportunities usually increase with the size of the city and we are more likely to find a trend to the larger cities. The same is true for criminals, prostitutes, and men who maintain a precarious balance between legitimate business and sharp trade. Conversely, persons of delicate health or those afflicted with certain diseases such as tuberculosis will try to move from a larger city to a small place with a more healthful countrylike environment.

7. While the farmer is by necessity sedentary and if he migrates, generally tries to settle down again, there are many city occupations which by their

[37] See T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis,* New York, 1948, pp. 328 ff., with maps indicating the pull of New York, Washington, D.C., Boston, New Orleans, Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco. Smith's assertion that Chicago also draws migrants from everywhere is not quite convincing; his own map shows that Chicago has hardly any migrants from the Mountain and the Pacific states.

very nature imply frequent migrations. In former times actors were incessantly on the move and this is still true in some countries as, for instance, for opera singers in Italy, where there is hardly a continuous season in one city. In America stage actors reside mostly in New York, traveling only in the off season, while screen actors stay in Hollywood. However, there is still much interchange and migration. Circus people and performers in variety shows are as migratory as before. So are many Federal employees; theoretically, at least, the entire staff in Washington might be moved any day to some other place. The employees of large corporations which have establishments in various cities are in the same position; college professors also migrate frequently.

8. Some people migrate against their wishes; they want to stay on but circumstances make them move: the fugitive from justice, the girl who "got into trouble," the person involved in a scandal, the unwanted who is "run out of town," and the nonconformist. These involuntary migrations are most likely to occur in small places where everybody is known and social control is very strict. The given place to start a new life is the big city where anonymity provides a haven for all. The nonconformist in particular will find that only a large city permits him to deviate.

9. Migration, in some instances, is caused by certain character traits which possibly are more frequent with city-born than with rural people. Some migrate because they are forced by circumstances but others are migratory by predilection: the adventurer, the restless, and the Bohemian.

Migration to the Country. We finally have to investigate the migration from the city to the country. In general it may be stated that a farmer can turn to an urban occupation but the reverse process seems nearly impossible. For sentimental and economic reasons, statesmen, reformers, and romanticists have tried again and again to move the urban surplus back to the farms but in vain. Rousseau's cry "Return to nature" had no effect other than to invent a new society game: masquerading as shepherds. Thoreau succeeded in becoming a hermit but he won no followers. The most notable experiment, Brook Farm, actively supported by the most illustrious men in New England, collapsed. The "back-to-the-land movement" in Germany was a miserable failure. Attempts to resettle people on farms during the depression period from 1930 to 1940 were equally fruitless. It is only too obvious that a city-born individual will hardly succeed in raising wheat or breeding cattle.

Yet in the United States there always is a substantial migration from urban to rural areas.[38] For lack of comparable data we cannot say whether this

[38] No figures are available for the period before 1930. Since then the U.S. Department of Agriculture has published estimates, according to which the number of people moving from cities to farms varied from 560,000 in 1920 to 1,740,000 in 1931. During the depression the migration dropped sharply.

mass migration is to be found in other countries or—as it seems—is an American peculiarity. Research has also been scanty, so any attempt to explain this unexpected phenomenon must result in only a tentative hypothesis:

1. To be a farmer is an American ideal. Many urban people own farms although they do not operate them. According to size, the farms either serve merely as residences or are operated by hired managers, but the owners call themselves farmers and are thus listed by the census. Many of our leading political figures fall in this category. Only recently a Cabinet member stated that he owns "two or three farms" but he actually spent his life in city factories and offices as one of the nation's foremost businessmen. Most of these farms are acquired after the individual has been a success in his urban vocation; statistically, he then has moved from the city to the farm. Such farms are also the given places of retirement; thus many leave the city for farms to spend the rest of their lives.

2. On the other hand, modern farming has become more and more business-like, which makes it less difficult to change from urban occupations to rural life. The most important branches of farming still require knowledge, experience, and abilities which city-bred persons do not possess. If they are wealthy, they can hire managers. But since farming became highly specialized, some smaller enterprises such as chicken farms, orchards, certain garden produce, cranberry farms, and horticulture can be handled by unskilled people. There is some evidence that city people sometimes take up these ventures as a hobby which later becomes an occupation.

3. Part of the migration to farms is actually remigration, a return to the farm. Some who have worked in cities return to take over after the father has died or retired. Some go to the city only to earn money with which to buy or rent a farm; they were from the outset only temporary migrants. Some come home after they have failed in the city. According to a study by Galpin,[39] only 13 per cent of the urban-rural migrants studied had not lived on farms before.

4. The available data probably exaggerate the situation; the census figures are based on residence rather than on occupation (although the latter too is listed). There is a steady stream of migrants into the cities; most of them belong to the lower stratum. They either swell the slums until they overflow, blighting adjacent sections and forcing the residents to move from the central areas toward the periphery, or they move directly into the workingmen's zone, which has an identical effect. The process of invasion and succession goes on until more and more middle- and upper-class people move beyond the city limits, either to urban suburbs, the "rurban" fringe, or areas classified by the census as rural. These out-migrants still remain

[39] C. J. Galpin, *Analysis of Migration of Population to and from Farms,* U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1927.

urban; they continue to work in the city and much of their social life is still urban. They go to the country only to sleep and attend to their gardens in their spare time. Thus the rural areas appear larger than they really are. If the census did not rely on political boundaries, the out-migration from cities would be much smaller.

5. From what has been said we may infer that the urbanites who move toward farm areas are generally much older than the urban immigrants. The assumption is corroborated by Galpin's study, according to which two-fifths of the out-migrants are thirty to fifty years old. Certainly very few persons abandon their urban professions to become real farmers at the age of fifty.

Race and Migration. Race is also a selective factor in migration in the United States, but despite a large number of studies, the situation is by no means clear. We must expect differences in migratory trends because the conditions upon which migrations depend vary. Among these differences the following are the most important:

1. Initially, the bulk of Negroes was concentrated in the Southern states; they had only one single region from which to migrate.

2. The Negro population was almost entirely rural; for a long time inter-city migration was mostly limited to whites.

3. Until emancipated, the Negro was not free to migrate; this does not imply that Negroes never moved, but that they moved only on the order of their masters.

4. Although Negroes were living in farm areas, they owned no land: thus the possession of a farm was no deterrent from migration nor were the younger children inclined to migrate because they did not inherit farms.

5. The Negroes were economically destitute, totally or nearly illiterate, and without any vocational training; they were also socially rejected even where slavery was detested. These circumstances denied them almost all the opportunities open to white migrants. The Negro could not become a pioneer in the frontier areas, he could not start a business in town, take up a profession, or find employment as a white-collar worker. Manual laborers refused to work with them. Even today some "all-white" unions decline to accept Negro members. On the other hand, the Negro had better opportunities in the type of work which whites rejected for its unpleasantness, low prestige, and substandard compensation, such as domestic work and menial factory jobs. This suggests a preponderance of female migrants and short-distance migration which, indeed, is characteristic of some stages in Negro migration. T. Lynn Smith,[40] for instance, has shown that practically the entire Negro population of Atlanta was born in Georgia.

6. Since the Negro, once he has left the rural areas, has nothing on which he can fall back, return to the country is less likely to occur than with whites.

[40] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

7. As mentioned above, the Negro started only from a single "area of dispersion." For obvious reasons the same area could not also serve as an area of attraction for other areas. Consequently, there is no "countercurrent." The Negro, living in the North, will migrate to any place except to the South. Recently there have been some exceptions. With the improvement of conditions in the South there are now increasing opportunities for them as lawyers, doctors, social workers, and teachers. Some of these vacancies have been filled by Northern-born Negroes.

8. After emancipation had been achieved, Negroes received educational and vocational training; their migration opportunities improved, coinciding with the rapid growth of the cities where not all jobs could be filled by whites. Negroes particularly gained for two additional reasons: the virtual halt of immigration after the First World War gave them openings in jobs formerly filled by the masses of destitute foreigners, and the lack of civilian workers during the Second World War forced their employment in positions formerly closed to them.

9. The latter implies a change in the occupational goals of migration as well as a change in the number of migrants, namely, from domestic to industrial work, which has further consequences: migration tends to shift from females to males, from neighborhood migration to long-distance migration, and from small town to big city migration. Hence the mass exodus of rural Southern Negroes after the First World War and the acceleration of the migratory movements during the Second World War. The attraction of the city is demonstrated by the emergence of large Negro communities in places where hardly any Negro had lived before, for instance, the "black metropolis" in Chicago and more recently in Detroit. Since these movements started after business opportunities in the Northeast had begun to decline, Boston and the rest of New England were hardly affected by the mass migrations of Southern Negroes.

10. All these factors permit us to propose at least one rather obvious hypothesis: the more different the conditions of the two races, the more the migration trends will differ; the more conditions become similar, the fewer the differences in migratory behavior. From extensive research conducted by Daniel O. Price,[41] of the University of North Carolina, results have been obtained which, at first sight, seem to contradict this hypothesis. Price investigated particularly migration trends in North Carolina, which he summed up as follows:

> Looking at the migration patterns of white and Negro males and females we can see the similarity in patterns of female migration regardless of color, and the similarity in patterns of male migration regardless of color, from 1900 to 1920.

[41] Daniel O. Price, "Estimates of Net Migration in the United States," *American Sociological Review,* 1953. A preliminary report on a much larger study.

That is, in this period the color differences are less important than the sex differences. However from 1920 to 1940 the color differences are more important than the sex differences.

Since the conditions of the Negroes improved steadily we should expect the very opposite, namely, an increasing tendency toward similarity of migration patterns. Yet the contradiction can be resolved. In the first place, the gains made by Negroes will induce them to follow the trends set up by whites; there ought to be a time gap before the Negro has caught up with this trend. Second, North Carolina is neither representative of the nation as a whole nor of the South as a region. Price himself points out that North Carolina displays a more liberal attitude toward Negroes, "relative to other Southern states," and he also emphasizes that the change in migration rates coincides "with the movement of the textile industry southward and the development of industrialization in North Carolina." These factors slowed up or even reversed the general tendency of an out-migration from the South. Third, the two decades, from 1920 to 1940, the period of color differences in migration from North Carolina, are too atypical to permit far-reaching conclusions. They cover an era of contrasts: prosperity in the first part and depression in the second part. The boom years, providing opportunities at home, coincided with the appearance of the Ku Klux Klan in the North, particularly in the Middle West, from which we may expect that the Negro had less reason to move. Indeed, the figures show a sharp drop in out-migration (for both Negroes and whites) for the years from 1920 to 1930. The following depression, with its large-scale unemployment, was, although for different reasons, another hindrance to migration and consequently out-migration decreased still more. It remains to be seen whether the war decade from 1940 to 1950 shows a reversal of the trend.

However, Price's study deserves further attention from two viewpoints. First, we note that the change in migration trends occurs exactly at the time when mass immigration came to an end. We will hardly be wrong in considering the lack of immigration as a contributory cause. Second, the finding that the Negro migration patterns sometimes conform to white migration patterns, and differ from them at other times, is sufficient proof that the real factor is not race. If migratory behavior were really racial in character, then the behavior could not change. On the basis of overwhelming evidence we are justified in assuming that similar social conditions tend to create similar social behavior.

Note on Statistical Methods. The figures on migration are, for sociological purposes, not entirely satisfactory. They are based mainly on census data, giving the place of birth and residence. If these places are not identical, migration, so it seems, accounts for the difference. For a variety of reasons this method, almost exclusively used by older studies, produces some fallacies and inaccuracies. What is measured is mobility rather than migration, which

in an extremely mobile society is not the same thing. The place of birth is now usually an urban hospital, not necessarily situated where the mother actually resides. Hospitals have been urged to list the permanent residence. But many hospitals are private institutions over which the bureaus of vital statistics have little control, and the reception clerk of a hospital is neither interested in, nor trained for, statistics. Illegitimate mothers often intentionally hide their identity and mislead the official with regard to their real residence. At present quite a few children are born while the father is attending college and is temporarily living with his wife in a college town until his return home after graduation. Neither he nor his wife nor the child are migrants. Reliance on census figures collected every tenth year cannot take into account migration failures if the migrant returns within a decade, which is likely in most cases; presumably very few fail after ten years. Furthermore, we get no information about multiple migrations because comparison between place of birth and place of residence reveals but one migration. The method also does not permit one to distinguish between voluntary and enforced migration. Young children have to leave with their parents, but for sociological purposes we hardly can consider a person a migrant because his father took him to another place when he was two months old. Most of these shortcomings cannot be corrected without costly and complicated changes in the census methods. One change, however, would require but little effort: a concentration on the place of work rather than on residence. Our present migration figures depend too much on the—for our purposes irrelevant—fact of whether or not a suburb has been annexed by a city. Thus many an intracity change of address is listed as migration. Even if a person leaves the urban area and settles in the rural hinterland from which he daily commutes to his unchanged place of work in the city, it is still questionable whether we can call him a migrant.[42]

[42] For a recent attempt to improve the statistical procedure by determining "survival rates" see Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36. The improved method will give much more accurate results with respect to "net" migration, that is, the balance between in- and out-migrations. This method does not attempt to determine the number of individual migrations; the latter is immaterial from the viewpoint of population shifts but very important for migration behavior of individuals.

Chapter 12

IMMIGRATION

Typology

Immigration: A Universal Phenomenon. Domestic migration does not change the population composition of a nation; it changes the distribution of the population within a country. Immigration nearly always causes considerable changes in population composition, since the country of departure and the country of arrival rarely have the same types of population and, what carries much greater weight, never have identical social institutions. A popular slogan states that all Americans are immigrants. So, for that matter, is everybody, since man did not remain in the still-unknown area where the cradle of mankind was located. Wherever that may have been, it certainly is not where contemporary man is living. If by chance some people exist now on the same ground where man evolved into a human being, they are there by reimmigration only. To believe that any larger part of mankind has remained at the same place for a million or half a million years would be naïve. The Europeans, from whom nine-tenths of Americans stem, were certainly relatively late immigrants who came to Europe after the end of the last ice age (although a very small number of late paleolithic men survived in some ice-free areas during the last glaciation). The ancestors of the extant Europeans began to arrive not earlier than 10,000 B.C., which is about the same time or, more probably, even later than the arrival of the first Indians in America. But the immigrants at that time did not remain at the point of their arrival but in repeated waves of mass emigrations changed their habitat again and again. Our great historical periods start with large population movements: Antiquity (in Europe) with the immigration of masses into the Balkan region and what is now Italy; the Middle Ages with the Great Migrations; Modern Times (with the process in reverse) with the discovery of the New World and the ensuing emigration to the Americas.

There are four main types of immigrants which, for lack of better terms, may be called (1) conquerors, (2) colonizers, (3) colonials, and (4) immigrants proper. All of them, though in different ways, have helped to build cities or to alter their appearance. In addition, we have to distinguish between group and individual immigrations. In the first case the immigrants appear in more or less organized units, and usually intend to remain together

in the country of their destination; in the latter case they emigrate as more or less isolated individuals.

Conquerors. If the theory advanced elsewhere in this book is correct,[1] the conquerors were the first to build cities. At any rate, there can be no doubt that some of the earliest cities were created by hostile invaders who needed fortified nonagricultural settlements to protect themselves and to dominate the surrounding rural areas. Such was certainly the case with Ur, Al'Ubaid, Nineveh, Athens, and Rome. The first urban places built by the Spanish conquistadores in Mexico and Peru were also of this type. Conquest, as far as our topic is concerned, can have two different meanings: either a country is conquered because the invaders intend to exchange their old places of settlements for new ones, or the conquerors want to extend the dominance of their home country over another area. In both cases immigration ensues but the impact on urban settlements is different. In the former instance the invaders replace or displace both the urban and the rural population, a process which can be quite clearly observed in such cases as the invasion of the Dorians in Sparta or the Spanish conquest in Mexico or Peru. Consequently, the composition of both the rural and the urban population changes. The invaders will occupy at least the larger existing urban places. If the invaders represent a preurban society, the initial result may be destruction of cities or their reduction to insignificance. This happened during the Great Migrations, when the invasion of Italy by preurban Teutonic groups caused a decay of Roman cities, especially of Rome itself. The invasion of the Near East by the Turks marked a period of urban destruction; some of the most ancient cities vanished forever. Similarly, the invasion of the Huns, Avars, and Mongols suppressed or retarded urban development in the European East for a long time. This type of conquest—invasion for resettlement—is more characteristic of times gone by; however, the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, the subsequent loss of East Prussia and parts of Silesia, and the expulsion of the Germans from Russian, Polish, Czech, and Hungarian territories—all the result of conquest—caused a profound change in the population composition of many European cities, among them Danzig, Königsberg, Breslau, and Prague. In this case the primary result was enforced emigration, but at least in the territories annexed by Russia and Poland the cities were repopulated by Polish and Russian immigrants. A similar process of enforced population exchange, due to conquest by militant invaders, seems to be under way in the Baltic states now annexed by Russia.

If the invaders have no intention of shifting their habitat but want to subdue another country, they do not have a sizable emigration of peasants or farmers but must concentrate on dominating the vanquished from fortified military places. They either build forts,[2] as the Romans did in many in-

[1] See Chap. 2.

[2] As at Colonia Agrippina (Cologne).

stances, and thereby create new urban places, or they occupy existing cities,[3] which permits control over the entire country. In either case the urban population will increase, the composition of the population will change and subsequently differ from the rural population.

Colonizers. Invaders wage wars, colonizers come peacefully. As so often in early times and again as was so characteristic of American colonization, they move into empty space, they settle on farms rather than in cities. They may settle in villages as the neolithic Danubians did, but these villages were agricultural settlements of which there are also some American counterparts, e.g., the Amish towns in Pennsylvania. Cities, as a rule, are the outcome but not the beginning of colonization.[4] When they arise, they are at first local markets and service centers; their population comes mostly from surrounding rural areas. The smaller urban places in the Middle Western farm areas are still rather homogeneous and of the same origin as the population of the surrounding rural regions.

Until about 1700 B.C. the immigration movements in Europe were mostly rural in character. Then the situation changed but only for the regions dominated by the Greeks and Romans. Except for some Phoenician and Carthaginian settlements, of which we know little more than their names, there was no other urban immigration in Europe before the end of antiquity.

If colonizers move into occupied territory, the very nature of peaceful colonization implies farming. Colonizers are either directly invited or cordially welcomed to clear forests and swamps and to till hitherto unoccupied or sparsely settled land. They rarely go to the cities. Such was the case with German farmers who, mostly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were called into Eastern European countries. Other colonizing groups were encouraged to settle in South American countries. The immigration of colonizing farmers has, at least initially, an unexpected effect: the rural population tends to become heterogeneous, while the urban population remains homogeneous, retaining its cultural hegemony.

Colonials. The "colonials" differ in that they either found new cities or move into existing ones, but they are invariably urban immigrants with a firm intention of preserving their political and cultural ties with their mother country. They do not identify themselves with the country of their settlement even when they do not expect to return to their mother country. In other words, they deliberately remain foreigners. In most cases there is a considerable cultural difference between "colonials" and "natives"; at any rate, we are dealing here with an entirely urban phenomenon of considerable consequence. The first colonials were the founders of the Phoenician and Greek colonies along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and even as far beyond as the British Isles. These colonies were urban trade centers, com-

[3] As at Lutetia (Paris).

[4] The term "colonist" is derived from the Latin *colonus*, a person who tills the soil.

mercial outposts in areas of primitive civilizations. These were foreign cities whose population had to keep distance from the natives if they wanted to remain what they were. Some of these colonies disappeared without leaving a trace; others have survived; but all have lost their colonial character and their cultural isolation. Today an old Phoenician city such as Cartagena is as Spanish as any other city in Spain. Similarly, the Greek colony Massilia, after many a conquest, became the French Marseilles.

In colonial America the urban centers normally did not rise as trade outposts in foreign territories but as a part of a concerted rural and urban movement. However, there are some notable exceptions, especially in New York, which came into being as a Dutch trading post. Its founders had neither the intention of setting up an empire nor of breaking away from their mother country. In some of the more primitive areas of the world, particularly in Africa, urban outposts for trading still exist, although usually the entire area is under the political rule of some European power; as in other colonial instances, the rural areas are inhabited by natives and the urban places by the colonial immigrants. Thus a peculiar situation has been created: these colonial towns are not a specialized part of an integrated country but the rural and urban areas represent different civilizations and different populations, the one oriented toward the native culture, the other toward the alien mother country, with no tendency in the direction of unification. It seems highly unlikely that such a situation can last.

Modern times have also created another type of colonials who do not found new cities but move into existing settlements. They may be distinguished from ordinary immigrants by their expressed intention of remaining foreigners; most of them want to return to their mother country later on. They frequently send their children home, at least to attend school; they do not change their citizenship and, if at all, mingle with the rest of the population only with reserve. Their motives for emigration to a foreign country are entirely economic. Most of them do not emigrate to earn a merely modest living. These colonials engage in large enterprises and are frequently the wealthiest groups in the country, a fact which induces the native population to accuse them of exploitation. If these immigrants become numerous, the spatial arrangement of the city consequently changes. Segregated areas arise, but this segregation is different from the type so familiar in the United States. The segregated areas of the colonials are usually in the most desirable parts of the city; instead of slums we find expensive homes, exclusive clubs, restricted recreation facilities, fashionable private schools, and all the other symptoms of upper-class life. The immigrants, as the representatives of a socially secure upper stratum, with attitudes ranging from cool aloofness or condescension to hardly concealed contempt for the native population, contrast strangely with the more familiar types of immigrants who differ from them in nearly all respects.

All colonials are Westerners; Asiatics, no matter how cultured or wealthy, have never been able to establish "colonies" in the sense just outlined. This has added to the existing resentment against foreigners in Asia. With the rapid spread of nationalism and the accelerated industrialization of Asian countries, the colonials as a segregated urban upper-class group are likely to disappear in the near future. In Europe we find a single instance of a "colony": Istanbul, with Pera as the quarter of foreign colonials, made up of many European nationalities. In the western parts of North Africa the Spanish and the French dominate and in Egypt the British. In the Near and Middle East almost all European trading nations and the United States are represented in Smyrna, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran, and other cities. The British are most conspicuous in India and the French in Vietnam. The Dutch are numerous in Indonesia but, as an exception, they are also represented in rural areas where they own and operate plantations. In China, Peiping has rather ancient foreign quarters; Shanghai has perhaps the largest "international" settlement, and Canton also has its colonials. All this, however, is in the process of disappearing and only Hong Kong, still under British control, retains an intact foreign colony.

Colonial immigrants are also found in Latin-American countries; most of them are British or American, although Germans are also quite numerous. Again we find spatial segregation although it is less strictly observed. There is more social intercourse with the "native" upper crust and intermarriages do occur. A minority of these colonials become regular immigrants and finally acquire citizenship; the others prefer the status of distinguished, though not always welcome, foreigners.

Immigrants. We turn now to the immigrant proper, who in modern times represents the most numerous group and is so very conspicuous in American cities. Much more than the conquerors, colonizers, and colonials, the ordinary immigrants have shown considerable variations with regard to numerical strength, country of origin, cultural standards, economic position, motives for migration, willingness and ability to adjust, and the direction of immigration toward rural or urban areas.

Colonials and colonizers are never numerous, even when the immigration periods stretch over many years. The stream of ordinary immigrants varies greatly; sometimes it is a mere trickle, as in 1820 when only 8,385 were admitted to the United States; at other times the influx has been considerable. The peak was reached in 1907 when 1,285,349 aliens came to this country. These vacillations do not occur at random; they follow clearly discernible trends not only with respect to the number of immigrants but also with regard to their traits, origins, and motives. This is true of all international migratory movements on a large scale. For instance, at various times German immigrants went in groups to Russia, Poland, and Hungary. Romanians went in such large numbers to the southeastern part of Hungary

that the region finally changed its population composition so completely that the Romanians gained the majority. From 1870 to 1918 Vienna experienced mass immigrations from Bohemia and Moravia, with the result that now at least one-fourth of its population is of Slavic ancestry. There were several periods of Jewish immigrations—all of them urban in character—in Poland, Russia, Hungary, Romania, as well as in Holland and Great Britain. During the last fifty years Italians moved in large numbers to France. Germany, from 1946 to 1948, received many hundreds of thousands of immigrants of German stock from Slavic countries. European countries, aside from these exceptions, have ceased to be immigration centers.

Traits

Numerical Trends. America experienced several periods of both moderate and mass immigration. The colonial period was a time of moderate immigration in terms of absolute numbers but of mass immigration if the ratio of immigrants to native-born settlers is the criterion. Accurate statements, however, are impossible since reliable figures are not available. We definitely can speak of mass movements with respect to Negroes; within the colonial period the percentage of Negroes increased from zero to 19 per cent. However, nearly all of them were residents of rural areas.

The next period—roughly from 1790 to 1840—was, both in absolute numbers and percentagewise, a period of moderate immigration. Again reliable figures are not available until 1820. From 1821 to 1840 a total of 742,562 foreigners were admitted.

The third period—from 1841 to 1924 (with a recession during the First World War)—was the period of mass immigration. During that time 35,248,453 aliens entered the United States as immigrants. During these eighty years the composition of the American population underwent its most drastic changes.

The fourth and last period—since 1925—is again a period of moderate immigration. From 1930 to 1945 immigration was virtually at a standstill because of the depression, the Second World War, and legal restrictions. In none of these years were the immigrants as numerous as in 1840, although the total population of the United States had increased from barely 17 million to more than 140 million. The figures would be even lower if the restrictions on immigration had not been lifted to admit displaced persons. Consequently, the effect of immigration during this period on both the size and composition of the population is almost negligible. Under the present quota system the proportion of immigrants per year is a maximum of less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the present population.

National Origin. The first and longest period of immigration stretched from the beginnings of colonial America to about 1840. Although during this

time the "old stock" was established, that stock did not have a monopoly. This was the period during which the ancestors of almost all of the present Negro population arrived in the United States. The percentage of Negroes subsequently decreased, ironically enough, because "nondesirable" white ethnic groups staged several mass immigrations. The first whites to arrive did not belong to the "old stock"; they were Spaniards who settled outside the boundaries of the original thirteen states, as did the French in Louisiana, in St. Louis, Detroit, and elsewhere. Both groups also differed from the old stock in that they were Catholic. Since neither group was augmented by new immigrations from their home countries, their growth was arrested.

The old-stock immigrants came in small groups; the "Mayflower" carried not more than 102 persons, of whom only a few survived the first year. But more immigrants arrived almost constantly, and with their colonizing attitude created a new country and a new nation which at the time of the Declaration of Independence comprised more than 15 per cent of the population of Great Britain. The old stock owes its hegemony to the extraordinary vitality of the original settlers. While the total population increased from 3,929,214 in 1790 to 9,638,453 [5] in 1820, the immigration during the same period is estimated at only 250,000 (although the accuracy of the estimate is subject to doubt). The English "younger sons" were the first to come and went to the South; the English lower middle classes went to New England but were soon joined by members of the British gentry. Pennsylvania received successive waves of English, Welsh, Scotch-Irish, and German immigrants; the Dutch and French Huguenots went to New York. All these groups were stanch Protestants (except in Maryland) and in due time became one nation whose members retained a memory of being of English, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, Welsh, Dutch, or French descent, but intermarried freely so that original diversities, if any ever existed, became indiscernible.

The next period—1850 to 1860—was one of the most momentous from the viewpoint of change; this was the period of mass immigration from Ireland in the wake of the potato famine. Of the 4,617,485 immigrants who arrived from Ireland in the period between 1820 and 1860, the bulk came during the decade from 1850 to 1860.

The third period—from 1860 to 1890—witnessed peak immigrations from countries whose populations were akin to or similar to the old stock: Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Switzerland; again the bulk of the immigrants was of the Protestant faith.

The fourth period—from 1890 to 1924—was marked by the arrival of what has been called the "least desirable" group of immigrants from Eastern

[5] This figure must be readjusted since it includes the population of territories not yet counted in 1790. If these areas are excluded, we arrive at the substantial figure of 8,374,780. However, the actual increase of the old stock is much higher, because all the new territories except Louisiana and parts of Missouri were settled by the old stock.

and Southern Europe; in other words, these people differed culturally from established American standards. Since they were the last to arrive and have had the least time to become Americanized, they are still the most conspicuous of all immigrant groups. The main centers of dispersion were Russia, the eastern parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Balkan countries, and Italy.

The fifth period—since 1924—is under the influence of restrictive immigration laws which attempt to stabilize the population composition as it existed in 1920. This has been partly modified by the displaced-persons legislation in favor of immigrants from the East and from Germany, but in view of the small totals it is safe to assume that future immigration will add little to American ethnic and cultural complexity.

Rural-Urban Immigration Trends. Lack of exact figures as to how many immigrants became farmers rather than city dwellers makes it impossible to distinguish clearly defined periods. However, some figures enable us to make certain guesses which cannot be far from the truth. Until the end of the colonial period the urban-rural population ratio was about 10 to 1. Although the effects of the Agrarian Revolution were manifested in the first half of the nineteenth century, the opportunity to colonize the best farming region in the United States, the Middle West, induced many immigrants to take up farming. We can hardly err if we assume that from the early periods until approximately 1850 the ultimate locus of immigrants was preponderantly rural. The Irish, who accounted for the next immigration wave, stayed in the cities. The decade from 1860 to 1870, in which the War between the States disrupted the economic structure of the United States, may be considered as an era of transition. In the decade from 1870 to 1880 the change from an agricultural to an industrial society began to take shape. Since present statistics show that the extant rural population of America is overwhelmingly composed of descendants of the old stock, plus an admixture of Germans and Scandinavians, it seems quite clear that the period since 1880 must have been a time of preponderantly urban immigration. This coincides with the periods of mass immigrations and with the arrival of newcomers from Southern and Eastern Europe. This was also the time when nearly all of the Chinese and Japanese immigrants came to this country. This is the reason why we deal with the phenomenon in this text.

Cultural Standards, Economic Conditions, and Adaptability. These three seemingly unrelated items can be lumped together because they actually show close correlations with one another. We can distinguish three periods in the United States: the colonial era, the settlement of the country, and the period of urbanization and industrialization.

The colonial period shows the greatest contrast. The Negroes were illiterate, came from a primitive civilization, had no property, and could acquire no possessions save some miserable goods for their own consumption. They were

excluded from the white community and their adaptability could be tested solely with respect to their fitness to do work to which they were unaccustomed and to the equally new master-slave relationship. They passed both tests, which led to a continuation of enforced mass immigration of Negroes.

On the other hand, the cultural standards of the white immigrants—taken as a group and not as individuals—were higher than in any subsequent period. That the cavaliers of the South and the children of the British gentry were well educated goes without saying. But it has been maintained that the New England settlers were the "scum" from the British Isles. Facts clearly point to the contrary. The Mayflower Compact was based upon a philosophy which uneducated people would have failed to grasp, and it is difficult to believe that the signers would have put their names to an instrument which they did not understand. All Puritans read the Bible daily and also interpreted the Scriptures to their children. The rise of congregationalism would not have been possible if people had been without education. This is corroborated by the frequency of colonial diaries, the early appearance of newspapers and works of literature, the faultless taste of early American homes and furniture, and the great number of spiritual and intellectual leaders who could not have worked without intellectual stimulation from the masses.

The period was one of economic opportunity. Although most of the immigrants were nearly penniless, they could and did acquire land when they arrived, and economic life in the towns was equally rewarding in a time of constant expansion. Of course there were individual failures and general economic crises but, as a rule, the immigrants, rural or urban, were assured of making a reasonably satisfactory living.

Their adaptability to different conditions also ranks high. Unlike later immigrants, they had to change from a relatively highly civilized life to the wilderness. They proved to be not only excellent colonizers of virgin land but they also built towns literally with their own hands because contract labor was extremely scarce in colonial times.

The second period was characterized by less sharp contrasts. Negro immigration had come to an end. The education of the white immigrants was still adequate. So were their economic conditions, except in the case of the Irish immigrants who were destitute. Opportunities in farming were still excellent but the urban situation was different. Individuals with business ability could still do well but the increasing supply of unskilled contract labor created serious difficulties. Slums, filled with poor immigrants, rose in number and size; the immigrant became a problem. The adaptability of the newcomers varied; their larger number permitted spatial segregation, yet, due to their origin, cultural differences were small and did not impede rapid assimilation.

The third period is marked by accelerated urban mass immigration. To fill the urgent need for cheap labor, immigrants of the lowest educational and

economic standards were encouraged to come to America. Illiteracy became so rampant that a law was finally enacted to ban the entry of those who could neither read nor write. The development of a highly complex capitalistic society made it virtually impossible to establish a business without an amount of capital beyond the reach of the average immigrant. A set of circumstances created principles of negative selection. With a few exceptions, the better educated and those with ability did not emigrate. The British preferred their own colonies if they emigrated. The majority of new immigrants came from countries which had never known democracy and whose religious institutions and intellectual values were totally different. So were their language, customs, and traditions. In this period the division between native whites and foreign-born, as well as between the old stock and the minorities, became paramount. The concentration of the new immigrants in urban settlements so transformed the American city that in many instances its original character has been completely changed.

Selectivity. An analysis of the data presented above suggests that immigration, like domestic migration, is selective, although the principles of selection were not devised by man; planned immigrations have always been rare. Selection depends on social conditions in both the countries of dispersion and absorption. Immigration is dynamic because there are constant changes with respect to the number of immigrants, their country of origin, cultural and economic standards, and motives for immigration. The latter are of special interest because they reveal the character of the immigrants. The decision to emigrate rests on two clearly independent variables: conditions in the country of origin and in the country of destination. If the comparison favors the latter, emigration may be expected. To gain a better insight, we shall distinguish between immigration as an individual venture and as a mass phenomenon. Individuals have always left their mother country for special reasons. Their motives have ranged from the most honorable to the most objectionable. Fugitives from justice, "black sheep" who had disgraced their families, soldiers of fortune, and other adventurers have always been a burden to the countries which received them. On the other hand, some of the most outstanding men emigrated, either upon invitation or on their own initiative, because the country of their choice offered unusual opportunities. Thus, for instance, Mazarin went to Paris; Gluck and Handel to London; Beethoven and Brahms to Vienna; Lully, Chopin, Meyerbeer, and Offenbach to Paris; a host of Italian and German singers, conductors, and musicians came to New York and other American cities. These immigrants of distinction are usually artists and scientists.

The immigration of foreigners for political reasons was quite acceptable in the past. The British invited their kings from Holland and Hanover. Mazarin, just mentioned above, came from Italy; Thomas Paine, to cite an

American example, from England. This type of immigrant has disappeared, for almost nothing is more resented nowadays than a foreigner interfering with politics.[6]

There are marked differences with respect to the countries of dispersion and absorption. For nearly four centuries Italy "exported" musicians and, to the end of the eighteenth century, architects as well. Vienna first invited, then attracted foreign musicians and later saw many of its native-born composers, conductors, and singers emigrate. Germany has perhaps furnished other countries with more scholars than any other nation. Paris has always enticed foreigners, but its own artists and scholars showed little inclination to emigrate. Furthermore, there are cases of specialists. The Swiss are specialists in the hotel business and thus Swiss operators of hotels are found in nearly all of the larger and smaller cities of foreign countries. The same applies to French cooks. New York has a number of jewelers of foreign origin and British pharmacists are quite frequent in Italian cities. Some American cities, notably New York, are a haven for Viennese psychoanalysts, while Hollywood attracts actors, directors, and scenario writers from all over the world.

Conversely, America provides the cities of the East and Latin America with technical experts. The financial centers of the world, New York, London, Paris, and Zurich, and in former times Berlin and Vienna, attracted foreign bankers and speculators. Rome has clerics from practically every country; all great metropolitan centers also have immigrant traders and manufacturers. These "individual" immigrants are never numerous; because of increasing nationalism and mounting difficulties their numbers are declining. London, for instance, had a smaller proportion of foreigners in 1899 than in late medieval times.[7] In no case have these immigrants changed the composition of the population or perceptibly added to the size of a city. They usually live in the better residential sections and do not create segregated areas. Because of their high personal prestige and their upper- or upper-middle-class status, they are emotionally secure and mostly well received by established society, which may admire or amusedly tolerate deviations from what is considered "correct" behavior. Antagonism, if it arises, stems mainly from inferior native competitors.[8] Although individual immigrants are not numerically important, they sometimes play an important role in influencing the cultural life of their adopted country. The importance of Chopin for Paris or Beethoven and Brahms for Vienna can hardly be exaggerated. The Italian

[6] The last immigrant to the United States who achieved political prominence without resentment was Carl Schurz.

[7] See A. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the 19th Century*, p. 232.

[8] Resentment, however, arises after foreigners have helped to build a sufficient native supply. Italian musicians were welcome in Germany after 1850 only as guests but not as permanent competitors. Recently some countries have discriminated against experts, particularly physicians, to a greater extent than against unqualified immigrants.

emigrants created the modern opera in Paris and London, in Vienna and St. Petersburg, as well as in New York. The intensity of the diffusion of cultural patterns among the various Western nations and the establishment of a distinct supranational Western civilization have been greatly promoted by the emigration of spiritual, intellectual, and artistic leaders to foreign cities.

Motives

Variety of Motivations. If we focus on the composition of the population and its changes, the cases of individual immigration are of negligible consequence. Mass migrations, on the other hand, have increased the size of cities and in many instances have had a profound effect on the compositions of the population. It has been assumed by many under the influence of the economic interpretation of history that the decisive motive for mass migration has been mainly economic in character. An examination of the facts shows that economic motives were prevalent for the period from approximately 1850 to the end of the First World War. This period has been perhaps more momentous for the United States than for any other country, but even here it was not decisive; it changed the composition of the population to some extent but it did not alter basic institutions. The same is true for Canada, Australia, and Latin-American countries.

Political Reasons. The main reasons for mass population movements in most historical periods have been political. Masses were forcibly ejected and in turn invaded other countries. This was the case with the Great Migrations, with the invasion of Russia by the Golden Horde, of Bulgaria by the Tartars, of the Near East and the Balkans by the Turks, or, in reverse, the expulsion of the Saracens from Spain. All these movements resulted in depopulation of cities, but the migrations were not preponderantly urban. Some of them, however, altered the character of cities completely. Constantinople changed from a Byzantine to a Turkish city; Granada and Cordova, once centers of a great civilization, became provincial towns after the Spaniards had replaced the Moors. Almost all other periods furnish abundant examples of mass migration by political force, although most of them are of minor importance for the formation or the character of cities. Exactly the opposite is true of the period in which mass migrations, due to the use of political force, reached its historical peak: our present era from the end of the First World War to the aftermath of the Second World War.[9] Mass emigration

[9] It is perhaps no chance matter that the beginning of this period coincided with the end of the era called *Pax Britannica,* that is, from 1815 to 1914. The latter was a period of generally peaceful expansion, with a freedom of movement which the world had never before experienced to such an extent. During these hundred years probably more than 50 million people changed their homelands peacefully. After such migrations had become impossible, population problems were settled by violence.

started when the remnants of the Armenians fled from Turkey after hundreds of thousands had been massacred. In the wake of the Bolshevik revolution masses of *émigrés*, either by choice or by necessity, left Russia. Next came the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, which was enforced by political means; the individuals had no choice. The formation of independent countries within the former territory of Austria-Hungary caused the migration of Germans from Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia to Austria, and of Hungarians from Romania and Yugoslavia to Hungary. These were the only movements which, although caused by political force, were largely voluntary. The rise of fascism in Italy, Germany, and Spain caused emigrations similar to the Communist revolution, but they were numerically smaller save for the Jewish emigration. During the Second World War the Russians, after dissolving the Volga-German Soviet Republic, deported the inhabitants to unknown destinations. The outcome of the war with its subsequent territorial changes ended with the forcible emigrations of Letts, Estonians, and Lithuanians from the Baltic countries, probably of Poles from the territory annexed by Russia, of Germans from East Prussia, Silesia, and Czechoslovakia, of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, and of Italians from Dalmatia. The establishment of the state of Israel caused the enforced emigration of Arabs from that area and in turn the emigration of Jews from Moslem countries. The Chinese Communist revolution drove Europeans and Americans from their residences in Shanghai, Canton, Peiping, and other cities. Exact figures are not available but very likely more than 30 million people became immigrants during the last thirty years.[10] This feat accomplished by political force has never been matched by any economic pressure. While the mass expulsions included both rural and urban populations, their impact on cities has been particularly momentous because of the latter's cultural leadership. Thus the Baltic emigration means—at least for now—the extinction of such venerable cultural centers as Riga and Tallin. Whatever became of Danzig, Königsberg, and Breslau, these cities are no longer outposts of German civilization. Scores of other German cities have changed to Slavic settlements. Similarly, Fiume, Pola, Spalato, and Ragusa are no longer Italian but Yugoslav cities. Never before has the urban character of whole regions been changed so radically and so suddenly.

In migration movements caused by political factors the United States has been mostly on the receiving end. America lost some of her citizens—mostly urban residents—when the Tories migrated to Canada or went back to England after the Revolutionary War. A very small number of disappointed Southerners left after the War between the States. There is reason to believe that from 1923 to 1939 some Americans of Italian and German descent emigrated because they were in sympathy with the fascist governments of

[10] That is more than the total population of Europe at the time of Augustus and almost equals the American population in 1860.

their mother countries. There was a considerable amount of emigration from America during that time and most of the emigrants were urban. Since this was also the period of America's greatest depression, and since we have no statistical measures of motives, we cannot say how many of these people left for political and how many for economic reasons. However, the political immigrants have been much more numerous. They came either of their own volition, were forcibly expatriated, or had to flee for their lives. Some came in search of liberty which they had failed to find at home. In later years there have been some scattered cases of people who left because their home country was too liberal.[11] The bulk of political immigrants to America from Germany came after the abortive revolution of 1848 and after 1933. Russians and Armenians came after 1918; the greatest wave of political immigration occurred under the Displaced Persons Act.[12]

Religious Reasons and Reformers. Political reasons are not the only noneconomic motives for immigration. Religion—the wish to worship according to one's conscience—has been one of the most powerful inducements to emigrate. In the history of the United States religious immigration has played an important role for two reasons: although the original religious immigrants were of various nationalities, English, Scotch-Irish, Welsh, German, French, and some Slavs from Bohemia and Moravia, the Anglo-Saxon element dominated to so large a degree that it established what was to become the native white old stock. But perhaps more important is that from the religious background of these immigrants was formed the basic philosophy of what is called "the American way of life." While the Protestant immigrants established these patterns, they were not the only religious immigrants. They were soon followed by the Catholic settlers of Maryland. The Jewish immigration has to be considered as at least in part caused by religious motives.[13]

Another type of noneconomic immigrant was the social reformer; such

[11] After the Second World War fugitive fascists went to Latin-American countries; recent changes in immigration regulations make it impossible for former members of fascist parties to come to the United States.

[12] The immigration of Negroes also must be classified as political, though in reverse, for they were not forced to leave by their own group but forced to immigrate by a foreign group. While the latter was motivated by economic reasons, the means of accomplishing immigration was political.

[13] Small Jewish groups of Spanish-Portuguese descent who came to America in colonial times had been persecuted because of their religion. The same was true in Czarist Russia, where Jews gained equal rights only in case of conversion. While the pogroms were partly instigated by political considerations, they were directed against a religious group and those who fled should be classified as religious immigrants. However, the masses of Eastern Jews who came between 1890 and 1910 were less motivated by discrimination than by the success of their relatives in America; their immigration was mainly economic. The Jews who left Germany after 1933 were persecuted because of their alleged race; conversion had no influence. Consequently, their immigration was neither religious nor economic but political in character.

people never arrived in masses, although they sometimes came in groups to found new settlements where they tried to transform their utopias into reality. Since many of them settled in towns—New Harmony, Indiana, for instance, was chosen to try out the reform plans of Robert Owen—they play a certain role in the multifarious setup of American cities. But their main importance rests on the fact that they helped to fortify the American spirit of public responsibility for social action, based on the free decision of independent citizens rather than on the benevolent acts of an authoritarian government. They also fitted into the established religious framework, for many of them represented Protestantism translated into social action, or, if the reformers had severed their religious ties, secularized moral ideas derived from Protestant thought. It must be stressed that America is the only country whose immigrants came in very large numbers in search of religious or political freedom or in search of social reforms.

Economic Reasons. Nonetheless, the economic factor was a potent motive in American immigration and probably furnished the greatest number of immigrants. The term "economic" is rather comprehensive; there are several types of immigrants who differ substantially although all of them came for economic reasons. Historically, the first was the group of "younger sons," the children of aristocrats and other privileged families who received land grants from the king so that they could live in comfort. This was a group which set out at an advantage. What made them emigrants was privilege, not privation. This group is important because it established the American plantation patterns which dominated both the economic and cultural life of the South for 200 years. It should be noted that this plantation culture was distinctly nonurban; but because of its social prestige and economic dominance, it delayed the urbanization of the South. At the same time that the South was being settled, the Dutch founded New Amsterdam and English merchants came to the already established Puritan settlements in New England. Both groups came as traders seeking, and often finding, wealth; they were entrepreneurs who were not desperately trying to make a living but engaged in promising ventures. This group was entirely urban and they were the founders of the families who still form the elite of the older cities.

From the time of the first settlements until the closing of the frontier two other groups also immigrated in large numbers. One is of no interest for our topic: the farmers who were attracted by the reports of abundant land. The second group consisted of artisans and small traders who went to the cities and towns. They were neither wealthy nor destitute. After America had established her reputation as the "country of unlimited possibilities," the economic motives showed the greatest range of variation. Some rich people immigrated because they wanted to become still richer; venturesome businessmen, with or without capital, availed themselves of ever-increasing opportunities; speculators, promoters, and fortune hunters arrived. But there was also an inces-

sant stream of middle-class urban immigrants with limited ambitions who simply wanted a good place in which to work and live. The general success (in spite of critical times and individual failures) of the economic immigrant created a special "problem": the absence of a large, impoverished urban proletariat. The builders of railroads and the masters of heavy industries found themselves insufficiently supplied with cheap contract labor. Just then the first mass immigration, created by economic despair, occurred; the potato famine drove the Irish to America. This might in part explain why the Irish, although they had come from rural Ireland, stayed in the cities after they had immigrated. They found employment in towns, although initially at very low wages. The Irish are still conspicuous as leaders in the labor movement while the old stock is rarely represented.

Destitution as an economic motive for immigration historically came last but in due time it furnished masses, probably exceeding all other immigrants in number. They came mostly from Eastern and Southern Europe; they were driven by starvation, caused by the semifeudal conditions of their homeland, by overpopulation, or by both. Consequently, the characteristics of the immigrants changed. The earlier immigrants, those who were well to do as well as those of moderate means were—in terms of ability although not necessarily in terms of moral traits—an elite; that is, they were above average in energy and inventiveness and knew how to organize and manage an enterprise. The middle-class immigrant, lacking the spirit of adventure and much more modest in his ambition, had at least the courage without which no one emigrates of his own volition; he had skill, industry, patience, and stamina. In brief, the upper and middle brackets of the economic immigrants came as a result of positive selection. This made it likely that they had certain qualities which are prerequisites for successful immigration. Conversely, the destitute immigrant came as the result of negative selection; he could not exist in his own country and left for another in despair. He was characterized by poverty and ignorance; he possessed no skills and had no training. With a few exceptions these immigrants came to and remained in the cities where they filled existing slums and created new ones. It is clear that negative selection by necessity is linked with a lower quality of immigrant. Observers were soon aware of this fact, but many erroneously attributed the deterioration to the alleged inferiority of the Eastern and Southern "races" rather than to unfortunate social conditions.[14] Ironically, the children of these

[14] That deterioration occurred cannot be doubted; army mental examinations showed a decline in the qualities of immigrants. The problem has been studied by Kimball Young, *Mental Differences in Certain Immigrant Groups,* Eugene, Ore., 1922. For a discussion of the phenomenon see also F. H. Hawkins, "Anglo-Saxonism and Nordicism in America," in V. F. Calverton (ed.), *The Making of Society,* New York, 1927, especially pp. 780 ff. Detailed data, reporting the results of tests given to various cultural groups are to be found in Otto Klineberg (ed.), *Characteristics of the American Negro,* New York, 1944. According to this report, sixteen studies showed that Italians have a lower IQ than the

destitute immigrants were in the forefront when the door to future immigration was practically closed. It was the pressure of labor (frequently led by persons whose parents had been destitute immigrants) which accounts for some provisions aimed at preventing poor urban laborers from coming to the United States.



FIG. 8. Immigration to the United States by nationality from 1850 to 1940. (*From T. Lynn Smith, Population Analysis, p. 319. By permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York.*)

OUTCOME

We can now sum up the trends in immigration and their impact on urban life. The colonial period brought the old stock, that is, the Anglo-Saxons, the Scotch, the Scotch-Irish, the Welsh, the Dutch, and the French Huguenots; the largest minority group was the Germans, who also were the only immigrants who—only in rural areas—were able to preserve their language. The Dutch and French Huguenots were not numerous enough to retain their mother tongue. The other white immigrants—Spanish and French Catholics—settled in regions which became American territory long after American patterns of life had been firmly established. This is also the era when Negroes

American Negro. Since Italy produced many of the world's greatest men, the unselective character of immigration is patent, even if it is granted that so-called intelligence tests are of doubtful validity.

were brought to America.[15] The great majority of immigrants went to rural areas and remained there. Many of their descendants never left the farms. Still the rural-urban migrants whose ancestry dates back to this and the following period, together with the old stock that settled directly in towns, constitute the "established families" which furnish the cities with their aristocracy, the groups with the highest "ascribed" status. There are two other reasons why this period, in spite of its preponderantly rural character, is important for American urban conditions. The old stock founded the "historic" cities after which later settlements were modeled. They also developed what may be called "the American pattern of life." This happened not only because the old stock was the first to arrive but because the leaders of the first immigrants came to this country determined to establish communities based on ethical principles, however vaguely conceived. This in turn occurred because the proportion of noneconomic immigrants was unusually high.[16] These noneconomic immigrants were Protestants, nonconformists, reformers, and experimenters longing for independence, all individualists who nevertheless had a strong sense of communal responsibility. The influence which Calvinism and certain sects, particularly the Quakers, exerted within this group has been stressed by Max Weber and Tawney and does not require further discussion. This was also a period of political immigration including the enforced immigration of the Negroes.

The second period—until approximately 1850—is a continuation of the colonial era with some modifications. The immigration was still mostly rural, though in the decade from 1840 to 1850 a larger part of the arrivals must have stayed in towns. Religious zeal had begun to abate although immigration on a sectarian basis continued. The proportion of noneconomic immigrants remained high. Probably fewer immigrants came to worship according to their own consciences, but larger groups were attracted by the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. The political immigrants who came of their own volition, or were forced from Europe by the political reaction after 1815, subscribed to the same basic philosophic principles as the founders of the American way. The economically motivated immigrants of this period were, as a general rule, not destitute, not forced to leave their country, and, varied as their motives were, generally had an enter-

[15] The first Negroes arrived in 1619; the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 1) states that the "migration or importation of certain Persons . . . shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight." There is reason to believe that some slaves were smuggled into the United States after 1808, but the increase by this kind of immigration could not have been substantial.

[16] The outcome might have been different if the War between the States had not resulted in a breakdown of the Southern aristocracy with a different pattern of life style. However, since these patterns were dependent on the plantation system, which was doomed before the secession, the disappearance of this Southern type was inevitable.

prising character and sufficient educational training. The ethnic composition did not substantially differ from the preceding period; the number of Germans, practically all middle-class people, increased and continued to rise until the end of the century.

The third period—roughly from 1850 to 1890—is characterized by the prevalence of economic motives for immigration. The religious nonconformist, the social reformer and experimenter, and the immigrant in search of political freedom no longer represented a mass phenomenon. At the beginning of this period large regions of the United States were still underdeveloped; at its end the frontier had disappeared and with it free or cheap farm land. Urbanization had started. New York City, whose population (including the entire area which is now incorporated) was still below 700,000 in 1850, had reached more than 2,500,000 in 1890. The masses of immigrants no longer went to rural areas; they chose cities and showed a preference for the largest ones. Urban immigration shows striking contrasts to the preceding periods. Most immigrants were destitute or nearly so. With the exception of the Irish, they did not speak English. By and large they were not Protestants, still less nonconformists. Again, with the exception of the Irish, they came from countries with an illiberal political philosophy; their traditions, their customs, and their cultural heritage differed in essential aspects from the American pattern, which after a history of more than 200 years had assumed a definite shape.

The fourth period extends until the First World War. In this period urban immigration reached its peak; the bulk of immigrants again came for economic reasons; all the characteristics of the preceding periods were even more marked: destitution, low educational level, and lack of familiarity with American institutions. The already existing problems became even graver. The main centers of dispersion in the third period were Ireland, Northern and central Europe; in the fourth period they shifted to Eastern and Southern Europe. Religious diversity increased. Catholicism gained through immigration of Poles and Italians; members of Eastern Orthodox churches arrived from Russia and the Balkans; Orthodox Jews from Poland and Russia immigrated in large numbers; the Irish, as the oldest group, successfully assumed the leadership of the subsequently immigrating Catholics from other countries. Eastern Jews soon outnumbered the Spanish-Portuguese and central European Jews who had arrived at an earlier time. In brief, in this period the urban population composition reached its present character.

The last period—since the First World War—is one of restricted immigration based on several selective principles. It excludes illiterates, persons of poor health, undesirable individuals such as mentally deficient persons, criminals, prostitutes, drug addicts, and, since the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, members or former members of totalitarian parties. These measures, however, aim only at the exclusion of elements which, rightly or

wrongly, are considered as unwanted accretions. The law also determines a maximum figure for immigrants (except certain close relatives, former citizens, and natives of the other American countries). The yearly quota is now 154,567. This is less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the entire population and the percentage will decrease even more as the native-born population continues to grow. Moreover, the difficulty in fulfilling all the requirements provided by the law is so great that the existing quota is rarely filled; from 1930 to 1936 the number of departing aliens actually exceeded that of those arriving. Since the maximum increase of foreigners during one decade—not counting emigrants and deaths of aliens—can never reach 1 per cent of the population, it is obvious that immigrants can no longer change the composition of the population.[17] Nor can they have an influence on the ecology of the city, the perpetuation of slums, or the diffusion of cultural traits differing from American patterns. Consequently, the number of foreign-born has been decreasing for the last three decades and this trend apparently will continue. Future immigration may or may not bring talented persons to this country or contribute to the solution of individual human problems, but it will have no further influence on the structure of the American population.

The impact of immigration on the size and composition of the population can be judged from the fact that from 1820 to 1951 a total of 39,531,199 immigrants were admitted. Table 17 shows the immigration movements for each year; Table 18 arranges the immigrants by country of origin. How many of these immigrants came directly to cities cannot be precisely determined. From a comparison between the growth of urban and rural areas we can venture to say that up to 1850 the majority went to farms, that for the two following decades they were more evenly divided, and that from then on, urban immigrants increased rapidly, and that since 1900, rural immigration has become insignificant. As soon as urbanization gained momentum, immigrants flocked to the cities.[18]

Note on the Refugee and the Foreigner. A refugee is a person who has to leave his mother country and finds hospitality in another country which grants him temporary or permanent refuge. Legally, no such persons—save a few exceptions—were admitted to the United States from 1924 to 1946. The so-called German refugees who came to America from 1933 until the end of the Second World War were regular immigrants who had to fulfill all the requirements of an existing law and were admitted only within the limits of the established quotas. Since statistics make no distinctions, the exact number of these refugees cannot be determined. Including Austrians, the

[17] For this reason we do not discuss the attempts made by the laws of 1924 and 1952 to stabilize the composition of the population as it existed in 1920.

[18] This statement has been contested by Walter F. Willcox, *Studies in American Demography,* Ithaca, N.Y., 1940, but his argument is unconvincing. For a documented refutation see T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis,* New York, 1948, pp. 50 ff.

TABLE 17. IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, 1820 TO 1951

Year	Persons *	Year	Persons *	Year	Persons *	Year	Persons *
1820	8,385	1853	368,645	1886	334,203	1919	141,132
1821	9,127	1854	427,833	1887	490,109	1920	430,001
1822	6,911	1855	200,877	1888	546,889	1921	805,228
1823	6,354	1856	200,436	1889	444,427	1922	309,556
1824	7,912	1857	251,306	1890	455,302	1923	522,919
1825	10,199	1858	123,126	1891	560,319	1924	706,896
1826	10,837	1859	121,282	1892	579,663	1925	294,314
1827	18,875	1860	153,640	1893	439,730	1926	304,488
1828	27,382	1861	91,918	1894	285,631	1927	335,175
1829	22,520	1862	91,985	1895	258,536	1928	307,255
1830	23,322	1863	176,282	1896	343,267	1929	279,678
1831	22,633	1864	193,418	1897	230,832	1930	241,700
1832	60,482	1865	248,120	1898	229,299	1931	97,139
1833	58,640	1866	318,568	1899	311,715	1932	35,576
1834	65,365	1867	315,722	1900	448,572	1933	23,068
1835	45,374	1868	138,840	1901	487,918	1934	29,470
1836	76,242	1869	352,768	1902	648,743	1935	34,956
1837	79,340	1870	387,203	1903	857,046	1936	36,329
1838	38,914	1871	321,500	1904	812,870	1937	50,244
1839	68,069	1872	404,806	1905	1,026,499	1938	67,895
1840	84,066	1873	459,803	1906	1,100,735	1939	82,998
1841	80,289	1874	313,339	1907	1,285,349	1940	70,756
1842	104,565	1875	227,498	1908	782,870	1941	51,776
1843	52,496	1876	169,986	1909	751,786	1942	28,781
1844	78,615	1877	141,857	1910	1,041,570	1943	23,725
1845	114,371	1878	138,469	1911	878,587	1944	28,551
1846	154,416	1879	177,826	1912	838,172	1945	38,119
1847	234,968	1880	457,257	1913	1,197,892	1946	108,721
1848	226,527	1881	669,431	1914	1,218,480	1947	147,292
1849	297,024	1882	788,992	1915	326,700	1948	170,570
1850	369,980	1883	603,322	1916	298,826	1949	188,317
1851	379,466	1884	518,592	1917	295,403	1950	249,187
1852	371,603	1885	395,346	1918	110,618	1951	205,717

* From 1820–1867, figures represent alien passengers arrived; 1868–1891 and 1895–1897, immigrant aliens arrived; 1892–1894 and 1898 to present, immigrant aliens admitted.

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

figure must be below 100,000. Most of these immigrants settled in New York City; the majority were beyond the prime of life and had few or no children. From the viewpoint of population composition, the immigration of this group is without significance.

The case of "displaced persons," who either fled or were forcibly expelled by Communist-dominated countries after the Second World War, is some-

Table 18. Immigration by Country of Origin, 1820 to 1951

(Figures are totals, not annual averages, and were tabulated as follows: 1820–1867, alien passengers arrived; 1868–1891 and 1895–1897, immigrant aliens arrived; 1892–1894 and 1898–1951, immigrant aliens admitted. Data before 1906 relate to country whence alien came; since 1906, to country of last permanent residence.)

Countries	1820–1910	1911–1920	1921–1930	1931–1940	1941–1950	1951	1820–1951
Europe:							
Albania [a]	.....	.....	1,663	2,040	85	7	3,795
Austria [b]	3,172,461	453,649	32,868	3,563	24,860	9,761	4,181,927
Belgium	103,796	33,746	15,846	4,817	12,189	1,802	172,196
Bulgaria [c]	39,440	22,533	2,945	938	375	1	66,232
Czechoslovakia [a]	.....	3,426	102,194	14,393	8,347	88	128,448
Denmark	258,053	41,983	32,430	2,559	5,393	1,076	341,494
Estonia [a]	.....	.....	1,576	506	212	.....	2,294
Finland [a]	.....	756	16,691	2,146	2,503	532	22,628
France	470,868	61,897	49,610	12,623	38,809	4,573	638,380
Germany [b]	5,351,746	143,945	412,202	114,058	226,578	87,755	6,336,284
Great Britain:							
England	2,212,071	249,944	157,420	21,756	112,252	12,393	2,765,836
Scotland	488,749	78,357	159,781	6,887	16,131	2,309	752,214
Wales	59,540	13,107	13,012	735	3,209	196	89,799
Not specified [d]	793,741	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	793,741
Greece	186,204	184,201	51,084	9,119	8,973	4,459	444,040
Hungary [b]	.....	442,693	30,680	7,861	3,469	62	4,181,927
Ireland	4,212,169	146,181	220,591	13,167	25,377	3,144	4,622,219
Italy	3,086,356	1,109,524	455,315	68,028	57,661	8,958	4,785,842
Latvia [a]	.....	.....	3,399	1,192	361	5	4,957
Lithuania [a]	.....	.....	6,015	2,201	683	8	8,907
Luxemburg [a]	.....	.....	727	565	820	51	2,163
Netherlands	175,943	43,718	26,948	7,150	14,860	3,062	271,681
Norway [e]	665,189	66,395	68,531	4,740	10,100	2,289	817,244
Poland [f]	165,182	4,813	227,734	17,026	7,571	98	422,424
Portugal	132,989	89,732	29,994	3,329	7,423	1,078	264,545
Romania [g]	72,117	13,311	67,646	3,871	1,076	104	158,125
Spain	69,296	68,611	28,958	3,258	2,898	442	173,463
Sweden [e]	1,021,165	95,074	97,249	3,960	10,665	2,022	1,230,135
Switzerland	237,401	23,091	29,676	5,512	10,547	1,485	307,712
Turkey in Europe	85,800	54,677	14,659	737	580	118	156,571
U.S.S.R. [h]	2,359,048	921,201	61,742	1,356	548	10	3,343,905
Yugoslavia [c]	.....	1,888	49,064	5,835	1,576	454	58,817
Other Europe	2,605	8,111	9,603	2,361	5,573	1,203	27,866
Total Europe	25,421,929	4,376,564	2,477,853	348,289	621,704	149,545	33,395,884
Asia:							
China	326,060	21,278	29,907	4,928	16,709	335	399,217
India	5,409	2,082	1,886	496	1,761	109	11,743
Japan [i]	158,344	83,837	33,462	1,948	1,555	271	279,417
Turkey in Asia [j]	106,481	79,389	19,165	328	218	3	205,584
Other Asia	16,942	5,973	12,980	7,644	11,537	3,203	58,279
Total Asia	613,236	192,559	97,400	15,344	31,780	3,921	954,240
America:							
Canada & Newfoundland [k]	1,230,501	742,185	924,515	108,527	171,718	25,880	3,203,236
Central America	10,365	17,159	15,769	5,861	21,665	2,011	72,830
Mexico [l]	77,645	219,004	459,287	22,319	60,589	6,153	844,997
South America	29,385	41,889	42,215	7,803	21,831	3,596	146,729
West Indies	233,146	123,424	74,899	15,502	49,725	5,902	502,598
Other America [m]	.....	.....	31	25	29,276	4,089	33,421
Total America	1,581,042	1,143,671	1,516,716	160,037	354,804	47,631	4,803,901
Africa	9,581	8,443	6,286	1,750	7,367	845	34,272
Australia & New Zealand	31,654	12,348	8,299	2,231	13,805	490	68,827
Pacific Islands	8,859	1,079	427	780	5,437	3,265	19,847
Countries not specified	252,691 [n]	1,147	228	.....	142	20	254,228 [n]
Total all countries	27,918,992	5,735,811	4,107,209	528,431	1,035,039	205,717	39,531,199

[a] Countries established since beginning of the First World War are theretofore included with countries to which they belonged.
[b] Data for Austria-Hungary not reported until 1861. Austria and Hungary recorded separately after 1905. Austria included with Germany 1938–1945.
[c] Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro first reported in 1899. Bulgaria reported separately since 1920. In 1920, separate enumeration for Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes; since 1922, recorded as Yugoslavia.
[d] For United Kingdom.
[e] Norway included with Sweden 1820–1868.
[f] Included with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia 1899–1919.
[g] No record of immigration until 1880.
[h] Since 1931, U.S.S.R. has been broken down into European Russia and Siberia or Asiatic Russia.
[i] No record of immigration until 1861.
[j] No record of immigration until 1869.
[k] Includes all British North American possessions 1820–1898.
[l] No record of immigration 1886–1893.
[m] Included with "Countries not specified" prior to 1925.
[n] Includes 32,897 persons returning in 1906 to their homes in the United States.

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

what different. Special laws such as the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the Refugee Immigration Act of 1953 admitted a total of 553,000 refugees. These refugees are, in some respects, exceptions. There was at least something resembling a planned immigration. The persons were screened before they were admitted, some plans were made in advance with respect to their location and employment; they were more evenly spread over the country and a greater number of them went, at least initially, to farms and not to big cities.

Real refugees have sometimes played an important role in their adopted country. This applies particularly to the French Huguenots who, after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, went to Berlin. There they organized new industries, quickened the pace of Prussia's industrialization, and soon became leading citizens.

The foreigner of distinction deserves attention for cultural reasons. Large cities always have a considerable number of foreigners. Diplomats, newspaper correspondents, students, scholars, and artists give these cities a special flavor. Although not numerous compared to the total population, they are often conspicuous because they tend to concentrate at the most frequented places and some of them are socially very active. Of the American cities, New York received the greatest number of foreigners of this type when the United Nations was established. Washington, D.C. probably comes next. Besides, some cities always attracted larger numbers of foreigners, whether they were centers of arts, scholarship, international meeting places, or just cities of pleasure. To varying degrees at different times these foreigners have lived or are living now in Paris, London, Vienna, Rome, Geneva, Florence, Venice, and some of the Riviera towns. This type of foreigner usually meets with little animosity; if he has made a reputation for himself, he is even a welcome guest. Psychologically secure, just because he is a distinguished stranger, he intentionally remains a foreigner, adjusted to, but not integrated into, the society which he has joined. Sometimes a creative person elects to live in voluntary exile rather than at home. Oddly, writers more than any other artists have preferred foreign cities, although they thereby lose contact with their mother tongue, the medium of their art. Shelley in Leghorn, Keats in Rome, Byron in Venice, the Brownings in Florence, Voltaire in Berlin, Stendhal in Milan, Heine in Paris, and Joyce in Trieste are a few examples. They are not changed by the foreign cities nor are the cities changed by them. But they prove that the intellectual function of great cities and the creative power which emanates from them are not limited to the specific culture which they represent.

C. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY

Chapter 13

THE PROBLEMS OF THE COMPOSITE CITY

Not all cities are composite. As a broad generalization it may be said that heterogeneity of population increases with the size of the city. Even in an extremely mobile society such as America, some smaller towns are as homogeneous as the surrounding countryside. However, the American city in general shows a greater diversity than perhaps any other urban settlement.[1] This is not difficult to understand. The great influx of immigrants has been of less than 150 years' duration, which is too short a time for them to become completely assimilated. No other country has ever experienced a mass immigration of similar dimensions. The existence of a large Negro population adds an element absent in Europe and, except in South Africa and some urban places in the West Indies, not present in a similar proportion elsewhere. Parts of the territory of the United States were acquired from the Dutch, French, Spanish, and Mexicans, all of whom had already founded urban settlements of their own. Some immigrants established new nationally homogeneous towns which soon, however, received additions from other ethnic groups. Perhaps of even greater importance is the fact that as soon as mass immigration began, the majority of newcomers came to the cities and shunned the rural regions. Consequently, the farm areas are more homogeneous and the cities more composite than is indicated by the percentage figures of the various groups constituting the population of the United States. True, there is a concentration of Negroes in the rural South, of Mexicans in the rural Southwest and, to a lesser degree, of French Canadians in the rural Northeast, but normally no more than one ethnic minority group is found in any given rural area, while the larger cities sometimes harbor more than a score. The problems arising from complexity are, for the most part, problems of the city.

In dealing with the population composition of urban areas our statistical data are of debatable validity. The available census figures indicate "race," whether native white or foreign-born, and with respect to the latter, also the

[1] A comparable diversity exists in some large urban centers outside the United States, notably in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Tangier, and Johannesburg.

country of birth.[2] We know that the census criteria of race are unscientific and, to a great extent, arbitrary. Herskovits, for instance, found that of 1,551 Americans classified as Negroes, only 22 per cent were "unmixed." [3] However, the official data show at least who is considered (and, accordingly, treated) as Negro, which is more important for social situations than the correct anthropological classification. The term "country of origin" conveys doubtful information; countries such as Russia and Austria-Hungary are not only multinational but have undergone substantial territorial changes. Members of the same family might have immigrated in 1913 as Austrians, in 1920 as Poles, and in 1950 as Russians. People from Alsace came either as Germans or French, and so forth. As far as the native white population is concerned, no official data yield information about their cultural antecedents. There is no reliable method to ascertain with accuracy the ethnic background of the native-born population; there are too many persons of mixed parentage and too many "marginal" men in various stages of transition. Statistical data are further inadequate for indicating the extent and the speed of disappearing cultural characteristics. For instance, during the period from 1820 to 1948 the number of German immigrants was 6,064,653 and of Irish immigrants 4,605,091. But the Irish remained far more conspicuous as a distinct urban group in America than the Germans. In other words, members of different ethnic groups have a different rate of disappearance as distinct entities.[4]

Some Generalizations. With these limitations in mind we may venture the following generalizations:

1. All cities are composite. Those which are ethnically homogeneous have at least a more or less marked class system.

2. Heterogeneity is usually reflected in ecological differentiation; different sections provide residences for groups of different class status as well as for persons belonging to different cultures or subcultures.

3. Not all heterogeneous qualities are of sociological importance. Some only lend color to a city, while others constitute grave problems. The problem is not created by an existing difference but by the value ascribed to a specific difference at a given time and a given place. The presence of Quakers was a problem in Puritan New England but is of no consequence today.

4. The problems are frequently based upon the number of minority group members. For that reason European cities have no Negro problem. For the

[2] The immigration figures add to the confusion. What the census calls "race," immigration authorities list as "color," while "race" refers to ethnic background.

[3] This means, of course, that the investigated individuals showed Negro characteristics but not that they had only Negro ancestors; see Melville Herskovits, *The American Negro: A Study in Racial Crossing*, New York, 1930.

[4] For further discussion see T. J. Woofter, Jr., *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life*, New York, 1933, pp. 4–11.

same reason the occasional presence of a Portuguese does not matter in most American cities. But in Provincetown on Cape Cod there are enough Portuguese to form a very characteristic group which has created distinct differences with respect to status, occupation, customs, and dietary habits.

5. Complexity of population has different effects in static ("closed") and dynamic ("open") societies. In the former, status, roles, and intergroup relationships are rigidly prescribed and ordinarily no attempts are made to change the pattern of the social situation. The open society is by its very nature in constant flux; at least it pretends to treat all members equally without regard to group differences. The group relationships in an open society rest much more on the actual power of the groups than on legal regulations.

Complexity and Conflict. Although the American population is more complex, the disorganizing effects resulting from complexity have never been as grave as they were at times in European countries. The most important aspects of social complexity are class, race, religious and ethnic differences. Class differences, as noted before, are minimized by public opinion in America. They exist but they have never had repercussions as serious as those in Europe. America has never had peasants nor a titled, legally privileged aristocracy. The intercity struggle between nobility and the ordinary townspeople, as experienced in ancient Rome, many times repeated in medieval Italian cities and elsewhere, has been completely absent. Conflict between city and country is, to be sure, always latent, but it has never led to anything like the medieval peasant revolts. Modern strife between the urban industrial classes and the moneyed interests has also been at a minimum; the absence of a genuine labor party and the fact that the terms *bourgeoisie* and proletariat do not exist in the common man's vocabulary are telling indications. America has not only been spared class revolutions but even the lesser revolts which happened in practically every European country. Nothing faintly resembling the Chartist revolts ever happened in American cities, let alone the many acts of violence by syndicalists and radical Marxists in Europe. American class conflicts—between urban and rural interests as well as the intraurban conflict between labor and management—are mainly fought by ballot, or by strikes which cause only minor disruptions even when still illegal. Race conflicts cannot occur in Europe (which is entirely white) while they are latent in America. Race violence, as sad as occasional acts of lawlessness are, has never led to revolts on a larger scale. Religious differences have also caused serious tensions and individual acts of terror. But these cannot be compared to the persecution of the Albigenses, the Inquisition, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Thirty Years' War, the pogroms of the nineteenth century, and the extermination of the Jews in the twentieth century.

National differences depend on historical situations. Domestic, and more specifically intraurban national differences, are the result of migration, peaceful or belligerent. In Europe the most widespread migrations took place dur-

ing the early Middle Ages when nationalism was not very powerful. In many instances the various nationalities fused into one nation and the source of potential conflicts disappeared. In other instances, or if immigration was too recent to permit assimilation, the results differed. If a nationality inhabited a fairly homogeneous region—cities and rural areas—peaceful solutions could be reached; the model case is Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Belgium.[5] Elsewhere, however, the need to establish a single official language immediately stamped the members of different language groups as minorities, which in times of a triumphant nationalism inevitably led to conflicts. To wipe out the differences minorities were frequently subjected to a ruthless policy of enforced assimilation, which sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed. The ensuing conflicts were all urban in character. The farm population, at worst, followed the prompters from the city. Invariably it is the city which furnishes the leaders, the organization, the ideas, the propaganda, and the masses who are willing to fight. In Macedonia, where the cities are agglomerations of Turks, Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and "Macedonians," violent strife is seemingly eternal because the tangle is so hopeless that people believe only in a solution by force. Nationalism finally broke up the Austro-Hungarian Empire but the struggle in the multinational cities continued in the newly established countries until it ended with the expulsion of the nonassimilated minorities. The struggle between Poles and Czechs for the possession of Teschen resulted in the splitting of the city into two parts, each belonging to another state, which, even for Europe, is a unique piece of folly. The Poles in 1938 started an abortive military raid to gain control over the entire city, and shortly before they had begun a war with Lithuania for the possession of a single city, Vilna. The nationalism of the cities led to the establishment of independent city units, first Danzig and then Trieste. America, having more nationalities than any European country, has never been in danger of similar conflicts, although her ethnic minorities are heavily concentrated in cities. The minorities in America are in a different position; they have been admitted, not conquered.

Implications of Complexity. It is impossible to determine precisely the composition of the American population in any other way than by vague approximation. The existing literature approaches the subject mainly from the viewpoint of ethnic and religious discrimination which, in the present analysis, is only part of the problem.

When the first census was taken in 1790, about 20 per cent of the population was nonwhite. The census, of course, did not include the population of territories which at that time were not yet a part of the United States. We shall hardly err in assuming that in 1790 at least 10 per cent—mostly

[5] Regional separation of the two main nationalities permitted a similar arrangement in Canada. Conversely, if a country fails to pacify national minorities, the situation is tense, as in Spain with its malcontent Catalonians and Basques.

Germans and Irish—of the census population did not belong to the old stock, which thus could not have exceeded 70 per cent. The acquisition of the remaining parts of the continent and of Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, plus the heavy immigration in the following 150 years, must have reduced considerably the proportion of the old stock although some of the newcomers were completely assimilated. If we further consider that the old stock is concentrated in rural areas, that for more than half a century the immigrants went to the cities, and that more and more Negroes move from farms to urban places, we have to conclude that much more than one-third of the urban population has to be classified as belonging to a minority group. In some of the major cities the old stock has undoubtedly lost political control.

The transformation of a national majority into a local minority is indeed a most striking feature of American urbanism. It is equally remarkable that minority traits are not limited to deviations in just one respect: there is usually an interrelation of ethnic, religious, class, economic, political, and social factors weaving disparate features into a single pattern. This simplifies the bewildering complexity but it also widens the gap. Let us illustrate this statement by outlining the biographical data of two imaginary men, both seeking election as governor of Massachusetts.[6] Their actual political views might be much more similar than the voters think and the election of either person might bring the same results in administration. Both men will be city-bred; A was born on Beacon or Chestnut Hill, or another of the exclusive residential Boston suburbs; B was born in South Boston, Dorchester, Roxbury, or some other "less desirable" section. A's ancestors arrived in the Bay State from England in the latter part of the seventeenth century, are therefore old stock, and belong to the approximately 3,000 families which appear in the *Social Register*. His father is presumably a business executive. B's grandfather arrived from Ireland as an unskilled worker; his father became a policeman. A and B might have had the same training but in different ways. A went to Groton or another prep school of good repute, did his undergraduate work at Yale, where he distinguished himself as an oarsman, and finished at Harvard Law School. If he practices law, he will be a corporation lawyer, advising railroads, banks, and insurance companies. B went to a parochial grade school, was an undergraduate at Holy Cross College, where he excelled in football, and received his law degree from Boston College. As a lawyer he either specializes in criminal cases or has a general practice but does not represent corporations. He might have served as district attorney. Both men will have some means, but A inherited a substantial amount while B started from scratch. A is either an Episcopalian or a Unitarian; B is a Roman Catholic. If A belongs to a fraternal society (which is doubtful), he is a Mason or a Rotarian, but more likely he belongs to some

[6] The example is fictitious but, at least in the last three decades, the actual deviations have been rather negligible.

club with restricted membership. B will belong to the Knights of Columbus and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. A is a Republican and B is a Democrat, but A may be more liberal and B more conservative. This description is intended to point out that ethnic differences have more implications than one might expect.

Separation versus Integration. The question of minorities is very much in the minds of the public. It is symptomatic that even brief biographical sketches for public information never fail to mention a person's cultural background, including instances in which the ancestry is obviously immaterial, as in the case of Jefferson, who, "according to a family tradition," was Welsh. Many persons have the habit of mentioning their origin shortly after they have been introduced. This may reflect emotional insecurity rather than pride. Problems of minority status have created a large amount of popular and scientific literature. Most authors have concentrated on a specific aspect: discrimination (or, at least, lower status) and its injustice. Such an approach is too narrow for present purposes. Theoretically, all injustice could be removed and the main problem would still exist: American urban society is to a considerable extent unintegrated and large groups whose members suffer no or only a modicum of discrimination refuse to consider complete integration as the final goal. "Stick to your own people" is a slogan which can be heard—sometimes only in a whisper—with equal force in Greek-letter societies and country clubs as well as from Catholic pulpits or in Zionist meetings and, more recently, from some Negro leaders. The situation would be different if minorities were regionally separated and town and country together represented one cultural unit. Such is the case in the split between French and British Canadians, with the Basques in the Pyrenees, the Bretons in France, the Welsh and Scots in Great Britain, and the four nationalities in Switzerland. Each subgroup, living in a well-defined territory, can maintain its own specific culture because contacts with other groups are either infrequent or limited to specific matters such as Federal legislation or national defense. The American situation is entirely different. First, as mentioned several times, the phenomenon of minorities is preponderantly urban and is increasingly so with the stepped-up exodus of Negroes from the farms. The minorities live in urban places which are completely surrounded by culturally different farm areas. In spite of regional differences in concentration of subgroups, all minorities are scattered. Their concentration is sufficient to keep them together but not sufficient to keep them entirely apart from other groups. The areas of segregation may give them a common residence but it cannot isolate them. They are bound to make continuous contacts with members of other groups. They cannot "stick to their own people" because they must mix. Thus perhaps more than one-third of the urban population live in an amphibious existence. Lack of effective community organization and per-

sonal disorganization inevitably result even if people do not suffer from actual discrimination.

Attitudinal Conflict. However, one aspect of discrimination has to be mentioned because of its aggravating effects: the inconsistency between discrimination and what has been called "the American creed." Man, irrational as he is to a large degree, is completely consistent neither in thought nor in action. If an Irishman immigrates to London, he knows that he goes to an English city and he does not expect home rule for the thousands of Irish who live there; he is aware of his minority status. A Protestant in Spain will not expect an appointment to a leading government position. Catholics in Sweden, with an established Lutheran Church, will not ask that the city of Stockholm pay the cost of school buses for parochial schools. America officially does not recognize minorities as such: all are Americans, equal and free, which means, as so many believe, that they are free to retain a state of cultural diversity and still have equal access to all opportunities. It must be pointed out that this kind of interpretation creates rather than solves problems. But the fact remains that the same people who stress equality regardless of creed, race, or nationality practice discrimination, and this holds true for both the old stock and the minorities. Even Negroes, who suffer more from that practice than any other group, sometimes do not want white people to live in their sections. Group antagonism is a two-way proposition.

In addition to the disintegrating effects on community organization and personality, minority status tends to disorganize families, especially those of first-generation immigrants. There is always a latent antagonism between generations, which even under ordinary circumstances may lead to open conflict. Ordinarily, the existing affectional ties prove to be stronger and the parent-children relationships finally become positive attachments. If the inherently antagonistic situation is aggravated by extraneous factors, the outcome may be different. With respect to class status, the danger is greater with more intelligent and sensitive individuals. Thus we can observe how the better-educated children of low-class parents break away from their homes and for what they stand, socially as well as politically. Quite a number of labor leaders saw their sons end as reactionaries.[7] Conversely, some children of the rich become rabid radicals.[8] In the first case, psychological insecurity, in the second instance, guilt feelings connected with the possession of unearned wealth, are contributing factors. Middle-class children, too, frequently reject their ascribed status; they are against Philistine ways of life and penny-pinching thriftiness, all only to become either snobs or Bohemians without creative power. In these cases family ties are broken and the individuals

[7] This is much more frequent in Europe, with its stricter class divisions.

[8] Corliss Lamont wrote an essay to explain why wealthy families have so many children who are "leftists."

become socially disorganized. The children of minority group parents blame their fathers and mothers for rejections which they suffer in school or for difficulties in obtaining positions in business and social life. They not only do not share their parents' appreciation of the values of their native culture but they hate everything which is dear to the parents. The following case history [9] is chosen because it demonstrates how violent the conflict between generations can become even when cultural differences are insignificant. The case also shows how the conflict sometimes leads to delinquency and ends in complete severance of all family ties.

My father was born in Denmark. . . . His parents inculcated in him the idea that work was holiness for a young boy and that idleness was the very devil. Implicit obedience in every regard was demanded of him, and he grew up under a family regime in which the man was master, the wife a servant, and the children puppets. . . . My mother had an equally severe and circumscribed upbringing in Sweden. . . . The Dane and the Swede met in Ohio and after an unemotional and sexless Nordic courtship they were married and engendered four children within eight years. I, unfortunately, was one of these. If we had been brought up in Sweden or Denmark everything would have been rosy, but the difficulty arose in my parents' attempt to establish a Scandinavian family in the United States. My brother and I went to Sweden for two years with our mother, and since we learned to talk while we were over there we could not speak English when we started school in this country. Naturally all the children made fun of us; so I immediately became a decided introvert, shunning all associations which might have brought hurt to my newly developed sensitivity. The conflict in the family was strong and of long duration. We were told one thing at home, another thing at school, and still other phases of the same subjects by children acquaintances; so we were in a quandary as to which authority to accept. . . . I began to feel out of place no matter where I was or what I was doing. . . . Sex was never explained to us; that was meant to remain a sweet mystery of life. And cards, women, dancing, smoking, drinking, parties, and such were all taboo for life. That explains my later indulgence in all of them. I even lied and cheated and perpetrated petty thieveries to "show them." It is always a pleasure to go beyond restrictions.

The divine-right-of-parents idea in the heads of my mother and father finally caused me to leave home. . . . I have wandered "lonely as a cloud" for several years now, but little as I like to be homeless I prefer it to returning to the situation I endured before. And naturally, feeling thus keenly the failure of the home from which I came, I desire all the more to manage differently in the home which I shall some day establish. With that horrible example always before my mind's eye I should be able to avoid committing the crimes of unreasonableness and outrageous omission of my parents. I feel that the problem in my home could have been solved by education and by a more thorough degree of Americanization. . . .

So this is just another broken family, because my brother, too, left when he had had enough. I may see my parents again sometime or I may not; it makes

[9] Ernest R. Groves and Gladys Hoagland Groves, *The Contemporary American Family*, Philadelphia, 1947. By permission of J. B. Lippincott Company.

no difference to me. If I do encounter them accidentally it will be like meeting an old acquaintance who had done you dirt long in the past. We would be frigidly polite if we said anything at all. My chief regrets are that the lack of home life leaves a void in my life. . . .

Complexity and Freedom. One aspect of a composite population is rarely discussed: the concomitant infringements on liberty. Even the most free society has its taboos. In a homogeneous society formal taboos tend to be less numerous. The concentration of minorities in cities permits the formation of pressure groups which—by their voting power and other familiar means—exert much more influence than their numerical strength warrants. Protests, picketing, and threats of boycott are sufficiently effective to exert an informal censorship contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and sometimes more restrictive than in less democratic countries. Minority groups have, with more or less success, objected to the presentation of films which only one group considers as blasphemous or indecent, to the performance of *The Merchant of Venice,* to keeping *Oliver Twist* out of school libraries, to television shows presenting a mixed white and Negro choir, to the exhibition of Renoir paintings in an artshop window, to using textbooks published under the auspices of UNESCO, and to selling popular editions of works by Freud and Faulkner.

Loyalty Conflicts. Much more serious is the undesirable fact of divided loyalty among some members of minorities. Almost all countries with multiple national groups are affected. But in other countries the minorities are quite aware that they are in a peripheral situation. The French in Lorraine, who before 1918 wanted to be reunited with France, or the Croats who supported Pan-Slavism, fought for their own cause and never claimed that their wishes were to the advantage of Germany or Austria-Hungary respectively. American minorities identify their own cause with the interests of the United States although sometimes the opposite is the case. The danger in periods of war is obvious, and they led to more or less grave conflicts with German, Italian, and Japanese minorities. But policies during peacetime are also seriously hampered by divided loyalties. Pressure has been brought upon the government to withdraw lend-lease help and, more recently, financial assistance to Great Britain, to appoint or revoke the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican, to support Franco in Spain, to ship or prevent the shipment of arms to various nations in the Near East. Clearly the United States cannot support all the causes dear to particular minorities without harming her own interests and without antagonizing other minority groups which may oppose these measures.

Attitudes toward Minorities. It is not true that all out-groups within a larger system are necessarily in open conflict, as some earlier sociologists (Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz) stated. It is also not true, as other more recent authors indicate, that group conflicts are due mainly to prejudice or

neurosis and that both causes can be removed. The attitude toward outgroups is ambivalent, subject to change of conditions, and dependent on traditional preferences and aversions. It can be shown that immigrants have been alternately invited and expelled, the recipients of privileges or discrimination.

Negroes were so badly wanted, although for purely economic reasons, that their immigration was forced. While they were treated as slaves, it cannot be denied that strong positive emotional ties were frequently established between whites and Negroes. The first Chinese and Japanese were welcomed by those who wanted cheap labor and hated by those whose jobs were threatened by the newcomers. At present, Brazil has invited Japanese to become immigrants while Australia refuses to admit them under any circumstances. The first Jews, in colonial times, came to various urban places in the East, from Georgia to Rhode Island, and usually found a friendly and never a hostile reception, although they lived in devoutly Christian communities which deplored Jewish beliefs. But after 1870 anti-Semitism appeared.[10] The immigration of the low-class Southern and Eastern Europeans, later considered as "less desirable," was at first promoted by all legal or illegal means.

Conversely, it can be shown that groups which now enjoy great prestige sometimes met open hostility. No immigrant group was ever more persecuted than the Quakers who, upon their arrival, were arrested, whipped, pilloried, and sold into slavery by the Puritans to whom they were related by origin. The Scotch-Irish, practically indistinguishable from either the English or the Scots and now fully accepted as old stock, were at first very unpopular. A Pennsylvania official called them "bold and indigent strangers," and people said, "They kept the Sabbath and everything else they could lay their hands on."[11] The Germans soon aroused animosity because they continued to use their mother tongue, which caused a man as mild as Benjamin Franklin to advocate the exclusion of Germans from immigration. His reasons are interesting, for they involve not only a wrong prognostication but also an equally wrong "racial" argument. According to Franklin, the Germans "will shortly become so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our language or customs, any more than they can acquire our complexion."[12]

Usually, but not always, the attitude of the majority becomes more unfriendly if the minority increases in numbers, but the Irish, who were re-

[10] Charles F. Marden, *Minorities in American Society,* New York, p. 497.

[11] Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, *America: The Story of a Free People,* Boston, 1942, chap. 2.

[12] Quoted by J. Bonar, *Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur Young,* London, 1931, pp. 204–205; see also Edmund Whitaker, *A History of Economic Ideas,* New York, p. 334.

ceived with hostility when they first arrived in small groups, are now the only minority which meets with practically no discrimination. The attitude toward additional immigrants is also subject to change. The Alien and Sedition laws were the first legal step toward restricting foreign-borns. After the act was rescinded the atmosphere became much friendlier. Later the Know-Nothing party displayed open hostility; the movement had hardly petered out by the time the first Ku-Klux Klan arose. Then followed the period of unrestricted, unselective mass immigration, which was promoted by railroads, mine operators, and other business enterprises which sought cheap labor. Shortly before the First World War it had become clear that minorities had increased to a degree which made quick assimilation impossible and resentment toward them began to rise. It manifested itself in three ways. First, the old stock and organized labor cooperated for a change and restricted further immigration to an infinitesimal number. Second, the Klan rose again and spread to the North and Middle West. Third, something quite new and, as it appears now, ephemeral, happened: a flood of pseudoscientific literature appeared exalting Anglo-Saxon superiority and racial "theories." [13] However, these proponents were, in a more moderate way, joined by several distinguished scientists.[14] This literature appeared during the period between the outbreak of the First World War and 1926. Since then the literary attacks have ceased but as various laws, including the Immigration Act of 1952, make unmistakably clear, the country does not want new immigrants because (which is more or less openly admitted) a change in the present population composition is unwanted. Whether or not this attitude is reasonable is immaterial. It exists as a very potent social force, demonstrating the coexistence of groups which have little appreciation of each other.

The Cultural Impact of Minorities. The existence of minority groups can have two types of repercussions: individuals belonging to the minority can add to the achievements of a country, or the cultural patterns of the indigenous group may be changed. It is the first, individual achievements, to

[13] The following books were widely read: Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916 and 1918); William S. Sadler, *Long Heads and Round Heads, or What's the Matter with Germany?* (1918); Charles W. Gould, *America: A Family Matter* (1922); Clinton Stoddard Burk, *America's Race Heritage* (1922); Lothrop Stoddard, *The Revolt against Civilization* (1922); and Carl C. Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence* (1923).

[14] Among them were the historian William Roscoe Thayer, *Out of Their Own Mouths* (1917); the psychologist William McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* (1922); and the sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild, *The Melting-pot Mistake* (1926). Fairchild, an eminent scholar, is very careful not to maintain that some races are inferior. Neither does he believe in pure races. But he states that the Anglo-Saxons in America represent a valuable racial combination which must not be diluted. Immigrants from Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Finland, having a very small proportion of Nordic "blood," appear to him as a "menace."

which minorities point in self-defense and the second, cultural change, which the established majority fears.

There are many examples of both effects. The immigrations of the Romans, who came mostly to small urban communities, eradicated the native languages of Spain, France, and Romania. The Norman Conquest profoundly altered the structure of the English language and almost doubled its vocabulary. The invasion of the Balkan countries by the Turks left its imprint on the cities which clearly show an amalgamation of native and Turkish elements. Similarly, the Dalmatian coastal cities were Italian outposts in an otherwise entirely Slavic region. Up to 1918 some Baltic cities were preponderantly German in character although the Germans were a small minority. In all these examples the cultural changes were due to the influence of immigrating urban minorities who had the prestige and the power of a ruling class. This can be compared to the "Americanization" of cities which had been founded by French and Spanish settlers. But otherwise there is no duplication of similar events in American history.

A voluminous literature deals with the contribution of immigrants and members of minority groups to American culture. Schermerhorn, Wittke, Roucek, and others have presented abundant material to refute the legend of the inferiority of minorities. However, the American achievements in their totality are by no means a mosaic to which all minorities contributed an equal or proportionate number of tiles. In the field in which America has led the world since Franklin invented the lightning rod, all pioneer inventors belonged to the old stock (Whitney, Fulton, Bell, Morse, Edison, and the Wright Brothers). In the field of architecture, the one genuine American achievement, the skyscraper, is mainly the work of the old stock. Various styles of residential houses are all derived from the way in which the old stock traditionally built; more recently Mexican architecture has appeared, notably in California, but less as a result of the influence of American Mexicans than by diffusion from Mexico. In fine arts both the old Americans and the minorities thus far have produced no great masterworks.[15] This statement rests, of course, on value judgments which are outside the realm of science but is backed by the common opinion of experts.

In the field of American literature the old stock furnished practically all the writers of international reputation until well after the turn of the twentieth century (Poe, Hawthorne, Emerson, Longfellow, Whitman, and Mark Twain). Recently some major writers have been of minority stock (O'Neill, Dos Passos, Dreiser), but these authors display no special features which could be attributed to their extraction. The Irish in their mother country created one of the most splendid of modern literatures but they did not repeat the feat in America, although they are the only minority not hampered

[15] The exception is Whistler, but he worked in Europe.

by the background of a foreign language. In classical music, which for a long time has been the weakest point of the traditional American culture, the situation is slightly different. One of the foremost composers, Copland, belongs to a minority group and another, Menotti, is an Italian immigrant. In light opera music a virtual vacuum existed until very recent times. It was mostly filled by immigrants or children of immigrants (Herbert, Kern, Friml, Gershwin, and Berlin). The old stock is not represented, probably because of historical factors. We have to remember that the English Puritans stifled musical production to such an extent that at the end of the eighteenth century foreign composers had to be "imported" (Gluck, Handel, and Haydn). Greater ethnic variety exists among actors, who came from many stocks: the motion-picture industry employs large numbers of outstanding actors of many extractions, including Negroes, Chinese, Japanese, and foreign-born. In the field of science great leaders were lacking for a long time; in the last fifty years the old stock has produced a large number of eminent physicists, chemists, and physicians, but they do not have a monopoly because some of the greatest scientists, among them several Nobel prize winners, are either foreign-born or of minority stock.

However, without minimizing all these contributions or overlooking the fact that lack of opportunity is a drawback for minorities, it still can be said that without the participation of minorities, America would be poorer, but she would still be essentially the same. There is only one, and indeed a very important, exception: the development of the atomic bomb. The theoretical foundations were almost exclusively and the practical work to a decisive extent due to foreigners, some of whom were only visitors. Even the suggestions which started the development came from immigrants.

On the other hand, some "contributions" of minorities and immigrants are definitely of an undesirable kind. It cannot be denied that these negative features are due to the character of the persons, either as members of a minority or as immigrants. These features stem partly from the social situation: adjustment difficulties, reaction against discrimination, and culture shock. For these factors the old stock must bear its share of responsibility. But undesirable contributions were also partly due to traditions which some minorities brought with them, for instance, the predilection for illegal secret societies. The following negative contributions are listed from an enumeration made by Marden.[16] Mass migration

> temporarily retarded the growth of unionism and trends toward industrial democracy. . . . [It] facilitated the perpetuation of "Tammany Hall" type of urban politics and conversely retarded the development of "good government" movements. . . . In its total impact, it increased the volume of personal maladjustment with particular reference to ethnic persons in marginal status positions. . . . It

[16] Marden, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–117.

retarded the trend from a supernaturalistic toward a secular approach to problems of human welfare, particularly the application of newer social science approaches to the problems of human relations.

However, it would be unjust to measure the influence of minority groups mainly in terms of positive or negative effects. The latter are inherent in any situation involving minority status. On the other hand, creative acts and extraordinary achievements cannot be expected from the average person. The real importance of the minorities lies elsewhere. They are the makers of urban America in a very distinct sense. The brains which changed America and developed the opportunities belonged to the old stock. But they would have been powerless if the minorities had not done the hard, manual work which the old stock were unwilling to do. It was the minority group members who dug the coal, built the highways and the railroads, and furnished unskilled labor for the urban industries.

Changes in Cultural Patterns. The influence of minorities on the American cultural patterns is difficult to assess. These patterns were from the beginning less uniform than is popularly assumed. The original patterns would have changed because of immanent forces; no higher civilization remains static for three centuries. The problem is one of determining how much extraneous forces contributed to the changes.

The earliest settlers brought their inherited culture to the shores of the colonies but had to make certain adaptations. They borrowed from the Indians many place names which have become so characteristic of America. Through the Indians they became acquainted with certain foodstuffs, without which survival would have been difficult if not impossible. The stock diet of the colonists was to a large degree not Anglo-Saxon: [17] potato, tomato, corn, and turkey. From the Indians they learned to smoke. Out of different situations the three main patterns arose, the Puritan, the plantation, and later the frontier cultures, all predominantly rural. Plantation and frontier patterns were bound to fade with the passing of the conditions on which they rested. The minorities had nothing to do with their disappearance. Puritanism would have eventually mellowed since the zeal of the first settlers could not last for generations. Other changes might be expected because of inevitable urbanization.

The main parts of a cultural system are its spiritual foundations, which create the supreme values to which actions are oriented. These foundations

[17] "Anglo-Saxon" patterns are used here to indicate a set of habits institutionalized in Great Britain at the time of the colonies. By no means is it implied that these patterns originated with Anglo-Saxons. They are, quite to the contrary, a composite product of many cultural diffusions. For a brief exposition of the origin of some of the most common elements in American civilization see Ralph Linton, "Our Debt to Other Civilizations," in Alain LeRoy Locke and Berhard J. Stern (eds.), *When Peoples Meet,* New York, 1942.

were distinctly Protestant and Anglo-Saxon. They stressed a direct relationship between God and man and consequently personal responsibility, based on autonomous decisions on the part of each individual. They rejected mediation and specific qualities of grace incumbent on clerical offices. They emphasized freedom and equality, self-determination of the people, and limitation of and checks on political power. They created the ideals of "rugged individualism" and isolationism. These two ideals are on the wane, but clearly not because of "foreign" influences. During the time of mass immigration they were at their peak. The decline of isolationism has been caused by a changed international constellation, particularly the decline of Western Europe and the rise of Russia. The trend toward social security is an inescapable concomitant of urbanization. When the philosophy of individualism came into being, nine-tenths of Americans were self-contained farmers; now the majority of the farmers depend on a market over which they have no control, and three-fourths of the nation are wage earners who have learned in the Great Depression that their own efforts and skills are not sufficient to obtain employment. As Marden pointed out, the minorities have retarded rather than accelerated the trends toward a system of social reforms. America is still less unionized than other industrial countries; she has no labor party and her social legislation lags behind Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, which are more Anglo-Saxon.

The basic American philosophy has been accepted by all minorities. Although they were unfamiliar with ideas on which America was founded, their acceptance was essential in order to obtain equal rights.[18] It is impossible to find any patterns in American life which are not derived from the system developed by the old stock, with two exceptions which will be discussed later on.

Precisely the same is the case with the customs and habits of which the American way of living is made. The preference for the one-family home, the desire to live in the country, the stress on the privacy of the home, the predilection for sports and even the type of games, the abundance of clubs and fraternal societies, in short, the main features of life style have been and still are the ways of the old stock to which the minorities conform. They celebrate Thanksgiving and the Fourth of July; they have the same interest in baseball, football, and basketball; they announce their weddings and their deaths in typical American manner; they have their rice showers, housewarmings, testimonial dinners, and engage in all the other American customs unknown in their mother countries. The established American patterns were not influenced by minorities. The latter were only passive recipi-

[18] Acceptance is not necessarily identical with observance. The "American creed," indeed, is often "more honored in the breach than the observance." But that is done by the old stock too, as demonstrated by the Klan and by practices of discrimination.

ents but neither changed, nor added to, the existing modes of American ways of life.[19] They sometimes retain their old customs which make them distinguishable as minorities but these customs do not become part of the national institutions.

"Foreign" Influences. To this general rule there are two exceptions. One concerns the field of popular dance and songs. In contradiction to rural folk songs and dances, urban light music is everywhere of low artistic quality. Its sociological importance is apparent because it sets distinct social standards of taste, it shapes the forms of recreational activities and establishes institutional patterns of urban leisure. Unlike peasants, urban masses were never able to create their own folk music; they borrowed most of it from operettas created by and for the middle classes. With the end of the First World War this type of music decayed. For reasons which have not been explored, syncopated music (jazz, "hot" and "sweet" songs) appeared and created much more than a fleeting fashion; a new style of art which has outlasted a generation emerged and this new style is the work of the urban Negro who had become a commercialized entertainer. This music is no longer Negro music; it is American music, accepted by all Americans as nearly the only type of light musical entertainment; the ordinary American is no longer aware of its origin and considers it a part of his own culture. The acceptance of this type of art, which is certainly alien to Western tradition, is indeed a strange phenomenon. In due time it has not only become an integral part of American customs but has been diffused all over the world, one of the rare instances in which modern Western civilization has been on the receiving end. In this instance, then, a group other than the old stock contributed to the forms of life which are considered American. In other respects the American way of life has not been altered by minorities. This can be shown by what has happened in the English-speaking parts of Canada. The English-Canadians have not been affected by mass additions of minority groups, and yet their own culture is so largely identical with American culture that it is difficult to see a difference.

The other exception concerns an incomplete acceptance of the basic American tenets in urban America. As has been repeatedly emphasized, these tenets have their roots in Protestant nonconformism. They have been accepted, in secularized form, by the millions who are not affiliated with any denomination and by non-Protestant groups such as Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Jews.[20] However, the religious split in the large urban centers has caused what Parsons calls a "structural strain." Large urban groups, in fact frequently a majority, adhere to a religion which, unlike Protestantism, is not based upon independent decisions made by the individual according to

[19] If minorities retain certain features of their own, they do so as a separate group; the St. Patrick's Day parade is an Irish, not an American, celebration.

[20] See Talcott Parsons, *Religious Perspectives in College Teachings,* p. 326.

his own interpretation. Its lay population is guided by the authority of priests. While the guidance in principle is limited to religious matters, the definition of what is to be regarded as such rests with the religious authorities. Moreover, social action is so interrelated with religious views that a strict limitation of religion to dogma and ritual is quite impossible. The moral code is an integral part of all religions, and that moral code determines, at least in part, the attitude toward social problems. The coexistence of two types of codes, one of which leaves the individual free while the other demands obedience, introduces incompatibilities.[21] However, the situation cannot be entirely explained by religious differences. In modern Great Britain, where the Catholics were under the enlightened leadership of such great men as Cardinal Newman and Lord Acton, the differences are, indeed, limited to the religious field. In the United States Catholic Germans, Italians, and Poles display little inclination to resist established patterns. The Irish, on the other hand, have been taught by their history to fight, and as the earliest large group of Catholic immigrants, they have been and are dominant in the hierarchy of American Catholicism. Their attempts to make other groups accept a moral code which is not their own has sometimes created problems. The differences sometimes concern only social changes. Authoritarian systems by definition are bound to be more conservative and more resistant to change. The deviation is quite marked in cultural matters in which the "American creed" plays a most decisive role. Such deviations have to do with attempts to curb individual freedom, to impose censorship on books, motion pictures, and stage plays, with the stress on parochial schools and public financial aid, with resistance against sex education in schools and against birth control, sterilization, and other eugenic policies, with enforced prayers in public schools, refusal to modernize divorce laws, and the like. The problem is not, of course, which group is right. That depends on theological views, not on scientific insight. The problem is the coexistence of two imperfectly integrated groups, which is a latent source of conflict. In essence, this creates a sociological problem because a large minority group holds an attitude which does not conform to the traditional standards established by the old stock, the "American creed."

Dynamics of Cultural Heterogeneity. Will the present minorities remain separate entities within a greater whole, as so many believe and desire, or will the trend be toward a greater simplification, if not complete amalgamation? Or will the minorities, as others fear, increase in number and thereby change the character of the American city? All statements must necessarily be tentative because the conditions which will prevail in the future are not known. Present tendencies, however, permit some conjectures.

[21] This element existed in other countries too. It was responsible for the Reformation. It created the split in the Second Republic of France and led to the Kulturkampf in Germany and Switzerland.

The old stock will be both strengthened and weakened. As urbanization is likely to continue for some time and the farm population is largely of old stock, the group will receive some reinforcements from rural in-migrants. There is at least a chance that modest reinforcements may come from overpopulated Great Britain, since that country has more than a token immigration quota (65,361 persons per year). The weakening comes from the fact that a sizable part of the old stock consists of upper-class Protestants who have the lowest reproduction rate.

The Negroes are most likely to become entirely urbanized. This means conformity with urban patterns, e.g., a decrease in both birth and death rates. It is possible that the total number of Negroes finally will increase in its proportion to the white population because the latter is no longer able to add to its stock by immigration. Indeed, that tendency has been indicated by the changes since the end of mass immigration. From 1810 to 1930 Negroes decreased continually from 19.0 per cent to 9.7 per cent. From 1930 to 1940 the increase was from 9.7 per cent to 9.8 per cent, and from 1940 to 1950, 9.9 per cent.

All other groups can hardly gain from rural-urban migration and foreign immigration. There are also no great changes due to differential birth rates. The changes which can occur will not be caused by biological but by cultural factors; or, in other words, the minorities might gain or lose members through mixed marriages and assimilation.

Let us first consider the imminent trends within a minority group. All minority groups are subject to influences emanating from their environment, which invariably force some changes upon minorities. These changes are brought about in three stages, of which the first two are inevitable although the third does not always occur. These three stages are adaptation, acculturation, and assimilation. In the first stage the individual adjusts himself to different conditions but retains his cultural identity; in the second stage some features of the new culture are adopted and, as a rule, somewhat modified, but the individual retains enough of the elements of his native culture to remain identifiable as a member of a minority group. In the first instance he is still a foreigner; in the second instance he has become a hyphenated American. The third stage is complete assimilation. The hyphen disappears and with it the minority status, the "consciousness of kind" and all cultural differences.

Members of minority groups do not react uniformly. What happens depends on length of residence in the United States, existence of segregated areas, numbers of compatriots, place of school training, acceptance or rejection by the community, and a host of other factors which act as stimuli in one direction or another. Every group, including the Negroes, has lost members through complete assimilation; almost all minorities have passed from the stage of adaptation to the stage of acculturation, though the degree

differs with individual members. All large groups have been able to retain a hard core of members who thus far have defied assimilation.

Since minority groups can no longer be augmented by new immigrants, the first-generation immigrants will cease to be a mass phenomenon, and acculturation undoubtedly will gain momentum. This is certain but the final outcome is in doubt. There are three possibilities reflected in views which Marden [22] calls (1) "Americanization," (2) "melting-pot," and (3) "cultural pluralism" theories. The Americanization theory advocates complete assimilation or, to quote Marden, to make over "the immigrants, if possible, and their children in any case, into Anglo-Americans." The "melting-pot" theory sees "emerging out of the interaction of all these various groups a broadly uniform, but more highly variegated and richer, American culture," or, in other words, the appearance of a new nation with a new culture derived from many sources. The "cultural pluralists" advocate that "the cultural groups should be encouraged to retain as much of their traditional heritages as is consistent with their new civic responsibilities and sentiments of loyalty to their adopted country," or, in blunter terms, they should remain what they are and yet become full-fledged Americans. The trouble with all these theories is that their advocates confuse what they like with what will happen. The values which they cherish twist the facts. Marden criticizes the Americanization theory for its "marked ethnocentrism highly confident in the superiority of everything in the normative native culture." He is less critical of the "melting-pot" advocates because they are "cosmopolitan in outlook and appreciative of the many values in the foreign cultures. As an ideal, this approach was highly congenial to liberal democracy and was prevalent among the intellectual, democratically-minded segment of the dominant status population."

Let us first discuss the problem of value. This is scientifically possible only if we exclude individual preferences and concentrate on social values by asking what conditions are advantageous either to a well-organized community or to a higher culture. The organization of a community can be evaluated by finding out how it functions, and the value of a culture is determined by what it produces in terms of an ethical creed, science, and arts. To take up the latter point first, there is not the slightest indication that the nation as a whole has anything to gain if the masses of the cultural subgroup retained their "traditional heritage."

The advocates of pluralism are themselves motivated by an ethnocentrism no less strong, equally unscientific, and less excusable than the native "ethnocentrics." We must not forget that the masses of minorities do not represent their native culture; they represent a negative selection because they are mostly economic immigrants of despair. What they preserve from their traditional culture are customs of minor importance, dietary habits, and the

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 108; all following quotations are from the same page.

like. We have seen that they have added nothing of consequence to the cultural inventory of America. As persons, retaining their Old World traits (and not as assimilated Americans), they have not produced anything even approximating the great achievements of their compatriots in their mother country. It would be unjust to measure American minorities by the greatest masters of the past such as Dante, Beethoven, or Copernicus. But it is legitimate to make comparisons with the more secondary contemporary cultural leaders. In America the Irish have produced no great men like Yeats or Shaw, the Germans no Thomas Mann or Richard Strauss, the Russians no Pavlov or Gorki, the Poles no Reymont or Paderewski, the Italians no Verdi or Toscanini, the Catholics no Gregor Mendel or Maritain, the Jews no Einstein or Freud. Before cultural "enrichment" is advocated, it has to be stated in precise terms what the American civilization can gain not from German, Italian, or Russian culture but from the culture of ordinary German, Italian, or Russian immigrants. The gains which have been made in the past came from the ability which a person had as an individual and not from his cultural background.

A grave mistake of the melting-pot theory is its implicit but unfounded belief that in a process of cultural fusion each group will contribute only its desirable national qualities (if such qualities, indeed, exist), while the undesirable qualities will be rejected and disappear. If it is true (which is subject to doubt) that every nation has something to offer which is especially valuable, the opposite must be equally true. According to a well-known anecdote, the dancer Isadora Duncan proposed marriage to Bernard Shaw for eugenic reasons: "You are the most brilliant man; I am the most beautiful woman. Our children will be the perfection of mankind for they will have your brains and my beauty." Shaw regretfully rejected the proposition: "I am afraid that our children will inherit my beauty and your brains." There is no guarantee, not even a probability, that a chance mixture of cultures will produce something better.

If we look at social organization, it is a priori clear that a social unit functions more smoothly if it is not disturbed by extraneous elements. However, complete homogeneity is a mixed blessing. It is characterized by complacency and cultural lag. Foreign elements, although their criticism is disliked, act as stimuli and accelerate needed social changes. Hence a modest admixture is quite desirable to prevent ossification. But this is entirely different from preserving a score of subgroups which have to live together and yet are supposed to live separately. Out-groups which have to live in the same town and are not regionally separated, as, for instance, in Switzerland, have a marked tendency to become hostile. Furthermore, experience shows that the coexistence of several groups with equal social status is something impossible to achieve. Pluralism means therefore the perpetuation of groups with lesser status. Consequently, we shall find arrogance and resentment,

privileges and discrimination. This in turn creates neurotics, delinquents, community tension, and social disorganization. But the greatest dangers come from loyalty conflicts. To encourage a person to retain his "traditional heritage" but to be loyal only to his "adopted country" is asking too much. Whatever decision a person will make in case of a conflict, he will suffer. To promote conditions of latent loyalty conflicts is cruel to individuals and a danger to the community which needs undivided and unconditional allegiance.

Tentative Prognosis. Let us now turn from values to facts. Of the three possibilities, the melting pot, in the sense of a cultural mixture of all existing groups, has the least chance. What already is going on is a biological mixture of all white groups. The white race, subdivided into perhaps ten or more subraces with countless shades, has been subject to repeated crossings in the past and that process has never been interrupted; the composite character of the American population promotes an accelerated speed of this biological fusion which actually represents only a recombination of existing qualities. As a result, we witness the emergence of one or, rather, several specialized types of the white race, which makes it possible to identify many Americans as such by their physical appearance. That process has nothing to do with cultural amalgamation, which is a social phenomenon of a different order. History provides many examples of the melting-pot type but only if two groups are involved, for instance, the emergence of the Indian civilization as the result of the merger of Aryans and Dravidians, or the Anglo-Saxon civilization which, despite its name, is a cross between the Saxons and the Celts. The most splendid merger occurred when late Hellenism and early Arabism created the culture of the Saracens. It is also true that after some time an existing composite civilization underwent another merger, which is a frequent historical event. But neither a merely mechanical nor a selective mixture of twenty cultures is a psychological and social possibility. Every person would have to acquire a score of traits which are alien to his own tradition. Such mixtures can be performed in a biological or chemical laboratory but not in a social community. This kind of melting pot is not to be found in the American past, or elsewhere in history, and its occurrence in the future is most unlikely.

As for assimilation, there is no doubt that it cannot be achieved in one generation. The existence of solid subgroups makes assimilation within two generations difficult, even improbable. But history provides no example of groups, living together in the same area, which remained unassimilated unless artificially kept apart by legal restrictions. However, civilizations with monogamous religious groups remain separated according to their faith. Christians, Moslems, and Jews have remained separated as groups notwithstanding numerous individual conversions with subsequent assimilation. While in the long run assimilation is unavoidable, the process can be slowed

by emotional resistance. In the American past assimilation was the rule; with mass immigration on the increase, resistance stiffened. All arguments against assimilation are basically rationalizations; because people are emotionally disturbed when they change from one culture to another, they desire moral and scientific justifications for advocating resistance to assimilation. Members of the old stock are much concerned with the threat of "mongrelization," being unaware that they already are mongrelized. Although the arguments are usually hazy, they consist mainly of two equally unfounded statements: that it is unethical to give up one's national identity and that admixtures are undesirable. The ordinary person combines these statements with unrestricted praise for his own group and total rejection of all other groups, in both cases accepting popular stereotypes. The better-educated and more conscientious persons stress the alleged values of pluralism. As an example we cite views ascribed to Charles Eliot (who, if correctly quoted, confounds race and culture); "What we want in this country is a number of races with various gifts, each contributing its own peculiar qualities to the common welfare. The Irish have never been assimilated in America anywhere and it is not desirable that they should be. The Jews should keep their race individuality in America just as the Irish have done." [23] This type of argument has become so familiar that it is taken for granted although its logic is questionable. Either a person or a group has a "peculiar" trait which is desirable, in that case everyone should acquire it; or if the trait is undesirable or of no consequence, there is no reason to preserve it. The emotional appeal of the argument, however, is so strong that universal assimilation is delayed, notwithstanding many individual cases to the contrary.

This leaves us with cultural pluralism, which at present prevails in urban America. Its more astute defenders point out that cultural variety is more attractive than uniformity. They like something similar to an anthropological museum where all mankind is represented. The function of a community is neither to provide aesthetic attractions nor to furnish scientists with objects for their study. The price for pluralism, group tensions, neuroses, antagonism between parents and children, loyalty conflicts and insecurity in times of war, is much too high. This objection might be dismissed as a subjective value judgment. But two objective facts point to a weakening of pluralism. One is the attitude of children who reject the values of their parents. As they leave segregated areas, as they cease to be bilingual, they loosen the ties with their subgroup. The other fact is the inability of the group to retain its cultural identity. The main trait of a national group is, after all, language and that trait is finally lost. Another element of culture is its literature; as we know, very few immigrants of despair are really acquainted with their own literature and what they have read is soon forgotten. Consequently, they

[23] Quoted from Fairchild, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–154.

no longer contribute to the culture of their native country; they become mere passive members. As the mother country changes, they represent a culture stage which is a thing of the past. The French Canadians are an extreme example of this development; from a stay in Quebec no one perceives modern French civilization; yet the Canadians have the advantage of French schools, newspapers, and books, without the competition of another language. Moreover, the subgroup cannot escape the continued process of acculturation. Members acquire more and more traits of their adopted country and thereby they lose more and more of their own "peculiar qualities." They are no longer Poles, Italians, or Germans; they have become Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, or German-Americans. They do not retain their old culture; they form a new subculture of the existing main culture. In the long run, considering the extent of American mobility and the movement away from segregated areas, the special features must become weaker and the impact of the American culture stronger.

There are two factors which work in favor of pluralism. One is discrimination. Nothing cements in-group feelings more than social rejection. Books are not read, works of art not understood by the less well educated, but discrimination is keenly felt by the illiterate as well as by the intellectual, and common fate keeps the group together. The second factor, religion, has already been mentioned. Differences in religion prevent intermarriages, preserve minorities, and delay assimilation. Our studies on intermarriage are still scanty, but they indicate that intermarriages between members of different religions are much rarer.[24] If this trend continues, as it most probably will for a long time, cultural pluralism will decline and assimilation will increase, but only up to a certain point: the multiple ethnical groups will be replaced by three main religious groups.[25] The reduction is most likely to have the following results: the old stock will absorb all Protestant groups (Germans, Scandinavians, splinter groups, and converts) and thereby gain in numbers. The Irish, who already hold the leadership of the American Catholics, will assimilate the other Catholic minorities. All other Christian groups are numerically too small to last as distinct entities. Whether the Jews will continue to marry mostly among themselves depends on the increase or decline of anti-Semitism and on the strength of Zionism, two unpredictable

[24] The figures, like all religious data, are subject to some doubt. A. B. Hollingshead, "Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review,* 1950, found in 1948 that 97.1 per cent of the Jews in New Haven married within their own religion; Albert I. Gordon, *Jews in Transition,* Minneapolis, 1947, p. 206, states that the percentage of Jewish intermarriages in New Haven increased from 1.1 per cent in 1900 to 6.3 per cent in 1940, which is twice as much as Hollingshead's figure for a later year.

[25] Cf. Ruby J. Reeves Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870–1940," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1944.

factors.[26] While it is uncertain whether the Catholics will gain at the expense of the Protestants or vice versa, it is probable that the Jews will decline, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to the total population. This prediction is based on the decline of orthodoxy among the Jews and the fact that non-Orthodox Jews have an extremely low birth rate.

If the foregoing assumptions are correct, the American population within a few generations will become less composite, although complete assimilation will not be achieved. Whether the change from an emphasis on nationality to an emphasis on religion will ease or accentuate group tensions remains to be seen.

[26] While religious endogamy will continue to be prevalent in the immediate future, interreligious marriages among all three faiths are increasing, thereby accelerating assimilation. For data and prognosis see John L. Thomas, "The Factor of Religion in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review,* 1951.

Part VII. THE URBAN FORMS OF BASIC INSTITUTIONS

Institutions arise from functional needs. The fundamental sameness of human nature explains why the same types of basic institutions exist in all societies and at all times. But the methods which are used to discharge the functions are different. With the exception of a few very primitive tribes, all human beings wear clothes; dress is a nearly universal institution and protection of the body is only one of its many functions. However, people dress very differently, not only according to their individual taste, which actually plays a minor role, but according to the variations institutionalized by the group to which they belong. One can readily identify the cultural background of a person by his dress. As institutions are modified by cultures, so they also vary within a given civilization in time and according to regions and areas. The peasants of Eastern Europe still wear their own colorful rural garments which distinguish them from their urban compatriots. Differences in attire are no longer institutional in the rest of the Western world, for institutions, due to their dynamic character, are subject to change. However, some institutions, more important than dress, show marked differences in urban and in rural areas. Some of the more marked institutional differences will be analyzed in the following chapters.

Chapter 14

THE URBAN FAMILY

Loss of Functions and Changing Roles. The family is the most universal among all social institutions. We know of no society, past or present, of no civilization, low or high, without a family system. The idea of general promiscuity, preceding the stage of the family, has been discarded long ago. The family is ageless and common to all social systems. The "bourgeois" family, once so bitterly attacked by early Socialists, is indistinguishable from the "Communist" family. Although political and economic differences between the two systems are marked, deviations in family life are negligible. But both our own and the Soviet system have at least two types of families: the urban and the rural type.

Under primitive conditions social organization is simple. If a society consists of a few hundred people, there is not much room for complexity. What the group needs to live in order and peace, to provide for food and shelter, and to take care of religious and intellectual wants, can be obtained through the services of only two groups: the local community and the family. There may be other groups but they are not essential. Of these two groups the family is much more important because it is able to fulfill nearly all functions within a society. Like our own family, it is a biosocial unit, a communion of parents and children; it is an all-embracing economic unit, producing whatever the family needs and producing only for the family. Sometimes the family is a religious unit; not only are rites performed at home but each family has its own special deities who are worshiped by no others. The family is an educational unit, for practically all knowledge and all techniques are passed on to the children by their parents or the older siblings. The family is a recreational unit, for all the leisure time—save special community celebrations—is spent at home with all members of the family participating.[1]

Over the years the family has been continually losing its functions. The more complex a society grew, the longer the process of specialization and differentiation went on, the more specialized agencies emerged to take over functions formerly discharged by the family. Religion became the concern of churches and education was entrusted to schools; the system of self-support-

[1] This is only a rough sketch describing the "ideal type" of the primitive family. The occurrence of deviations is not denied but they should be regarded as unessential.

ing families was replaced by a division of labor between interacting families in an economy of exchange. However, the process was gradual and families retained some, though only a small part, of the functions they were losing. The father in Protestant communities continued to read the Bible to his family and led in hymn singing in leisure hours. The mother spun, wove, and knit. The parents who could not send their children to school gave them whatever instruction they could.

It is apparent that the loss of function is a threat to the institution of the family. The near monopoly of the family is lost; there are now competitors asking for attention, time, and even loyalty. It ought to be equally apparent (though this is not always admitted) that urbanism did not initiate loss of functions; the trend started much earlier. In the Old World, with the peasant village as the prevailing form of settlement, with a social organization which implied the use of pasture and forest as a common right of the local community rather than as the individual right of separate families, with an organized church, and with an overlord who performed political functions, the sphere of the family was by no means universal. It is interesting that this universality was approached much later under very special conditions: the early American frontier family assumed nearly all essential functions. The settler who cleared virgin ground quite often lived in no community, historically a very rare and exceptional phenomenon. The next farmer lived miles away. There was no church, no school, no government, and no police. In addition to all these functions, the frontier family had to assume a political function. The family had to defend itself against Indians and outlaws. Eulogists of the rural family draw their highly romanticized descriptions which contrast so sharply with the realities of modern life in great cities from this exceptional set of conditions. Not the urban way of life, as such, but occupational changes added another, very serious, loss. In modern times only the farm family can be a producing unit. All other occupations—with minor exceptions—cannot be carried on by the family. The urban family has, by necessity, lost its function as a producer and has been reduced to a consuming unit. In all other respects the farm family has lost functions, as has the city family. The farmer's wife no longer spins and weaves; the children are sent to school; the state police protect life and property.[2]

The effects of the change were only gradually felt. The individual artisan still worked where he lived; his wife and children, although not actually producing, could be of some help. Similarly, the merchant quite often had his office at home and the rest of the family could render some services. What is perhaps more important, the family was never spatially separated and all members participated in the ups and downs of the father's trade by

[2] The loss of family functions is a central theme in the study by William F. Ogburn and Clark Tibbits, "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends in the United States,* New York, 1933.

actual observation. Even when separation of business and residence took place, the distance in small towns was short, frequent visits to the place of business could be paid, and the father came home for lunch. The returns from a trade generally sufficed to support a family and permit it to maintain traditional standards of living.

On the farm there are as many breadwinners as there are persons beyond the stage of infancy, since even children contribute to their upkeep by their work. The modern nonfarmer has a difficult task: a single person must earn what an entire family needs. This problem can be solved in several ways. One is for the father to earn enough to support the entire family. In the incipient stages of the Industrial Revolution this was not possible for the industrial worker, so the rest of the family also had to work. This meant child labor and woman labor, which not only split the family but necessitated neglect of housework and of smaller children. Another possibility was the lowering of the standard of living. This meant slums, undernourishment, lodgers, and overcrowding. Finally, the size of the family might have been reduced, implying birth control.

Another consequence was the change in the role of the wife. At the turn of the century, when women began to demand equal rights, their opponents coined the slogan "The woman's role is to be the wife and mother." They did not realize that the limitation of the woman to two biological functions was contrary to the entire history of mankind with the exception of middle-class urban society in the nineteenth century. Deprived of any opportunity to support herself, the urban woman was restricted to thankless auxiliary services such as cooking, scrubbing, and darning. Apart from the fact that most families could not afford to maintain an adult who earned nothing, a very unsound psychological situation was created. The woman was tied to the home for the whole day, engaged in monotonous, repetitious work which was undone almost immediately after it had been finished. Isolated during the day, she naturally wanted some distraction and entertainment in the evening. But the husband, returning from the factory or office, was tired from the routine and nettled by the inevitable irritations of his work; he wanted to stay at home and rest. An unavoidable conflict of psychological needs arose because of a situation which did not exist in any other society. That conflict was less acute as long as women received a minimum of education and could find satisfaction in a life spent mostly in keeping an apartment clean and preparing a decent meal. With rising educational standards, the demands of women rose too; they wanted a better economic role, they wanted to return to the role of an economic producer. This meant fewer children. It also meant greater freedom; the woman no longer depended on her husband for support. Once she was able to support herself, she was no longer forced to live in an unhappy family. Divorce became more frequent.

Clearly these developments are not simply the result of moral deteriora-

tion, as we are told so often. They are the logical consequences of a situation which burdened the husband with economic obligations which he could not meet, and degraded the wife to the role of a servant, depriving her of elementary psychological satisfactions.

Rural and Urban Family Types. Thus at least two different types of contemporary Western families came into existence. Their main differences are:

1. The farm family is a producing and consuming unit; the urban family is only a consuming unit. This has economic and sociological consequences. The farm family is always on the farm; there is no spatial separation. The people are always living together: at work, during meals, and in their leisure time. The farm family, in time and space, is in continuous communion; all members can share the same experiences, the same pleasures, and the same griefs.

2. Children are an economic asset for the farmer and an economic liability for city people. The poorer the farmer, the less he can afford to be without children. There is no problem in finding room and food for another child. There is no problem of rearing children; the farm is the only place where a woman can work and at the same time take care of a nursling.

3. The position of the wife is necessarily different. Regardless of legal provisions, the farm is the wife's as well as her husband's. The farm is a joint venture. Husband and wife depend on each other. The urban wife either depends economically on her husband or she earns her living separately. The latter cannot happen on the farm. The farmer's wife cannot become a career woman, nor can she be a charwoman, a typist, or a factory worker.

4. Rural families have a lower divorce rate than urban families.

All these statements, however, must be taken with several reservations. First of all, it is extremely doubtful if we can speak of the urban family as a single type. The complexity of urban life is reflected in great variations of family life, which is influenced not only by economic conditions and by habitat, but also by traditions, national origin, religion, class, and educational differences, as well as by the size of the city. In small towns, where social control is rigid and where husband and wife have usually known each other since they were children, marriages are hardly less stable than on farms.

Second, it would be quite wrong to regard the typical farm family as the more "desirable" form (whatever that may mean). Whether it is desirable to have a large number of children depends entirely on the situation. In overpopulated areas such as the Far East or Southern Europe it is definitely undesirable. In our own country it is undesirable that parents with subnormal intelligence rear equally subnormal children, which is so frequently the case in some of our own backward, out-of-the-way rural districts.

Third, the statements imply only one thing: that the rural family is more stable than the modern urban family. They do not imply that the rural

family is more happy. Until statisticians have found a way to measure happiness we shall be on unsafe ground, but it is rather obvious that a family is not necessarily happy because there is no divorce. Rural divorces are rare not because moral standards are higher but because conditions prescribe a course from which it is nearly impossible to deviate. A farmer with three little children can hardly divorce his wife. He has to find another woman who is capable of doing the farm work and is willing to raise three children who are not her own, in addition to those she expects to bear herself. There is little chance that he will find a suitable partner. The farmer's wife is in an even worse position. Once she has passed the prime of life and is no longer physically attractive—a stage which is reached rather early on farms—she is unlikely to remarry. Even a well-to-do farmer is short of cash and cannot pay alimony to support a wife who has to live in town. If, in addition, the children are awarded to the wife, the total alimony will be entirely inadequate. Without any vocational training, the woman can get only menial jobs which pay very little. Her economic situation will deteriorate to a point where life becomes unbearable. The psychological effects are still more devastating. She has to leave the farm—her farm—where she has been her own mistress, where she has helped to build and maintain a family enterprise which gave her a certain degree of satisfaction and security. In all probability she will have to leave the children on the farm where they are better off. She has the choice of becoming an agricultural worker on another farm and suffering the degradation of taking orders rather than giving them, as she used to do; or she can go to town and become an unskilled factory worker, a cook, or a charwoman, receiving substandard wages, living alone in the slums, and having no other expectations than to continue this kind of life until she dies. Under these circumstances she will rather put up with an impossible husband and stay on the farm with her children. But neither she nor the rest of the family will be happy. The eulogists of rusticity indulge in depicting farm life as an idyl which bears little resemblance to reality. Only naïve and uninformed persons will believe that all is harmony and happiness on the farm.

Reasons for Differential Divorce Rates. However, the higher urban divorce rate cannot be explained exclusively in terms of different economic conditions. Hasty marriages are among the many contributing factors that are perhaps more significant in urban areas. The farmer takes a much more sober view of marriage and will not marry unless he is reasonably sure that his wife will not only be a suitable soul mate but also an efficient partner in farming. There are many people in towns who not only fall in love at first sight but also marry at first sight. They meet at a party or a dance, become infatuated and, after a very brief acquaintance, get married. Marriages which are based only on physical attraction are not lasting. To love one another and to live together are two different propositions. In recent times

another difficulty has arisen. After so much talk about the "romantic fallacy," young people have become skeptics. They know now that passions fade. They have learned from Swinburne that "love hath an end." They distrust their feelings. A new attitude has developed: "We like each other but we do not know whether it will work out. We can always get a divorce, so let's try." Marriage thus becomes an experiment. A wedlock concluded with the understanding that it need not be permanent has a poor chance of survival. This is an attitude of misplaced resignation. The slightest disagreement will make the partners conclude that "it did not work out." There are not only hasty marriages but also hasty divorces.

The other reasons for higher divorce rates hardly need elaboration. Divorce is no longer anathema and the stigma has disappeared. Divorce has become less unpleasant than perpetual marital unhappiness. Women are now able to earn a living and divorce is no longer an economic problem. Modern hygiene, a more reasonable diet and attire, sports, and less exhausting housework keep women attractive for a much longer time and they have less difficulty in finding another partner. As is well known, most people marry again after a divorce, and in many instances the second marriage is satisfactory.

Size of the Urban Family. The smaller size of the urban family is an uncontestable fact; yet this statement needs considerable qualification. Close scrutiny shows that it is impossible to regard the urban family as one single type; there are several types showing marked differences with respect to the number of children.

There is first one special type which is virtually absent on farms: the family which is childless because the parents, or one of them, are physically handicapped. Blind or crippled persons, or those inflicted with serious diseases, frequently marry each other but remain childless. This group may be too small to influence significantly the statistical figures.

The second group is the temporarily childless family, a group constantly increasing in number. Not so long ago it was an established custom that a man did not marry before he was reasonably sure that he could support a family. This necessitated a delay in marriage, particularly in the group with a college education. Before the First World War professional men rarely married before the age of twenty-five and quite a number deferred marriage until they reached their thirties. Such was still the situation when, on the basis of the 1920 census, Groves and Ogburn [3] examined the differences between urban and rural marriages and concluded that urban life discourages marriages. According to their study, the difference was about 10 per cent in favor of rural areas. The trend has subsequently been reversed, although the situa-

[3] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships,* New York, 1928, p. 478.

tion between 1930 and 1940 is somewhat irregular because the depression years prevented or deferred many marriages already planned. In 1930, for the first time, census figures showed that the percentage of married males was higher in cities than in farm areas. Conversely, the percentage of married females was higher in the country than in the city. There are several reasons for this apparent discrepancy. One is a fallacy which can be attributed to unadjusted statistics. The census percentages are based on the comparison of married and unmarried persons, fourteen years of age and over. Up until about eighteen years there was not much difference in marriage rates between urban and rural areas as far as males were concerned. A farm boy rarely married before he was eighteen. But quite a number of rural girls married as early as fourteen, which was extremely rare in cities. Second, unmarried farm girls tend to move to cities hoping to get married there and thus they increase the number of unmarried city females. Third, the cities are filled with almost all the women who for one reason or another are unfit for marriage.

Marriage and Divorce Trends. However, the trend toward earlier marriages in cities is quite unmistakable and is borne out by three successive census data (1930, 1940, and 1950). At one time a married college student was a rarity. Nowadays it has become commonplace. It was customary for newly married couples to move directly into their own home or apartment which, of course, was possible only if they could afford to buy or pay rent. Now many young couples are not yet in that position and they "double up" with parents. Increasing numbers of early marriages are reflected in an increasing number of families "without own household." The census showed that these families increased from 1,946,435 in 1940 to 2,275,000 in 1950. Of the total, 332,000 families lived in rural nonfarm areas, 346,000 in farm areas, and 1,597,000 in cities. Many of these families without own household, if not the majority, are forced to remain childless until they can pay for their own home. Since the practice of birth control has often been deplored, it must be pointed out that the new trend toward early marriage, with its inevitable first period of childlessness, has had most salutary effects: it has removed the psychological strain caused by overlong engagement periods, and it has helped reduce prostitution and venereal diseases. As a result, statistics show a greater number of married persons, a greater number of childless families and—if all families are lumped together—a smaller size of all families. For a fair comparison the families who are, for the reasons stated above, permanently or temporarily childless ought to be excluded, for most of them represent not ordinary family types but an exceptional form of adjustment by marriage which was nearly unknown in former times and is still not too frequent among farmers. These types may be viewed as representing progress, not deterioration, in family relationships and should be encouraged rather than criticized. But they are also, as types of an "arrested" family, atypical.

The statistical figures for the period 1930 to 1950 have to be cautiously interpreted for they are affected by two irregularities: first, marriages and divorces [4] fell under the impact of an extraordinary crisis and then both rose far above "normal" on account of the war and its aftermath. This can be seen from the following figures: [5]

In 1929, at the peak of prosperity, the marriage rate was 10.1 per cent. In the three following years, when the country suffered from an unprecedented depression, the marriage rate declined:

1930	9.2
1931	8.6
1932	7.9

Divorces showed exactly the same trend:

1929	1.7
1930	1.6
1931	1.5
1932	1.3

When the country began to recover, the trend was reversed in marriages as well as in divorces. Since recovery was slow, the upswing in marriages and divorces was slight too. The economic setback in 1938 is likewise mirrored in the family situation:

Year	*Marriage rate, per cent*	*Divorce rate, per cent*
1933	8.7	1.3
1934	10.3	1.6
1935	10.4	1.7
1936	10.7	1.8
1937	11.3	1.9
1938	10.3	1.9
1939	10.7	1.9

Then came the war years, which accelerated the trend, reaching its peak at the end when marriages and divorces reached an all-time high:

[4] It is a mistake to assume that a crisis, economic or otherwise, increases divorce. In many cases disagreements are reconciled if the family undergoes a serious test. Of course financial settlements are also more difficult to obtain in hard times. But it is borne out in many instances that some people become divorce-minded if their economic situation improves. On the other hand, war always increases both marriages and divorces. War disorganizes existing families and prevents the establishment of properly organized new families. There are too many hasty marriages and also too many hasty divorces.

[5] Sources: Federal Security Agency, U.S. Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics. Rates per 1,000 population.

Year	*Marriage rate, per cent*	*Divorce rate, per cent*
1940	12.1	2.0
1941	12.7	2.2
1942	13.2	2.4
1943	11.8	2.6
1944	11.0	2.9
1945	11.2	3.5
1946	16.4	4.3

Since then the rates again have declined; divorce rates are still higher than in any year prior to 1940; so are marriage rates but with these exceptions: 1917 and 1919, 1942 and 1946:

Year	*Marriage rate, per cent*	*Divorce rate, per cent*
1947	13.9	3.4
1948	12.4	2.8
1949	10.6	2.7
1950	11.0	2.5

With corrections and allowances the figures indicate that dire predictions about the future of the American family are without empirical foundation. More people are marrying than ever before. This is a trend (interrupted only during the three years when the depression was at its worst) which has continued since 1886,[6] when the marriage rate was 9.1 per cent.

Divorce rates, to be sure, are high. In part, they result from higher marriage rates because many of these marriages are hastily concluded; otherwise they reflect changing economic conditions; they also reflect changing attitudes. Divorce is now preferred to an unhappy wedlock while in former times the opposite was the case. But the claims made by a sensational press in 1947 that 1 out of every 3 marriages ends in divorce are fantastic. The exact ratio is extremely difficult to determine because it changes from year to year. Elliot and Merrill[7] compute (for 1946) the ratio between the number of divorces per married female and the number of unmarried females who are marrying as 1 to 8.5, and since then the ratio must have become more favorable. Moreover, 4 out of 5 remarry after divorce. We get a better insight by comparing the exact figures of married and divorced people at a given date, as is done by the United States census. From Table 19, based on the census figures of 1950, it can be seen that 37,022,000 males were married and only 878,000 divorced, which is slightly more than 2.5 per cent. The figures are somewhat higher for females, mainly because of the surplus of women of marriageable age.

[6] The year in which tabulations by the Federal Security Agency started.

[7] Elliott and Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, p. 437.

Table 19. Marital Status of Persons 14 Years and Over (in Thousands)

	Male	Female
Single	11,212	11,126
Married	37,022	37,451
Widowed	2,176	6,838
Divorced	878	1,220
Total	51,288	56,635

Source: United States Census, 1950.

It must be noted, however, that the figures do not reveal the whole situation. They do not include cases of desertion, which probably affect as many as 1 million families.[8]

There are also widespread regional differences. New York has a law which makes it almost impossible to obtain a divorce; it is obtained in other states, in Mexico, or an annulment is substituted. Consequently, New York has the lowest divorce rate in the United States—for 1950 the rate was 0.8 per cent as compared with the national total of 2.5 per cent. This, of course, does not mean that marriages are happier in New York than elsewhere in the United States. The situation is reversed in Nevada. This state has a population of 160,083;[9] it issued 49,872 marriage licenses and granted 8,909 divorces in 1950. Thus the marriage rate per thousand was 311.7 per cent and the divorce rate 55.7[10] per cent, the former nearly thirty times, the latter almost twenty times, the national average.

Although statistical material is extremely scarce, there is no doubt that divorces occur much more frequently in urban than in rural areas. Furthermore, divorced persons tend to leave rural districts and small towns and to concentrate in larger cities.

Birth Control and Family Size. What is distinctly new is the reduction of the family in size by means of scientific birth control. During the last hundred years this has become an institutional feature of the Western family. We now find many more families with no children, with only one child, or with two, three, or four children, while larger urban families have become an exception. The latter is more remarkable than the overpublicized phenomenon of small families. Since its introduction toward the end of the eighteenth

[8] The census lists among the married families 1,096,000 with "wife absent" and 1,526,000 with "husband absent." From the latter figure we have to deduct the married men in active service (figures not given). Not all absences are due to desertions.

[9] 1950 census. It is not clear whether the figure includes the "bona fide" residents who are living in Nevada for just six weeks to establish legal residence, obtain a divorce, and remarry the same day.

[10] Federal Security Agency.

century, scientific means of birth control have been under heavy but largely noneffective criticism. The attackers of birth control have created an array of fallacious notions which are still widely accepted. Among these the following may be mentioned: that birth control is entirely new; that it causes a dangerous decline of population, destroying civilization and threatening the security of a country; that it is the result of irreligion, decadence, and irresponsibility. None of these assertions is correct.

There is hardly any society, including the most primitive types, which does not try to control the size of its population. The means, however, are unscientific, crude, sometimes dangerous, and sometimes, at least to the modern Western mind, revolting. Among these are prolonged lactation, enforced celibacy, mutilation, abortion, infanticide, and patricide. The only "new" feature of modern birth control is the replacement of objectionable methods by scientific, innocuous devices. That birth control, and only birth control, accounts for population decline, is equally untrue. Of all countries practicing modern birth control, only France and Austria showed a temporary decline in population, and France only during the decade 1920 to 1930; since then the population has been rising again. But ancient Greece and Rome, without modern means of birth control, both lost so much population that both countries finally collapsed. Indeed, during the history of mankind, stable or even declining populations seem to have been the rule and the present growth of world population is rather the exception.[11] That birth control causes decadence (or conversely, is caused by decadence) is a myth. In the First World War, after the family, limited to two children, had become an established, much criticized institution in France, the French fought more valiantly than ever before in their history, while the Italians with their large families, fighting under less desperate conditions, showed less tenacity.[12] The accusation of irresponsibility is the most unfounded of all. The more responsible a family is, the more likely birth control will be practiced. With children properly spaced over a due period, the once-great danger for mother and children disappears. The figures prove without the shadow of a doubt that smaller families reduce the mortality rate of mothers and infants to a minimum. Those who advocate abolishment of birth control implicitly promote higher death rates for mothers and babies. Incidentally, birth control is essential for world peace and higher standards of living. All experts agree that the population surplus due to lack of birth control in Italy contributed to the rise of Fascism. They also agree that the same reason induced Japan to enter the Second World War. Further, it is obvious that the nations which now are unable to control their population, e.g., India, China, and Indonesia,

[11] See Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950, chap. 7, especially p. 105.

[12] In the Second World War the French were hopelessly outnumbered and never had a chance to stop the enemy. But the epic battles of the maquis could never have been fought by a decadent people.

are in constant danger; their people are living on a starvation level, sometimes below it. Unrest, famine, misery, revolutions, and wars are the result. If Americans, living in prosperity because of a reasonable population density due to birth control, would cease to be "irresponsible," they would possibly reach the population density of Java, which is twenty times greater. This would mean that the American population would exceed 3 billion, which is 50 per cent more than the entire population of the world. Those who attack the advocates of birth control as irresponsible ought to explain not only how we could feed, house, and clothe so many people but also how we could possibly provide hospitals, doctors, nurses, and drugs for mothers and infants. There would not even be sufficient space for graveyards to bury all those who would die only because there would be too many of them.

The whole problem, however, is highly theoretical for the Western world because changing conditions—the new position of women, rising educational standards, and other factors—are stronger than all objections. Birth control is now an institution in all countries of Western civilization. In varying degrees it is practiced everywhere, including Soviet Russia.

Differentials in Birth Control. The reduction of families to a smaller size is by no means only an urban phenomenon. There are differences, however, between city and country. Childless families—by design and not by fate—are very rare on farms but quite frequent in cities. Farm families also tend to be larger. Nonetheless, really large families with eight or more children are a thing of the past. Rural birth rates are still constantly falling, thus indicating the increase of birth-control practices on farms. There are rural-urban differentials but only in degree.

Many persons believe that religion has a decisive influence on the number of children and birth-control practice. Unfortunately, the census omits all references to religious membership and other accurate data are not available. However, existing evidence points in the opposite direction. Taking entire nations, France and Austria are the only two countries with a temporary population decrease; both countries are preponderantly Catholic.[13] Even more striking is the situation in Ireland, whose population of 2,958,878 (census of 1951, provisional figures) includes 2,786,023 Catholics, very much devoted to their church. But since the disastrous potato famine in 1846, which cost the country half of its population, there has been no increase. For more

[13] Against this argument it is held that many are only nominal Catholics, which is quite true. The strength of French Catholicism, however, has been greatly underrated. Any observant visitor to the French provinces is aware of the deep religiosity of the people. Pétain, during the Second World War, undoubtedly was supported by a large group of Catholics, while a considerable Catholic group worked also with the maquis. After the war, the M.R.P., an outspoken Catholic group, emerged as the strongest party. Similarly, the Catholic party in Austria has always had the majority. Thus, although practicing Catholics in either country are numerous enough to make up the population deficit caused by nominal Catholics, the low birth rate continues.

than a century Ireland has had a stable population. In the first decade after the crop failure, emigration provided an outlet for the surplus population. In the last twenty years the Irish emigration to the United States—the main goal—has become insignificant (total from 1931 to 1940: 13,167; from 1941 to 1950: 25,377). There have been no catastrophes accounting for population losses nor is the death rate from natural causes high. The stability of the population must be due to birth control.[14]

Stouffer [15] investigated more than 40,000 families in Wisconsin and found that the fertility of Catholic urban families declined at a faster rate than the fertility of non-Catholics for the period from 1919 to 1933. A similar study of Indianapolis, made by Whelpton and Kiser,[16] among 41,498 white, native households showed that Catholic families were 18 per cent less fertile than Protestant families. Boston, now a bulwark of Catholicism, declined in population from 1930 to 1940. Manhattan, New York, with a Catholic majority, gained 22,612 persons from 1930 to 1940, only 2.2 per cent for a whole decade, and from 1940 to 1950, 48,427, or about 3 per cent. The low figures both for Boston and Manhattan for the decade from 1930 to 1940 undoubtedly reflect the economic crisis but they do so only because birth control was practiced. During the decade from 1940 to 1950 the total population of the United States increased by 14.3 per cent and the population of central cities in metropolitan areas by 13 per cent; both increases are four times larger than the total population gain of Manhattan. Similar results are obtained from regional comparisons. Massachusetts represents the heaviest concentration of Catholics among all states except Rhode Island. In addition, Massachusetts and Connecticut are the only states which legally prohibit giving of birth-control advice. The population of Massachusetts increased from 4,316,721 in 1940 to 4,690,514, or approximately 8.6 per cent, in 1950, which is 51 per cent below the national average. Virginia, mostly Protestant, increased within the same decade from 2,677,733 to 3,318,680, or nearly 24 per cent, or 70 per cent above the national average. Another indication that Catholics practice birth control to approximately the same degree as the rest of the population is the relative stability of the proportion of Catholics and non-Catholics, which has been approximately 19 per cent of the total population for many years.

Although we may discard religion as a relevant factor in causing fertility differentials, there is no doubt that the low urban birth rate does not result from equal attitudes among all city people. There are many differences which influence the birth rate. Intensive research into the reasons for these differ-

[14] See also R. T. LaPiere, *Sociology,* p. 149.

[15] S. A. Stouffer, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 41.

[16] P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1943.

entials is being conducted by P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, who are testing not fewer than twenty-three hypotheses.[17] The differentials are difficult to evaluate because our family mores are in a state of transition. What we are able to observe now might change even within a decade. We are, sometimes slowly, sometimes with unpredictable acceleration, moving from a society without scientific birth control, with high fertility, infant, maternal, and general death rates, to a society in which carefully planned parenthood will reverse all these conditions. In this process, which began about 1800, some groups have taken the lead, others followed reluctantly, still others resisted.[18] Almost all generalizations have to be revised from time to time. For instance, Negroes, both urban and rural, generally have a higher birth rate than whites. But the nonwhite urban net reproduction rate declined during the decade from 1930 to 1940 from 90 per cent to 74 per cent.[19] In Chicago, New York, and Memphis the 1940 ratio of children under one year per 1,000 women fifteen to forty-five years of age was lower for Negroes than for whites.[20] Similarly, the situation with respect to higher rates of foreign-born as compared with native whites has changed.[21] During the depression the birth rate was at its lowest point but the war years after 1940 brought an upsurge. But the rise in births was not uniform; what happened was contrary to all expectations. The greatest increase was among groups whose fertility is usually low: urban families, people living in the Northeast, and families with a college education.[22] Thus what we observe is the situation at a given moment, but that situation will certainly change. The most outstanding trend—at present—is the negative correlation of economic status and education with fertility. A study by Karpines and Kiser [23] shows the following net reproduction rates in 1935:

Income	*Net reproduction rate, per cent*
$3,000 and over.....	0.42
$2,000–$3,000	0.55
1,500– 2,000	0.63
1,000– 1,500	0.75
Under $1,000	0.96

[17] *Ibid.* So far eleven reports have been issued by the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly.*

[18] The point is stressed by Amos H. Hawley, *op. cit.,* pp. 114–119, who divides the process into three phases, the third and last one still to come.

[19] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Net Reproduction Rates by States,* Bulletin 13, Series P.5.

[20] United States census. Statement taken from Gist and Halbert, *Urban Society,* p. 214.

[21] W. Ogburn and M. Nimkoff, *Sociology,* Boston, 1946, p. 485.

[22] Frank W. Notestein, "U.S. Population and National Welfare," *Scientific American,* September, 1951.

[23] B. D. Karpines and C. V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Population in the United States," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* October, 1939. The figures in the text are from the adaptation by Hawley, *op. cit.,* p. 116.

Education of women	*Net reproduction rate, per cent*
College	0.52
High school	0.68
7th or 8th grade	0.86
Under 7th grade	0.97

Similar results were obtained in another study by Kiser [24] and by the National Resources Committee.[25] In other words, within an urban population the number of children increases with poverty and ignorance. The emphasis is on the combination of both factors. With rising living standards of the masses and better general education, the class differential will probably disappear. There are indeed indications that the change is well under way. Jacobson [26] has shown that the class differences in birth rates for New York had decreased from 1929 to 1942; the small population increase from 1940 to 1950 corroborates his findings. Similar observations have been made in England and Wales.[27] In Sweden the trend has even been reversed. Edin and Hutchinson showed that in the period from 1919 to 1922 manual workers and low-income groups had the lowest birth rates; the rate rose slowly and reached its peak in the highest income groups with business and professional men. We note that in all three instances—New York, England and Wales, and Sweden—educational standards are very high. Everything is still in flux and the final outcome is unpredictable since it hinges on immanent trends as well as on extraneous factors such as wars or technological changes. We venture to say that the family will continue to be less stable than in former times. Lack of stability in all respects is, after all, the most conspicuous trait of our fast-moving, dynamic society.

Review of Changes in Family Patterns. We are now ready to reevaluate the features of modern urban family life. During medieval times Western society developed a family type, frequently called "familistic," and which, with some variations, also appears in other civilizations. This family type was multifunctional and characterized by the almost absolute authority of the husband and the father over his wife and children. The families were of considerable size but enormously high death rates kept the population down so

[24] Clyde V. Kiser, "Birth Rate and Socio-economic Attributes," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* April, 1939.

[25] *The Problems of a Changing Population,* National Resources Committee, 1938.

[26] Paul H. Jacobson, "The Trend of the Birth Rate among Persons on Different Economic Levels, City of New York, 1929 to 1942," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* April, 1944.

[27] John W. Innes, *Class Fertility Trends in England and Wales, 1876–1934,* Princeton, 1938; also John W. Innes, "Class Birth Rates in England and Wales, 1929–1931," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* January, 1941. Cf. F. W. Notestein, "Class Differences in Fertility," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* November, 1926.

that for centuries growth was hardly perceptible. Selection of mates was a family affair and, if not actually made by parents, subject to their approval. The selection was, in the first place, guided by economic considerations, namely, the ability of the future husband to support a family and the endowment of the bride. Women were largely uneducated. The education of upper-class women concentrated on languages and music. Sex mores were based on several contradictory standards. The official standard permitted only sex relations between married couples, but tacitly double standards were tolerated. The family was very stable; divorces were impossible before the Reformation and, for a long time afterward, rare.

This system had considerable advantages but was far from being as idyllic as some critics of the modern system maintain. Under a brutal, domineering man, life could become unbearable for wife and children. Women were kept in subservience and ignorance. The contradictory sex standards, of which the city-operated houses of prostitution were symbolic, created hypocrisy and caused much misery. During this time the West suffered from several waves of syphilis; seduced girls, a favorite theme of literature, became outcasts and the fate of illegitimate children was tragic. Since only the wealthiest could secure the future of all their children, the surplus had to leave home early. The younger children from farms were forced into mercenary armies or flocked into the cities where many of them perished. The happiness of the family, if it existed, was mainly the result of low expectations. Children were brought up strictly; it is quite obvious that even a most tender mother cannot bestow as much love on each of a dozen children as she can if she has only two or three. It is also questionable that marital happiness was greater in a system where the bridegroom fell in love with the dowry before he fell in love with the bride, and where a woman assented to marriage only because she feared to remain a spinster and needed somebody to support her. That the marital behavior of the kings and the aristocracy, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cannot be defended from any point of view is well known.

However, this system broke down. The change to a new stable pattern has not yet been completed. Changes in the city preceded those in the country, and within the urban population different classes still have different standards. Selection of mates is now based on personal preference; family interference is becoming increasingly rare. Inequality of sexes has almost disappeared. There is a definite trend toward uniform sex standards. Children are less subject to authoritarian rule. The size of the family has shrunk. Childless families, either temporary or permanent, have become frequent by design. The stability of the family has gone—in cities divorces, separations, and desertions are numerous. Birth control has become a common practice.

The new family patterns are far from being ideal; they have solved some problems but they have also created new difficulties. But criticism of the

emerging new system overshoots the mark. The advantages of the modern patterns are patent. Love suicides are now largely a sad memory of the past. To a large degree children have been freed from the tyranny of unreasonable parents and women are better protected against brutal husbands. Birth control enables people who must not have children to marry; it enables others to marry at an earlier age and have children at a later time, which is preferable to fleeting affairs and recourse to prostitution. Birth control also protects the health of mothers and children. The often-heard statement that the modern family is in a crisis is quite inaccurate. What is in a crisis is the stability of the family. The institution of the family as such is in no crisis. With the exception of a minority of ill-adjusted persons, everybody wants to marry and most people do. Divorced and widowed persons mostly remarry. And most families have children, though fewer than before. All propositions to abolish the family or to replace it by some other institution are fantastic and have never been taken seriously. The turn from laxer procedures to strict family regulations and the great stress on motherhood, as practiced by the Soviet Union for the last twenty years, is perhaps the most convincing evidence that the family as an institution is in no danger.

It is likewise untrue that the modern family does not properly fulfill its functions. In the first place, the family discharges as properly as ever before its function as the basic unit of social life. Men live, as they always did, in families, perhaps even more so, since tribal ties, clans, age or sex groups, which in other societies compete with families, do not exist. The family is still the main concern of the ordinary man. But the family has ceased to be what it once had been, an almost universal unit. It is now a specialized unit. This makes the family less stable but, what is not sufficiently realized, more efficient. At least it gives greater opportunity for reaching higher efficiency. The actual performance depends on the person, not on the institution. A modern surgeon is more efficient than his colleague a hundred years ago, but only if he is capable. The family lost many functions because other specialized agencies can do a better job. Just because the family is reduced to the functions which no other organization can fulfill, a more perfect performance is possible. These genuine functions are mainly two. First, the family is the most intimate community because it is the center of affection. Because the family is now so small, there can be more communion and more affection than ever before. All the sensational clamor is contradicted by the fact that most people stay together for life, work out their problems, overcome dissensions and disappointments, share worries and pleasures, and remain united until death. While much remains to be done, there is also little doubt that children are affectionately treated, that they receive a better education and, especially girls, a better preparation for their future. That children are no longer desired is simply not true. The United States has the rare distinction of being the country where the demand for

children—in cities—exceeds the supply. Peasants may want children because they need workers. But urban Americans want children only for the sake of affection. Social agencies are flooded with applications for adoption which they cannot satisfy so that a grotesque situation has evolved: a black market in babies for adoption. That alone should refute the opinion that American family life is deteriorating.

The second genuine function which the urban family has retained is the bringing up of children. It has to be realized that this is a task which poses more difficulties than in any other system. The city is no place for preschool children. Even the elaborate roof gardens of millionaires are a poor substitute for the fresh air and the open spaces of the country. Suburbanites are not much better off since their gardens are mostly small. The shorter working hours and modern laborsaving devices in housework have given the working classes much more leisure time and the intelligent worker makes use of it to the advantage of his family. While families with only elementary education are still lagging behind the times, the great progress which has been made is unmistakable.

To sum up: The urban family has retained two functions which cannot be discharged by any other agency with equal success—to be the center of affection and to bring up children. While the latter has become more difficult, there is no indication that the urban family fails to discharge the two functions satisfactorily. On the contrary, the reduction of the size of the family as well as the reduction, and consequently the specialization, of functions has had beneficial effects. The urban family, like any other type, has its problems, its conflicts, its crises; but there can be no doubt that there is also real communion, affection, and attention, that children receive a better education than ever before, and that the family continues to be the basic unit around which the entire life centers. With reasonable exceptions the common man is still more concerned with what happens to his family than with anything else. As long as people continue to marry and to live together as well as can be expected, as long as they have their own children or adopt those of others, as long as they take care of emotional, economic, and educational needs of all members of the family, we have no reason to be alarmed for the future or to expect a disintegration of the family as an institution. An era of transition is always replete with problems, but there is no indication that the average family is either too unstable or unwilling to cope with these problems successfully.

Chapter 15

URBAN RELIGION

Urban Life and Religion. Popular opinion concerning the role of religion in modern urban life abounds with a variety of unwarranted generalizations. Those who have broken away from established religion tend to minimize its role; to some religious bigots the city is a new, gigantic Sodom and Gomorrah, godless and sinful. But the extremists on both sides find themselves agreeing that urban religion has lost its power. Both the atheist and the zealot seem to think that rural areas are the stronghold of religion. Closer analysis shows that religion is a very complex phenomenon, with many different aspects which defy any simple formula. In the first place, religion is an institution which is almost as universal as the family. Among nonreligious intellectuals there is a tendency to underestimate both the numerical strength and the importance of organized religion as a social force. As for the United States, a public-opinion poll conducted in 1948 indicated that 94 per cent of the population professed personal belief in God.[1] Although it would seem that this figure is too high, reluctance to reveal irreligious attitudes is itself sufficient evidence of the general acceptance of religion and its influence. Another proof is provided by the Soviet Union, where churches still flourish although the Communists have been conducting an extremely skillful propaganda campaign against religion for more than thirty years. Although churches encounter great financial difficulties, although membership in a church is tantamount to exclusion from any leading position, and although the Russian Communist party accepts only atheists, the church survives. In addition, it is becoming more and more recognized that Communism itself is also a religion, although it denies a supernatural order. If we consider religion as a system of supreme values which man has to accept and over which he has no control, and if we regard this value system as the means of ultimate orientation for action, then Communism is most certainly a very orthodox religious system, having a kind of bible—*Das Kapital;* saints—Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; a college of high priests—the Politburo; all characterized by extreme intolerance, and by persecution of heretics.

Those who regard the city as being doomed by its very nature as an irreligious habitat overlook two undeniable facts. All world religions are city-

[1] Kimball Young, *Sociology,* 2d ed., New York, 1949, p. 382.

born and have grown in opposition to more primitive forms of rural religions, which are usually connected with fertility deities. As is well known, Judaism evolved from the belief in a family—and later on—a tribal God to henotheism until it became monotheistic in a preponderantly urban society and in constant struggle with the initially rural cults of Palestine. Jesus was born in a town and preached in cities. Paul, also born in a city, missioned only in cities. Christianity spread from city to city and reached the rural hinterland much later. The early Christians identified the heathen with the peasant.[2] The words "peasant" and "pagan" have the same root and were originally synonymous. Harnack demonstrated that the growth of Christianity was causally connected with the growth of cities. As late as in the seventeenth century Baxter thought that the increasing contacts of the weavers of Kidderminster with the city of London would promote religiosity.[3]

Higher forms of religion and a more complex and effective organization of religion arose only in cities and were maintained in cities. Practically all sects, and certainly the most important of them, originated in cities. The leading authorities, the learned theologians, and the teachers of religion live in cities.[4]

Differences in Urban and Rural Religious Life. Thus the contrast between a pious countryside and the irreligious city disappears. Nonetheless, there are distinct differences in the modes of urban and rural religious life. Some of them have their roots in general attitudes. The farmer, in all things more conservative than the city dweller, is not only more reluctant to change his religious outlook but also sticks to the time-honored ways of church life. Also, group pressure is much stronger in rural than in urban areas, with the exception of the small town where social control is most complete. Despite sectarianism, there is much more conformity in rural areas, and persons belonging to minority denominations are often unwelcome "strangers." If some unconventional sects exist, they have a tendency to concentrate in a restricted area rather than to scatter; the Amish in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, are perhaps the best-known example. Radicalism usually, intellectualism always, is absent in rural churches. Religious activities, as a rule, are family affairs; only one member going to church regularly is rare in the country but frequent in cities. Services are by necessity simple; the churches are modest structures; the ministers are often part-time clerics, part-time farmers; their education is sometimes limited.

Nominal versus Genuine Membership. To determine the real strength of religious bodies is extremely difficult. Available statistical material must be

[2] See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* p. 269.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] This is stressed by Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* pp. 418 ff.; see also J. G. Thompson, *Urbanization,* New York, 1927, chap. 21; and Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* p. 262.

viewed with great caution. In almost all European countries, except France, it was nearly impossible to profess agnosticism before 1918. To sever connection with a recognized body was tantamount to social suicide. After the First World War pressure lessened in some countries; where Communist governments were set up the situation was even reversed. But conditions remain unchanged in Spain and Portugal and, to a lesser degree, elsewhere. There is no doubt that many hesitate to leave a religious organization because they are afraid it would be to the detriment of their children. That there are handicaps is undeniable. Even in the United States an instructor was recently dismissed from a state teachers college because, despite her denial, she was suspected of being an atheist. Hence, people prefer to remain nominal members of a church. From the religious point of view the nominal adherence is entirely meaningless; to the sociologist it is a measure of social pressure but not an indication of religiosity.

An example of reluctance to leave the church is provided by the city of Vienna. Before 1918, under monarchic rule, church membership was socially required. After the republic was established, the requirement no longer existed and "anticlerical" groups, fighting the political influence of the Catholic Church, engaged in intensive propaganda against the church. The results were meager. In 1912, when Austria was still a monarchy, 0.2 per cent of the Viennese population belonged to no religious organization; in 1934, the year in which democracy was replaced by a semitotalitarian system which again favored the church, the figure rose to 4.1 per cent.[5]

Statistical Inaccuracies. In the United States we are beset with additional difficulties. No official census is taken; all figures come from reports made by religious bodies. Religious minorities which are under attack from one quarter or another have an interest in arriving at a maximum estimate of their membership. Great urban mobility makes some duplication of church membership inevitable. People move to another town or another district, join another church without notifying the former church, and are counted twice for at least one year. Those who baptize children when they are born —notably Catholics—count every infant. Their membership figures represent a maximum. Denominations which baptize adults only and receive members only by assent of the congregation give minimum figures. While some persons retain membership for other than religious reasons and therefore ought to be eliminated from the count, it is well known that many Protestants never join a particular church although they are very religious. Among our Presidents, Jefferson and Lincoln were never affiliated with a church. Jefferson was somewhat like a Unitarian in his religious views. No one knows what Lincoln was, but he regularly attended church and was a very religious man. We may be justified in assuming that the figures presented by Catholics and

[5] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien, 1938.*

Jews are maximum estimates while, if the same yardstick were to be applied to Protestants, their estimates would be much higher.

Similar inaccuracies hamper a comparison between urban and rural church membership. The available figures are mainly based on the location of the church and not on the residence of the members. Farmers in increasing numbers are attending urban churches because they are now easily accessible, and their services are sometimes conducted on a higher level. Moreover, the farmer often welcomes the opportunity to spend some hours after church in town. An unknown number of members of urban churches must be credited to farms. Furthermore, the rural areas have a much higher proportion of Protestants than the cities. Consequently, more children are counted in urban districts than in the country: statistics are thus slanted in favor of the cities.

Existing figures show that approximately two-thirds of the people affiliated with a religious body belong to urban churches and one-third to rural churches. If children were uniformly excluded (or included), and if residence and not church location were used to compile the figures, the distribution would change in favor of the farms. Since the proportion of the urban to the rural population is also 2 to 1, we might deduce, after allowing for the above-mentioned inaccuracies, that farmers are organized to a higher degree in religious bodies than city people. This does not necessarily imply great religiosity, but it certainly implies greater conservatism and greater community pressure.

The total United States church membership was given for 1950 as 85,705,280 [6] and for October, 1951, as 89,391,076.[7] This would leave approximately 65,000,000, or 42 per cent, without religious ties. The percentage of those not affiliated with any denomination is substantially higher than in any other Western country (including France but probably excluding Russia). The high percentage is partially based on the omission of children from religious censuses. The real figure lies somewhere between the 58 per cent who are listed as organized and the 94 per cent who profess belief in God.

Nonconformism and Religious Diversity. America is traditionally the country of nonconformism. Although some of the early nonconformists, notably the New England Puritans, tried to establish a religious monopoly for their own denomination, tolerance, or, perhaps better, toleration, finally won. Diversity of creed is not only accepted but expected. However, all the early settlers, except in Maryland, were Protestants. The rural areas have preserved their predominantly Protestant character. Of a total nonurban population of approximately 54 million, slightly more than 10 per cent, or 5.7 million people, are Catholics. Nearly all of the remaining 90 per cent are Protestants or descendants of Protestants. Even sectarianism in the country is less varied. The great majority of rural Protestants belong to five de-

[6] *Information Please Almanac, 1952,* p. 648.

[7] *World Almanac, 1952,* p. 483.

nominations: Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist and—mostly in New England—Congregational.

Nowhere in the world do we find a religious diversity comparable to that in American cities. There is scarcely any religion or sect which is not represented. In October, 1951, there were 265 different religious bodies,[8] most of which were entirely urban. However, fewer than fifty had a membership exceeding 50,000. Some are so small that they are negligible. For instance, a sect called "House of God, Holy Church of the Living God, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, House of Prayer for all People" has a membership of 200. On the other hand, the importance of a denomination and its influence cannot be measured by figures. Some of the denominations whose members are socially and politically powerful are small. The Protestant Episcopal Church has only about 2,000,000 members; the Unitarians, who are mostly urban, have fewer than 80,000; the Quakers, also preponderantly urban, amount to approximately 115,000. All denominations are split. The Roman Catholic Church, of course, is a single unit but it has suffered some defections—the Liberal Catholic Church and four different bodies of Old Catholic churches—practically all of them urban.

In addition, urban America possesses some religious bodies which, for one reason or other, fall outside the scope of traditional religious life, such as Baha'is, the Mayan Temple, the Vedanta Society, the Theosophists, the Humanists, and the Society for Ethical Culture. Although all of them are small, they all indicate dissatisfactions of urban groups with existing denominations as well as a continuous need for some form of organized religious life. Some denominations are almost entirely or overwhelmingly urban. Among these are the Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Universalists, and, as already mentioned, Unitarians and Quakers. There is, or has been, a tendency of certain denominations to concentrate within certain urban areas. Thus Boston is connected with the Unitarians, Philadelphia with the Quakers, and New York with the Dutch Reformed Church.

Changes in the Position of Protestantism. Much more important is a general shift to the disadvantage of urban Protestantism. In the first 150 years America was largely rural, her settlers were nearly all Protestants and, with exceptions in the South, sectarianists. Around the midnineteenth century everything changed. The immigrants were largely non-Protestants and they moved into urban places.

If we dispense with numerically small splinter groups, the non-Protestants comprise about one-fourth of the total population (20 per cent Catholics, 3 per cent Jews, and 1.5 per cent members of Eastern Orthodox churches). But they are not evenly divided over the country. Generally speaking, we can say that the proportion of Catholics and Jews rises with the size of a city. In addition, they tend to concentrate in the Northeast while the South

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 481.

(except for Maryland and Louisiana) and the Mountain states are still solidly Protestant with the Middle West and the Pacific states in between. As a result, Protestants have become a minority in some of the most important cities. Boston has ceased to be Unitarian; the City of Brotherly Love is only sparsely inhabited by Quakers, although there is still a concentration of Friends; the Dutch Reformed are barely able to support four churches in Manhattan, which they once dominated. The Protestants undoubtedly contributed to the change because the Protestant upper and middle classes, following the familiar patterns of invasion and succession, were quick to move from the cities to independent suburbs.

Nonreligious Implications of Changing Religious Composition. This retreat of Protestantism from the cities is probably unique. Certain repercussions were inevitable and the situation became even more complicated since the shift in religious composition was not due to conversion but to the influx of groups who differed not only in their creed but in fundamental attitudes with respect to nonreligious matters. In the first place, the shift created resentment among the established groups. It is one thing for a group to tolerate a minority belief and another thing to become a minority group. This rather delicate matter is usually glossed over. However, science cannot afford to prefer tactful silence; it has to face facts. To be deposed from a dominant position and to become relegated to second place must create resentment. The Protestant groups have coped with this problem with more grace and less resistance than others; Protestant missionaries in Latin America, where Catholicism is in less danger, certainly meet with more difficulties than Catholic priests did when they began to mission in this country (except in the early days of colonial New England). Yet a certain tension exists although it has had no serious consequences.[9] The problem, however, is more than a question of group attitudes and social relationships. These can be changed and improved and progress in this respect is unmistakable. But religious differences are not restricted to doctrines. The time when religion was considered a "private" matter has passed; we know that religion deeply influences large segments of secular life which is oriented toward values derived from religious beliefs. The patterns of American life are distinctly Protestant and always have been so. The Bill of Rights is a translation of Protestant tenets into moral-political terms. The theories of Locke and all other philosophers whose ideas guided the early Americans were either direct derivations from Protestantism or secularized forms which disregarded theological doctrines but accepted their secular consequences. Among these concepts which form the basis of American life are the following: (1) the strict separation of state and church with its opposition to interference in governmental affairs by churches; (2) the role of the priest conceived as only

[9] Notwithstanding the Know-Nothing movement and the Ku Klux Klan, which seem to have been only interludes.

a leader in worship and a spiritual teacher, subject to approval by the congregation and not accepted as a necessary intermediary between God and the individual; (3) the idea of liberty and its specific interpretation as individual independence and individual responsibility from which no person can be relieved; (4) the obligation (not merely right) of the individual to act according to his conscience and conviction and not on the orders of an ecclesiastical authority.

Only on the basis of these tenets was it possible to develop the type of liberal democracy which is so typically American; only on the basis of these tenets can we understand the peculiar combination of extreme individualism and voluntary cooperation which also is characteristically American. The Catholic Church disagrees with all these concepts. Although separation of state and church is accepted for the United States, the acceptance is temporary; wherever Catholics are in the majority the separation of functions is rejected and a privileged status for the Church is demanded. The priest is the indispensable mediator between God and man; his qualities rest on the sacramental character of his ordination; the laity has no right to speak in religious matters. Interpretation of religious doctrine is the exclusive prerogative of clerical authorities and absolute obedience is required. On the other hand, after due penitence, absolution is granted and the person is relieved of his responsibilities for the past. All this implies dependence on authority rather than independence based on individual conscience, obedience rather than autonomy, shift of responsibility from the person to the Church, and rule by authority rather than rule by majority. While liberal democracy was instituted in the United States (and equally so in the Scandinavian countries, England, and Holland) without opposition from Protestant churches but indeed with the active support of leading churchmen, similar developments in France and Italy succeeded only after the resistance of the Catholic Church had ceased.[10] The waning influence of Protestantism in the cities, especially the large ones, with its implicit substitution of a different system, tends to change established American patterns and to replace them with patterns based on a different value system. To avoid possible misunderstanding it should be made clear that for this discussion the question of approval or disapproval of one system or the other is irrelevant. What is sociologically important is the fact that the changed religious composition in large urban areas implies the possibility of a change in attitudes and behavior outside the field of religion.

With respect to the Jews, a few remarks will suffice. Only the role of Jewish religion will be discussed and all other aspects of a large urban concentration will be disregarded. Official Jewish sources for several years in

[10] For a more detailed discussion of some of the basic questions see Talcott Parsons, *Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Sociology and Social Psychology,* The Edward H. Hazen Foundation, New Haven, Conn., 1952, pp. 37 ff.

succession have given the number of Jews as 5 million. This lump figure is obviously an estimate and, like all figures on religious minorities, exaggerated. The number is certainly much lower and the more so as many nominal Jews—either out of a sense of loyalty or for social and economic reasons—affiliate with some congregation. Since the Jews neither hope to become a majority nor try to win converts, their participation as a group in community life is mainly directed toward fighting discrimination. The main tenets of the Jewish faith, as applied to secular problems, are in line rather than in conflict with established patterns.

At present the points of most intensive Jewish concentration are the largest cities, although the situation varies considerably. The Jewish position is strongest in New York, followed probably by Chicago, but it is hardly significant in Boston. There is no doubt that Jews are more susceptible to secularization than other religious groups. Anti-Semitism probably delays their final disappearance more than other factors. However, the times of Jewish mass immigration have obviously ended. The Jews, as an urban group, have few children and tend to have even less than other urban groups. Since no urban group reproduces itself, the American Jews must decline in numbers. With increasing secularization the process of decline will gain momentum. From this point of view the Jews as a religious minority are an ephemeral phenomenon.

Diversity as a Source of Tension and Division. Although diversity of religion is part and parcel of the American heritage, it has to be recognized as a source of tension. All monotheistic religions are by necessity intolerant. None of them can even hypothetically admit the possibility of an error and any major deviation from one's own creed must be considered as heresy. It is therefore surprising that actually so little tension exists, and this the more so, as religious diversity is usually accompanied by differences in cultural background. The bulk of Protestants consist of groups which are culturally akin: Anglo-Saxons, Scotch, Welsh, Scandinavians, Dutch, and Northern Germans. The Catholics are mostly Irish, Italian, Polish, and Southern German, in New England, French Canadian, in Louisiana, French, in the Southwest, Mexican, and thus more diversified. Actually the oldest group, the Irish, are in the lead; they hold almost all the hierarchical positions and dominate the Catholic press and educational institutions. This gives American Catholicism its special flavor which politically appears in an anti-British attitude. The Jews, initially a small number of Spanish-Portuguese origin, followed by coreligionists from Germany, are now overwhelmingly of Polish and Russian background, with quite different dietary habits, customs, and life styles.

That there is less tension than we might expect is partially explained by the institutional tolerance of the American people, but is facilitated by the

urban setting which makes it possible for the members of a group to live in segregation, thus avoiding contacts which may lead to conflict.

However, the religious diversity has definitely divisive effects. Some religious leaders exhort their groups to "stick to their own kind," to send their children to parochial schools supported by their own denomination, to refrain from joining interdenominational organizations such as the Y.M.C.A. or service clubs. The setting up of parochial schools as done by Catholics and some Lutheran and evangelical groups, the establishment of Hebrew Y's for men and women, and the Knights of Columbus are examples of the reluctance to unite the nation by common educational and recreational activities. These separatist tendencies are not entirely unprovoked since minorities are frequently excluded from activities which are supposedly community undertakings. The greatest failure in this respect, however, is intradenominational, since nearly all religious groups still segregate white and Negro members of the same denomination.

Intermarriage. All these things, however, could be straightened out, and efforts are being made to minimize the detriments to national unification, although progress is slow. But one difficulty is inherent in religious diversity: it is an obstacle to marriage. Several studies show that the work of the melting pot is seriously impeded by this obstacle. Deeply religious persons, especially those who believe that salvation depends on the right faith, will be troubled by the heresy of the partner. But even those with more liberal views have to face the problem of bringing up their children. The implicit intolerance of monotheistic religions, mentioned above, makes it a problem to teach that only one faith is right but that the parents differ on what it is. Skepticism, so necessary in science, has no place in religion and is unsuitable for the psychological needs of children who want certainty. It is therefore not surprising to learn that religious intermarriage is rather exceptional. Interestingly, intermarriages are more frequent at the opposite poles: among the habitual lawbreakers who, to be sure, do not care for religion and among the upper crust of the intellectuals who have either broken away from established religions or are not dogmatic about faith. Both groups represent thin strata. What counts is the behavior of the intermediate masses, and their reluctance to intermarry slows up the process of biological unification of the nation.

Class and Religion. Another important sociological corollary is the class character of religious denominations. The upper class is almost everywhere connected with the established church of a nation, at least insofar as membership is required. Thus, the British aristocracy belongs to the Church of England, the upper classes in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are Lutherans. In Switzerland, the oldest democracy, the class character is less marked although Protestants have a slight edge, due to the fact that the old patrician families are mostly Protestants and Swiss history is so much connected with

the movements of Zwingli and Calvin. America has no established church, but the religious class character is undeniable. The explanation seems to be that religion does not account for class status but that it acquires a class character because certain classes are identified with certain denominations. This is probably not the entire explanation, but it may serve as a tentative hypothesis until the problem has been more thoroughly explored.

That the general order is Protestant first, Catholics second, and Jews last is in line with the general situation in all Western countries as outlined above. More interesting, however, are the subdivisions within each major religion. Within Protestantism there are some regional differences. But generally the Episcopalians hold the lead everywhere with the possible exception of some Southern regions and of Boston, where good society is solidly Unitarian. In New England the Congregationalists also have upper-class status while they are numerically not strong enough in the South and Middle West to play an important role in the class structure. Presbyterians follow; their rank is very high, particularly in the South. Methodists are largely middle class; the lower middle classes tend to be Baptists. Lutherans are also mostly middle class. The lowest classes are represented by "basement churches," "holiness" sects, and similar denominations. The Jews are split into three groups: reformed, conservative, and orthodox, and their class structure closely corresponds to that order.

In Catholicism there can be no class division because there is only one church. The class character appears, though, in the location of the church to which a parishioner belongs. Again, this distinction is very weak in America but the cathedral is at least socially preferable. Thus, upper-group Catholics in New York want to be married in St. Patrick's, just as the noble Parisian wants to be married in Notre-Dame.[11]

It has to be stressed that the correlation of denomination and class status is preponderantly urban. A farmer hardly gains in prestige because he is vestryman in an Episcopal church. In the city this function enhances or confirms a high social position.

Since the class character of American society is entirely informal, we cannot expect a rigid conformity of class and denomination. There are exceptions. The Quakers, for instance, enjoy high prestige regardless of their actual class status; however, they have few members among the lowest socioeconomic stratum. Non-Protestant foreign aristocrats are usually accepted as upper-class members, as evidenced by society marriages. Here snobbery carries more weight than anything else.

It would be rash, however, to see in the class character of denominations

[11] The differences in prestige and the social desirability of being married in a certain church are a specific trait of urban life, reflecting class differentiations even within the same denomination. Examples are London's St. Margaret's, Westminster, Boston's Trinity Church, and New York's St. Thomas' Church.

a mere expression of arrogance or traditional evaluation of certain faiths. To some extent denominational differences are real class distinctions because they reflect different class attitudes. The upper classes, usually well educated, incline toward denominations which are progressive in thought, moderate in their demands for "righteousness," and whose services are of a dignified type, corresponding to secular patterns of upper-class groups. The middle classes emphasize the secular and religious consequences of an accepted creed and they prefer denominations which stress these aspects. The middle classes, in line with the upper classes, and also because of the common Anglo-Saxon tradition, abhor both too much liturgical formalism and emotionalism. The latter is exactly what the lower socioeconomic groups apparently desire. They ardently wish to be uplifted but not by a tacit communion of the faithful nor by a sober understanding of the deeper meaning of religion; they are neither used to the suppression of their feelings nor do they want to suppress them. They demand excitement and approve of those methods which arouse emotions. Hence the predilection for denominations which favor testimonials and revivals and which conduct services in a highly emotional way. The Holy Rollers are the best-known example of this extreme type.

All this is almost entirely urban; bigotry, on the other hand, can occur everywhere and among all classes, although upper classes are least bigoted. Consequently, we find that the Bible belt is regional but shows no split between country and city. Fundamentalism, though city-born, has spread into the countryside but has not affected the upper classes. They are not necessarily averse to rigorism in religion, but they find other expressions for it. Religion, as must be realized, serves a great variety of needs and expectations [12] and both, in turn, are partly conditioned by class attitudes.

Functional Losses of Religion. The medieval church was a universal communality aiming at an absolute supremacy over secular powers; although this goal was never realized, the political power of the Church was considerable. Since clerics were almost the only ones who could read and write, they filled all important positions. The Church obtained an educational monopoly; it exerted censorship over arts and sciences; the ecclesiastical courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction in cases of annulment or separation of marriages. As one of the greatest landholders, the Church played a very important economic role. Social life was strictly controlled and the whole community was by necessity organized on the basis of a single Church.

Although the early American colonists had a different concept of the role of religion, the New England Puritan theocracy made totalitarian claims which were rather similar, but the attempts were unsuccessful in the long run. Since then, religion, like the family, has constantly lost functions which

[12] The pioneer study in this respect is William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*

were taken over by other agencies. The loss of functions is partly due to the establishment of the basic American pattern: separation of state and church, right to nonconformism, and freedom of thought; partly it is due—exactly in the case of the family—to changes in attitudes as well as in the emergence of specialized agencies which are superior in performance. Some losses were generally accepted as a matter of fact; others were—and in certain instances still are—resented. This is then a potential source of conflict which occurs again and again. Hence, religion is not only a factor in organizing a community; it also is occasionally a disorganizing, disturbing factor. Here again the phenomenon is mostly urban. The rural community is so uniform that conflicts are unlikely to arise.

Among the declining religious functions, formal education is foremost; the problems involved are exclusively urban, insofar as higher education is concerned. In former times practically all colleges were founded and operated by denominations. In the course of time nondenominational colleges came into being and many outstanding institutions emancipated themselves from their founding churches. Harvard severed its ties with the Unitarians, Yale with the Congregationalists, Columbia with the Episcopalians, Princeton with the Presbyterians, and Brown with the Baptists.

Now and then attempts are made to exclude from education in general certain teachings which some denominations regard as irreligious. The most successful attempt was made in Tennessee, where it is still forbidden to teach the theory of evolution. Such interference is fought by scientists and conflicts are the inevitable result. Another loss of function concerns the control which the Church once exerted over the legal regulations of marriages and divorce.

Religious versus Secular Agencies. If religious bodies try to stem the tide and to prevent the loss of functions by retaining their own church-supervised institutions and competing with secular agencies on a merit basis, there will be no conflict. Some Quaker preparatory schools, for instance, have maintained very high moral and educational standards and are, by any objective yardstick, preferable to exclusive private schools which have an undesirable divisive effect by separating classes and fostering arrogance. On an entirely voluntary and competitive basis the churches have largely preserved their marriage function; most weddings take place before a minister and not before a civil magistrate. Conflicts arise mainly from two sources. Either leaders of religious bodies try to promote their own policies by other means than the perfectly legitimate way of exhortation. Pressure is exerted to keep parishioners out of secular activities or to direct these activities in certain ways. A church dignitary, for instance, demanded that the owner of a motion-picture theater withdraw a film to which only that particular church objected. Otherwise the members of that church would be ordered to boycott the theater for a period of two years. Such infringements upon liberty must

cause conflicts and disorganize a community. The same is true of the second method, which is frequently applied. In many urban places the two major political parties are almost of equal strength. Every large minority group can swing an election by voting solidly for one party. This situation is used by intimidating any candidate who does not promise to vote for (or against) a measure on which a religious body has taken a stand. Thereby minorities are able to force decisions against the will of majorities. Inevitably tension results. It so happens that—with some exceptions—the use of political pressure differs rather distinctly along religious lines. Protestant denominations are predominantly interested in blue laws and in the restriction or prohibition of gambling and drinking. Steps in that direction may irk some persons and may harm some business interests but they have no essential consequences. That stores may or may not open before Sunday church services are over, that alcoholic beverages cannot be sent by mail, that bingo is prohibited, may or may not be criticized, but such regulations have no influence on the essential patterns of community life. Catholics, on the other hand, concentrate on issues of greater importance. They are against liberalizing the divorce laws, including regulations for non-Catholics; they are against any form of sterilization as well as against birth control. They were, for instance, instrumental in closing all advisory agencies of the Planned Parenthood organization in Massachusetts and Connecticut. They are for stricter censorship of books, paintings, radio, and television. They want to eliminate the dissemination of information, by teaching and otherwise, of opinions which they regard as irreligious, blasphemous, or dangerous. Such a split on very essential issues along religious lines can cause considerable tension.

Secularism. The final aspect to be discussed is secularism. Since the latter half of the fifteenth century Western civilization has been undergoing a continuous process of secularization which apparently has not yet ended. Although secularism has spread into the rural areas, it originated in the cities and has its roots in urban life. Secularization occurs in various ways; it takes place either within the framework of religious bodies or is directed against them. As indicated above, it is sometimes only a reduction of functions, leaving to the churches the performance of genuine religious tasks and assigning other functions to specialized agencies. It has its main roots in the insight that many nonreligious activities are hampered by the interference of persons who are neither qualified to direct or criticize performances in these fields. This is especially true of science, which has made tremendous progress since it was freed from control by religious bodies. Although the problem has never been sufficiently explored, there seems to be another psychological factor involved: an apparent lessening of anxiety, which in itself has important implications for the character of a religion. It may be stated tentatively that urban life tends to mitigate some forms of anxiety which

are fomented by the relatively great isolation of rural areas and the helplessness of the farmer against the threat of natural catastrophes (storms, hail, drought, etc.).

Be this as it may, secularism within churches expresses itself in liberalized doctrine, in less emphasis on liturgy, and in lesser demands of ritual performances, and consequently in a greater stress on moral obligations and a reconciliation of tenets with reason and science. In this sense the Reformation, again a product of the cities, is the most revolutionary form of secularism within the framework of religion. As all revolutionary movements become more and more conservative after their victory, the Protestant bodies began to extend their functions beyond the initial intentions of the reformers.[13] Thus the process of secularization had to begin over again.

There is no doubt that the religious zeal which once pervaded the Western world has abated. Whether or not this is a result of secularism may be left undecided. It seems that religious life has cycles of tides and ebbs, regardless of secularism. The Western world has seen many periods of increased religious interest and great religious agitation; the times of St. Francis of Assisi, the Reformation, and, in America, the period of the Puritans and of the Great Awakening.

The present decrease in intensity has led to the belief that religion is on its way out, a typical error of intellectuals. Some people who have broken away from established religions expect the disappearance of all forms of religious life in the near future. By doing so they only display their lack of insight; as Talcott Parsons [14] acidly states: "The proponent of this view is the victim of his own ignorance and counter-superstition." Yet the fact remains that a portion of the population—again mainly urban—can either manage to live outside established religious organizations according to individual religious convictions or are entirely agnostic or atheistic. This has not always led to the beneficial effects which the more noble among the agnostics once took for granted. Man cannot live without a firmly established system of ultimate values which he recognizes as supreme. If one religion is destroyed, another is created. When God is dead, the idols come to life. Some of them are as bloodthirsty, cruel, and vindictive in the name of humanity as some self-appointed leaders of a supposedly Christian religion who killed, tortured, and persecuted dissenters in the name of the God of love.

We refer, of course, to the various modern forms of "isms" which serve as substitute religions for many who assert that they do not "believe." The rise of various forms of totalitarianism is a form of secularization which replaces a supranatural religion by a supposedly "natural" pseudo religion. All these totalitarian systems are city-born and are patently urban in character. One

[13] Perhaps with the exception of Calvinism, which from its inception allowed no intrusion of secularism.

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

of the characteristically urban traits is the insistence of pseudo intellectuals among the adherents that their brand is "scientific," although none of the theories have stood the test of scientific investigations and part of them are outright nonsense. It is to the credit of America, partly due to the persistent vigor of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights, that the impact of these isms has been much weaker here than in many other parts of the Western world. Neither fascism nor national socialism was ever very virulent in the United States, and this despite large numbers of immigrants from Italy and Germany. No person of prestige ever professed agreement with these types of totalitarianism.

The situation with respect to Communism is not very much different, although there is much noise. It should be noted that among those who have the only right to speak with some authority on that subject, namely, the social scientists, no one has supported the movement. Its numerical strength has always been exaggerated, partly by political rabble-rousers who exploit the fear of Communism for their own purposes, partly because some of the followers are extremely vociferous and thus give an impression of mass support which they do not have.

The existence of these isms is not only a consequence of secularization but also an expression of another symptom which again is a product of modern urban life: the neuroses with which so many people who cannot make the necessary adjustments are afflicted. This is part of the pathology of the city. Nonetheless, religion keeps its position, undisturbed by secular movements and undisturbed also by science, although many hold the opposite opinion. The views of the sociologists are perhaps best stated by LaPiere: [15] "Science neither destroys such beliefs nor removes the social need for their existence. The knowledge that science provides is a supplement to the empirical knowledge by which all men live, not a substitute for the faith that makes life worth living."

[15] Richard T. LaPiere, *Sociology*, p. 311.

Chapter 16

URBAN RECREATION

Rural and Urban Recreation. Recreation is a universal phenomenon but few other institutions show so many variations. Even within a given social system recreational activities differ according to class, education, moral standards, and income. They also vary in rural and urban areas.

Recreational activities of farmers have been praised both for taking place within the framework of the family and for their wholesomeness. The statement is partially true. By sheer necessity the isolated farm family has to spend most of its spare time together; that at least was the case before the advent of the automobile. What a family does with its spare time depends on circumstances. In isolated areas, distant from larger settlements, the inability of rural families to use their leisure time in a sensible way resulted in a cultural lag and general backwardness. While the farm family may stay together regularly, there are occasions when they part company, and then the recreation may be less wholesome than some believe. In European peasant villages many men spend their Sunday afternoons at the village inn, drinking to excess, gambling, and fighting one another. Serious injuries are by no means rare. Even the British farmer is used to spending more of his spare time in the pub than is good for his health, his purse, and his family relationships. The different behavior of the American farmer is due more to tradition than to his rural habitat. But both location and occupation have a bearing on recreation. Farming at times permits a combination of work and recreation. People sing and talk while working; they can stop their work and have a friendly chat with their neighbor when he is passing by. Furthermore, many recreational activities can be carried on right after work and on the farm, for instance, a game of horseshoes or a barn dance. (Barn dances, however, usually fall under the category of community recreation, with the entire neighborhood participating.) Until recent times almost all recreational activities took place on the farm, during or after work, or as a community enterprise, or in connection with the church. The arrival of a circus, or the yearly fair, or similar occurrences were extraordinary events. Nowadays, due to the automobile, radio, and television, much has changed.

However, there are still different needs. The farmer needs no physical exercise; he needs no outlet for nervous tension, due to monotonous or irritating

work; what he needs, perhaps more than the urbanite, is intellectual stimulation.

We have abandoned the puritanical view that recreation is idle and sinful; we know that a certain amount of play, entertainment, and relaxation is a physiological and psychological necessity, but now some may be going too far in the opposite direction. For the child, play and life are almost identical; the young child does everything in a playful way, even such things as eating and bathing become play; for the mature adult play still has its functions but only in a very restricted sense. With increasing maturity, entertainment becomes more and more a side issue. But the modern city harbors quite a number of persons for whom recreation is the only attraction in life and whose thoughts, according to predilection, concentrate on baseball, horse racing, card games, cocktail parties, dances, and so on. These attitudes reflect a lack of maturity.

Commercial Recreation. The types of urban recreation are the result of both necessity and opportunity. Recreation fulfills a salutary function, and city people, often having to work and live under trying or unsatisfactory conditions, need more recreation than the farmer. Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible, to obtain what is really needed. Activities in which the entire family may participate face the obstacle of crowded home conditions and of high expenses away from home. Communal recreation in larger towns is inadequate because there is hardly room for crowds. Neighborhood recreation suffers from lack of facilities as well as lack of neighborly spirit. There remains, to be sure, the church, if it is not too far away. But church programs are necessarily limited in scope and moralists fail to understand that the tedious work and the many vexations of urban life require stronger antidotes than churches provide.

This is precisely the point where want and opportunity meet. Commercial recreation offers a confusing variety of entertainment. The encroachment of commercialized recreation upon national life in general and urban life in particular has been much deplored. Some of the disadvantages are obvious; but some erroneous opinions are in need of correction. First, it is not correct that commercial recreation is of recent origin and simply a product of the modern city. Entertainment has been a profitable enterprise since time immemorial. Since the age of Homer minstrels and bards have made their living by providing recreation for others. All through the Middle Ages troubadours, jugglers, and other artists did the same. The village musicians, the circus, and, of course, the inn as a place of recreation all antedate the modern city. Commercial recreation has never been confined to the city limits, and even within urban boundaries it also serves farmers who come to the city because they desire the same type of entertainment. It is also incorrect to assume that private recreation is always preferable to commercialized entertainment. A public dancing hall is often more innocent than some private dances

which are only a pretext for surreptitious love-making. There is nothing more private than "parking," but it is hardly a harmless form of recreation. The same applies to very respectable forms of private recreation. Exclusive country clubs do not operate purely to make profits but they also serve to foster segregation of the upper groups and create snobbishness. Some forms of commercialized recreation are indispensable for higher artistic achievements, e.g., theaters, opera houses, and symphony orchestras. In these instances commercialized recreation creates opportunities which families or private groups either cannot provide or only on a much lower level. In fact, commercialized recreation exists only because, on a competitive basis with private endeavor, it renders superior services. But it is interesting to note that in many instances the supply created the demand. Phonographs, radio, and television are examples of entertainment which were offered before effective demand existed. Finally, it is fallacious to believe that private recreation is always less expensive than commercialized entertainment. Some private recreational activities are more expensive than anything commercial, and many families have been ruined by lavish parties, hunting, or yachting.[1]

Commercial recreation became an urban institution for a variety of reasons. The family—at least in low-income groups—was unable to satisfy recreational needs; a shorter working week and shorter work hours created much more leisure time; the money economy of urban life provides cash to pay for amusements; commercial recreation offers diversions which the family cannot produce and which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as desirable.

One consequence of urban recreation—a preponderantly rural society would be unable to support large-size enterprises—is the rise of a gigantic entertainment industry which has become an important force in the national economy. The motion-picture industry is surpassed in size by only a few other industries. The makers of cameras, phonographs, wire and tape recorders, pinball and slot machines, juke boxes, and sport equipment produce almost exclusively for recreational purposes. The legitimate stage, motion-picture houses, sports arenas, skating rinks, bowling alleys, travel bureaus, sports clubs, and many other establishments employ a host of workers. In addition, there are many industries which profit partly from recreation: railroads, buses, hotels, restaurants, breweries, producers of hard and soft drinks, etc. While the outlay for recreation varies greatly within the same income groups, it is safe to assume that at least 10 per cent of the national income is spent for recreation. The figure is indicative of the economic impact of recreation in terms of employment, profits, and taxes. Commercial recreation created new types of urban occupations: radio and television actors, writers,

[1] The National Resources Committee stated in 1937 that expenditures for commercial recreation constituted 25 per cent of the total recreational expenditures (*Our Cities,* National Resources Committee, Washington, 1937, p. 22).

and announcers, tourist guides, and athletic coaches. It created new media of communication and publicity. It has made its imprint on the spatial order of the city: the amusement area and the hotel district are its products. It gave whole cities their character, e.g., Hollywood and Monte Carlo, and it makes resort towns going concerns.

Influence of Recreation on Personality Types, Family Life, and Cultural Standards. Undoubtedly the extent and facilities of urban recreation have created some new socially undesirable personality types. All have in common that their main or only concern in life is amusement. There is the playboy of the upper classes, the race-track habitué of all classes, the sports fans, etc. Their "economic" counterparts are the cardsharps and the gigolos. They must be regarded as abnormalities of an otherwise healthy development. There is no doubt that the coherence of the urban family suffers if the members do not spend their leisure time together because each pursues his special kind of recreation. Objections also come from moralists and intellectuals. The former, conforming to their puritanical tradition, consider nearly every form of recreation as unethical because no worthy purpose is served. For a sociological evaluation the intentions of the actor are less relevant than the effects. The latter appear to be more healthy than undesirable.

Some intellectuals are indignant about the low level of recreational activities. The social value of recreation does not rest on its intellectual standards. The urban world is not composed predominantly of intellectuals and the masses demand other than intellectual stimuli. If existing types of entertainment were not offered, the masses probably would turn to other forms of nonintellectual entertainment. Yet there are serious drawbacks in the quality of commercial entertainment. One need not be an intellectual snob to be disgusted when apparently grown-up people read scandal sheets rather than reputable newspapers and pass over all the important news to devour the comics, sports results, society gossip, and crime reports. George N. Shuster, of Hunter College, recently remarked that the nation is in danger of becoming childish if inane television programs are not improved. Radio and television companies would be glad to raise their standards because some of the most favored programs are also the most expensive, but the sponsors pay according to audience demand. Regrettably, it is the demand which determines the quality of the supply. This has perhaps more serious consequences if problems of art are at stake. Great art has rarely been a sound economic proposition; it has always needed benefactors. Opera houses, for instance, have never existed without substantial subsidies which, in former times, came mostly from royal houses. America has few opera houses because public support is insufficient to make up the inevitable losses. Poetry cannot be published because there are only a few readers and still fewer buyers. Similar

obstacles prevent the performances of plays and the printing of books of high standards. Frequently the profit system is blamed for the deplorable situation, but it must be pointed out that the offerings of the Russian radio or motion pictures, although different in type, are not superior in quality.

The public libraries of the United States are unique institutions which offer gratuitous services of the highest quality. But the public refuses to be served. For example, Table 20 shows the statistics of the city library of

Table 20. Use of a Public Library. Statistics of the City Library—Springfield, Massachusetts

Year of report: 1950
Population: 162,399
Terms of use: Free for lending and reference

Registration	*Adults*	*Juveniles*	*Total*
Total number of registered borrowers	38,566	15,646	54,212
Book stock			
Total number of volumes at end of year	429,073	105,093	534,166
Use			
Number of volumes of adult nonfiction lent for home use			217,919
Number of volumes of adult fiction lent for home use			406,985
Number of books for children lent for home use			572,598
All nonbook material lent for home use			171,835
Total book and nonbook circulation			1,369,337
Grand total of operating expenses			$392,107.83
Operating expenses per capita			$2.41
Operating expenses per registered borrower			$7.23

Source: *Annual Report* of the Library Association of Springfield, Mass., 1951.

Springfield, Massachusetts, an outstanding, almost hundred-year-old, institution with a stock of more than 600,000 volumes. As can be seen, children make proportionately a much larger use of the library, but partly because of school reading assignments. Assuming that the number of adults in Springfield approximates 100,000, somewhat more than two nonfiction books are borrowed each year per capita. Somewhat more than four volumes of fiction are borrowed, but as every librarian can relate, three-quarters of these books fall into the categories of "mystery," "westerns," and "romance," and the remaining volumes are mostly best sellers which "have to be read" and are soon forgotten. This scant use makes the services extremely expensive. A per capita circulation of 8.4 per cent is matched by operating expenses per registered borrower of $7.23. The residents of Springfield pay yearly $2.41 per capita to maintain a library which two-thirds of the population do not use at all while the rest do not even read one book per month. An improvement

in the level of entertainment cannot come from the supply side; the demand must improve. What is needed is better education. Another criticism is directed against what Jesse Steiner [2] has called "spectatorism": "That Americans prefer to be amused by others than to participate actively in sports and games." It is indeed questionable whether it is worth while to sit for hours when the weather is at its hottest and watch a baseball game, only to see the home team beaten in a no-hitter. To call that sport appears to be a misnomer, but since so many enjoy it, it would be captious to object. Passive recreation by a very discriminating audience is neither rare, new, nor objectionable; without it there would be no legitimate theater, no opera, or no symphony concerts.

Hygienic and Curative Effects. Some enthusiasts see the cure-all for every social evil in more and more recreation. They believe that more parks and playgrounds, free sports equipment, free vacations, and so on will alleviate family discord, do away with juvenile delinquency, foster community organization, and break down all barriers between races, national groups, and classes. Such claims contain only a modicum of truth. Many a family quarrel has been avoided because the family went for a picnic, but conversely, many a picnic caused a family quarrel. Recreation reduces some forms of juvenile delinquency, but recreation is also responsible for juvenile offenses, e.g., petty thefts to get money to go to motion pictures or a ball game. Moreover, it is rather obvious that the curative effect of recreation applies only to less difficult cases. Just as the best hygiene is of no help in cases of cancer or organic heart diseases, so recreation is no preventive of marital incompatibility, stupid or cruel parents, or neuroses.

Sociological interpretation has to concentrate on the functional role of recreation in urban life. As long as masses are crowded into inadequate space which provides imperfect homes, as long as economic activities are largely of a kind which can give no real satisfaction to many workers, as long as the urbanite is subject to either monotonous or irritating work, as long as he is the victim of excessive noise, haste, and pressure—so long will there be need of an antidote. The main function of recreation is physical and psychological relief. Present facilities are usually sufficient to meet reasonable recreation demands. Some exceptions exist. Slums do not have enough playgrounds and children are either deprived of recreation or have to play in the streets. Older people, especially single women, sometimes find it hard to get adequate entertainment. Large families in low-income groups are hampered by the high costs of some of the most desirable forms of recreation such as excursions and vacations in the country. On the other hand, many things are free or available at low cost. Compared with the situation thirty years ago,

[2] Jesse F. Steiner and Chester D. Babcock, *Recreation and Morale,* National Education Association, Washington, 1942.

even the poor have more recreational opportunities today than the middle classes of the last generation.

Detrimental Effects of Recreation. All functions can suffer from excessive use and overemphasis, just as the organs of the human body will show pathological changes if they are forced to function in excess of their capacity. Some of the negative aspects of recreation have been discussed, particularly its tendency to prevent the growth of maturity and to make people oblivious to their obligations as citizens. Other aspects are treated in later chapters on social pathology; alcoholism, some forms of drug addiction, prostitution, and gambling are necessarily connected with recreational activities. Furthermore, commercial recreation is liable to abuses, just as any other business can be conducted in an illegitimate way. The roadhouse and the gambling den are examples of this pathological type. Certain substandard forms of recreational establishments also have to be classified as pathological because they represent degenerate types, are a danger to health, tend to disorganize people, and to deteriorate neighborhoods. In this category fall burlesque shows, taxi dance halls, shady types of "night clubs," poolrooms, speakeasies, cheap, unsanitary bars, and a great many "amusement" centers in arcades, as well as other establishments in skid rows.

Recreation can be used for criminal purposes, a rather recent phenomenon of distinctly urban character. Much of it is connected with betting. Crime's invasion of colleges, with the resultant notorious basketball scandals, is particularly unfortunate. The main reason for crime in recreation is the absurd behavior of the masses who will bet on anything even if the odds are clearly unfair. Since this is an institutionalized attitude, improvements are difficult to make.

Distribution and Frequency of Recreational Types. Very little is known about the distribution and frequency of recreational activities. Exact figures are almost impossible to obtain since data furnished by the questioning of individuals are known to be highly unreliable. No one keeps an amusement timetable and many are loath to admit activities which are not universally approved. Much depends on individual taste, passing fads, and changing economic conditions. The Lynds,[3] who investigated the leisure-time activities of a middle-sized city, state that in 1935 they could observe a marked change from the situation in 1925. Within a decade recreation had taken a turn away from commercialism and mechanization to greater spontaneity and informalism. This is hardly in line with the general trend and probably reflects the impact of the economic crisis in the intervening decade. Nearly every larger city has conducted a recreation survey to guide the activities of various community organizations. There is strong suspicion that the usual methods—questionnaires and interviews—give an inadequate picture of the real situation. We cite as an example an older study which has been unearthed by

[3] *Middletown in Transition,* New York, 1937, chap. 7.

Carpenter.[4] J. L. Low-Gillen [5] attempted to find the ten most common recreational activities among Cleveland males, of "school-to-marriage age" for the period from 1890 to 1900 and for 1917. According to the study, reading was the most favored recreational activity with a participation of 55 per cent in 1900 and 76 per cent in 1917. This is in itself scant information, for it does not tell us how much time is spent in reading and what is read. From the library statistics in Table 20 we may assume that only one-third of urban adults read regularly something other than newspapers and magazines. There were no motion pictures before 1900, but in 1917, 37 per cent reported attending them, a figure which has undoubtedly increased since then. Dancing was a favorite with 42 per cent in 1900 but does not appear at all in the 1917 list. Other preferred activities—all under 30 per cent—were walking, hiking, cards, and baseball. The 1890–1900 list also contains pool and billiards, swimming, fishing, and the curious item "fussing"; all had disappeared by 1917, but church activities and motoring were added. Baseball was attended by 27 per cent (1890–1900) and 31 per cent (1917).

Preference for different recreation activities partially depends on national differences. There is no mention of music in the Cleveland report, indicating the lack of popularity which active or passive participation in concerts has in America. The playing of a musical instrument is very important in Italy, while in Germany practically everybody who can sing belongs to a glee club. In sports, both baseball and basketball are American inventions and draw the largest number of spectators in the United States. Abroad, basketball has become rather popular but baseball is rarely played. The most favored game of all Europeans is soccer, for which Americans show little enthusiasm. Mountain climbing and skiing, though gaining in popularity, are still practiced by few in America; in Switzerland and Austria even children are trained to climb and to ski. An example of a purely national sport is cricket, which is not played outside the British Empire. Bullfights take place mostly in Spain, Portugal, and Mexico. Some kinds of activities depend on economic conditions; car excursions are an American institution because the masses can afford to buy automobiles; in poorer countries the automobile is replaced by motorcycles and bicycles, which are also used in racing. Slot machines are not very popular outside the United States and this is probably due to economic factors; their production is not sufficiently profitable in other countries.

Class Distinctions; Age and Sex Differences. There are, in addition, distinct class differences in recreational activities. One difference is the amount of time which is spent on recreation. The upper classes—especially the women

[4] Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* New York, 1932, p. 252, from which the data in the text are taken.

[5] J. L. Low-Gillen, *Wholesome Citizens and Spare Time* (Cleveland Recreational Survey, vol. III), Cleveland, 1918.

who have little or no work to do—and the workers in mass establishments, with their strictly observed forty-hour-week schedule, probably have more leisure than middle classes and professional people. The latter work much longer hours and spend part of their leisure time in political, church, or civic activities of various kinds. The least leisure time is had by domestic servants who get a minimum of recreation on their "day off." Another class distinction refers to the place of recreation. It is likely that the middle classes spend more of their spare time at home than any other group; they cannot afford the expensive diversions of the rich and they dislike the gratuitous or cheap facilities patronized by the poor. This means greater utilization of radio, television, books, magazines, after-dinner visitors, and home games. The upper classes have their fashionable clubs and restaurants, their long trips, and their lavish parties; the poor flee from their uninviting homes to pool-rooms, bowling alleys, cheap dance halls, and if they have no money at all, to parks or into the streets.

A further class distinction refers to the type of recreation. The upper-class amusements are too expensive for others. Because of democratization, their number is relatively small in America. The most frequent are polo, yachting, horseback riding, private balls, and receptions. On the European continent golf is restricted to the upper classes, as is the traditional fox hunt in Great Britain. The educated classes are characterized by emphasizing certain activities such as chess, which are neglected by others; they also furnish the bulk of those who are interested in arts and sciences not only as an occupation but also as recreation; they read serious books, play or listen to serious music, and visit museums and art galleries; they show the least interest in professional sports. The latter draw most of their spectators from the lower middle classes and manual workers. The recreational activities of the lower classes are characterized by the exclusion of certain forms of entertainment. Some are excluded because they are too expensive; others because the educational standards for their appreciation are too high. In other instances the reasons are less clear; tennis, for instance, is less frequently played by manual workers. It is not because they want to avoid physical exertion, for they like wrestling and weight-lifting. On the other hand, certain games of chance are definitely "low class"; among them are more primitive card games and crapshooting. Bridge, like tennis, is not popular with the masses.

There is a marked difference according to sex and age which needs no further elaboration. Children, adults in the prime of life, and older people have different ways in which they spend their leisure time. The gap between the sexes has considerably narrowed within the last generations. However, men still do not knit or make lace as a diversion and women amateurs neither play football nor wrestle.

Media of Recreation. Sociology is concerned only with social recreation but not all types of recreation are social. Some of the most desirable forms

of recreation require no company; creative work by amateurs, reading, and all kinds of contemplation; the lone hiker, hunter, and fisherman belong to this category, as well as the person who is merely passing the time by playing solitaire or solving crossword puzzles. While all these types of relaxation fall outside the scope of sociology, certain inferences may be drawn. The solitary urbanite pursues his isolated course more often than not because he does not have suitable company. The rural person is used to solitude and does not object to it. Some rural occupations imply isolation: gamekeepers, forest rangers, and, in former times, cowherds and shepherds. If they desire company, they do so because they want a change. The city dweller who always works with others frequently seeks "society" not because he is lonesome but because he wants to escape from his own person. The inability to remain alone for even a short time is a pathological feature of urban life. The mechanization of the city and the ensuing loss of spiritual and intellectual values make the minds of many people so empty that they cannot do anything by themselves. Conversely, the recluse who never leaves his boarded-up house and avoids all human society is also a pathological case.

Group participation is either required or at least preferred in most recreational activities. To sit in an empty motion-picture theater and to see a film as a single spectator is something which few enjoy. As a social being, man wants company even when eating and drinking. Group recreation can be active or, in the cases of "spectatorism," passive. Perhaps "receptive" is a better term than passive because the audience does participate in action. "Razzing" in ball games seems to be necessary for the proper enjoyment of a contest, and even a more mature audience wants to applaud and to comment on a performance. (The study of audiences gives very valuable insights into the problems of collective behavior.) Group recreation can be organized or unorganized; it is offered on a commercial or a nonprofit basis; it can be planned or spontaneous; the organizers can be private associations, business establishments, religious or cultural institutions, social agencies, or public authorities; it can be carried out by democratic procedures or under a more or less authoritarian leadership.

The outstanding informal, spontaneous, private recreation group is, of course, the family. The dwindling importance of the urban family as a recreational unit is much lamented. Some aspects have been discussed above but it is necessary to reduce exaggerated complaints to their proper dimensions. The family has lost recreational functions for the same reason that it has lost other functions: specialized agencies provide better opportunities. It is also undeniable that the constant spatial congestion of urban families creates tensions which are best abated by separating the members. It also makes no sense to insist on the presence of the entire family if certain forms of recreation are enjoyed by only one person. There is no justification in forcing all members to go to a symphony concert which perhaps only the mother really

appreciates. Moreover, too much stress on family cohesiveness is no less dangerous than the opposite. It is unwise to foster extreme egoistic "familism," an attitude which disregards community relationships. It is also necessary to release children from home at certain times, which facilitates the socialization of the younger generation. Sound family relationships call for a happy medium in the allotment of leisure time, some of which has to be spent together and some separately. An unwanted encroachment upon family recreation is of recent origin: the policies of authoritarian governments, which press members of the family into different party units which have their own recreational activities. This is done by dividing people into age and sex groups and subjecting them to strict discipline. Since these groups demand supreme loyalty, the family suffers not only from loss of recreational time but even more so from depreciation of family values.

Other informal private recreational activities take place within the framework of friendship groups. The term "friendship" is rather broadly used and refers to the whole range of relationships from mere acquaintance to the most intimate ties between close friends. All these activities generally have more than a mere recreational value; they bring people more closely together, promote mutual understanding, and make them more secure because they feel that they can rely on friends in the event of emergencies.

All informal small groups are limited in their opportunities; many activities demand investments beyond the facilities of a single family and they need more space than the home can provide. By banding together in larger numbers and pooling financial resources, clubs can offer what family or friendship groups are unable to give. Clubs exist in a bewildering variety and not all of them are recreational associations. Some, like all political clubs, are party organizations, others serve special interests as, for instance, automobile clubs. Some specialize in a given field of recreation (sports clubs, chess clubs, dramatic clubs); others are more general in their purpose. Recreational activities frequently become a secondary factor if membership in the club carries social prestige; it then becomes a symbol of social status. Some of these clubs derive their reputation from a distinguished membership but most of them are renowned only for keeping the "wrong people" out; nearly every place has at least one country club which admits only members of so-called "good society"; these clubs become the goal of all social climbers and they create as much tension among the "outs" as they offer relief to the "ins."

The various service clubs which promote certain civic causes as well as the business interests of their members are of another type and serve a legitimate function. Various fraternal orders combine the promotion of friendship with subsidizing charitable organizations. They usually convene once a week and provide harmless recreation, mostly to married men.

There are also numerous nonprofit organizations whose only purpose is to provide recreation for the sake of recreation and for its beneficial effects on

community relationships. These groups are superior in many respects. They serve special functions, they are managed by trained professional leaders who work with scientific methods, and they are open to all respectable members of a community. From the point of view of efficiency, sound policy, technical competence, legitimate social control, and community organization, these institutions are preferable to all other forms of organized recreation.

With increasing urbanization, public agencies are invading the field of recreation. Until the beginning of the twentieth century cities did little besides maintaining a few parks, which were mainly kept for the sake of beauty. To walk on the few gravel paths in these parks, with carefully fenced-in flower beds, with no permission to sit on the grass and no playground for children, was a labor rather than a pleasure. There have been many changes in the last fifty years. The Federal government, the states, and above all, the municipalities compete in their offerings. National and state parks have come into being, city parks have multiplied; athletic fields, playgrounds, picnic places, swimming pools, beaches, ice-skating rinks, tennis courts, municipal stadiums, radio stations, and public concerts are some of the features of modern public recreation. Yet the share of public agencies in total recreational expenditures is very small. The National Resources Committee reported in 1937 that all governmental agencies—local, state, and Federal—accounted for less than 2 per cent of the total recreational expenditures.[6] There is a certain danger in public recreation: its possible abuse for political purposes. The Romans, who coined the slogan *panem et circenses* ("food and amusements"), knew how to cajole unruly city masses in order to keep them subservient; they issued free tickets to the Colosseum, where the masses could watch gladiators kill each other. Similar techniques were adopted by totalitarian systems. The fascists introduced their *dopo lavoro* ("after work") organization, which kept the masses under control even in their leisure time. The German National Socialists had, and Soviet Russia still has, similar organizations. Such an intrusion of politics into recreation tends to deprive the masses of that little spontaneity which is still available and makes them dependent on the paternal authority of political rulers even during their leisure time.

There is little need to elaborate on various aspects of commercial recreation. It exists because its services are superior or more convenient than gratuitous entertainment. Patrons are as much to blame as entrepreneurs for its less desirable aspects. This kind of business would not be profitable unless there were a demand for it. The two extremes of society are mostly responsible for the patronage of the more reprehensible types of recreation. The lowest classes account for the continued existence of skid rows, and the rich for that of vice and crime-ridden roadhouses, gambling dens, and certain night clubs. But the advantages of recreation for profit are too often underesti-

[6] *Our Cities*, p. 22.

mated. Without commercial recreation Shakespeare and Beethoven could not have created their works. Without an efficient hotel industry there could be no travel. Besides, the boundaries between commercial and noncommercial recreation are very vague. Professionals increasingly provide recreation for nonprofit organizations whose management is similar to that of legitimate business. Many club directors receive salaries which are higher than the profits derived from some types of commercial recreation. Nonprofit organizations are forced to charge membership and admission fees and the prices for performances of equal standards are approximately the same. Admission to a football game between two first-rate college teams costs hardly less than to a professional baseball game in the American or National League. The problem is not so much one of profit but rather of high costs which are invariably incurred if better standards of recreation are wanted. Conversely, some types of free recreation are very objectionable.

Final Evaluation. Many professional recreation leaders insist that there is not enough recreation. There are two main reasons. One is financial: low-income groups with large families to support do not have the means for the types of recreation they want. However, everybody can have some type of recreation; radio and public libraries are free; the latter often furnish not only books and magazines but also phonograph records. Newspapers are a negligible expenditure and so is hiking. Some form of subsidy is necessary to achieve greater variety; this is done by providing parks, playgrounds, and athletic fields. Children get excellent recreation facilities free of charge in schools and for very little money in various boys' and girls' clubs.[7] For adults, churches, settlement houses, and community centers offer ample opportunities. More serious are the elements of location and time. The slums have not enough space for recreation and children have to play in the streets. The increasing movement to suburbs on the fringe of a city makes it both difficult and expensive for those living far from the center to reach the places where recreational facilities are located. Some people have neither the time nor the money to commute twice a day. In larger cities it is not rare that friends can be reached only by traveling an hour, which is more time than working people can spare on workdays. Such seemingly imponderable circumstances cut down recreation possibilities.

It is a more serious question whether we have not already reached a stage where we have too much recreation. The last century witnessed a complete reversal of the conditions of urban recreation. When the Industrial Revolution was in its first stages, only the upper groups had sufficient time and means of recreation. The cities had no recreational space save a few parks, mostly in the best sections and many of them not open to the public. Nonprofit recreational organizations were unknown. Public schools, when they came into being, had no recreational programs. The masses worked for sub-

[7] Some of these clubs have waiting lists, indicating that more are needed.

standard wages and had no money for entertainment. Worst of all, they had no time. Around 1840, for instance, working days in New England textile mills averaged twelve and a half hours a day, including Saturday, but were longer in summer, the best season for recreation.[8] After such a workday the laborer was physically exhausted; besides, there was no time left save on Sunday. The little entertainment and recreation which the masses got was mostly of an objectionable nature. Moreover, they worked from early childhood until their usually premature death.

The tables have since been turned. Urban work generally does not start before the age of sixteen and the worker can retire at sixty-five. Both young and old now have ample time for recreation. Wages have risen far above the subsistence level; the single worker and the small family can afford to pay for their recreation. Above all, working hours have been shortened. With the five-day, forty-hour week the masses now have two full days of freedom, permitting sufficient time for sleep, transportation, meals, and at least five hours during workdays for recreation, not counting holidays and vacation. Roughly speaking, the ratio of working hours and rest hours (not including sleep and meals) has changed from 72 to 28 to 40 to 57 per week. For the first time since man left the food-gathering or hunting stage he can spend more time in leisure than in work. Millions of city workers find no satisfaction in their economic activities which are monotonous or senseless; they now have the opportunity to make life more meaningful by sensible use of their leisure time. The example of the upper classes, who have always had ample time but have spent it in idle amusements, should have warned the optimists who expected more reasonable behavior from the masses. Entertainment has its virtues and even the adult is perfectly entitled to play. But there are limits. If body and mind have been rested, if man has had a well-deserved amount of pleasure, he should spend some time on more serious pursuits, whether his church, community endeavors, or in improving his education. Some do so, but their number is deplorably small. A new urban personality type has come into being: the man who is not interested in his work (which is understandable), who waits with impatience until he can leave his office or factory or business so he can play. He might be a good husband and father and a reliable friend, but besides that he has no interests in life but play. We have solved an economic and technological problem but a new social problem has arisen.

Earlier in this discussion it was pointed out that the quality of recreation should not be judged too strictly. What is objectionable is the length of time spent on recreation and the monopoly which amusement has obtained on the human mind. That monopoly is established to the detriment of spiritual and moral values and at the expense of civic duties. That an adult should have

[8] Broadus Mitchell and Louise Pearson Mitchell, *American Economic History,* Boston, 1947, p. 425.

no other interests in life than games indicates a double regression: into childhood, which is the appropriate play stage in human development, and into the primitivity of the earliest periods of human society. These strictures have to be made not out of moral indignation but because of social consequences. Our modern society is fraught with most difficult problems which cannot be solved without interest in, and understanding of, these problems and without active support and cooperation of the masses. Instead, we find millions who are citizens in name only, and are entirely indifferent and absolutely unwilling to participate. Instead of responsible citizens, we have masses that have never grown up, clamoring for more and more play. They leave the serious problems to others: to the government, business organizations, and union leaders. Thus they become more and more dependent, more and more childish, and more and more oblivious of social values and obligations. There are certainly many exceptions and many features which make the outlook less gloomy. Recreation has its own rights and its own very important functions, but it ought to have only its proper share in human life and must not replace or supersede more serious activities.

Part VIII. THE RULE OF THE CITY

Chapter 17

CITY GOVERNMENT

1. Organization

Historical Survey. The first cities, if our explanation is correct,[1] were sovereign political units; their government was identical with that of the state. From the time of their founding or soon afterward, they were ruled by kings, sometimes absolutely, sometimes with the assistance of an aristocratic council. The secondary cities, the trade colonies, were governed from the mother cities, but their distant location necessitated some sort of home rule, which was, however, exerted by leading families. Many colonies became politically independent after due time, but the rule was again aristocratic (Carthage) or absolutistic, "tyrannical" (Syracuse). After the city-states were replaced by territorial states, the cities of the East had even fewer rights than before; the administration was in the hands of kings or royal officials. One absolutistic regime followed another; in Mesopotamia, for instance, the absolute rule and the subordination of the cities persisted through the periods of the Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Alexander the Great, the Seleucidae, the Romans, the Sassanidae, the early Arabs, the Ommayads, the Abbasides, the Seljuks, and the Ottomans, a time span from approximately 4500 B.C. to A.D. 1918. Although at different times and places the merchants and tradesmen had more or less liberty to regulate their own affairs, there never was anything resembling a representative administration of cities by their residents. The trend toward city autonomy is basically European, and within Europe more Western than Eastern.[2] The Byzantine Empire, with its extensive bureaucracy and emphasis on centralization, gave the cities very little independence. In the West independence grew slowly but steadily. The Romans generally granted their cities considerable freedom. But under the Roman rule, as well as in later times, the administration was in the hands of a privileged minority, a condition which prevailed in modern Europe until the nineteenth and even the twentieth century (Prussia until 1918). History abounds with examples of more or less successful attempts of under-

[1] See chap. 3.

[2] This statement differs from Max Weber's opinion in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* chap. 8, p. 522, but concurs with his later remark (p. 523): "A communal city in the real sense of the word as a mass phenomenon was known only in the occident."

privileged groups to gain representation. It seems that prior to modern times Rome, but only Rome, granted equal suffrage to all citizens, but that right soon became meaningless under the rule of the emperors.

Cities elsewhere in Europe declined with the Roman Empire, and their status in the early Middle Ages is not too well known. Decentralization, inherent in feudalism, the political weakness of the kings, and the necessity of granting cities economic privileges, which also implied some political concessions, gave cities more freedom. In all probability many cities managed their own affairs long before A.D. 1000, and their legal right to do so was formally recognized by royal charters. Vienna, for instance, as a frontier city, was certainly behind the general development, but received her first (lost) charter probably in 1198. The Magna Carta did not grant London new rights but expressly stipulated that the city should have all its ancient privileges and customs, by land as well as by water. Indeed, almost 200 years before, the city had received a charter from William I, but he too, as stated in the charter, only renewed privileges which London already possessed under the rule of Edward the Confessor. London, like other cities, must then have enjoyed considerable autonomy. That autonomy, however, was a far cry from democracy, which was nonexistent in medieval times. Some cities, residences of rulers, garrison towns, and seats of bishops, had no autonomy; others were ruled by one or several leading groups. These groups were normally (1) the urban nobility which lived in the city but was economically supported either by landed estates or by income from royal offices; (2) the merchants, that is, international or at least interlocal traders; (3) the artisans; and sometimes (4) the clergy. Besides these groups there were others who never participated in city rule: the journeymen, domestic and other workers, the farmers within the city, and a motley array of persons with low status: barbers, actors, gravediggers, homeless and unemployed people, etc., and finally the "foreigners" who were protected only within the limits of special privileges, namely, traders from other cities and the Jews. Even when all four leading groups participated in city administration, large parts of the population remained unrepresented. Between the four groups there was a never-ending struggle for power with varying results.

The situation in America was different inasmuch as the colonial cities necessarily enjoyed some home rule from the beginning. However, property and poll taxes remained for a long time as prerequisites for participation in municipal affairs. On the other hand, the small size of urban settlements, the fact that families were related through frequent intermarriages and a common tradition, that everybody knew all the others, and that municipal administration was concerned with only simple problems made the early American cities, especially in New England, the most democratic communities which ever existed. The town meetings—the closest approximation of Rousseau's direct democracy—made the participation of all residents possible. They not

only attended the meetings but voiced their opinions and their votes really decided the issue. In small New England towns every citizen of good standing had a fair chance to be elected to some office.

Legal Types of City Organization. The cities are now legal entities; their autonomy is based on a charter, granted by the state, and limited by the terms of the charter. The limitations in America sometimes go further than in European cities. Usually the American city cannot issue bonds or incur other debts beyond limits set by the charter. The autonomy of cities is not guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and is not subject to any intervention by either the Federal government or Congress. All rights which cities possess are derivative and obtained from the state in which they are located. But there is much similarity in the legal status of cities. Of course city charters are not identical, but the variations are technical in nature and imply no basic difference in the extent of home rule. Washington, D.C., is an exception, which for administrative purposes is practically Federal territory under the jurisdiction of Congress. Paris, since the times of Napoleon, has been governed by a public official, the Seine prefect, who is appointed by the government. He shares his rule, however, with an elected city council.

There are three possible democratic methods for the supreme rule of a city:

1. Direct representation, as in town meetings, with no leader or only a figurehead
2. The election of an administrative leader, the mayor, usually but not always controlled by an elected body of councilmen
3. A council without a leader, dividing the administrative functions among its members, elected either by direct vote or by a city parliament, which in turn is elected by the population

The last is the favorite form of city government in Germany, except in the Rhineland, the Palatinate, and Hesse. Its American equivalent is called the commission plan. Its main advantage, although of dubious value, is the benefit derived from collective bodies: more thorough consideration of difficult problems. The disadvantages are slower procedure, lack of personal responsibility, and reduced initiative.

Conditions in America. The town meeting is a typical American institution. As has been pointed out before, it worked well in the past but it is an effective means of administration only if all citizens can participate, which limits its functions to very small towns. It has now become almost extinct. Massachusetts has tried to salvage the venerable institution by introducing the representative or limited town meeting. In essence this modification provides the meeting of a large number—usually 240—of district representatives rather than the total population. In 1948, twenty-six cities with a population over 5,000 in Massachusetts adhered to this form of government, four of them

with a population between 25,000 and 50,000.[3] The old town meeting still exists in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, but not in Maine. Fifty-one cities over 5,000 population retain their traditional form of government with apparently good results. Altogether, 3.8 per cent of all American cities with a population over 5,000 still work under town meetings; all of them, as ever before, are in New England.

The commission plan has been adopted by 308, or approximately one-seventh, of the American cities with a population over 5,000. Eight of them are in the bracket from 250,000 to 500,000, which is more than one-third of the cities of this size. According to this plan, the elected commission forms a common legislative body while the various departments are headed by a single commissioner; thus we have a combination of collective legislation and individual administration.

The majority of the cities—roughly four-fifths—are governed by a mayor and a council. All cities over 500,000, and the majority of all cities between 5,000 and 50,000 are thus governed. This system allows for several variations. The council can act as the only legislative body or together with a second board (bicameral system). Springfield, Massachusetts, for instance, has a common council and a board of aldermen. In addition, the voters frequently directly elect certain leading city administrators such as treasurer or city clerk, assessor, auditor, engineer, police chief, and others. New York City elects the mayor by direct vote, as well as the comptroller, the president of the city council, and the city council, consisting of twenty-five members.

The mayor-council system is based on a tradition as old as the autonomy of cities. Although conditions have changed since its inception, the system has persisted. There are several variations. The mayor is either elected by popular vote or by the council, of which he is a member; he has or has not a veto power; he does or does not have the right to vote on council motions. Accordingly, there are strong- and weak-mayor systems. Yet it seems that the differences in procedure influence the actual administration only slightly. The cities have grown until the mayor and the councilmen are no longer able to keep direct contact with the electorate. The functions of the cities have multiplied until it has become impossible to supervise directly even the performance of essential services. These are now done by employees who are frequently political appointees. The services which a modern city has to render have become so technical in nature that their organization and control have to be entrusted to a bureaucracy which, at least in larger cities, is anonymous and not responsible for anything but the formal discharge of its duties.

[3] Figures from various sources but mostly from "Governmental Data for the 2,042 Cities Over 5,000 Population," *Municipal Yearbook, 1948,* and Grace L. Geer, "Council-Manager Government," *ibid.*

The mayor is nearly always elected as the representative of a political party. Just as any other successful politician, he owes his position to his ability to get votes but is usually ignorant of the technical problems which are paramount in modern city administration. To retain his office he must build up a machine and reward those who voted for him. Extensive use of the patronage technique is inherent in the mayor-council system and is even more conspicuous in America, where the slogan "To the victors belong the spoils" is still considered a legitimate principle by many. One serious implication is the fact that in larger cities the mayor cannot work at municipal administration. In addition to his time-consuming duties in representing the city at every convention, visits of notables, jubilees of churches, schools, benevolent and not so benevolent organizations, golden anniversaries, parades, celebration of memorable events and holidays, he has to preside at the sessions of the council, to introduce and to supervise legislation, and to run all administrative departments, which is more than any one man can do. In addition, he is the political leader of his party in the city. Even if patronage can be kept within legitimate limits, the result is waste and inefficiency. The mayor must appoint persons with meager qualifications, he must carry out projects which are not necessary, he must prefer bidders with inferior offers, and he must overstaff all his offices. Everyone is familiar with the preelection picture in larger cities: streets are planlessly torn up, official buildings are hastily repaired, and parks superficially renovated—all only to employ a sufficient number of job seekers for the sake of vote getting.

The Manager Plan. It is little known that the United States pioneered in devising the best system to meet modern requirements for city administration.[4] In 1911 Richard S. Childs [5] drafted a charter which was proposed by the board of trade in Lockport, New York. The charter, which contained all the essentials of the council-manager plan, remained a piece of paper since the state legislature never approved it, but it served as a model which was studied and widely acclaimed by experts. The first city to adopt the plan was Sumter, South Carolina, which set the precedent in 1912. At the end of 1948, 433 cities with a population over 5,000 in the continental United States, or 21.3 per cent of all these cities, adhered to the council-manager plan. In addition, 301 other places with a population of less than 5,000, or not classified as urban by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, have joined. Also, Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Ketchikan in Alaska, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, are operating under the plan. So are a number of cities in four Canadian prov-

[4] "In other countries the plan is regarded as America's greatest contribution to the science of local government," *The Story of the Council-Manager Plan,* National Municipal League, rev. ed., 1948.

[5] The council-manager plan was originally promoted by the National Short Ballot Association, of which Woodrow Wilson was president and Richard S. Childs secretary.

inces, among them the city of Quebec. The government of Eire prescribed the plan for all cities in 1940. At present Dublin is the only national capital with a council-manager government. In the United States one city over 500,000 (Cincinnati) and eight cities between 250,000 and 500,000 (Oakland, Long Beach, and San Diego in California; Kansas City, Missouri; Rochester, New York; Toledo, Ohio; Dallas and Fort Worth in Texas) operate under the council-manager plan. There are at least four variations of this plan, differing in technicalities but not in principle. The plan has not always worked to the satisfaction of voters. From its introduction up to 1947, a total of 143 referendums demanding abandonment of the plan were held; in thirty-four cases the referendum carried. Among larger cities which abandoned the plan are Houston, Texas; Tampa, Florida; Fall River, Massachusetts; Trenton, New Jersey; Akron and Cleveland, Ohio. Brattleboro, Vermont, abandoned the plan but readopted it afterward.[6]

The basic idea of the plan is the replacement of a system of checks and balances (taken over from the Constitution) by a strict separation of legislation and administration. The legislative power is vested in the (usually small) council, headed by the mayor. Council and mayor are elected by popular vote. The mayor is the representative of the city and the leader in legislation. The council members are supposed to be elected on a nonpartisan basis. Although the opposite has been stated, the mayor gains in strength by this arrangement. He has much more time to concentrate on policy making and he is not hamstrung by political obligations, job seekers, and business hunters. As the mayor gains, the boss loses power.

The administration lies in the hands of the manager who is a trained career official. He is appointed and can be removed by the council. The manager is therefore the administrative head. Unlike the bureaucrat, he is not anonymous, and he is responsible personally for his acts. If his services are unsatisfactory, he can be replaced since he has no civil-service status. But he will make every effort to satisfy the public because his promotion—call to a larger city—hinges on his success. One person, for instance, worked his way up from assistant city manager with a salary of $4,200; he subsequently managed four other cities with increasing pay until he became (in 1946) manager of a city of over 200,000, with a salary of $20,000. The past history of the plan has shown that in many instances managers were able to provide more and better services at reduced expenses. Cincinnati saved almost 2 million dollars in the first two years of the plan. In Kansas City the manager was able to present the taxpayers with a tax cut of 7 per cent.

Despite these striking successes, the plan still has many opponents. It is

[6] Cf. Arthur W. Bromage, *Manager Plan Abandonments*, National Municipal League, 1940.

generally believed, even by promoters of the plan, that this form of government does not meet the needs of very large cities.[7] Indeed, of the eighteen places with a population of 500,000 or more, only Cincinnati has adopted the plan.[8]

All other large cities operate under the mayor-council system and it is well known that some of them have the worst administrations in the country. It would seem that the largest cities qualify for the council-management form even better than smaller ones. A mayor has many more duties under greater time pressures and has to discharge potentially dangerous political obligations. The cramming of offices with political protégés is more difficult to control; city business orders amount to many millions, thus tempting businessmen to push their bids through by using political pull rather than by free competition.

The plan would be more widely adopted but for a series of obstacles. One is the ignorance or apathy of voters, particularly in larger cities. This is the greatest difficulty. A successful referendum presupposes an intensive campaign, with considerable costs, which independent citizens cannot raise. A second reason is the city employees' fear of losing their jobs (which is usually unfounded) and the fear of political protégés of losing their opportunities and income (which is well founded). The third reason is the resistance of the political bosses, which is easy to understand. With the disappearance of patronage the boss loses his power. The political parties, including the impeccable leaders, are also not enthusiastic. They dislike nonpartisan tickets and point to the fact that national parties are made up from local units. These arguments are not convincing. Political differences and the role of majority and opposition have no place in city administration; the administrative issues concern only efficiency and technical competence, about which there can be no dissent along party lines. Experience, furthermore, proves that the political influence of honest mayors (quite different from corrupt politicians) is practically nil; outside their cities they are almost unknown. It would be difficult to name an efficient mayor who has won national prominence except New York's Fiorello La Guardia. But his influence has been overrated; he was at war with all parties and he was unable to bring about the election of the man he recommended as his successor. The usual way to national political success and influence is through the position of governor or senator, and very few mayors succeed in reaching either position. But in spite of all resistance, the council-manager form of government is constantly gaining.

[7] But in 1953 the governor of New York suggested the adoption of the plan for New York City.

[8] More recently New Orleans and Philadelphia are trying a modified plan adapted to the needs of larger cities.

Election Methods. Another problem of city government is the method of election. For a long time the majority principle as it is in force in national elections was uncontested. The rising opposition against boss rule and European examples created a movement which promoted the introduction of proportional representation, of which there are several forms. All require that the council seats be distributed according to the proportional voting strength of the candidates. A thorough discussion of this method is outside the scope of this text.[9] It should be noted, however, that proportional representation has ruined democracy in Italy, Germany, and Spain, has caused serious crises in other countries, and is unable to guarantee a just distribution of seats. The greatest danger of this system is the likelihood that the seats will be split among many parties so that none commands a majority. If this happens, the council is paralyzed.

Americans have shown little sympathy for proportional representation. Only a few cities have adopted the method. Cincinnati is said to be doing well under the system, but there is considerable opposition. The experience in New York was so discouraging that after ten years of proportional representation the city returned to the majority principle. So did a number of other cities, among them Long Beach, California; Boulder, Colorado; Yonkers, New York; and Toledo, Ohio. At the end of 1949 only twelve cities had proportional representation, seven of them in Massachusetts. The state legislature of Massachusetts, however, passed a law prohibiting the further adoption of the method by all cities of the commonwealth.

2. Administration

Cities as Service Organizations. The farmer in his comparative isolation can provide for himself most of the services which he needs. The farmer is able to (and often does) build his own home, barn, stable, and pens on his farm without public supervision, and he is not necessarily subject to rules concerning safety, health, fire hazards, or other restrictions. He gets his water from his own well, he disposes of waste as he sees fit. The noise, the smoke, and the stench which he creates are his own affair. He slaughters his own cattle for his own meat, gets his milk and butter from his own cows, his eggs from his hens, his vegetables from his garden as he pleases. He does not have to obey rules about pasteurizing, conservation, grading and processing of foodstuffs. The main public service which the farmer receives, and that only in modern times, is the education of his children.[10]

The city dweller, even if he is willing to live on a very low level, needs

[9] For the best treatment of the problem see F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy, A Study of Proportional Representation,* Notre Dame, Ind., 1941.

[10] The American farmer now receives considerably more services, some of them free of charge. They are not essential in the sense that he could not live without them.

public services because he cannot perform them himself. The city serves his needs by necessity. Without these services there can be no urban life. The city therefore is more than a human habitat, a place where people live and work. It is, above all, a huge ecological service unit.

This function is not necessarily urban. It could be performed by government organs just as the police in rural areas are state employees. It is possible, although undesirable, to deprive a city of its public authority and thus relieve the city of its political function. But it is not feasible to replace the city as a service unit. Parts of these services can be rendered by others. Utilities are provided by private companies, education is offered by profit and nonprofit institutions, and these services are paid for by those who make use of them. But public streets are not built at the order and expense of individual users; the same is true of sewers, garbage collections, waste disposal, over- and underpasses, bridges, street lights, pavements, and so on. Insufficient attention is paid to the fact that there are extremely important activities of a purely economic nature which cannot be performed by private enterprise. In modern times governments have assumed all kinds of economic activities which formerly were the prerogatives of private individuals and corporations. The United States government, for instance, owns and operates hydroelectric power stations for individual consumers (TVA); other governments have monopolized railroads, telephone and telegraphy service, broadcasting stations, coal mines, and banks, among many other things. The essential point, however, is that the government could discontinue all these operations and would still remain what it is,[11] the nation would continue its life because government services can be replaced by private services. But the economic services of the city are uniquely irreplaceable. Not even the stanchest promoter of the idea that all economic activities should be left to private enterprise would propose that cities refrain from lighting and paving streets and that individual residents employ and pay private firms for these services.

Cities as Economic Enterprises. The city is not only a vast economic enterprise but also the most diversified of all existing enterprises. There is hardly an economic activity which is not undertaken by some city administration. Cities are engaged in primary production: they extract water from the soil; they run dairy and vegetable farms for hospitals; they specialize in horticulture to provide parks with flowers and trees; they own forests; the city of Vienna, for instance, operates coal mines. Industrial activities are usually limited to a few important branches, mostly the production of gas and electricity. The city of Vienna is unique in that it is the owner of a brewery, an enterprise outside the usual orbit of municipal endeavor. Cities are among the largest transportation units in the world; they run subways, elevated lines, buses, ferries, and transport and passenger boats. They provide bridges, piers,

[11] The assumption of these services by the government is based either on political philosophies or for the sake of increased revenue.

warehouses, and public markets. There are municipal savings banks and pawnshops (the latter all over Italy). The city of Vienna is again unique since it owns an insurance company, run in competition with private corporations, and is the proprietor of most cemeteries and the largest undertaking establishment. It also owns abattoirs. In recent times many cities have become the greatest builders of all types of houses. There are also numerous types of activities in which the city specializes, some of them mentioned before: building and paving of roads, sewers, waste-disposal plants, street lighting, garbage collection, street cleaning, filtering of water and other measures to keep water free from contamination, food inspection, market control, and fire brigades.

Of the many cultural services, one, once bitterly attacked by critics, is now generally recognized as a primary duty of all cities: elementary education. Many cities, in addition, maintain high schools, colleges, trade and training schools, and adult education centers. Practically all American cities have public libraries, many own museums, national monuments, zoos, acquariums; some operate radio stations, theaters, and opera houses.

Municipal medical services include hospitals and general clinics as well as school physicians and school clinics, X-ray and other examinations, and homes for the incurably sick, the crippled, blind, deaf-mute, and otherwise handicapped persons. In the legal field cities maintain police and municipal courts,[12] some giving free legal aid. Recreational services include maintenance of parks, playgrounds, picnic areas, public baths, and summer camps.

Assistance to the underprivileged has developed into an intricate system of social services: orphanages, homes for old people, shelters for the homeless, rehabilitation centers, relief for needy families, parole and probation officers, and low-cost public housing.

Public versus Private Services. Of course not all these services are performed by all cities. How many of them ought to be so performed is still a matter of controversy. Some want the services provided by cities to extend into all directions; the most radical advocate that all residential buildings should become communal property; opponents argue that public management is wasteful, more expensive, and less efficient than private enterprise and point to the advantages of competition.

There are certain services which can be rendered only by communities; in these cases there is no place for private enterprise. In other instances the

[12] Most court functions fall in the political category because they discharge their duties on the basis of authority vested in them by the city charter. Many functions of domestic courts—protection of orphans and abandoned children, protection of minors and insane persons, and reconciliation in family quarrels—have much more the character of services; they are performed in the interest of the clients rather than in the interest of the authorities.

services can be performed only by a monopoly: supply of water, gas, electricity, and transportation. Thus there is no competition, free or regulated. Clearly, residents of a city cannot be put at the mercy of private firms which will charge as much as the traffic will bear. The private firms must be kept under control. There are two alternatives. As experience has shown, one is to utilize the greater efficiency of some private managements but to impose service rates on those corporations which provide service at a rate which is at least not higher than the charges would be under public management. This is quite frequently the case with gas and electricity. The profit of the private firm is then only an efficiency premium. If so, there is no reason to change from private to public ownership. Experience also shows that cities whose water is supplied by private firms usually pay higher rates than cities with a municipal water supply. In such cases the communalization of waterworks is indicated, a process which is continually going on. More and more cities own their waterworks.

Other services depend on their urgency and on the ability of the city to finance them. Smaller places cannot do as much as large cities and do not need to do so. There are many towns where there is no demand for institutionalization of deserted or delinquent children, no necessity for building a museum, and no money to maintain a zoo. Some cases will always remain doubtful. Whether or not an American city should operate a radio station is more a matter of personal preference than of objective criteria. If services pay their own way, objections are usually unfounded.

The critical problem concerns the services which operate below cost or are provided free of charge. As demonstrated by the case of the slums, there is an urban substratum whose economic conditions do not permit payment for vital services. The need for assistance is more or less generally acknowledged for serious medical operations, for the case of orphans and abandoned children, and for various forms of relief. Assistance to underprivileged groups is not a charitable action but in the interest of the entire community, especially its wealthier members. In the long run the costs are repaid.[13] These services must not only be retained but expanded.

The Scope of Administration. With the exception of the Federal government and some large states, big cities constitute the largest economic units

[13] There is much empty talk about "subsidies." Practically all groups receive open or hidden subsidies, including the largest corporations. For example, until June 30, 1952, when the law was repealed, the public hospitals of New York City, and for that matter all other places in New York State, were legally prohibited from using oleomargarine. Similar provisions exist or existed in other states; they are clearly subsidies for dairy farmers. This law forced the city-owned hospitals to waste several hundred thousand dollars a year, sums which the city taxpayers paid in effect to dairy farmers and which otherwise could have been used to take better care of the sick poor.

both as producers and consumers. Small towns, of course, have simple tasks. The difficulties of administration, its scope, and the variety of functions increase sharply with the size of the city until it reaches such proportions that no single person can properly supervise even the main activities. They are for all practical purposes directed by bureaucrats. This is probably the explanation of why the largest cities are still able to function although their administration is in the hands of amateurs without professional training, without administrative experience, and, quite often, without sufficient general education. It also explains in part why some of our largest cities have suffered so much from maladministration. To show the rapid increase of administrative duties the following list compares the administrative organization of the largest city, New York, and a middle-size city, Springfield, Massachusetts, whose population is 162,399. As can be seen, even the latter already has an extremely complex organization.

Administration Divisions of New York City

Art Commission
Board of Assessors
Bureau of Budget
City Record
City Register
City Sheriff
Civil Service Commission
Department of Commerce
Department of Correction
New York County Clerks
Offices of the New York District Attorneys
Board of Education
Board of Higher Education
Department of Finance
Fire Department
Department of Health
Department of Hospitals
New York City Housing Authority
Department of Investigation
Law Department
Department of Licenses
Department of Marine and Aviation
Department of Markets
City Marshals
Chief Medical Examiner
Department of Parks
Parole Commission
City Planning Commission
Police Department
New York Public Administrators
Public Service Commission
Department of Public Works
Department of Purchase
Department of Sanitation
Board of Standards and Appeals
New York Surrogates
Tax Department
Teachers' Retirement Board
Department of Traffic
Board of Transportation
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
Board of Water Supply, Gas, and Electricity
Bureau of Weights and Measures
Department of Welfare

City Magistrates Courts (5)
Municipal Courts
Domestic Relations Court

Administrative Division of Springfield, Massachusetts

A. Appointed

Board of Supervisors
Board of Appeals
Board of Park Commissioners
Board of Fire Commissioners
Board of Police Commissioners
Board of Public Welfare
Personnel Commission
Public Utilities Commission
Board of Assessors
Collector of Taxes
Department of Public Buildings
Department of Public Works
Street Department
City Property Commissioner
Water Commissioner
License Commission
City Planning Board

B. Elected

City Clerk
Treasurer

3. Finances

The Power of Taxation. That the principles of public and private finance differ in essential points is basic to understanding their operation. Even the public households—Federal government, states, counties, and urban municipalities—cannot be judged according to identical principles. The power to tax is derived from the Constitution and can be exercised only within its limits. The wording of the Constitution (Article I, Sections 8–9) is not clear and has caused conflicting Supreme Court decisions. However, since the Sixteenth Amendment made the Federal income tax legal, Congress has controlled all important sources of revenue except property taxes. The states are constitutionally entitled to levy any taxes whatsoever except import and export duties. But cities derive their right to tax from their state charters. If existing revenues become insufficient, the city depends on the permission of the state to raise income from new revenues. The permission is not easy to obtain because new city taxes deprive—not legally but actually—the state of the same opportunity. Moreover, Federal and state governments can incur debts at their pleasure, or rather as long as they find credit.[14] But city charters limit the debts of a city. The limitation of indebtedness to a percentage of the assessed value of general property is the most frequent restriction. Cities thus cannot use all available financial sources. The Federal government has additional means of coping with financial difficulties. Through inflationary measures it can reduce the real amount of its debts and increase the nominal return of its revenues. Since 1918 practically every government has done so, including the United States and (several times) Soviet Russia. It can ease its

[14] The Federal debt limit is set and can be changed by Congress. Most states after 1837 imposed upon themselves constitutional limits; subsequent amendments liberalized the provision to such an extent that no state encounters serious difficulties with its debt policies.

burden by legally cutting the interest rate of Federal bonds. It can—and so can the states—repudiate its debts. It thereby jeopardizes future credit but suffers no legal consequences. Nations and states cannot become legally bankrupt but cities are subject to bankruptcy laws and cannot default in their obligations with impunity. Cities are therefore more impeded in their financial operations than the Federal government and the states. Undoubtedly the limitations are imposed to ensure honest city government, but they have not completely prevented fraudulent practices and they sometimes hamstring emergency measures.

Financial Difficulties. Political units nearly always find budgeting difficult. As a result of the depression of 1929, three states (Arkansas, Louisiana, and South Carolina) defaulted. At the same time, more than 600 cities were unable to pay their debts.[15] This, however, was the result of an unprecedented, unforeseen grave crisis. But cities have difficulties even in good times. Two Texas cities defaulted in 1924, a great number of Florida cities in 1926. Many large cities (New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Kansas City) have been on the verge of ruin regardless of the economic conditions of the country. In many cases faulty or fraudulent management was the main reason. Yet it remains a fact that the duties of an urban community, and consequently the expenditures, tend to increase at a faster rate than their revenues, which makes the financial situation of all large cities precarious.

To be sure, the financial problems depend in large measure on the size of a city. Smaller places can still manage without serious impediments. They have a minimum of obligations and can afford to offer a minimum of services. Maywood, Illinois, with a population of approximately 27,000, had a total expenditure of $353,000 (about the yearly salary of a big corporation executive). Of this sum, $295,000 was used for the operation of the city, the rest being spent for debt retirement, interest, and pensions.[16] This means that the city spent $11 per person, and it is clear that services were not only kept at the lowest level but that larger cities cannot operate with the same thrift. In counterpart, the residents paid only $306,000 in local taxes, or less than $12 per capita. To compare this with the other extreme, Los Angeles, with a population of 1,970,000, had in 1949 a total expenditure of $316,000,000, an outlay of more than $160 per capita. Only twelve state governments had higher expenditures than this one city, which demonstrates how urban services have outgrown the operational costs of much larger geographical units. Their activities are of utmost importance for the economic life of the nation. They give direct employment to a great number of people and indirect employment to still more who depend on orders by the cities. New York City employees surpass in numbers the total population of all but sixty-six

[15] See Alfred G. Buehler, *Public Finance,* New York, 1936, chap. 39.

[16] Figures for 1946; see *Municipal Yearbook, 1948,* p. 206.

American cities; this count does not include the members of their families. More people work for the City of New York than live in Tacoma, Washington; Sacramento, California; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Austin, Texas; or Chattanooga, Tennessee, to mention only a few well-known places. A great proportion of these employees are unskilled manual or semiskilled office workers who would have difficulties in finding other jobs, a fact which helps explain boss rule and political machines. The combined spending of the ten largest cities amounts to approximately 3 billion dollars.

Types of Expenditures and Their Control. These expenditures may be roughly divided into the following main categories:

1. Costs of administration proper (salaries of mayor, councilmen, "overhead" costs for the maintenance of offices, including the costs of tax collection, etc.)
2. Public duties payable by the city to county and state [17]
3. Capital investments
4. Debt operations (interest and redemption payments)
5. City services proper

The latter may be rendered free of charge (street lights, sprinkling, snow removal, sewers, waste disposal, parks and, foremost, schools) or against payment which may or may not cover the full costs (water and transportation). They can be to the advantage of all citizens (practically all services just mentioned) or of special groups only (relief, free hospitalization, old-age homes). Of all services, the schools are the most expensive and their costs are steadily increasing by added benefits (free luncheons, school buses, medical examinations, and guidance services). In smaller communities education sometimes costs as much as all other city operations combined. In larger cities the proportion is lower because many other services are added and not, of course, because of a reduced school program. School costs for all cities over 25,000 population comprise more than one-fourth of all operational expenditures.

The taxpayer, indignant over the rising tax burden and clamoring for thrift, is not aware that his city administration is not in full control of its expenditures. There are "statutory" or "mandatory" expenditures not determined by the administration. Due debts must be redeemed and interest on current debts must be paid. If the city has a pension plan, it is under legal obligation to pay its share. Other services are controllable but only within narrow limits. School expenditures can be cut but education must continue; the practical possibilities of reducing the police force or the fire department are almost

[17] Some county and state levies are collected by the city and paid to county and state authorities. The receipts equal the payments, so while these expenditures are not real costs, they must be mentioned because their collection is included in the total assessment of local taxes; they are not a burden on the city administration but on its residents.

nil; streets must be cleared of snow,[18] hospitals cannot be closed, and so on. The town of Montclair, New Jersey, a wealthy, conservatively and efficiently administered suburb, commissioned The Princeton Surveys, a branch of Princeton University, to find out how the costs of governmental activities might be properly reduced.[19] The study showed that in 1941 the town commission spent a total of $4,941,877 but that only $1,286,172, or 26 per cent, was spent at the discretion of the commission. This sum could be—in theory—somewhat reduced, but the study concluded that only about one-fourth of the total expenditures (excluding schools) is controllable and that from this amount all services have to be supported. The study further investigated the possibility of savings and tax reductions by cutting services. It demonstrated that a reduction of 20 per cent in services would lead to increased private expenditures,[20] but that taxes, in spite of the greatly curtailed services, would drop 6.5 per cent, or 30 cents per $100 valuation. If a city is well administered and provides the maximum of services for the minimum costs, there is little chance to ease the taxpayers' burden. Savings are possible only if the administration is inefficient or corrupt. The lack of control over expenditures is further aggravated by several circumstances. Laborsaving methods can be applied only to a limited degree. Much of the work has to be done by unskilled labor and their wages have risen at a faster rate than those of others. American cities are more expensive to administer than cities abroad. The greater width of the streets, the trees with which most residential streets are lined, and the enormous traffic cause higher expenditures. Moreover, the trend toward residential decentralization and the preference for the one-family home imply much greater costs: more streets, paving, lighting, cleaning, more sewers, a larger police force, an enlarged fire department, and, above all, more schools. The extension in space of residential sections tends to increase city expenditures beyond the increase of revenue (from taxes paid by newly developed areas). Again, the city has very few means of preventing these additional expenses.

While incapable of controlling a major part of its expenditures, the city, for reasons already discussed, is also unable to increase the sources of its revenue. The city can tax only what the charter permits.[21] In the early days

[18] Occasionally this meets with opposition. In 1941 the mayor of a Massachusetts town refused to clear the snow. "The Lord," he said, "who makes the snow fall will also remove it and save the taxpayer's money." Shortly afterward he went to prison because he had appropriated the savings.

[19] Town of Montclair, New Jersey, *A Study of Municipal Service and Finance,* Princeton University, The Princeton Surveys, Princeton, N.J., 1942.

[20] For instance, a reduction in the fire department would lead to an increase in fire-insurance rates.

[21] If, as so often happens, the mayor of the city and the governor of the state belong to different parties, politics may prevent the city from getting an extension of its tax powers.

of municipal autonomy it was generally assumed that some kind of modest property tax would suffice to furnish the city with ample means for administration. At a time when cities were small, officials served without pay and the staff consisted of a few clerical workers; there were no schools to support, many streets could remain unpaved, no traffic problems existed, and the neediest could be sent to the poorhouse; then the assumption was correct. But conditions changed for all public bodies. Public expenditures have a tendency to increase both in absolute figures and also in proportion to the national income (Wagner's law). But it has been only during the last sixty years that expenditures have risen so steeply that the drain on national resources has become a major problem, and the impact of taxation is now felt by the lower income groups which formerly contributed mostly by indirect taxes. The years after the Second World War, with their continued high taxation by the Federal government, have left little additional resources to states and cities and have made the financial situation of municipalities even more critical than before.

The Tax Problem. The property tax, which will be discussed presently, is still the backbone of municipal finance but in all large communities it has become inadequate for even ordinary expenditures. Cities have shown their inventiveness by taxing practically everything possible. The mere enumeration of the types of taxes would fill several pages. In many countries cities receive some share of national taxes, particularly business taxes, from the government, but this is impracticable in the United States. Many cities impose some special taxes on business, which is dangerous because it may drive firms beyond the city limits.[22] Some cities such as Philadelphia, Toledo, and Washington, D.C., levy income taxes, but obviously this cannot be done in the majority of states which have their own income tax in addition to the Federal income tax. Yet all the multitude of taxes still do not solve the revenue problem of the larger cities.[23]

[22] Compare the following report in *The New York Times,* July 3, 1952: "Rather than pay about $188,000 in taxes to the city and to the state for the privilege of doing business in New York City, companies managing four diversified investment funds with assets of $230,000,000 have moved out of a Wall Street skyscraper into two private dwellings at Elizabeth, New Jersey. The move will mean a tax saving of about 85 per cent for 60,000 stockholders of the investment companies. . . . What spurred the investment managers to move was the law just passed by the City Council doubling the gross receipt tax on financial business." According to the managers, "This tax is eight times the rate which was in effect in 1946."

[23] A detailed discussion of forms and types of city taxes is outside the scope of this book. The same is true of the management of city debts. It is sufficient to say that debts—except short stopgap loans which are repaid within the fiscal year—should be incurred only for installations or capital improvements and not for current expenditures, a primitive rule which is commonly recognized and observed by all diligent administrations. American cities are fortunate because well-administered cities have no great difficulties in floating bonds and have to pay only low interest rates. The municipal bond market

Problems of the Property Tax. The property tax deserves some discussion, for it has not only financial consequences but influences the social conditions in a city to a considerable extent. There are two kinds of property taxes: the general property tax and real property tax. The latter taxes land, buildings, and permanent improvements attached to the land; the former taxes not only furniture, rugs, silverware, paintings, stamps and other collections, but also "intangible" property such as stocks, bonds, mortgages, bank accounts, and so on. All municipalities have real property taxes, some also have general property taxes.

The general property tax is among the oldest levies and is now thoroughly outmoded. All economists agree that the tax is obnoxious, "grossly inequitable," [24] impracticable, and, it may be added, undesirable from the point of view of effective city administration. The situation was different when the tax was levied by the Federal government and not by cities, because it applied to the entire country. The city can tax property only within its legal limits, which makes tax avoidance easy. If a city taxes bank accounts and mortgages, the owners will keep their accounts and place their mortgages in cities without a general property tax; the city will not only be unable to tax the property but will lose business. The personal property tax makes large "unproductive" holdings almost impossible. The owner of a collection of old masters, valued at $100,000, can ill afford to pay the value of his property again in taxes within a time span of approximately twenty-five years. The city is interested in having beautiful homes with tasteful furniture, Oriental rugs, genuine china, libraries, and art collections. In a city with a general property tax the owner is penalized and the best thing to do is to live frugally. Tax avoidance is legal and legitimate. Tax evasion, on the other hand, is immoral and undesirable, but that is what happens with the connivance of the authorities.[25] Since taxpayers evade the full tax by underrating their holdings, the tax yield is so low as to become negligible in many instances.

There cannot be a tax evasion on real property. The tax is a flat tax on the value of the land and the buildings on it. All owners pay the same rate whether the total value is $100 or 1 million dollars. Being a property, a private park which requires great expense for upkeep but brings no income pays

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is always considerable and absorbs a substantial amount of the money seeking investment. In times when the supply of money exceeds the demand of business for bonded debts, cities fulfill an important function in the national economy. They provide legitimate opportunities for the conservative investor, thus preventing money from becoming idle.

[24] Buehler, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

[25] A person of high integrity and very moderate means moved into a town with a general property tax. He told the author that he conscientiously evaluated his modest belongings according to their true value. He not only got a large tax bill but soon found out that he paid more than practically anyone in town. When he complained, the assessor advised him to reevaluate his personal property at a rate "as everybody does it." After that he had to pay only an insignificant amount.

the same rate as a tall office building, rented in its entirety, whose owner has no maintenance or other expenses to pay but may receive as rent the equivalent of a 15 per cent on his investment. This is strictly in accordance with the theoretical requirements of a true property tax. The value of the property is normally determined by the value of the land plus the building costs for the structure.[26] The value, thus determined, remains the basis of assessment for all future tax periods unless the city demands a higher evaluation for an increase in value or the owner a lower evaluation for a decrease. Here is the crux of the problem which has consequences far beyond the mere revenue aspect. The value rises or falls mainly for the following reasons:

1. As an effect of inflation or deflation. Actually the value of the property remains what it was; the value of money has changed. In this case all properties change at the same rate and the results are of no interest for our discussion.[27]

2. As an effect of sectional changes in the city. If an area becomes blighted, all real-estate property loses value; conversely, if an area becomes fashionable, the prices rise correspondingly.

3. As a result of improvements or deterioration of the buildings. This is the most interesting case.

Let us examine the following example, which is far from being imaginary. A small investor can buy a slum structure for $20,000 above the mortgage. If he invests his money in bonds, he will get no more than 3 per cent interest, or $600 a year. The slum building usually returns 15 per cent if services and repairs are kept to a minimum. Thus the return is $3,000 a year. In seven years the buyer has received back his total investment plus $1,000 and can probably resell for $10,000 over the meanwhile reduced value. He managed to receive $6,800 more than the bond investor; in the meantime he was able to deduct the deterioration of the building from his taxable income, a further advantage. But in addition, year after year he demanded from the city a reduction in property tax because the building was deteriorating and constantly losing value.

Let us now reverse the situation. An owner replaces the shingles on his roof with tiles; or he removes the wooden stairs in his tenement house and

[26] The taxation varies according to state laws and city ordinances. Sometimes the "true" value, that is, the actual price of lot and building, is taxed; sometimes an assumed lower value, which, however, is supposed to be equal for all property. Iowa, for instance, enacted a law in 1897 fixing the assessment of real property at 25 per cent of its value (Buehler, *op. cit.*, p. 283).

[27] There are exceptions. At present the cost of a new building is approximately twice the cost of the same type before the Second World War. This is the effect of inflationary increases in wages and building materials. A building erected in 1954 for $20,000 is no better than a home built in 1938 for $10,000. But in many towns the buyer of the new building pays twice the tax which the old owners have to pay.

builds a new stairway of concrete—in both instances a substantial decrease of fire hazards. Or he remodels cold-water flats into steam-heated apartments; or he adds bathrooms which did not exist. In all these cases the city will reassess the holdings and the owner will have to pay higher taxes. In



FIG. 9. Property values and taxation. The two charts demonstrate the futility of attempts to gain tax relief by devaluating taxable property. The property values in Springfield, Mass., declined continually from 1928 to 1945, but the tax rate rose in approximately the same proportion. The increases in both real-estate values and taxes reflect the effects of inflation. (*From a pamphlet by the Springfield Taxpayers' Association and used by permission.*)

other words: *The property tax puts a premium on neglect and a penalty on improvements.* In areas which are threatened by blight or already deteriorating, the effects are devastating. The tax also discriminates against conscientious landlords who spend sizable sums for repairs and services, and favors the inconsiderate operator who does nothing; both pay the same taxes although the attentive owner derives a lesser income from his investments.

Taxation Procedures. Why is a tax system, so obviously unjust to the individual and so detrimental to the community, in general use with all com-

munities? First of all, there are constitutional or other legal obstacles which prevent a shift to a better system. There is also the inertia which makes it so difficult to change one of the oldest tax types. But the decisive reason is the fact that the property tax is of all taxes the simplest to administer and the cost of tax collection is consequently very low. No returns are necessary, no individual assessments, varying from year to year. No deductions or expenditures have to be considered. The value of each property is fixed and the total value of all assessed property is known in advance. All that the assessors have to do is to find out the total city expenditures (minus revenues from other sources) and to compute the proportion of the expenditures to the total value of land and buildings, a procedure which costs no money and can be done in one minute by any schoolboy. The proportion is the tax rate which is uniform for all taxpayers.

Here is an example of how the procedure actually works in a town of 40,000: [28]

1. At the beginning of each year (example 1941) the Town Commission:		
Makes a schedule of amounts to be appropriated for the various "Town" activities		$3,069,588.00
Deducts expected surplus and miscellaneous revenue (fees, license receipts, Montclair's share of certain state utility taxes, water rents, and other incidental income)		1,104,062.00
And raises the remainder from the general property tax—commonly called the "Local Purpose Tax"		1,965,526.00
2. The Board of School Estimate does the same for schools:		
Appropriates for schools	$1,283,243.00	
Deducts state school aid, surplus, and miscellaneous revenue	266,209.00	
And determines the "Local School District Tax" (on general property)		1,017,034.00
3. Montclair's portion of Essex County's tax goes in		601,828.00
4. And the state's property tax for school aid (about 29 cents) is included		253,427.00
5. Raising Montclair's total general property tax to		$3,837,815.00
6. Divide this by the assessed valuation of property		$82,938,782.00
7. And the tax rate becomes		$4.63 per $100.00

In spite of all these advantages, a tax reform is indicated not so much to raise the revenue but to use the tax to improve housing conditions, accelerate the demolition of overaged and dangerous buildings, stimulate the erection of better homes, and remove penalties for considerate management.

Principles of Rational Taxation. A modern tax system has to comprise the following features:

[28] Montclair, N.J. The example is taken from the Princeton study mentioned before. Since the report is not easily accessible, the quotation is a literal selection. The town commission to which the report refers is the equivalent of the city council.

1. To promote homeownership the tax should be higher for tenanted buildings and lower for owner-occupied homes.

2. The tax on buildings (not on the land) should be a use tax rather than a levy on the value of property. The houses should be classified according to standard categories of usable rooms, but bathrooms, porches, basements, etc., should not be counted. The building type (timber, brick, or stone) should be disregarded. This would encourage the use of better and more durable material and liberal equipment with modern heating systems, good insulation, modern bathrooms, and toilets.

3. Improvements (not including room additions or transformation of single homes into multiple dwellings) should not be taxed. Nor should any tax reduction be granted for deterioration of buildings.

4. The owner of rented homes should pay an additional tax on their returns; the tax should be progressively assessed, however, not on the absolute amount of the net rentals but on the proportion of the invested capital. A legitimate proportion of the return, say, 5 per cent or 6 per cent, would remain tax free. This would encourage improvements, repairs, and the rendering of services and partly confiscate the lucre of inconsiderate speculators.

5. In case of resale with profit, a part of the gain should be taxed by the city.[29] Such profits—save for cases of inflation—are due partly to the efforts of the investor if he developed hitherto unused land thereby improving land values. For the risk he takes, for the work involved, and for the benefit the neighborhood derives he deserves a legitimate profit. But a considerable part of the increase is due to work done by the city involving substantial expenses (building and paving of new streets, sewers, planting of trees, etc.), which entitles the city to a share of the increased value. This type of tax was included in the reform proposals of a "single tax" advocated by Henry George. His idea as a whole and his belief that the confiscation of the entire land rent would solve all social problems cannot be taken too seriously. But the proposal to levy a tax on unearned increase of urban land holdings is perfectly sound. It has been adopted by many European cities to their great advantage.[30]

Impact of Tax Exemptions and Services for Nonresidents. The revenues of cities derived from property taxes are seriously impaired by the exemption of nonprofit organizations (churches, charitable, educational, and other organizations). The holdings of these institutions increase steadily; some of them concentrate in the areas of highest land values, and cities are losing more and more revenue. It has been estimated that for one or another reason

[29] At present this is impossible because many states and the Federal government subject these "capital gains" to income tax, although the profit from capital investment is theoretically not income.

[30] Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*. About unsatisfactory experiments in America, see Buehler, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

one-half of the taxable land in Manhattan is exempt.[31] A revision of the existing laws is necessary but cannot be undertaken by cities, which lack the authority to do so. A redefinition of nonprofit institutions is advisable because many organizations, from which no one profits but their officers, hide behind a convenient front. Furthermore, tax exemption should apply only to real estate which is used for the proper performance of the nonprofit function. One college, for instance, owns a needle factory which thus is tax exempt. Moreover, tax exemptions, at least for additional acquisitions, should not apply to certain areas with very high land values. Nonprofit organizations can work—practically all colleges do so—on the fringe rather than in the center. That will improve neglected areas and prevent avoidable losses of revenue in sections with high land values.

Another problem from which large cities suffer is the great amount of services from which nonresidents profit without making any contribution. This is invariably the case if residential suburbs remain independent and refuse to be incorporated. The residents of these suburbs work in the city, derive the means of their livelihood from the opportunities of the city, use their services but pay no taxes. In New York City—at least until July, 1953—the subways were operating with a deficit and each ride was subsidized by the taxpayers; hundreds of thousands of people working in the city but living in New Jersey or New York State received a daily present of cheaper subway fares. They have the advantage of living at lower rents or in nicer homes outside New York and get additional benefits without cost. In Boston the wealthiest suburbs, Brookline, the Newtons, and Milton, are not incorporated but enjoy the Common and all the other advantages at the expense of the Bostonians. The just solution would be a unified financial administration of the entire metropolitan area, which at present for many practical reasons is out of the question. Some help, however, could be gained by a reallocation of the existing state grants. The question is part of the greater problem of metropolitan government, to which McKenzie[32] called attention long ago.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that the existence of the states is a liability rather than an advantage for larger cities. The contributions which the largest units receive are not only less than the financial burden, particularly in states which impose a state income tax, but all other services performed by the states for the cities could be obtained more cheaply if the city were left alone. If the largest cities were all independent units, they would be better off financially. Under present conditions the great world cities subsidize the states to which they belong, that is, they subsidize the rural population and the smaller towns which already indirectly derive great

[31] According to a statement by the borough president, 59 per cent of all real estate in Manhattan was tax exempt in 1950 (*The New York Times,* Jan. 19, 1951).

[32] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community,* pp. 303 ff.

TABLE 21. BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Departmental City Budget Totals as Proposed by Mayor

Statement showing executive budget recommendations for the various city departments, all funds, for 1953–1954, submitted by Mayor Impellitteri to the Board of Estimate and the City Council, with comparisons between the budget for 1952–1953, as modified to March 15, 1953, and the executive budget for 1953–1954.

Department	Executive budget for 1953–1954	Increase (+) or decrease (−) compared with 1952–1953
Council and City Clerk	$ 564,761.00	+$ 5,639.00
Mayoralty	401,155.00	− 10,790.00
Elections, Board of	2,781,118.00	− 178,370.00
Estimate, Board of	1,243,919.00	− 10,255.00
President, Borough of Manhattan	5,029,318.38	− 90,386.68
President, Borough of the Bronx	4,025,539.90	− 74,764.80
President, Borough of Brooklyn	6,189,578.46	− 150,730.08
President, Borough of Queens	7,712,189.56	− 79,061.78
President, Borough of Richmond	2,383,444.56	− 16,216.00
Controller	5,696,818.00	− 215,548.00
Budget, Bureau of the	757,539.00	− 19,958.00
Finance, Department of	4,334,073.00	+ 380,610.00
Tax Department	1,976,789.00	− 5,138.00
Assessors, Board of	123,779.00	− 3,713.00
Licenses, Department of	352,958.00	− 5,864.00
Purchase, Department of	2,602,841.00	− 61,369.00
Law Department	3,224,083.00	− 52,408.00
City Record, The	1,006,526.00	+ 56,850.00
City Register	1,211,061.00	− 66,238.00
Art Commission	17,595.00	− 760.00
City Planning Commission	643,183.00	− 38,497.00
Municipal Civil Service Commission	1,226,994.00	− 9,360.00
Investigation, Department of	390,493.00	− 2,684.00
Public Works, Department of	15,072,741.52	− 476,989.94
Municipal Broadcasting System	305,415.91	− 34,557.64
Commerce, Department of	110,033.00	− 29,356.00
New York Public Library	4,664,853.41	+ 135,336.90
New York Public Library Building	133,785.00	+ 2,569.40
Brooklyn Public Library	3,256,989.00	+ 86,878.00
Queens Borough Public Library	2,026,278.00	− 1,192.00
Education, Department of	349,642,364.94	+ 20,113,377.19
Teachers' Retirement System	375,875.00	+ 8,025.00
Higher Education, Board of	22,930,859.68	+ 110,840.27
Metropolitan Museum of Art	815,927.00	− 12,591.00
New York Botanical Garden	463,110.00	− 9,862.00
American Museum of Natural History	1,178,864.00	− 3,908.00
New York Zoological Society	676,112.00	− 8,826.00
Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, The Brooklyn Museum	423,869.00	− 3,345.00

TABLE 21. BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Continued)

Department	Executive budget for 1953–1954	Increase (+) or decrease (−) compared with 1952–1953
Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Brooklyn Children's Museum	$ 89,959.00	−$ 2,796.00
Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Botanic Garden and Arboretum	180,498.00	− 2,110.00
Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Academy of Music	79,690.00	+ 74,020.00
Staten Island Institute of Arts and Sciences	32,746.00	− 724.00
Staten Island Zoological Society	89,345.00	− 1,915.00
Museum of the City of New York	107,455.00	− 12,350.00
Grant's Tomb	10,685.00	+ 805.00
Parks, Department of	22,135,909.18	− 147,777.48
Police Department	130,767,571.68	+ 6,335,897.50
Fire Department	70,042,632.14	+ 859,358.08
Housing and Buildings, Department of	4,834,515.00	+ 479,360.00
Standards and Appeals, Board of	149,173.60	− 4,597.00
Civil Defense, Office of	1,703,503.00	− 594,528.00
Traffic, Department of	1,690,519.88	+ 167,255.98
City Sheriff	625,962.00	+ 292.00
Veterans' Cooperation	14,930.00	− 7,350.00
Medical Examiner, Office of Chief	395,720.50	+ 4,712.00
Sanitation, Department of	68,188,533.70	− 1,007,331.45
Health, Department of	13,940,704.68	− 536,856.72
Air Pollution Control, Department of	283,844.00	+ 58,840.00
Hospitals, Department of	112,177,008.88	− 60,841.40
Welfare, Department of	167,936,876.06	− 7,651,630.52
Charitable Institutions, Payments to	41,878,780.00	+ 584,807.00
Correction, Department of	8,697,958.24	− 136,957.40
Parole Commission	193,650.00	+ 3,115.00
City Court	1,744,353.16	+ 99,125.33
Records, Commissioner of, of the City Court	69,391.00	+ 4,631.00
Special Sessions, Court of	971,805.00	+ 44,151.00
Domestic Relations Court	2,022,163.00	+ 60,933.00
City Magistrates' Courts	2,893,117.00	+ 90,945.00
Municipal Court	3,247,055.00	+ 149,745.00
Transportation, Board of	1,078,338.00	− 9,889.32
Marine and Aviation, Department of	8,555,321.56	− 237,527.00
Water Supply, Gas and Electricity, Department of	31,087,852.18	+ 1,912,191.38
Markets, Department of	1,709,548.20	− 3,127.50
Water Supply, Board of	5,234,888.00	+ 453,420.00
District Attorney, New York County	1,164,166.50	− 8,686.00
District Attorney, Bronx County	463,701.00	+ 1,558.00
District Attorney, Kings County	789,236.00	− 1,201.00
District Attorney, Queens County	405,904.00	− 2,051.00
District Attorney, Richmond County	74,950.00	+ 5.00
County Clerk, New York County	569,184.00	− 4,183.00

TABLE 21. BUDGET OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Continued)

Department	Executive budget for 1953–1954	Increase (+) or decrease (−) compared with 1952–1953
County Clerk, Bronx County	$ 310,104.18	−$ 3,938.00
County Clerk, Kings County	420,678.00	− 7,331.00
County Clerk, Queens County	256,872.00	− 5,178.00
County Clerk, Richmond County	156,277.00	− 8,287.00
Supreme Court, First Department	3,868,679.96	+ 34,933.32
Supreme Court, First Department, Maintenance of Appellate Division Court House	101,432.00	.....
Supreme Court, Second Judicial District, Kings County	1,826,084.92	+ 17,593.30
Supreme Court Library, Borough of Brooklyn	14,670.00	+ 300.00
Supreme Court, Second Department, Appellate Term	52,837.00	.....
Supreme Court, Tenth Judicial District, Queens County	371,945.00	− 40.00
Supreme Court Library, Queens County	12,870.00	.....
Supreme Court, Second Judicial District, Richmond County	65,515.00	.....
Supreme Court Library, Richmond County	17,780.00	− 500.00
Supreme Court, Second and Tenth Judicial Districts and Appellate Division, Second Department	567,000.00	+ 23,200.00
General Sessions, Court of	1,747,694.50	+ 18,955.05
County Court, Bronx County	529,171.00	+ 5,185.00
County Court, Kings County	1,104,110.00	+ 805.00
County Court, Queens County	545,060.00	+ 1,085.00
County Court, Richmond County	86,630.00	+ 1,465.00
Surrogate's Court, New York County	688,365.00	+ 1,015.00
Records, Commissioner of (Surrogate's Court) New York County	99,760.00	− 1,575.00
Surrogate's Court, Bronx County	228,441.00	+ 1,600.00
Records, Commissioner of (Surrogate's Court) Bronx County	69,745.00	.....
Surrogate's Court, Kings County	462,978.00	+ 1,050.00
Surrogate's Court, Queens County	310,657.00	+ 2,574.00
Surrogate's Court, Richmond County	89,721.00	+ 1,785.00
Public Administrator, New York County	68,967.00	− 4,448.00
Public Administrator, Bronx County	4,435.00	− 100.00
Public Administrator, Kings County	45,045.00	+ 1,429.00
Public Administrator, Queens County	28,816.00	+ 650.00
Public Administrator, Richmond County	6,375.00	− 100.00
Debt Service	256,219,946.47	+ 20,174,537.25
Miscellaneous	94,132,156.02	+ 14,758,393.54
Total budget	$1,528,812,795.51	+$55,193,182.78

SOURCE: *The New York Times,* Apr. 8, 1953.

financial advantages from the metropolis. This would not be so objectionable if the metropolis could handle its financial affairs without difficulties. Since this is not the case, the wisdom of the existing financial arrangements is questionable. It increases the city taxes beyond the necessary lowest limits. The higher tax burden stimulates the exodus of those larger business units and wealthier residents who are subject to higher taxes. The ensuing ecological changes, with their blighting effects, do not represent desirable forms of city decentralization and put a still heavier burden on those who remain, particularly the middle classes who have to bear the brunt of rising expenditures.

Part IX. URBAN PATHOLOGY

Social pathology deals with the difficulties of social adjustment, with situations which hamper the fulfillment of social functions, or endanger the existence of a group. Urban pathology has to investigate whether or not specific urban conditions create or promote situations which in turn cause social disorganization.

Since the times of Rousseau there have been a number of writers who have considered the city as an unforgivable deviation from "natural" life, who have described the city as "sin," as a monster devouring his own children, or, in other words, as an institution which in itself is pathological. This might be relegated to the field of unscientific literary ventures. But some scientists also incline toward the view that the city in itself is a threat to social organization and that many pathological features of social life are the direct effects of urbanization. This view cannot be summarily dismissed and will be examined in the following section separately for each of the many fields in which disorganization occurs. A few general remarks may be made in advance. The belief that only urban societies show serious problems of social disorganization is entirely unfounded. The opinion that the rural population is happy, in good mental health, and well organized is equally wrong. What we know of preurban societies, both contemporary and in the past, points in the opposite direction. The real problem is to find out whether there are specific forms of disorganization which occur only in cities or, if there are none, whether some of them occur with greater frequency in cities than in the country. Even in the latter case we have to find out whether the city is responsible for creating these conditions or functions merely as a repository. If, for instance, we should find that there are more sick people in the city than in the country, we have still to know whether they are sick because they have lived in a city or whether they came to the city because they were already sick.

Chapter 18

DEATH AND DISEASES

Rural versus Urban Conditions. There is no doubt that the medieval city was a very unhealthy place; throughout the Middle Ages the cities suffered from all kinds of epidemics. Medical knowledge was elementary, hygienic measures were primitive, and the death rate and incidence of disease were much higher than in rural areas. In modern times the situation has become less clear. The advantages of the country are obvious. The air is clean, the scattered settlements decrease the danger of contagious diseases; slums are nonexistent; to work in the open rather than in factories keeps a person in good health; farm work is not as conducive to nervous tension.

But the modern city, due to advanced techniques, is superior in many other respects. Practically all cities have an excellent system of sanitary provisions. Water is no longer contaminated in urban places but quite a number of farms have polluted water; toilet facilities are usually more satisfactory in cities. The same is true of the removal of garbage and refuse. Foodstuffs are carefully inspected, dairy products must be pasteurized. Flies, responsible for several communicable diseases, are rarer in urban areas. Cities have more and better doctors and more specialists; they have a variety of hospitals, clinics, first-aid stations, ambulances, and pharmacies. All these are easily accessible and, in cases of danger, available within a few minutes. Farm work may be healthier but city work is not as exhausting. Health conditions also depend on education.[1] In this respect the situation varies from country to country and within a country from region to region. Where educational standards are high, as notably in Denmark, many Western European countries, and generally in the United States, the farmer might have an edge over city people because the cities harbor masses of poor people with substandard training. In peasant countries with few educational facilities the situation is less favorable for the countryside. But there are exceptions even in America. The health of the Indians, living on rural reservations, is notoriously poor; Negro sharecroppers and Mexican agricultural workers, all poorly educated, all in economic distress, all living in unsanitary homes and on unsatisfactory diets, are hardly better off. A priori the balance sheet is difficult to evaluate. If we turn to empirical investigations and available statistical

[1] Honor students are the best life-insurance risks.

figures, we have to be cautious in our interpretation. The figures are biased against the city. Farming is in many ways selective. People with a weak heart or a frail body cannot work on farms. They move into cities after their health has become unsatisfactory; but the city did not cause their weakness. Also, many ailing or older farmers sell their farms and retire to the city where they die after a few years. Their death is statistically a city liability.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there are also considerable differences with respect to age groups, sex, race, nativity, and economic status. Many researches have yielded refined rates for the crude death rate, but very little differentiating material is available for most of the diseases and still less for educational and economic differences.

Rural and Urban Death Rates. Under these circumstances the existing data are not fit for broad generalizations. The statement that the urban death rate is higher than in rural areas should be viewed with some reserve. For the United States the statement is certainly sustained by the crude death rates as well as by rates adjusted according to race. Sorokin and Zimmerman,[2] who support the theory, present abundant evidence in favor of the hypothesis, and Queen and Thomas,[3] Niles Carpenter,[4] and Wiehl [5] concur with some reservations.[6] But there is also evidence to the contrary. Dr. Jastizebski [7] has shown that urban death rates are lower than rural rates in Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Japan.

In the United States the urban death rates are by no means higher in all population brackets. In one important case—infant mortality—the urban rates are not only lower but decrease with the increasing size of the city. Table 22 shows that the rural death rate for infants is higher in general, considerably higher than in the largest cities, and only somewhat lower than in towns between 2,500 and 10,000 population. This applies to the whites. For nonwhites the urban rate of infant mortality is generally higher but in cities over 100,000, the infant mortality is nearly 5 per cent lower than in rural areas. Infant mortality is substantially higher than that of any other age group (for 1942 the total death rate per 1,000 in the United States was 10.6 per cent). The lower infant mortality in bigger cities is undoubtedly due —but only in part—to better care. On the other hand, infant mortality reflects the health situation better than mortality of all other groups because

[2] *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* pp. 182 ff.

[3] *The City,* p. 393.

[4] *The Sociology of the City,* p. 180.

[5] Dorothy G. Wiehl, "Mortality and Socio-environmental Factors," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* October, 1948.

[6] The main dissenting voice comes from A. F. Weber: "There is no inherent reason for the relatively high urban mortality except man's neglect and indifference" (*The Growth of Cities,* p. 367).

[7] Figures for 1924 in "Death Rates," *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 14th ed. See also Carpenter, *op. cit.,* p. 180.

Table 22. Infant Mortality in the United States
(Death rates per 1,000 for age under one year)

	White	Nonwhite
Urban	35.6	65.9
100,000 and over	31.8	58.4
25,000–100,000	37.1	73.0
10,000–25,000	38.5	76.4
2,500–10,000	41.9	77.4
Rural	39.7	63.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics, Special Report,* 1942.

occupational differences are entirely removed and many other nonmedical factors almost entirely so. This permits us to assume that the city in itself is not an unhealthier place than the country, and the differences in rural-urban death rates should be mainly explained in other than ecological terms. This assumption is also supported by the decrease of the death rate over time. In all advanced countries it is constantly declining for both urban and rural areas. But the decline in cities is much more rapid. Half a century ago A. F. Weber [8] could already speak of a "gradual approximation of the urban to the rural death-rate," showing that the trend existed in London, New York, Vienna, Prussia, Bavaria, Denmark, and Sweden. Since then the trend toward equalization has persisted and is likely to continue.

Molyneaux, Gilliam, and Florant [9] have pointed out that it is necessary to modify the proposition of higher urban death rates. They proved for Virginia that lower urban death rates exist as follows:

1. For white females until the menopause
2. For white males up to about the age of 45
3. For nonwhite females of the age groups 5 to 9; 10 to 14; 20 to 24; 30 to 35; and 75 and over
4. For nonwhite males, 25 to 29; and 70 and over

For the United States Gist and Halbert,[10] using statistical data supplied by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, demonstrated that in 1940 the urban death rate was lower for both sexes in cases of pneumonia and influenza and for females in cases of cerebral hemorrhage and tuberculosis. The death rate of nonwhites, which is for all practical purposes that of the Negro, is much higher, as can be seen from Table 23.

[8] *Op. cit.,* p. 353.

[9] Lambert Molyneaux, Sara K. Gilliam, and L. C. Florant, "Differences in Virginia Death Rates by Color, Sex, Age, and Rural or Urban Residents," *American Sociological Review,* October, 1947; also L. Molyneaux, *Differential Mortality in Virginia,* Charlottesville, Va., 1947.

[10] Gist and Halbert, *Urban Society,* New York, 1950, p. 220.

TABLE 23. DEATH RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930–1940

	White	Nonwhite
Urban males	12.52	20.43
Rural males	11.76	18.52
Urban females	8.67	17.58
Rural females	9.15	16.08

SOURCE: Adapted from Lambert Molyneaux, Sara K. Gilliam, and L. C. Florant, "Differences in Virginia Death Rates by Color, Sex, Age, and Rural or Urban Residents," *American Sociological Review,* October, 1947.

It would be rash to assume that the difference in death rate between white and nonwhite is in this case due to a biological superiority of the white race. The possibility of innate racial differences cannot be excluded a priori; it seems that in tropical regions the white race is biologically inferior; lack of pigmentation makes the white more susceptible to excessive radiation of the sun. As for the differences in the United States, judgment must be reserved until we have more and better statistical material with respect to death differentials according to economic conditions,[11] occupation, and education. The high rural Negro death rate indicates that the city is not the primary factor causing premature death. The comparative infant mortality rates point to a similar conclusion.

The proportionately greater decline in urban death rates over the past fifty years suggests that the earlier higher adult mortality might be due to certain physical urban conditions detrimental to health. The decline shows that modern techniques are successfully removing these conditions. The higher death rate would be the consequence not of urban habitat but of urban conditions at a specific time and in specific places. This hypothesis is also supported by the situation in Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Japan. Yet all doubts are not removed by the foregoing rectification. It might still be the case that urban life is conducive to premature death and diseases in certain instances if not in general.

Social Factors in Health Differentials. Reasons for a higher incidence of urban death rates would then be social rather than natural in character. In this case not the urban habitat but urban ways of life would produce either specific or more numerous causes for sickness and death. This is the core of the problem whether or not there is a particular urban pathology with respect to the health situation. Interpretation of available figures is sometimes difficult. Heart disease is the most frequent cause of death. The mortality

[11] "It is significant that from 1940 to 1945, when Negroes as well as whites had higher incomes than ever before, the mortality decline for Negroes was definitely accelerated." (Wiehl, *op. cit.,* p. 336.)

rate for heart disease is much higher in cities but this does not imply that the city causes more heart disease. In the first place, as pointed out before, persons with heart disease are more likely to move into the city than to stay on farms. However, a higher incidence of deaths from heart disease might even be an indication of better health in general. If it were possible to prevent all premature deaths and to cure all diseases, we would all finally die of a weakened heart. An increase in deaths from heart disease indicates progress in preventive medicine.

A. F. Weber [12] divided the causes of high urban mortality into three categories: "town-made," "due to occupation," and "brought about by the migratory movement." This tripartition is a convenient starting point but is in need of elaboration. To begin with the last category—migration—we have observed that farm work presupposes good health and a strong physique. Weaker persons and those afflicted with chronic illnesses move into towns. So do those who seek cures for an acute disease but fail to recover. Until recently it was generally assumed that rural migrants were in better physical condition than native urbanites; Sorokin and Zimmerman [13] presented much evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Ronald Freedman [14] furnished evidence to the contrary, leading to the conclusion that "in 1936 the health of recent rural-urban migrants who remained in the city was poorer than that of the general urban population" and that "this health differential existed within each specific income class." Finally, older farmers often retire to cities where they spend the rest of their lives. This is a process of negative selection; urban places thereby become areas of concentration for people who are less fit. Yet this has to be considered as a positive urban function. The city enables these individuals to receive more comfort and provides employment for otherwise unemployable persons. Hence the concentration is not a pathological phenomenon of urban life, it does not create illness, it causes no death; it only reflects the existing health situation which, if anything, is improved by migration to urban places.

In turning to occupational factors there is no need to stress the hazards of work. Dangers to life and health exist, to be sure, on farms but they are less severe as can be seen from Table 24. These figures reflect social conditions rather than inherent occupational hazards. The low injury figure for manufacturing results not from lack of danger but from the successful application of safety measures. Not all these hazards are concomitants of urban life. Accidents in construction work and transportation occur both in rural and in urban areas but again the workers live in towns. Since the statistics are based on residence and not on the place of occurrence, the figures are biased

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 359.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 574.

[14] Ronald Freedman, "Health Differentials for Rural-Urban Migration," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1947.

Table 24. Injuries per 100 Workers by Industry Group, 1947

Mining and quarrying	101
Construction	72
Transportation and utilities	56
Trade (wholesale and retail)	39
Manufacturing	34
Finance, service, and government	33
Agriculture	33

Source: Adapted from "Work Injuries in 1947: Preliminary Estimates," *Monthly Labor Review,* 1948, pp. 301 ff.; see also Phelps, *Introduction to Labor Economics,* New York, 1950, p. 213.

against the cities. There are other occupational diseases where figures are less revealing. Various forms of heart disease, particularly arteriosclerosis, are apparently more frequent among the professions, above all, doctors and lawyers, than with other groups. This is the price which the professions have to pay for greater nervous strain.

The third category—"town-made" factors of higher incidence of deaths and disease—is crucial. Close scrutiny shows that there is a variety of such factors; some of them have been mentioned before. There are unsanitary conditions; in general these can be eliminated and many no longer exist to a dangerous degree (water pollution, lack of sewers, etc.). There are still slums, which are discussed in Chapter 20. There are by-products of urban industrial activities: excessive dirt, dust, smog, and other types of air contamination. That there are "town-made" factors is certain; they assuredly contribute to death and disease, but their actual influence is difficult to determine. It has been common opinion that tuberculosis is at least greatly increased by these factors. The statistical figures should make us reluctant to accept this supposition without closer scrutiny. In 1940 the ratio of white urban to white rural death rates because of tuberculosis was 1.20 for males but .84 for females.[15] Hence tuberculosis caused proportionately more deaths among rural than among urban women. Diabetes apparently has a higher urban incidence, which seems to be connected with dietary habits, but the situation is not quite clear. The greatest divergence in death rates is caused by cancer; the ratio of urban to rural death rates is for males 1.54, for females 1.31.[16]

There are, however, two diseases with a much higher urban death ratio which defy any attempt to exonerate the cities: syphilis and cirrhosis of the liver. In the case of syphilis the statistics are in all probability biased in favor of the city, for there can hardly be a doubt that many rural people

[15] See Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.,* p. 220.

[16] For 1940, see *ibid.*

acquire the disease in the city. It is obvious that the city does not create these diseases merely because of its physical arrangement. It is the urban way of life which is responsible. The reasons are exclusively social and therefore challenge the sociologist rather than the physician (if he limits his activities to medical treatment). Syphilis is the result of either extragenital infection, which is very rare, or of congenital transmission, which affects yearly about 60,000 newborn babies (or about 1.7 per cent of all births). Or it is—by far the most frequent reason—the result of intercourse between two persons, of whom at least one must be promiscuous. Although reliable data about the source of infection are unavailable, there is general agreement that prostitution is one of the most frequent factors. This assumption is supported by the high incidence of the disease among prostitutes.[17] Since prostitution is almost exclusively an urban phenomenon, the responsibility of the city is obvious.

The second disease with an unquestionably urban etiology, cirrhosis of the liver, is one of the effects of chronic alcoholism. In America it is more typically urban than any other cause of death. The ratio of urban to rural death rates for males is 2.16, as compared with 1.54 for cancer, which has the second highest ratio. In 1940 the death rate from this cause was 15.1 per 100,000 urban males, but it was only 7.0 per 100,000 rural males.[18] The explanation is perhaps less traceable to urban mores but more to the particular attitude of the American farmer. The United States presents a great contrast: excessive drinking is much more frequent than in some countries where a modicum of wine is regularly served, even with the meals of the poor (France and Italy). But no other country has as large a number of abstainers, a group powerful enough to impose prohibition, a measure which no other great country has ever tried. Drinking habits vary from country to country, but there are usually no great differences between rural and urban places. In Eastern Europe drunken peasants are no rarer than intoxicated urbanites. But in America temperance, which actually means total abstention, is distinctly rural. In urban places teetotalers are mostly members of fundamentalist denominations. The two states which still ban liquor, Oklahoma and Mississippi, are overwhelmingly rural. Certain urban mores doubtless contribute to alcoholic excesses: the upper classes indulge in "social" drinking much more than in most other countries, business is often transacted by salesmen treating their prospects generously with alcohol, and the saloon adds to the urban stimuli. Yet the habit of excessive drinking is not essentially urban; in fact, it is rare in small towns where social control is strict and many women, belonging to fundamentalist churches, enforce temperance in their homes. It is an institutional and not an ecological phenomenon, which accounts for different attitudes toward drinking in rural areas.

[17] An examination in New Orleans showed that 80 per cent of the prostitutes had syphilis (Elliott and Merrill, *Social Disorganization,* 3d ed., New York, 1950, p. 168).

[18] Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.*

Mental Diseases and Urban Life. There is another field in which urban life is a serious danger to health: some mental diseases are definitely "town-made." The terms "mental disease" and "mental deficiencies" cover a large field and some distinctions are necessary. Mentally deficient persons—those with subnormal intelligence—exist everywhere and the countryside has at least an equal share of them. At least one mental disease has nothing to do with residence: senile psychosis is the result of physical deterioration. Traumatic psychoses might be influenced by the urban environment but only because the danger of brain injury is greater in cities. There are two physical psychoses which are clearly urban: paresis and delirium tremens. The first is the result of syphilis, the second of alcoholism. These reflect psychiatric concomitants of previously noted urban diseases.

Those disorders without a determinable physical cause, functional psychoses and the neuroses,[19] must also be examined. Our knowledge about the real nature of these diseases is still limited and the main theories controversial. Nevertheless, existing information is sufficient to indicate that urban ways of life contribute substantially to them.

We can be reasonably sure that neither traumatic experiences nor sexual problems are sufficient to account for the extent of mental disorders in American cities. The U.S. Public Health Service has estimated that approximately 8 million Americans are in some way mentally deranged. In 1947 there were 543,726 resident patients in mental institutions.[20] When Freud in his later years wrote an essay on "Civilization and Its Discontents," [21] he realized that higher culture is a disturbing factor which might create mental disorders. Unfortunately, reliable statistical data are too scarce to make definite statements. A study by Malzberg [22] showed a much higher rate of admission to mental hospitals for urban areas but it is not conclusive; it is restricted to New York State and does not include cases treated by private hospitals, clinics, psychiatrists, and social agencies. Another study of one locality, which was not directly concerned with mental health, found that in Miami County, Ohio, farm children had fewer nervous symptoms and that the proportion of children of superior personality adjustment was "highest among farm and village children and lowest among city children." But it also found that "the proportion of children classified as very poorly adjusted was not significantly different among farm, village and city children. About one in each five or six was in this category." [23] We may note the high percentage

[19] We dispense with a discussion of hysteria since it is of minor importance for our topic.

[20] "Mental Health Statistics, Current Reports," Series MH-850, no. 1, *Patients in Mental Institutions, 1947,* U.S. Public Health Service, National Institute of Mental Health, Washington, 1949; from Elliot and Merrill, *op. cit.,* pp. 274 ff.

[21] Translated by Joan Riviere, London, 1930.

[22] Benjamin Malzberg, *Social and Biological Aspects of Mental Disease,* Utica, 1940.

[23] A. R. Mangus, "Personality Adjustment of Rural and Urban Children," *American Sociological Review,* October, 1948.

of those who fail to adjust. Smith and Mahon [24] point out that the tensions of urban life create serious problems of mental hygiene, and Gist and Halbert [25] suggest that "the complexities of urban life are conducive to the development of neurotic personalities." Despite the lack of precise data, there seems to be general agreement that the city has a higher rate of mentally deranged persons.[26]

Cultural Causes of Mental Derangements. Bearing in mind the complexity of the situation, we may enumerate the main urban-"cultural" factors which are a threat to mental health as follows:

1. *Tensions* arising from the peculiar setup of modern cities. Urban life is characterized by many physical irritations such as excessive noise, the constant cacophony of mechanical sounds, incessant visual attacks on the eyes by glaring, changing multicolored lights, mass congestion in public conveyances, restaurants, department stores, and amusement places, and the strain caused by daily commuting.

2. *Strain from competition.* Ours is a competitive society, as we are frequently told. Actually there is no society, not even a small social group, without competition. In our own system, however, competition on a large scale is basically an urban phenomenon. Farmers compete for marriage partners, sometimes for local political positions, and similar cases. But there is, contrary to a widely held belief, very little economic competition. The farmer, in ordinary times, does not ask for a price for his products. The prices of most commodities are usually determined by the market. There is one uniform price for each grade of all standard commodities and every farmer receives the same price for his wheat, corn, cattle, pigs, or whatever he produces. It is only when demand falls far behind supply that he tries to undersell his neighbors. There is also relatively little social competition. Differences in status exist and are represented in the amount of property owned but rarely in conspicuous consumption. The rich farmer can be distinguished from the poor farmer by his bank account but not by his attire, automobile, entertainment, or his wife's jewels and mink coat. Rural positions which give

[24] *The Sociology of Urban Life,* p. 674.

[25] *Op. cit.,* p. 351.

[26] Carney Landis and James T. Page, *Modern Society and Mental Disease* (New York, 1938), voice a somewhat dissenting view. They point out, as others have done, that the admission figures prove only that more urban patients are hospitalized. When they compared the total incidence (in the few cases which made comparison possible), they found no difference. In other words, fewer rural people are sent to institutions and more are treated at home. But their own figures reveal an unusually high rate of alcoholic psychoses among urban women; this is quite patently an effect of different urban mores. It is certainly not permissible to rely only on hospitalization cases, but there can be no doubt that urban conditions are causal to nervous diseases. Moreover, the sum of all home and hospital patients is still not the total of all mentally sick. A great number of neurotics can and do work, but they suffer and make others suffer. They are disorganized. But we have no means to find their number.

prestige and social standing are so rare that there is very little competition in this field.

But urban life is completely different. There is incessant competition: for jobs, for business orders, for customers, for patronage, for membership in clubs, for political office, for a better seat in a restaurant, for a ticket to a ball game, for honors in college, for athletic contests, in short, for everything. In many cases such competition is highly ridiculous and betrays nervous restlessness; but in many other instances success is vital for survival. Those who stress only the advantages of competition (which are indisputable), and demonstrate that competition leads to higher achievement and the selection of the best, forget that there are not only winners but also losers, who have to pay a heavy price for being less able. The latter sometimes lose their jobs or their business, often without hope of recovery, and they frequently break down. The city certainly breeds people who like to fight and who enjoy life as an endless series of competitions. However, the number of opportunities are much smaller than the number of competitors. The loser may blame his failure on himself and thereby develop an inferiority complex, or he may blame the situation or other persons, which would have other unpleasant effects; in either case the result is frustration, a major cause of mental disorders.

3. *Conflict* is a common sociological phenomenon; it occurs everywhere—within families, between families, among neighbors, and, to be sure, in rural as well as in urban areas. Farm conflicts are frequently bitter and protracted because the adversaries cannot move to another place, a convenient means of ending city quarrels. There are even typical farm conflicts such as trespassing, right-of-way and boundary disputes. But these conflicts are incidental and many a farmer has lived all his life peacefully. There are few contacts which are likely to lead to conflicts. Conversely, conflicts are inherent in city life with its daily numberless contacts, its competition, and its many economic, political, and social interests which are bound to clash. These conflicts result in court litigations, riots, crimes, loss of jobs and business opportunities, family tragedies, and lasting enmities. The conflict itself might be a symptom of mental derangement, for many of them are only actuated by the quarrelsome, aggressive characters of the persons involved. A single conflict might not be sufficient to cause a breakdown but some persons, often unwittingly, have the misfortune to be involved in a series of conflicts and they might lose in all of them. Conflicts which cause mental anguish can arise from all possible situations but they usually have their roots in personal antagonism and the inability to get along with others.

4. *Cultural diversity*. Urban America adds to mental problems because of its variety of subcultures, institutionalized attitudes, and contradictory sets of moral values. Cultural diversity tends to create tensions whenever there is no strict local separation, as, for instance, in Switzerland. Ironically, there

are indications that dangers to mental health increase with a lessening of group antagonisms. The possibility of surmounting a barrier—social, occupational, or economic—which was formerly impassable arouses expectations which do not always come true; the result is frequently frustration.

Cultural diversity endangers health if it causes adjustment problems. These primarily concern the newcomer, especially the immigrant. "Culture shock" is not caused by intrinsic cultural differences or by language difficulties; the latter have been anticipated and come as no surprise. The main difficulties stem from the necessity of adjusting to the many small details in which a foreign country deviates from accustomed institutions. The Englishman is irritated because he cannot get what he considers "decent" tea, and the German because he has to look for a store selling dark bread. The Sicilian is nettled because he has to take a sandwich for lunch rather than his customary full meal and he dislikes to have dinner two hours earlier than "at home." Immigrants become confused if they have to substitute American weights and measures for the familiar metric system; men dislike washing dishes or pushing perambulators. From morning until night the numerous details of daily living must be performed in new and unaccustomed ways requiring constant adjustments. Change of habits is irritating to most people.

Not as frequent, but more serious, are conflicts between cultural groups. If group antagonism cannot be held at a level which permits outwardly peaceful contacts, the results are riots or other disorders. Youth groups particularly feud with each other. These classes are bound to create intense anxiety, as well as extreme hostility, which may lead to juvenile delinquency or mental disturbances or both.

Cultural diversity creates "marginal men." The concept of the marginal man was developed by Park and further elaborated by Stonequist.[27] Park calls him a "cultural hybrid," which may be misleading since we are all cultural hybrids. He is rather a "transitional" man, an individual in the process of assimilation, changing from one culture to another. It is assumed that no person who has passed his teens can completely change from one cultural system to another. Although there are different degrees of assimilation, a marginal man will always retain some traits of his cultural past and will never acquire all traits of the new culture into which he has grown. This creates a number of problems. The marginal man may either have guilt feelings for having deserted his old group or he may hate everything for which that group stands; or his position may be ambivalent. He may also develop an inferiority complex if he becomes aware that his attempts to become a hundred-per-cent American fall short of his goal. These internal conflicts add to the tension. The marginal man may suffer from the hatred which the old group

[27] Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1928; Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man,* New York, 1937.

feels toward the "renegade" or from the rejection by the new group, which still considers him to be what he no longer is.

5. *Insecurity.* All these phenomena involve emotional insecurity. In its more popular meaning insecurity refers mainly to the economic situation. Economic insecurity in modern times is chiefly urban. It goes without saying that in a competitive society no one is economically secure, and the farmer who might have thought differently learned his lesson in the depression of the thirties. Owner-farmers as a group are reasonably sure that they can stay on their farms and can weather adverse times. Shelter and food will protect the family. In a great depression the government can stay the eviction of the farmers by decree, but it cannot prevent urban workers from losing their jobs and, in many instances, their homes. Before the crash in 1929, the problem was not so serious because Americans were optimistic, and, on the basis of their past experience, believed that even a severe crisis was a passing event, that business failures were only temporary, and that job opportunities were unlimited. After the shock of the economic catastrophe, Americans became pessimistic; they realized that the era of expansion had come to a standstill and that depressions were neither fortuitous nor ephemeral. Since then many Americans have been haunted by the specter of a crisis which they feel they cannot control. If they do not become neurotic for this reason, they may constantly fret, become irritable and "nervous," and, although they are not mentally ill, their resistance is weakened. They are potential neurotics.

6. *Isolation.* Isolated persons are rarely found in rural areas. The city, on the other hand, teems with single persons who are unable to make more than fleeting contacts and, in the last analysis, are without emotional ties. Some have become isolated by sheer misfortune: older persons who have survived all their relatives and friends; others are just strangers in strange cities where they find it difficult to make contacts. Some are isolated because they are unable to get along with people; they have quarreled with their families, their business associates, and their neighbors. Still others are ostracized because they have offended "society." Those who belong to a racial or cultural minority are in danger of isolation if they are rejected by the majority and do not find people of their own ilk, which happens only in smaller places. The absence of emotional ties and the failure to become integrated into a group always will have unpleasant effects. One of them is ecological: the tendency of isolated people to concentrate in the Zone in Transition, with all its undesirable concomitants. There can be no doubt that protracted isolation will create mental disorders and in extreme cases finally lead to suicide.

Suicide. Unless it is of the type which Durkheim [28] has called "altruistic," suicide also reveals a state of mental derangement. Suicide is a very complex

[28] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide,* Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

phenomenon in which various factors such as age, sex, physical health, family status, occupation, economic circumstances, moral values, and religion are involved, so no single cause can be held responsible. It is well established that Catholics show a much greater resistance against suicide than Protestants. The high percentage of Catholics might possibly explain why the largest cities in the United States have a lower suicide rate than some smaller cities with a larger Protestant population. On the whole, there is no doubt that rural suicide rates are much lower than in urban areas; with the exception of religion, all factors mentioned above tend to prevail in cities and to diminish in farm areas. Little detailed research has been done with respect to the American situation, but all authors agree on the preponderance of urban suicides.[29] That "a tendency has been noted for fast-growing cities to have a higher suicide rate" [30] is an indication that not only the more peaceful and less complicated rural life accounts for lower rates but that acceleration of the factors discussed above is destroying the mental health of the city population.

[29] Sorokin and Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, chap. 7; Ruth Cavan, *Suicide,* Chicago, 1928; and Austin L. Porterfield, "Indices of Suicides and Homicides by States and Cities: Some Southern–Non-Southern Contrasts with Implications for Research," *American Sociological Review,* August, 1949.

[30] *Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy,* National Resources Committee, Washington, 1937, p. 11.

Chapter 19

VICE, CRIME, AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Vice

Under the name of vice (a convenient rather than a scientific category) four phenomena, not necessarily connected with each other, will be discussed: drug addiction, alcoholism, prostitution, and gambling. A single aspect of each will be discussed: their propensity to disorganize individuals, families, and localities in an urban society. All other aspects, in particular the moral considerations, have no bearing on the study of urban pathology. Drug addiction and prostitution are typically urban phenomena and rural areas are normally free of them. Alcoholism, for reasons mentioned in Chapter 18, is predominantly urban in America, while in some other countries the peasants or farmers are as likely to commit alcoholic excesses as city people. Some problems are international: prostitution and drug addiction are the scourge of all "advanced societies." Alcoholism is less universal; the Mohammedan world and the rest of Asia apparently suffer less from it than the West. Gambling, as a mass phenomenon affecting all urban classes, seems to be more of a problem in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States than elsewhere.

Drug Addiction. Drugs are widely used by primitive peoples both as sedatives and stimulants; they are not the invention of modern degenerates, who may be described as reverting to an earlier stage. Modern medicine has developed synthetic drugs as painkillers. These chemical drugs can be manufactured by rather simple means and without great technical knowledge, thus facilitating illegal production. There are four main groups which are victims of drugs: (1) patients who by continual use have become addicts; (2) certain underworld types (prostitutes, procurers, professional gamblers, and dope peddlers) for whom the drug is an escape from conditions which they despise; (3) the drug addicts of "society," an assortment of playboys, "high-class kept women," blasés of either sex, mostly women hungry for sensation, but also stranded artists, Bohemians, and the like; and (4) teen-agers who are persuaded by professional dope peddlers and similar irresponsible persons, and who start from sheer bravado, expecting some alluring adventure, but quickly acquire the habit. Of these, groups (2) and (3) take drugs

because they already are victims of social disorganization, while groups (1) and (4) become personally disorganized by taking drugs. The latter are in greater need of protection. The drug addict, unless treated in a very early stage, is, as a rule, a hopeless case, which makes the habit so serious a problem. The number of afflicted persons is unknown. James May[1] in 1922 estimated that there were more than a million addicts. The figure seems too high; it corresponds to approximately 777 per 100,000 population, while syphilis, probably more widely spread, had only a rate of 234.5.[2] In 1946 the rate of persons admitted to hospitals for permanent psychiatric care was only 622 for individuals with psychosis "due to drugs and other exogenous poisons" and 957 for drug addiction without psychosis.[3] These persons, to be sure, are merely a fraction of all addicts, but it appears unlikely that only a tiny percentage deteriorates to the point where they have to be institutionalized. Most drug addicts become physical and mental wrecks. As dope peddling is an extremely lucrative business, social and personal disorganization is not limited to the victims. The profiteers, who often have large organizations (manufacturers, smugglers, wholesale distributors, and retail peddlers), exercise a disorganizing influence over all those who are actively or passively connected with the habit. The phenomenon is undoubtedly solely an urban form of disorganization. The dope peddler must remain anonymous and inconspicuous. His appearance in a farm area would be observed and would lead to his arrest. Moreover, scattered customers who have to be visited are no attraction for this kind of business. Reliable data, however, on the spatial distribution of drug addicts are not available. Within the city, addicts tend to concentrate in areas of transition. Coping with the problem is very difficult. Addicts protect their sources of supply; peddlers protect their bosses. If science ever develops innocent drugs with the same sedative effects so doctors will no longer have to prescribe toxic remedies, the problem will be partially solved. If it were possible to institutionalize all addicts, the illicit drug traffic would cease, at least temporarily, for lack of customers. It has long been realized that the problem is international in character; some of the largest organizations operate from countries where there is little control. A series of international treaties have been concluded and partial successes have been scored.

Alcoholism. Alcoholism is similar to drug addiction in that it is either the cause or the effect of mental disorders. Unlike drug addicts, chronic alcoholics have a good chance of being rehabilitated and the effects of alcoholic intoxication are not always as destructive as drug effects. On the other hand, alcoholism has many more victims. It has been pointed out that in the United States alcoholism is preponderantly urban. In addition to reasons dis-

[1] James May, *Mental Diseases,* Boston, 1922.

[2] Elliott and Merrill, *Social Disorganization,* 3d ed., New York, 1950, p. 171.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 276.

cussed in Chapter 18, the particular spatial arrangement in rural America discourages "social" drinking. European peasants and farmers live in villages with the inn right in the center.[4] The American farmer, living on his isolated homestead, neither passes a drinking place on his way home nor finds one within easy reach after working hours. The rural-urban difference is not only one of mores but also of opportunity.

It is apparent that alcoholism as a mass phenomenon can exist only if drinking is in some way institutionalized. This is indeed the case in our society. Western civilization is the only higher developed culture which stresses the value of alcohol. The three ancient civilizations from which the West inherited so many of its main features, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman, were all opposed to alcoholic excesses; these people drank regularly but moderately. The Moslem civilization is abstemious on religious grounds. The great civilizations of the East have their own intoxicating drinks, but excesses do not seem to reach large dimensions (Buddha, like Mohammed, tabooed alcohol). In the West, Charlemagne tried to outlaw alcoholic drinks but with as little success as in many later attempts. The temperance movement, which can be understood only as a reaction, is of very recent date. The positive evaluation of drinking is evidenced by the use of alcoholic beverages for toasts, at all official occasions (christening of ships with champagne), and, above all, in poetry. Drinking songs have been written by Greeks, Romans, and Chinese, but only occasionally. Western poets have not only produced a much larger volume of drinking songs but they extol drunkenness. This reflects the evaluation of society. A person anxious to keep his social prestige will readily admit that he has been "tight"; but few will volunteer that they are teetotalers, unless they abstain on religious grounds. In brief, drinking is an institution, alcohol has a positive value, and excesses are to a large extent excused. Opposition to drinking comes from four quarters: (1) religious objections, almost exclusively limited to certain Protestant denominations; (2) irate housewives, largely unorganized, who suffer from the intemperance of their husbands; (3) a very small group who hold that alcohol, even in small doses, is detrimental to health, made up largely of doctrinaires, hypochondriacs, and cranks; and (4) athletes, whose performances are hampered by alcohol. As noted, the problem is specifically urban only in America and for reasons which have little to do with habitat. However, urban ways of drinking show distinct differentiation along class lines. The upper classes and their imitators drink because it is "the right thing to do." The middle-class businessman, particularly the salesman, drinks in carrying out his business, a peculiarly American urban custom. The lower classes drink because they like the atmosphere of the saloon, because alcohol is the only luxury accessible to them, and because it is customary. The

[4] The British farmer, even if he lives outside a settlement, is always close to the pub; some make it a habit to drop in regularly every day.

white-collar worker, on the other hand, represents the most temperate group; consumption of alcohol is too great a financial strain.

However, the institutional aspects of urban drinking must not be exaggerated. No other country has so many adult urban males who regularly drink milk rather than alcohol. Also, contrary to continental European customs, restaurants do not expect their patrons to take wine or beer with their meals; many do not even have a liquor license. Drinking is therefore not universal in urban America, but among those who do drink, excesses are frequent, so frequent that we are entitled to speak of a mass phenomenon. The disorganizing effects of excessive drinking are well known: disruption of the family, economic ruin, physical and mental disorders ranging from slight indispositions and mild neuroses to insanity and fatal diseases. From this point of view there is no objection against either occasional or even regular drinking; the danger lies with the chronic alcoholic. It has been estimated that 3,000,000 Americans, of whom 400,000 are women, drink to excess and are in peril. Some 750,000 are chronic alcoholics who are either physically ill or mentally deranged or both.[5] No breakdown into rural and urban figures is given.

The fight against drinking excesses has not been too successful. Neither teaching nor preaching reaches those who need reform. Legal prohibition proved to be a disaster rather than a remedy. Some have recommended prohibitively high taxes on liquor. The results are not encouraging. The masses turn from more expensive brands to cheaper products, which are often more intoxicating. Very high taxes promote illicit production of the most potent liquors, brandy and whisky. In some regions such as the mountainous areas of Kentucky and Tennessee the unlicensed stills are traditionally considered as legitimate, and "moonshining" is regarded as a sport rather than an offense. The Russians have made the production of liquor a public monopoly. Their lack of success in fighting alcoholism indicates that we can hardly hope to succeed by a similar device. The system of licensing package stores and drinking places has been an utter failure. The most hopeful sign, however, is the increase in sports activities, which necessarily reduces the consumption of alcohol.

Prostitution. Although some forms of sexual venality are found among primitives, prostitution is an urban phenomenon. The city has the doubtful distinction of having a monopoly in prostitution. This, however, means only that there is an ecological connection between the city and prostitution. It does not imply that prostitutes do not come from farms or that they have only urban customers. But only the city provides sufficient patrons to make prostitution a profitable occupation. Only the city provides the anonymity which men want even more than does the prostitute. Where prostitution

[5] E. M. Jellinek, "The Problems of Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 1945, quoted by Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

is a punishable offense, the city makes it possible to work "under cover"; clandestine prostitution is an even greater problem.

Within the city prostitution concentrates mainly in the area of transition. Prostitutes work close to the amusement center, where the greatest number of potential customers are to be found. They live there because the residents of the area, all kinds of disorganized persons, offer no objections. Houses of prostitution are also found at the periphery of the city and beyond the city limits and its police jurisdiction (roadhouses). This is what Reckless [6] calls the "geographical isolation of vice." As he points out, prostitution is not limited to the amusement area, the Zone in Transition, and the circumference. There is some prostitution in the high-class apartment zone, catering to persons who are willing to pay high prices; conversely, there are prostitutes in the slums and cheap rooming-house zones for the poor. The latter represent the most repulsive, pitiable, and perilous forms of prostitution. These women are mostly aging, worn-out, mentally and physically diseased, and beyond hope of rehabilitation. Since they carry on in residential sections, they corrupt the neighborhood and are a danger to teen-agers.

The objections against prostitution are obvious. It is the most frequent reason for the spread of venereal diseases. The prostitute is a disorganized person who finally becomes a public burden, a patient in a hospital, an inmate of a mental or an old-age institution, or a prisoner in jail. Rejected by society, she associates by sheer necessity with dope peddlers, fences, thieves, and gangsters. She creates opportunities for professions still more objectionable than her own: procurers, white-slave traders, and owners of houses of ill repute. Under present conditions she is a source of civic corruption. If prostitutes have children, which happens frequently, they deprive them of normal family life or they endanger their future in other ways.

In the United States, after several experiments with toleration had failed, prostitution became a punishable offense. Nevertheless, it is still rampant. Estimates of the extent of prostitution vary considerably. According to a study undertaken by the U.S. Department of Justice, the number of prostitutes shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War amounted to 200,000, of whom one-half were inmates of houses of prostitution.[7] Reitman,[8] examining the situation between the two world wars in Chicago, maintained that that city alone had at least 100,000 prostitutes. If that figure is correct, and other urban places in America had a proportional share, the total number would amount to 1,700,000, which is certainly too high.

Certain comparisons and conclusions can be derived from a recent study made by the police in Vienna.[9] The city exerts an incomplete but rather

[6] Walter C. Reckless, "The Distribution of Commercialized Vice in the City," in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community,* p. 193.

[7] Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.,* p. 156.

[8] Ben Reitman, *The Second Oldest Profession,* New York, 1931.

[9] Official report issued by the police of Vienna, 1951.

effective control by issuing permits. No license is given to married women, which is probably responsible for some clandestine prostitution. There is no doubt that the police are incorruptible and that the data are reasonably accurate. As a world city, Vienna obviously has proportionately more prostitutes than a smaller urban place. Moreover, the situation has deteriorated because of the moral contamination of a prewar totalitarian rule with cynical views about sex, to the war and postwar misery, which always causes an increase in prostitution, and to the still continuing military occupation by four powers, which has the same effect. If anything, the number of prostitutes in Vienna ought to be higher than in an American city of comparable size. In October, 1951, there were 577 licensed prostitutes in Vienna. The number of clandestine prostitutes, according to the police estimate, lies between 600 and 700, bringing the total up to a maximum of 1,277. Vienna has a population of 1,750,000; the total urban population of the United States was somewhat less than 96,028,000 in 1950 (including more than 6,000,000 living in places of 2,500 to 5,000 population which have little or no prostitution). On a strictly proportional basis there would be a total of approximately 75,000 prostitutes in America. There are a variety of factors which speak either for a higher or for a lower American rate but they presumably cancel out each other. Since there are reasons to believe that prostitution has declined since the afore-mentioned study by the Department of Justice was made, we might assume that the real figure lies somewhere between 75,000 and 100,000.

It is widely believed that prostitution is on the decrease. Paul M. Kinsie and Wilbur Hallenbeck [10] think that it has increased since the end of the Second World War. Elliott and Merrill [11] concur, although they concede a general decline over a longer period. In Vienna the decline is not only demonstrable but extremely sharp. The figures (for controlled prostitutes only) are as follows: [12]

Year	*Number of prostitutes*
1861	1,437
1873	1,546
1914	1,879
1926	1,030
1927	985
1928	927
1929	826
1931	810
1936	813
1937	846
1938	623
1951	577

[10] Wilbur Hallenbeck, *American Urban Communities,* New York, 1951, p. 369.

[11] *Op. cit.,* pp. 165 ff.

[12] The population of Vienna rose constantly from 1861 to 1918, when it began to decrease.

Gist and Halbert [13] attribute the decline in part to a change in the social status of the prostitute from "outside the pale of respectable society" to partial acceptance. Queen and Thomas [14] also speak of the narrowing gulf between prostitutes and other women. This is a debatable proposition.

Prostitutes consist partly of subintelligent, even feeble-minded women, partly of those who, for one reason or another, have revolted against their families or society in general. The once widely held belief that poverty creates prostitutes has long been proved to be a half-truth. That belief, immortalized by Dostoevski's *Crime and Punishment,* has its only basis in the fact that rich women are not in need of pecuniary compensation. The inability of the Russians to abolish streetwalking is sufficient evidence that opportunity to work (which the Soviets provide) is not enough to abolish prostitution.[15] Of the 568 Viennese prostitutes who answered the police questionnaire, only 219 maintained that they chose their profession because of poor economic condition; 188 frankly ascribed the choice to their "levity" and 56 to "constitution." In fact, the prostitute is, as a rule, already disorganized before she enters her career and, in most cases, cannot change without proper treatment. The main reason for prostitution, however, is not the woman but her customers on whom she is economically dependent. Our own urban society is perhaps more prone to perpetuate prostitution than any other system. Any higher civilization taxes sexual self-discipline because of the long time gap between reaching physical maturity and marriage. In primitive societies sexual maturity and the first sex experience frequently coincide. The delay in sex experience is a necessary prerequisite for higher civilizations characterized by a marked length of time between the moment in which a person attains physical maturity and the moment in which a person is psychologically fit for sex relations.[16] But modern urban society extends the gap beyond the stage of psychological maturity until the time when the male is able to marry and support a family. This causes a strain which many are unable to bear.

Our own society officially recognizes only marital sex relations as legitimate. But since medieval times another unofficial standard has been in operation although never practiced by the totality of the population. According to this standard, the male was granted extramarital prerogatives while the female was supposed, sometimes under the penalty of death, to obey the official rules. Prostitution was the inevitable result. However, there were clear class distinctions. The peasants stuck to their pre-Christian sex customs which were, although not frivolous, rather liberal. Moreover, they married at a very early

[13] Gist and Halbert, *Urban Society,* pp. 167, 355.

[14] Queen and Thomas, *The City,* p. 434.

[15] This is reported by many who have been to Russia; see also Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.,* p. 167.

[16] It seems self-evident that it would be not only a moral but a cultural catastrophe if it were "normal" in our society that a girl should have her first sex experience at the age of fourteen. In fact, such early sex experiences often create prostitutes.

age. The aristocracy treated the official standards with open contempt, their courts and palaces teemed with mistresses. The urban lower classes also tended to disregard conventions. Before the advent of birth control, both groups contributed a great deal to the extent of illegitimacy. Only the urban middle classes took the code seriously—as far as their women were concerned.[17] Some of the males complied but some patronized prostitutes.

In modern times the number of customers has been increased by more permanent bachelors, by rising numbers of divorced men, and, in America, by the extreme mobility of commercial travelers. This seems to point to an increase in prostitution but the trend is actually in the opposite direction. The explanation lies in several factors. Because of a change in our economic evaluations, it is no longer necessary for a man to postpone his marriage until he has a firmly established position. Urban people now marry at an earlier age. Divorce is no longer regarded as a social disgrace and divorced men no longer find it difficult to remarry. However, the most important factor is the apparent disappearance of the double standard for males and females. This again is due to various changes. It probably mirrors the partial disintegration of the middle classes. It also signifies a general change in sex attitudes. It is facilitated by the economic independence of women and the availability of contraceptives. At any rate, sex relations between reputable women and men are increasing. This does not necessarily imply an increase in promiscuity.[18] What is going on is an increase in extramarital relationships, which are frequently premarital relationships. They are more or less permanent and are quite often as monogamous as those in wedlock. Whatever our personal opinion about the development may be, it is no passing fashion and it certainly has an adverse effect on prostitution.

Gambling. Of all the "vice" types, gambling is the most universal and least connected with the urban way of life. It is also entirely innocuous unless it becomes an obsession. It is common to all societies, primitive or advanced, all historical periods, and all classes. It is officially promoted by some countries; the principality of Monaco lives on it and so does, partly, the state of Nevada. It seems that it had never been tabooed before Puritans and fundamentalists put a stern ban on it. Again we find that America is the scene of strange contrasts. There are large groups to whom a game of bridge without stakes is an abomination and others who spend their whole spare time

[17] There are some other exceptions. The code is seemingly still obeyed in rural Ireland, French Canada, and Greece.

[18] There are indeed many symptoms indicating stricter sex mores. Leading families no longer display the rather generous sex attitudes which were so common in the days of Washington and Franklin. The levity of Southern plantation life has gone. The decline in illegitimacy cannot be entirely explained by effective birth control. The promiscuous mores, so apparent in Elizabethan times in Shakespeare's plays, or of the Restoration period in the works of Wycherley, are no longer treated in a humorous matter-of-course way. The custom of bundling has disappeared. Other examples could be added.

(and sometimes more) playing the most senseless games of chance. While in Reno roulette (which is forbidden nearly everywhere) is openly played by thousands, so harmless an entertainment as bingo is legally barred in other states. Every culture and country has its own special types of gambling but America seems to have the largest variety. There is also a large variation as to the legality of gambling. New York, for instance, forbids bingo but pari-mutuel bets on horses are permitted.

There are two main aspects of gambling. One is personal disorganization, which has no bearing on our special topics since it occurs at random regardless of area. The farmer is threatened with it no less than the urbanite. The second problem concerns the connection between gambling and racketeering, essentially an urban problem. Professional gambling, if efficiently organized, is immensely lucrative. Estimates of the income derived from gambling are largely guesswork, but all agree that those who are in control earn millions. The amount of money which changes hands has been estimated at 20 billion dollars a year, which is, in all probability, grossly exaggerated. But assuming an average per capita expenditure of $20 a year, which seems conservative,[19] we arrive at a figure of 3 billion dollars, which is about as much as the combined expenditures of the states of California, New York, and Pennsylvania. There are three principal types of racketeering connected with gambling: the numbers or policy racket, slot and pinball machines, and bookmaking. It is not quite clear why these forms of gambling have such disastrous effects in America. Machines are very popular in Great Britain and France, though little used in other countries, but they only serve as a childish amusement. The policy game is hardly known elsewhere, at least not as a mass obsession, and bookmakers operate in other countries without criminal affiliations. In America groups of gangsters control these forms of gambling in many cities and the racket is combined with a series of other criminal enterprises. What is worse is the corruption of the police, and what is still worse is the domination of some important urban places by the underworld. The ignominious history of Tammany Hall is largely connected with the political power of gambling kings. The situation in Chicago, Kansas City, and other places has been similar. Gangsters select candidates for mayor and, through him, appoint judges, police chiefs, and control patronage in general. Although many of the old machines which once ran the cities have been eliminated, the political power of organized gambling is still strong.

A variety of remedies has been proposed. The main fault lies, of course, with the population. Without patrons, the racket would automatically disappear. There is little hope of a change in that direction. Legal bans have only a weak effect. Victims protect those who rob them; occasional arrests lead to the conviction of small fry but legally sufficient evidence against ringleaders

[19] Even children spend some dollars playing machines.

is hard to obtain. Trapping them for income-tax evasion has worked in only a few instances.

The problem is undoubtedly aggravated by the adamant attitude of powerful groups against any form of legalized gambling. As in the case of drinking, many do not believe that gambling as such, in a moderate way, is sinister and evil. Betting on horses is legal in most countries and has no observable detrimental effects. In Great Britain the bookmaker is a licensed businessman. We are entitled to believe that a person ought not to make a living by taking bets on horses, but obviously it is preferable to have honest bookmakers than criminal ones. Changes in the organization of municipal government would also help in diminishing the control of organized gambling. City managers, merit systems in police departments, and more modern methods in the appointment of judges would bring improvements.

Crime

Crime is as old as mankind. Adam and Eve were the first to break the law and Cain was the first murderer. No society and no group is exempt from crime. Neither is crime necessarily an urban phenomenon. On the contrary, small urban places, with their strict social controls and puritanical standards, probably are more free from crime than any other community. Peasants are sometimes inclined to acts of violence, much more so than timid urban middle-class members. Some types of crime are typically and exclusively rural, for instance, cattle rustling. In former times even organized crime was rampant in rural areas where it was easy to escape or to hide in forests and mountains. All famous highwaymen, glorified by legend and folklore, lived in the country like Robin Hood. In the American past Jesse James and others operated in rural areas and, if we can believe our western stories, the bad men still roam the wide, open spaces.

Crime in Modern Cities. However, there is no doubt that the scene has shifted to the cities which now provide better hide-outs and more opportunity. Every larger city has its ecological crime area; the habitual criminals live mostly in blighted areas, in the Zone in Transition, and in some of the poorest quarters. They work in the business districts and the better apartment house areas. This applies to the ordinary type of crimes: housebreaking, hold-ups, and pickpocketing. There are also special types: some in port cities operate at piers. Blackmailers live everywhere; leading gangsters reside in the best sections.

The great amount of crime in modern urban centers reflects the inability of the urban community to integrate all its members and to control those who resist integration. Crime and city are thus causally connected. There are several types of lawbreakers. Some are of little interest for our topic. Sex criminals, if they can be properly classified as criminals, are hardly connected

with the urban way of life. Assault and battery, if they are only the expression of extreme aggressiveness, have their origin in human nature rather than in urban environment. But there are criminal groups which are, at least in modern times, characteristically urban. The city harbors certain groups which, in their entirety and not as scattered individuals, reject the established value system.

The existence of such groups has been explained by their extreme poverty, but this is not quite accurate. Poverty could explain crimes against property but not acts of violence which also are frequent. Moreover, the majority of the poor never commit crimes and occasional conflicts with the law are not followed by second offenses. Inasmuch as there are connections between poverty and crime, the deviations from the recognized value system come partly as a protest against a society which fails to provide a proper share for the underprivileged. Crime also stems from the great contrast between rich and poor in the city, from ecological segregation which facilitates the formation of local groups with similar values, and from the opportunity of committing an offense and escaping the consequences. Finally, these groups do not fully share the values of an established society because they live only at the fringe. They are in some sense marginal people. They are rejected by society, or not fully accepted; lacking full integration, they never acquire the values which a society transmits through formal and informal education to all its full-fledged members.

There is another much more dangerous group, that representing organized crime. This group, too, rejects the established value system, and has chosen crime as an occupation which is carried out like ordinary business on a year-round, day-by-day, basis. These "crime concerns" are well organized; they have their executives, their specialists, their staffs, even their doctors and lawyers. They compete with each other or band together, as the case may be; they divide their territories, they specialize in divers fields such as traffic in narcotics, numbers rackets, counterfeiting, and so on. There are several reasons for the frequency of these gangs in American cities. One of them is certainly the former indiscriminate admittance of immigrants with a doubtful background. Many came from countries where secret societies were institutional; some of these societies were engaged in a queer mixture of political and criminal activities (Camorra, maffia, and Black Hand). In at least one instance we have succeeded in wiping out vestiges of the past. The Chinatowns were once rampant with crime, feuding secret societies, and opium rackets. The secret societies are gone and the Chinese are now among the most law-abiding citizens. The small number of Chinese, the ease with which they could be identified, the smallness of their natural areas, and their insignificance as voters or vote getters facilitated the cleanup. In most European cities organized crime is limited to the largest ones; gangs operate on a much smaller scale and police cooperation with crime is nonexistent. London

is a striking example of a world city with an extremely low crime rate and a minimum of organized gangsterism.

Coping with the crime problem is the task not only of the city, which can contribute only by setting up a clean administration and maintaining an efficient police force. As long as cities have no right to ban undesirable individuals they will be hampered. Effective combating of crime requires more uniformity of procedures among states and a revamping of our prescientific penal system, more modern judges, more intelligent juries, more and better trained parole officers, and more rehabilitation specialists. The greatest handicap is the apathy of the public and resistance to modern scientific methods. What can be done has been demonstrated in Sweden, where some prisons had to be closed for lack of inmates.

Juvenile Delinquency. This is a very complex phenomenon. Heredity, family conditions, neighborhoods, bad companions, poor housing, lack of recreational facilities, poverty, and a host of psychological factors have been held responsible. In almost any case it is a combination of several causes. Juvenile delinquents come from rich and poor families; some have had strict, some lenient, upbringing; some are overprotected, some neglected; some are feeble-minded, some very intelligent; some are brought up on farms, some in cities. The statistical data need to be cautiously interpreted. They are heavily weighted against the poor, Negroes, and immigrants. Statistics show only the number of court convictions or police arrests, which do not account for all actual cases.[20] Several states treat certain acts as offenses but in other states these are left to disciplinary measures by parents. The number of cases is greatly increased by offenses which adults cannot commit and which laymen do not consider as delinquency, such as truancy, running away, being ungovernable, or acts of mischief; the latter are often nothing else than obnoxious behavior common to most children. Some states (California, Iowa, and Arkansas) extend the age of juvenile delinquents to twenty-one, others only to sixteen, and there seems to be no lower limit; in 1945 the age of 4,172 juvenile "delinquents" tried before 374 courts was under ten.[21]

Under these conditions comparisons between country and city cannot be made with accuracy. Unless we succeed in assembling a sizable number of cases in which, clearly and unequivocally, neither adolescence nor personal characteristics and experiences, but local environment is the main and decisive reason for delinquent behavior, we cannot come to a definite conclusion, al-

[20] A study conducted in Massachusetts brought out the great number of unreported cases which consequently escape the attention of the statistician. Of 6,416 offenses admitted by boys, 6,321 remained unreported (Fred M. Murphy, Mary M. Shirley, and Helen L. Witman, "The Incidence of Hidden Delinquency," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,* October, 1946; see also Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.,* p. 74).

[21] Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.,* p. 69. In many countries offenders below fourteen are not classified as delinquents and are subject only to various forms of treatment.

though the available evidence suggests that the city as such is a disruptive force. However, within the urban area the pioneer work of Clifford Shaw [22] and his collaborators has provided us with ample material in regard to the spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency. They found, in conformity with the general character of deteriorated areas, that juvenile delinquency decreases with the distance from the center (including the amusement area and the adjacent transitional zone and its slums), and that areas with high rates of adult crime show also high rates of juvenile offenses and vice versa. We have, to be sure, to make certain allowances. The two serious offenses most frequently committed by juveniles are theft (boys) and sex offenses (girls). Children from better homes are less likely to be arrested on either count. If a boy from a better family has stolen apples from the grocer—a favorite pastime of youngsters—the family will pay and the grocer will not tell the police lest he should lose a good customer. The grocer catching a boy from a family which has run up a debt which they cannot hope to repay will have no qualms in calling a policeman.

It is granted that many considerations warn us against taking the figures and their spatial distribution at face value; nevertheless, the extremely high incidence of sex offenses cannot be disputed. Their higher rate in substandard areas is not difficult to explain. Poor housing, lack of recreational facilities, broken homes, and bad family conditions drive girls into the streets. There are many other factors, too, but those just mentioned are definitely urban and, within the city, concomitants of life in slums and blighted areas.

In focusing on juvenile delinquency as an urban phenomenon we have to pay special attention to the juvenile gang. We have long ceased to regard the gang as an aberration, a pathological association found only in slums. The gang, far from being pathological, is rather a symptom of "normality" if we conceive as normal an event which will take place unless extraordinary conditions interfere. Nor is the gang necessarily, or even ordinarily, engaged in undesirable activities.

Man goes through three stages of basic associations, unmistakably related to age. They are fairly universal so we may assume that they depend less on variable social institutions than on psychological evolution. In childhood the basic group is the "family of orientation," which, for the preschool child, is almost the exclusive unit. In adulthood it is the "family of procreation," the community of husband and wife, parents and children, which is the center of human life. Between the two stages, in adolescence, the young person is outgrowing his dependency on the family of orientation and is not yet prepared for a family of procreation. Relationships to the other sex have not reached the importance which they gain later on. The younger adolescent prefers the company of his own sex and, with reasonable exceptions, the com-

[22] Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas,* Chicago, 1929; Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas,* Chicago, 1942.

pany of many to the company of one. Hence, the formation of youth groups serves elementary psychological needs in the stage between childhood and adulthood. Primitive groups recognize the need by institutionalizing associations of young people; in many instances male adolescents are removed from the parental home and live together in bachelors' houses. In our own civilization the situation is more obscure because other factors interfere. On farms adolescents are needed and they have to work after school hours; the scattered type of settlement makes it difficult to meet other youngsters after dinner. There is more supervision and less opportunity, which explains the virtual absence of youth gangs in rural areas. There is much more opportunity to associate with larger groups in cities. These can be called gangs if the term is used without any derogatory implication. Such age-youth groups are, for instance, college fraternities which, indeed, sometimes engage in what is indulgently called horseplay, but differs little from what youngsters in some ordinary gangs do.[23] The psychological need for such groups has been recognized by setting up special summer camps, by organizing church groups of young people, by founding special age-youth associations such as boys' clubs, the Camp Fire Girls of America, and so on. The weak spot is the situation with the lower classes. Education ends just when adolescence reaches its most passionate and perturbing stage. Permanent or full-time employment is more often than not a disadvantage because the youngsters have some money to spend. Housework and employment still leave them leisure time after dinner. Staying home is not attractive; recreation facilities are insufficient. The street corner is the given meeting place in the neighborhoods of the poor. There are certainly many gangs which are nothing more than informal neighborhood associations. The so-called "cellar clubs" are examples of legitimate organizations of young people from poor sections. Delinquent gangs, frequent as they may be in larger cities, are rather exceptional. As such, they represent a pathological variety of an otherwise "normal" phenomenon, but they confront us with a serious problem which is urban in character and, as such, ecologically located in areas of deterioration.

The existence of delinquent gangs is a very serious threat not only because of the offenses they commit but, much more so, because they serve as training schools for adult criminals and because they make the successful integration of many young people into the community difficult or impossible. If we accept the view that the formation of gangs is both normal and inevitable, the treatment of this social cancer cannot aim at the extinction of gangs. The gang must be prevented from becoming delinquent. The main problem

[23] An old favorite student prank is the removal of street signs. Harvard regulations still forbid students "to display in their rooms signs which obviously were taken from streets without permission." The same thing, done by a street gang, will land its members in court and will be listed as an "act of mischief," swelling the figures on juvenile delinquency.

is to control the gangs without trying to run them. Delinquent gangs are less numerous and less destructive in other countries, so there is good reason to believe that substantial progress toward the solution of organized delinquent youth groups can be made.

Political Corruption

Portrait of a Boss. America's most notorious boss, William Marcy Tweed, son of a chairmaker of Scottish ancestry, was born in New York on April 3, 1823. He had almost no formal education, save one year in a private school where he learned bookkeeping which, later on, he used to the detriment of the city. His father acquired an interest in a firm which manufactured brushes and the son worked for a while with the firm before he decided that politics was a more lucrative business. He married the daughter of his boss, became the father of eight children, and seems to have been a good husband and father. At the age of twenty-nine he was elected alderman of the New York City Council. In his twenty years of political activity he was at various times United States Representative, member of the New York Board of Supervisors (ironically, an institution created to check corruption at elections), school commissioner, state senator, and deputy commissioner of public works. He won popularity by fighting corruption, or rather by fighting the corrupt administration of Mayor Fernando Wood. He formed the "Tweed Ring," which also consisted of A. Oakey Hall, Peter B. Sweeny, and Richard B. Connolly. Hall became mayor in 1869. The years from 1869 to 1871 mark the summit of the fraudulent activities of the group commonly known in New York as "The Forty Thieves." Their crimes were many and varied. They consisted of plain thefts, fraud, accepting bribes, extortions and blackmail, and illegal use of their influence. Tweed, although devoid of any legal knowledge, opened a law office, which served only as a pretext for "clients" who wanted tax reductions, jobs, or business orders from the city. He bought a printing concern which not only got a monopoly on all printing orders for the city but forced others who depended in any way on Tweed's influence to become customers, for instance, the Erie Railroad. In 1869 the Tweed Ring held a session in Albany. They decided that "all bills thereafter rendered against this city must be one-half fraudulent. Later the proportion was raised to 85 per cent." [24] How much the ring really stole, extorted, or got by other criminal acts has never been determined. The estimates run up to 200 million dollars, of which probably at least 40 million were directly stolen or defrauded. Although crimes of such magnitude could not be committed in secrecy, Tweed was able to deceive such outstanding persons of great sincerity as Peter Cooper and Horace Greeley. Tweed is described as an amicable and generous man, which gives a clue for the success

[24] Albin F. Harlow, "Tweed," in *Dictionary of American Bibliography.*

of bossism. However, many realized the criminal nature of his activities and began to fight against the ring and Tammany Hall, of which Tweed had become the leader. The press fight was led by *Harper's Weekly,* which printed the now-famous cartoons by Thomas Nast, a German immigrant, and by the *New York Times,* then owned by George Jones. In a chapter on corruption it is only fitting to point out that not everyone is dishonest. Tweed offered Nast $500,000 (at that time a still greater fortune than today) if the caricaturist would stop his campaign. Nast refused bluntly. We gain another insight into the mechanics of bossism by recalling an anecdote related to this unsuccessful attempt. When Tweed was asked why he tried to bribe Nast, but at that time did nothing to stop the editorials which attacked him, he replied: "My voters cannot read but they can see." But Tweed changed his attitude when the *New York Times* obtained legally unattackable evidence of his crimes. Tweed offered Jones 5 million dollars for the suppression of the damaging material, but, like Nast, Jones refused. The authorities were forced to prosecute. Hall, Sweeny, and Connolly fled and were never brought to justice. Tweed was tried; his popularity or his influence was so strong that the jury disagreed. In a second trial he was found guilty and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Unbelievable as it seems, the Court of Appeals reduced the sentence to one year, but Tweed, who by then had lost his fortune, was jailed again for debts. His prison term appears to have been a farce since he was permitted to leave jail at his pleasure to see his family. He did not return from one visit but fled to Spain, where he was arrested and sent back to the United States, and a short time later he died in prison. The Tweed Ring died with him but not Tammany Hall, which continued to furnish New York City with bosses until 1934, when for twelve years the "fusion" administration led by Fiorello La Guardia replaced Tammany rule. Today Tammany Hall, though greatly weakened and free from outright criminals, is far from dead.

Neither Tweed nor Tammany Hall is an isolated phenomenon; the boss has ruled and ruined many a city and brought still more cities to the verge of disaster: Boston and Cambridge, Philadelphia, Chicago, Kansas City, and Memphis are familiar examples. Not every boss is a criminal and many have managed to remain on the right side of the law, but all have corrupted municipal administration, promoted incompetent government, cost the taxpayers untold millions, prevented or delayed necessary reforms, and brought ill repute to the cities of the United States. We have to account for an occurrence which is almost unique in its dimensions and its ability to survive the most adverse conditions.

Organized Corruption and Its Causes. Several explanations have been offered. Hermens [25] considers political machines as something like a historical whim, due to merely fortuitous circumstances. As he points out, there were

[25] F. A. Hermens, "Exit the Boss," *The Review of Politics,* October, 1940.

no political machines in the first decades after the Declaration of Independence, they have never existed in all American cities, they do not seem to be a necessity in other countries, and, as historical conditions change, they are now on their way out. The boss is thus a special product of certain American urban places. Without denying that chance is a factor in history, it appears to be more than doubtful that bossism came into being by accident. It is hard to believe that the same combinations of accidents occurred again and again, withstood all onslaughts, recovered from many setbacks, and afflicted cities so different in type as Boston and Memphis.

The opposite view is taken by Queen and Thomas,[26] who, in accordance with L. Stephens, believe that corruption is a phenomenon which can be found everywhere. They hold that municipal government in great cities "is perhaps no worse than county government in rural areas. . . . It is impossible, even now, to say definitely that the practices of city officials and employees are more to be condemned than those of many people of the business world, that municipal government is less effective and less honest than that of our rural sections." It is, to be sure, true that crimes are committed everywhere; however, it is not the occasional occurrence of isolated crimes, but the existence of organizations for the exploitation of cities and their support by large numbers of voters which, if it exists at all, is exceptional in rural areas and needs an explanation.

Various totalitarian propagandists declared bossism to be simply a product of degenerate democracy. We can dispose of their argument without lengthy discussion. Several brands of totalitarianism have produced much more corruption; their leaders became rich overnight, set up political machines which could not be defeated in elections, and created bosses who could not be sent to prison as long as the totalitarian regime lasted. In the pre-Victorian, nondemocratic era of Great Britain civic corruption was rampant; after democratization had taken place, corruption disappeared and British administration became a model for the entire world. Niles Carpenter,[27] who defends democracy against similar attacks, gives several striking examples of corruption in nondemocratic communities. He regards the prime reason for corruption as being the faulty selection of city administrators who "are not particularly well-endowed as to either brains or conscience. If they blunder and bully and embezzle, they do no more than most men with their limitations would do in the same situation." The problem, however, is not to explain character defects of corruptionists but to account for the fact that they are voted into office and are able to retain their positions after their incompetence has come to light. To do so, we have to separate the factors which not singly but in combination make the city boss the problematic figure he is.

It must be realized that no modern party has existed without a machine.

[26] *The City*, p. 218.

[27] *The Sociology of City Life*, pp. 407 ff.

If the machine is nonexistent or very weak, the parties are labile and tend to disintegrate or split, or, if they survive, they are unreliable either as supporters of a government or as opposition. This is, or has been, the case with parties in France, Italy, and Germany. A machine implies neither corruption nor autocracy but it assures stability. All British parties have machines, but no one complains. Second, those in control of the machine by necessity have greater power and more influence than ordinary party members. The greater power of Gladstone, Disraeli, Lloyd George, or Churchill could be explained by the great prestige which they personally won, but in the case of Asquith, Baldwin, Chamberlain, and Attlee, the argument does not carry. Again, greater power is of little real relevance if it is used for legitimate purposes, namely, to define and direct the policies of a party. It is only its use for personal interests, for illicit economic advantages which is illegitimate. Third, political corruption occasionally occurs in any government, just as the healthiest body is not immune against a contagious disease. But there is a great difference between the amount of corruption by individuals on the political scene and by an organization whose only purpose is to exploit people under the convenient cloak of politics. In Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and, for more than a hundred years in Great Britain, political corruption has been nonexistent; in the very rare cases in which irregularities have occurred, no party and no leading politician have been involved. In other countries, particularly in the Balkan region, in the Near East, and in some Latin-American countries, corruption is great; politicians can be bought and officials can be bribed but the machine working for the boss behind the scene is absent.

Bossism in the United States is largely an urban phenomenon. Although county administrations may sometimes be inefficient, and the existence of patronage and favoritism is undeniable, criminal acts are rare; there is no rural boss. Similarly, state governments have machines; they are not always efficient but they are not run by criminal organizations. Only the Huey Long machine in Louisiana was comparable to city machines and the Crump machine in Tennessee was for many years powerful in the same sense. In the Federal government cases of corruption have not been infrequent, but even during the Grant administration there was no organization which had the Cabinet on its strings and ran the country to its personal advantage. An official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue might be bribed—as has been done all over the world—to grant a tax abatement. The Secretary of the Treasury might—as has once happened—use loopholes in the law to pay no income tax although he is a millionaire. But in no known instance have invoices been fabricated so that the Treasury paid for goods which the government never received.[28] The latter is a favorite means which city bosses use to get rich.

[28] There is, of course, the justly criticized pork-barrel practice of wasting public funds for useless expenditures. Chester Maxey compiled an amazing list of post offices which

Contrary to the opinions mentioned above, bossism is indeed exceptional, representing an organization controlling a political machine for its own non-political and corrupt purposes. Ironically, city bossism exists only because the American parties have no permanent central machine, or only a very weak one. In most countries the parties are formal, centralized associations. They have a chairman and other officers, a permanent, paid full-time secretary with staff, and a central office. They publish a daily newspaper which is the official voice of the party; they receive regular annual dues from all party members. The officers determine the party policies and exert a strict discipline. On basic issues at least, all the party members who hold office vote as one man. Although organizational procedures may vary, parties are centralized, orders come from the top, and their adherents have to follow.[29] There is only one organization in America built on the same principle, the Communist party. Both the Republican and the Democratic parties have no real central organi zation. They have no legal leader, no permanent policy-making body, no regular income from dues, no official newspaper, no control over local candidates, and no techniques for streamlining the vote of officeholders. Significantly, the title of the supreme organization is "National Committee." There is hardly any vote in Congress which is strictly along party lines. Even on the most crucial issues some members of the majority vote with the opposition and some members of the minority for the administration. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had more actual power within his own party than any other leader, tried in vain to "purge" some of his opponents in his own party. There are not even means to "read one out of the party" for continual breaches of discipline. But it is possible to be thrown out of Tammany Hall, which has a leader and other officers, a permanent staff, which collects annual dues, and nominates candidates for office. The American parties are very weak superstructures built up of strong local organizations. The latter, through ward leaders and precinct captains, control the cities and—deliver the votes. The national officeholders depend on the city bosses. The latter can neither be elected nor ejected by the national leaders. Moreover, there is one type of boss who cannot be ousted by the party or by the voters, the boss who never takes an office himself but gets his puppets elected.

Although their impact is difficult to appraise, two other factors contributed to the power of bosses. The first is the rapid growth of cities because of mass

were built only to get votes. For instance, Vermal, Utah, with a population of 836, got a post office which cost—before the First World War—$50,000 (Chester C. Maxey, "A Little History of Pork," *National Municipal Review,* December, 1919). But no one ever charged that the congressman responsible for the legislation had been bribed, or that a part of the appropriation went into the pockets of bosses. These practices are very undesirable forms of favoritism but they are not criminal. Their aim is political—getting votes—not plunder.

[29] Whether this is democratic or not, whether it has more advantages or disadvantages, is not discussed here. We are concerned only with the implications for city machines.

immigration of people not familiar with democratic institutions. Where cities grew slowly and where the increase in population came from nearby areas and from the same stock, the established families kept control of the administration for a long time and the newcomers gradually shared in the administration. Hence the smaller cities, although some of them have political machines and are controlled by a few families, have no bosses and little or no corruption. On the other hand, the large cities were suddenly filled with people without political experience. In their old countries the poor did not have the right to vote; they were used to political dependence: on their king, their parish priests, or on officials appointed by the government. If they had taken some interest in politics, they were accustomed to readily identifiable parties, sharply separated by basic issues, such as a monarchy versus republic, socialism versus capitalism, secularism versus religiously oriented groups, and so on. In America they had the right to vote but their choice was limited to two parties, which were indistinguishable to the continental European. The vote went to the person with the greatest personal appeal; the successful boss such as Tweed was always a genial man, dispensing favors, whose ready smile and cordial handshake captivated the masses.

The situation was aggravated by a curious fact which James Bryce noted long ago: the reluctance of members of the upper group to run for mayor in larger cities. The mayoralty is not the way to national political eminence. Even the intelligent voter often does not have much of a choice among candidates in municipal elections. Furthermore, from pioneer times on, the American population has had very little appreciation for public servants, who have been regarded as inferior to the independent businessman. Consequently, self-respecting, able men did not apply for administrative municipal positions which, in addition, were poorly paid. The unsubstantial municipal wages—so much applauded by the thrift-minded public—encouraged graft.

All these factors in combination still cannot account for all the votes which kept the bosses in power. It cannot be denied that the bosses were backed by the masses, because the bosses were the only ones who cared for the masses. If a member of a family with great prestige happened to be in office, he discharged his duties with conscience; in line with the philosophy of economy he held expenditures to a minimum, kept taxes low, and balanced the budget. Apart from occasional appearances at popular meetings, he had no contact with the masses; their manners and their ways of life were obnoxious to him. If sometimes he heard of the misery of the poor, he regretted their lot but saw no way to help them. After all, there were charitable societies to which he contributed. That they only meted out doles was not their fault; there were just too many destitute people. The boss was quite different. He and his underlings mingled with the masses; they spoke and understood their language; they lived in their wards, patronized the same places, and stood the drinks in the saloons at whose mere sight the patricians shuddered.

But the boss was not merely sympathetic; he really helped, although he was not meticulous in his methods. He did not care for balanced budgets or for low taxes. He crammed the city administration with employees for whom there was no need. He built courts, firehouses, police stations, bridges, and streets at enormous expense. He got his "cut" from the contractors but that was not enough. He dictated whom they had to hire and many a man who had been unemployed got a job. The range of services was very wide: free Thanksgiving dinners, food baskets for needy families, bail for those who were arrested, protection from eviction, and legal aid.[30] Of course a job was the most important thing. Moreover, the immigrants got through the bosses what they could not get anywhere else: advice and help in obtaining their first papers and, later on, citizenship; the illiterate and those who could not speak English got clerical help to write applications, and so on. In short, the masses became as thoroughly corrupted as the boss for whom they voted. There can be no doubt that many bosses, even after their conviction, remained popular. The belief, so dear to some intellectuals, that the simple man has high moral standards is entirely unfounded.[31]

The days of the bosses are numbered, primarily because their services—insofar as they were legitimate—are no longer essential. America today has a system of public and private social agencies, unsurpassed and unprecedented in their scope, which serve the masses more efficiently than any boss could. Other factors, too, worked against the machine. Mass immigration has stopped and it is easier to take care of the few newcomers. Illiterates can no longer immigrate and grade school education has become more effective. The last decade witnessed the defeat of Tammany Hall in New York, Curley in Boston, Hague in Jersey City, Kelly in Chicago, Pendergast in Kansas City, Crump in Memphis, and of the Grundy machine in Philadelphia. These successes must not be overestimated. The bosses ceased to be autocrats but the machines are still powerful. The growth of cities and the increase of functions have made patronage—both in jobs and contracts—an even more powerful means of obtaining votes. Corruption has decreased but inefficiency and waste continue.

The establishment of decent, effective municipal government requires more than the election of clean officials. In the first place—this is the most difficult thing to achieve—both parties must come to realize that party politics has no place in city government, which is merely a matter of efficient administration. Accordingly, elections should be held on a nonpartisan basis with non-

[30] This was sometimes clearly against the law. The boss was able to "fix" matters.

[31] Russell rightly remarks: "If it were indeed the case that bad nourishment, little education, lack of air and sunshine, unhealthy housing conditions, and overwork produce better people than are produced by good nourishment, open air, adequate education and housing, and a reasonable amount of leisure, the whole case of economic reconstruction would collapse." (Bertrand Russell, "The Superior Virtue of the Oppressed," in *Unpopular Essays,* New York, 1950, pp. 63–64.)

partisan tickets. The election of judges on a partisan ticket is particularly objectionable and should be eliminated. The city-manager plan should be generally adopted, leaving to the mayor and the council only the functions of representation and policy making. Once the elected politician is deprived of patronage, the power of the machine must collapse. Furthermore, the merit system has to be extended and all salaried city employees should become subject to civil-service regulations. Special control commissions ought to supervise the work of building inspectors, of the sanitation department, and similar branches, to reduce graft and negligence. All policemen should be properly trained and, after examination, appointed according to merit. In metropolitan areas with several independent police forces changes are necessary. If the example of metropolitan London is not imitated, at least some coordinating body should be created and, with the help of the counties and the state, the rural fringe beyond the city limits must be effectively policed. Finally, the education of the masses must be broadened and intensified. In many cities civic courses in grade and high schools are woefully inadequate. Part of the education—mainly for adults—has to be done by citizens' committees, some of which have already started. They have not yet received sufficient support from churches and other organizations; they have had more appeal to the educated than to the masses. The latter, after all, are the majority and decide the outcome of the elections. Political education is a tedious process but it is progressing. But we have to realize that not only the rich but the poor too have their vested interests. If the masses are assured that their interests are protected, the machine will lose its hold and the "shame of the cities," as Lincoln Steffens called it, will disappear.

Chapter 20

SLUMS

The Natural History of a Slum. In 1866 settlers in southern Kansas founded a town which they named Wichita. It was situated at the junction of the Little Arkansas and the Arkansas rivers, in a plain without any natural obstacles, and it could expand in all directions. Land values and building costs were low and economic conditions rather good. The town was initially a trading station on the Chisholm Trail and subsequently prospered by serving a large area of wheat farmers and cattle breeders. The discovery of oil was an additional factor accounting for the steady growth of the town. Destitution was absent, the richer people, conforming to the equalitarian standards of the Middle West, did not display their wealth and lived in homes which hardly differed from those with lesser incomes. Even today the city consists mostly of one-family frame houses of moderate size. The city did not attract too many outsiders so the residents were mostly native white Americans from Kansas and neighboring states. Wichita was the town where Carry Nation started her drive against alcoholism; the state went dry and the disappearance of saloons kept the deterioration of the transitional zone at a minimum.

This unusual combination of favorable conditions made the emergence of slums very unlikely. However, in due time railroad tracks bisected the city and thereby blighted adjacent areas. Stockyards, close to the railroad tracks, made this area more unpleasant as a residential site. Despite this, slums similar to those in Eastern urban areas did not arise. What did happen was the formation of a Zone in Transition, with its concentration of light industry, and, some blocks farther away, the erection of less attractive multiple dwellings. There was still plenty of inexpensive space available for those who wanted an ordinary one-family home. In 1916 the railroads needed unskilled labor which they could not secure from local sources, at least not for the wages offered. As in many similar cases, the railroads imported contract laborers with their families from Mexico. Their wages permitted them neither to buy nor to rent homes. The railroads provided "living quarters" which were nothing but wooden shacks, built along the tracks; some families were accommodated in lean-to additions. These shacks were built in three sections, covering a total area of twenty-one blocks. When the Mexicans

grew in numbers, some of them had to move outside the original track sections. They had no difficulty moving into the blocks adjacent to the stockyards, where some of the poorest white people, employed by the newly established packing industry, had their "residences." The Mexicans in turn accepted Negroes, who began to move in.

In 1941 the conditions prevailing in this Mexican community were investigated by the Sedgwick County Welfare Board.[1] The favorable economic conditions at the time of the investigation—full employment and high wages—tended to minimize the slum problems; they showed the slum at its best. At this time the Mexican community consisted of 900 persons or approximately 165 families. They represented only a small proportion of the city population, about one-half of 1 per cent.

Housing presented the most dismal aspect. Most of the Mexicans still lived in the wooden shacks which were built for them when they had moved in, but natural deterioration and lack of repairs had made them even worse than before. The houses were of rough boards and had flat roofs, which usually leaked so much that washtubs had to be placed under the holes in the roof during rainstorms; breaks in walls, floors, and ceilings made adequate heating impossible. This usually was provided by a single stove. Oily old railroad ties were used as fuel. As the report laconically remarks, "Almost every house is a fire-trap." The major parts of the slum were without city sewage and water supply. The latter was furnished by wells close to toilet facilities, thus creating a health hazard.[2] Most of these shacks were still the property of the railroad companies, which charged rents of only $2 or $3 monthly but were negligent in collecting. In other words, the Mexicans paid almost no rent—and the latter is usually an important item in the budget of the lower and middle classes. This had two very unpleasant consequences. Mexicans could therefore work for wages which were low enough to exclude competition, but they could not afford to move to more satisfactory quarters because their wages were too low. The homes were also overcrowded. A family of eleven was found in a one-room shack with only one window and one door. One family of thirteen lived in a four-room home with four beds. Despite these crowded conditions, all interviewers remarked upon the cleanliness of the homes and of the children.

It goes without saying that economic conditions account for poor housing, but the economic situation is primarily based on social factors. Within twenty-five years immigrants can obtain positions which pay enough to rent a modest home. But the Mexicans, regardless of their abilities, were rejected

[1] The data and the map presented in this chapter are taken from *A Study of the Social, Economic, and Health Characteristics of the Mexican Population of Wichita,* unpublished paper, Wichita, 1942. Permission to use the material, hereby gratefully acknowledged, has been given by the Sedgwick County Welfare Board and Miss Aileen Calkins.

[2] Garbage disposal was another threat to health. Some got rid of garbage by feeding it to chickens and goats, others buried it, and still others simply threw it into back yards.

by employers other than railroads and meat packers. At a time when the city experienced an unparalleled industrial boom—Wichita almost doubled its population during the war years—the Mexicans could find no better employment. Three large airplane factories, despite working at maximum capacity, employing three shifts daily, and advertising for labor, employed a total of seven males and one female of Mexican extraction. Construction firms hired fourteen men during this period. Others of Mexican ancestry who did not work for the railroads or meat packers could get nothing better than poorly paid odd jobs such as maids, janitors, or work in laundries, junk yards, poolrooms, and bowling alleys.

Under these conditions most Mexican families could eke out a meager living only by putting their children to work. Thus seven families, consisting of eight to thirteen persons, reached a combined income in excess of $300 per month, but even so, the average family income was about 50 per cent below the national average, and twenty-four families were on relief. In less prosperous times the number of relief recipients was substantially larger and family incomes decreased sharply. Such a low income almost invariably results in insufficient nutrition. Normal diet consisted of *tortillas,* beans, and potatoes. Bean soup and *tortillas* were served at noon, beans and potatoes in the evening. Meat appeared once a week. "High-income" families had fresh fruits, vegetables, and milk (particularly the owners of goats). The report tells us that families from four to thirteen members used an average of two quarts of fresh milk daily, but that in many instances milk was consumed exclusively by preschool children. Neither the public nor the parochial schools had a hot-lunch program and many children went home for the meal.

The food situation was even more serious since the Mexican families had many children. Birth control was rarely practiced and, indeed, almost unknown. Interviewers reported such responses as "I don't know why I have so many children but every year one comes along" or "I will be glad when I am too old to have more babies but my family is big enough." This does not point to sound family relationships which, as we are sometimes told, exist primarily in families with many children. In fact, some mothers openly rejected their children. One woman told her interviewer: "Why do I have so many children? I don't want them and some day I think I'll leave them." Fathers took a different attitude; they adhered to their traditional patterns, were proud of large families, and hoped to have many sons to support them when they were old. In 1942 the size of the average Mexican family in Wichita was 5.8 compared with the then national average of 3.8. To put it differently, the average Mexican family had to support 50 per cent more persons on an income of 50 per cent below the average national income. Children had to leave school as soon as possible. Most children did not attend school beyond the eighth grade. Of all the children covered by the survey,

only ten attended high school and one was in college. Even children enrolled in school frequently stayed at home on the slightest excuse. The report remarks that "the public schools have been very indifferent to this problem and have taken no steps to insure their regular attendance."

More than 90 per cent of the Wichita Mexicans were Catholics, the others being Protestants. However, many Catholics never went to church. There were four all-Mexican churches, two for each creed. The Catholic churches were headed by American priests while the two Protestant ministers were Mexicans. Members of the two faiths did not get along entirely well but there were no open conflicts. Apparently the cohesion of the Mexican population was not affected by the religious split.

The investigation did not cover such aspects as crime, vice, or related types of social disorganization. Personal observations of the writer indicate rather satisfactory conditions. Organized vice appeared to be absent; juvenile delinquency was represented only in its mildest form, truancy. Otherwise there were hardly any perceptible deviations either by adults or juveniles from the behavior of other groups. Divorces and desertions were probably rarer. The health situation was mainly explored with respect to tuberculosis. Free X-ray examinations were offered to all persons over thirteen years of age but 56 per cent of the eligible Mexican population failed to respond. We may suspect that some of those who refrained from taking the test were afflicted with tuberculosis for, as the report remarks, "there prevails rather a general philosophy among the Mexicans that the disease will probably come to most of them, but they would prefer not to ascertain its presence." However, at the time of examination there were 225 known cases of tuberculosis in Wichita. Of these patients, 173 were white, 37 Negro, and 15 Mexican. Since 5 per cent of the population was Negro and only one-half of 1 per cent Mexican, it is apparent that the incidence of tuberculosis among both those Negroes and Mexicans tested was far in excess of their numerical proportions. It may also be assumed that the health of the Mexicans was not too good in other respects. Only fourteen of 902 Mexicans, or about 1.5 per cent, were sixty-five years of age and over, as compared with the national average of this age group, 6.3 per cent. As for the young people, the report remarks: "The Mexican is often characterized by smallness of stature and lack of real physical strength. The sixteen-year-old children are physically not equipped to do work which is available in Wichita for them."

Although these data are incomplete, they permit us at least a tentative interpretation. First, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the reasons for the emergence of a slum and the reasons for its continued existence. In early colonial times the first white settlers frequently lived under conditions quite similar to those of the Wichita Mexicans. But the primitive, unsanitary, makeshift homes of the pioneers were soon replaced by better

ones. The Wichita slum had its origin in economic conditions; substandard wages necessitated substandard housing. But the immigrants had ample time —twenty-five years—to adjust themselves to American ways of life and to prepare themselves for better employment which would enable them to live in less objectionable quarters. Their continued slum life is attributable less to the effect of economic than of social factors, namely, the attitudes of both



FIG. 10. Map of Wichita, Kans., showing location and extent of the Mexican slums.

the majority of the population and the Mexicans. The majority refused to accept the newcomers. They were excluded from all communal activities; the laxity of the school authorities in enforcing attendance indicates that the Mexican children were regarded as "outside the pale"; their education did not matter, and their assimilation through common schooling was considered undesirable. Employment outside the slum area, which included railroad installations and stockyards, was denied. No acts of overt hostility occurred. Like the Southern Negro, the Mexican was "right in his place." But this policy of tacit rejection could succeed only because the Mexicans accepted their position. The sordid conditions which they found in Wichita were apparently better than those they had in Mexico. If they resented the treatment which they received, their feelings were not strong enough to lead them to protest or leave for some other town which might offer better opportunities. There is no indication that they tried to improve the chances of their children, for they apparently discouraged their education; such widespread truancy could not have been practiced without the consent of the parents. It appears that Wichita Mexicans preferred the emotional security of their slum to the conflicts which might have arisen from attempts to fight for improvements and to break down the invisible walls of social segregation. The low educational level of the group facilitated the perpetuation of the natural area; if they left, they would have had to establish relationships with a group which they could not have hoped to meet on equal terms. Rejection by the majority in all probability was ascribed to "racial" differences, considered as innate and unchangeable. The immigrants in turn were not inclined to change, because they wanted to retain their identity as a group. In other words, the two groups had different sets of values and each group accepted its own value system without further questioning. Spatial segregation and occupational separation removed the most likely sources of conflict and enabled the two groups to live side by side without much antagonism but also without any chance of integration.

In this case the social isolation of the minority, its acceptance of its position with its ensuing economic conditions, and the preservation of its own value system explain why the pathological features which are usually the concomitants of slum life were either entirely absent or only faintly visible in this particular case.

Health factors remain as a typical slum problem. The Wichita area as such was not crowded, although the houses were too small for large families. The real danger came from undernourishment, excessive smoke, and unsanitary water. The health of the Mexicans was obviously not too good before they immigrated and their new habitat was not conducive to health. There is little doubt that the incidence of tuberculosis was high and that health conditions in general were poor, as is indicated by the small number of older people.

The Mexican community in Wichita indicates that, apart from health aspects, a slum does not necessarily cause social disorganization. As long as a group preserves its own value system and accepts segregation it can remain well organized. However, this situation cannot continue. Acculturation can be slowed up but not prevented. Although Mexican children get little education, they do become acquainted with American standards. As the older generation dies out (it is unlikely that it will be replaced by new immigrants), the Mexican tradition must become more and more a memory rather than a reality and Americanization must increase. Once the new generation begins to discard its old value system and to accept the value system of its environment, dissatisfaction will grow—unless the majority is willing to accept the minority, which seems unlikely. In either case the slum community will break apart.

The Nature of Slums. There is no general agreement on the definition of a slum. Some writers regard it as a special type of disorganized area.[3] But the Mexican slum in Wichita, as discussed in the foregoing section, is not a disorganized area. Others treat the terms "slum" and "blighted area" as synonymous,[4] but it seems preferable to follow Quinn's example [5] and to distinguish between them. Quinn also holds that "blighted" is applicable to both residential and nonresidential sections, while "slum" should be reserved for residential areas. Moreover, blighted areas are always sections in a process of deterioration, while many slums—the Mexican quarters in Wichita are again an example—did not become blighted; they have been slums from the beginning. Still others believe that slums can also be found in rural areas, a debatable proposition. Deplorable as some rural housing conditions are, rural homes are scattered and do not form visible units in sharp contrast to more fortunate sections.

Slums may be characterized as areas of substandard housing conditions within a city. A slum is always an area. A single neglected building, even in the worst stage of deterioration, does not make a slum. Furthermore, the term "housing conditions" refers to actual living conditions rather than to the mere physical appearance of a building. In many instances formerly "good" residential sections have become slums not because the buildings were inadequate but because large one-family structures have been converted into inferior, overcrowded rooming houses. Also, the term "substandard" is to be taken not in an objective or technological but rather in a relative social sense, i.e., compared with the recognized standards at a given time in a specific country. The cave dwellings of prehistoric people, the dugouts, and the makeshift shacks of the pioneers are all substandard according to our own

[3] This appears to be the opinion of Gist and Halbert, *Urban Society,* New York, 1950, pp. 162–163.

[4] Cf. Queen and Thomas, *The City,* chap. 17.

[5] James A. Quinn, *Human Ecology,* p. 156.

notions, but they did not create slum conditions. Theoretically, nearly all houses built before 1900 and not "modernized" are substandard, for they have no central-heating systems, no running hot water, and usually are not fireproof; many of them have no flush toilet and no electricity. Indeed, whenever concentrations of such buildings remained in their original state, the areas have become slums. But at the time of their erection they were considered desirable homes. Between 1920 and 1930 the city of Vienna built approximately 60,000 apartments. None of them had central heating or running hot water; practically none had a bath and many had only one outlet for water, with a basin which served for both cleaning the body and as a kitchen sink. Yet these apartments did not create slums; they helped to clean them up. For these apartments were so superior to usual Viennese (or for that matter Eastern European) standards, their erection was such a tremendous progress in housing, that they served as a model for public-housing projects all over continental Europe. But doubtless similar buildings in the United States would result in the emergence of new slums.

There is disagreement as to whether people make slums or slums make people. In other words, are substandard housing conditions due to the social standards and behavior of certain groups or vice versa? In such a formulation, the question is unanswerable because it is scientifically meaningless. It is obvious that lower-income groups have lower living standards. That does not necessarily imply that these standards are identical with slum conditions. Many immigrants, particularly those from Southern and Eastern Europe and from Latin-American countries, are used to housing conditions which, according to American patterns, are unacceptable. This partially explains why they put up with conditions which other groups consider unbearable. It also partially explains why areas which were once in better shape quickly deteriorate into slums if these groups move in. It does not explain the existence of "original" slums. Neither the poor nor the immigrants are able to erect homes to suit their taste. Frequently their homes are built by individuals who would hate to live in them. The Mexican slums in Wichita were erected by railroad magnates and many slum areas have been "developed" by speculators who made a fortune by building substandard tenements.

The slum is a complex product of many factors, as is true of many other social phenomena. But poverty is the foremost cause. The Mexicans in Wichita accepted wages which did not permit them to rent suitable dwellings. Similarly, Poles who came to this country to work in coal mines received substandard wages and could afford only substandard homes. In these cases we clearly have an interplay of objective economic facts and subjective group standards. Low income forces people to live in slums, but such groups do not object because they are used to even worse conditions. It is also true that almost any area will turn into a slum if its residents do not take proper care of their dwellings. New York City cleared a whole slum

block of rubbish, garbage, and debris only to find that after a year uncleanliness was as rampant as before. Again we have an interplay of social and economic factors. Many slum residents are negligent and do not mind dirt as much as others do; others have neither the money nor time to keep their areas as clean as they might desire.

The study of Roman ruins indicates that even in ancient times tenements crowded with the poor of the empire created slum conditions. These, however, were exceptional. The medieval cities of the West, picturesque as they were, suffered from inferior housing. The Middle Ages were characterized by less technological skill than that of the Romans; aqueducts, sewers, paved roads, and private baths were unknown. It has been said that in those times a traveler could smell a city before he could see it. The inadequacy of urban dwellings exacted a heavy toll in deaths from contagious diseases, in high mortality from other causes, and in destruction of large areas by fire. The contrast between the miserable shacks of the poor and the splendid palaces of the aristocrats was far more startling than anything which can be seen in modern cities.

In any case, the existing social order, including what was considered proper housing according to class status, remained unchallenged; the acceptance of existing standards deprived the situation of its sting. Neither the conscience of the rich nor the sufferings of the destitute acted as stimuli for improvements. Modern slums are characterized by other than technological and hygienic features; social elements have to be added: the awareness of upper socioeconomic groups that conditions have to be changed and the demand of the underprivileged for improvement. The situation deteriorated with increasing urbanization. Even in Elizabethan times cities were so crowded with utterly destitute people that poor laws were enacted to cope with the problem. However, the homeless, though proportionately large, were still small in numbers and many were kept out of the cities. But after the Industrial Revolution the poor were needed to work in urban factories. It was then that the modern slums began to grow. The low wages permitted no decent quarters; rapidly increasing industry multiplied the number of the urban masses. Housing had to be provided. Under the given conditions, the living quarters had to be inadequate. New sections, consisting entirely of tenements for manual workers, sprang up overnight. The tenements were made of poor materials so workingmen could afford them; apartments were provided in basements or looking over back yards; rooms were small and low and baths were omitted; toilet facilities and water outlets had to be shared by several tenants. These houses were firetraps, unsanitary, and they deteriorated quickly.

In the United States the process of urbanization and industrialization was quicker than in Europe and low-paid manual workers immigrated in masses. It became technically difficult to provide homes for the many newcomers.

Inadequate as housing still is, the real, big slums of central and Western Europe are essentially a phenomenon of relatively few very large cities. In 1914, the peak immigration year, 1,218,480 persons came to the United States. Most of them stayed in the cities and were penniless, manual workers. They filled the existing slums and created new ones. Since most American homes are wooden structures which quickly decay without proper maintenance, the process of blighting whole areas was rapid. The invention of the automobile, and the subsequent exodus from more centrally located residences leading to their conversion into rooming houses and multiple dwellings, constantly added to the deterioration of once satisfactory areas. Two world wars, during which building activities were sharply curtailed or entirely discontinued, added to the shortage and increased crowding. The result is that not only the largest cities but the middle-sized, as well as some smaller industrial towns, have large slum districts.

There are three main types of slums. One is the "original" slum, an area which, from the beginning, consisted of unsuitable buildings; these sections are beyond recovery and need to be razed. The Mexican slum in Wichita is an example of an original slum. The second type consists of slums created by the departure of middle- and upper-class families to other sections and subsequent deterioration of the area. An example is the South End slum in Boston; its condition deserves a more detailed discussion.[6]

The South End is an area between Huntington Avenue and South Bay. Its limits are St. Botolph Street to the northwest, Albany Street to the southeast, Kneeland Street to the northeast, and Camden and Lenox Streets to the southwest. Columbus Avenue and Tremont Street are the main thoroughfares. Some of Boston's finest landmarks are only a few steps from this section. Trinity Church, the Boston Public Library, the Opera House, Symphony Hall, the New England Conservatory of Music, the medical school of Tufts College, and Northeastern University are all within walking distance. Beyond Huntington Avenue are the two most fashionable sections of Boston: Beacon Hill and Back Bay. The South End once was an upper-class section but its residents moved when the central business area to the northeast began to expand. The old residents sold their three-story one-family homes to real-estate operators who converted them into apartments and one-room accommodations. Thus the district became an area of cheap rooming houses and deteriorated to such extent that the City Planning Board, in the *Gen-*

[6] The conditions of the South End were the subject of a recent investigation by Gertrude Keefe. She obtained the data by personal inspection and field work with social agencies, from the United States census, and from the following sources: *Surging Cities,* published by the Greater Boston Development Committee, 1948; *Boston's Health,* statistical summary, Boston Health Department, 1950. The data presented in the text are mostly taken from Miss Keefe's description, incorporated in her master's thesis at Springfield College. She also drew the map which is shown on page 416. Her permission to make use of the thesis and to reproduce the map is hereby acknowledged.

eral Plan for Boston: Preliminary Report 1950, declared that it was the residential area most in need of redevelopment.

The population of Boston was approximately 800,000. Of these, about 53,000 lived in the South End. The density of population in Boston was 95 persons per residential acre but rose in the South End to 349.3 persons, almost four times the average of a badly overcrowded city. Of the 3,500 rooming houses licensed by the city, 2,500 were located in the South End. More than half of its population (55 per cent) are roomers.

After the departure of the old families, the composition of the population underwent radical changes and at the time of the study reflected the multiple origin of metropolitan immigrants and their children. Thirty-nine different racial and national groups were represented. The majority were descendants of people from the maritime provinces or were Irish. The second largest group was, curiously enough, of Arabic origin, followed by Negroes. The latter comprised 11.8 per cent of the population. Of the whites, 28.1 per cent were foreign-born.[7]

The median monthly rent was the lowest in the city and in 1940 amounted to $19.33. More than two-thirds—69.6 per cent—of the tenants paid less than $25 a month. Only 11.8 per cent of the residents owned their homes, as compared with the city average of 20 per cent.

The age distribution was abnormal, the majority falling between forty and sixty years. There were approximately as many people over sixty (9,655) as there were under eighteen (8,418), and more than 3,000 persons received old-age assistance. Although there were very few children, infant mortality was higher than in any other part of the city; 50 per cent above the city average. The section rated second in juvenile delinquency. Furthermore, the district led in rates of deaths, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases. Some of these facts are not necessarily direct results of slum conditions. The death rate, for instance, might have been higher because the population was overaged. Tuberculosis and venereal diseases had been acquired by many before they moved into the South End, although we know from the Wichita Mexicans that tuberculosis is a familiar feature in slums. The occupational distribution was as follows:

	Per cent
Proprietors, managers	3.5
Professional and semiprofessional	7.7
Clerical (white collar)	10.8
Laborers	16.5
Service workers	30.2
Seeking work or on relief	22.8
Others	8.5

[7] These figures refer to the 1940 census and are taken from "Study of the South End Health and Welfare Area," Community Studies Division, Research Bureau, Greater Boston Community Council, 1944.

The higher percentage of unemployed was explained by the large number of foreign-born persons and their lack of skills and education; the median for school years completed by persons twenty-five years old and over was 8.2. Consequently, the section had the highest rate of people on relief in Boston.

These deplorable conditions have been aggravated by objectionable and administrative practices. The state of Massachusetts limits the granting of liquor licenses to the proportion of one license for every 1,000 persons which, considering the number of children, sick people, and total abstainers, is a generous allotment. But the South End has one to every 250 people. As a result, the district has become a place of pilgrimage for alcoholics, many of them vagrants. Another result is the extremely high incidence of offenses. Police consider the South End police station the busiest in the world. In an area where 55,000 people live, including children and infirm persons, approximately 18,000 adults are arrested every year, more than 90 per cent of them for being drunk. To be sure, most of them do not live in the South End; actually less than 2 per cent of the offenders are residents. But the influx of so many undesirable elements makes life in the district unpleasant and dangerous.

It ought to be clear that this type of slum presents problems different from that of the Mexican areas in Wichita and similar other instances. Consequently, the most feasible plan for rehabilitation is also different. There is no necessity for wholesale demolition. Only those structures which are dilapidated beyond the hope of rehabilitation should go. In part they have to be replaced by public-housing projects for which the district is qualified. One such project is already under way. Other space should be used for sorely needed recreational purposes. According to accepted urban planning standards, the district ought to have 15 acres for playgrounds, 20 acres for athletic fields, and 20 acres for parks. Actually there are only 5.3 acres of playgrounds, 6.5 acres of parks, and no athletic fields.

If the foregoing steps were taken, the remaining rehabilitation work would be mainly a matter of administration and community organization. Better inspection would enforce the existing building code, remove firetraps, clean back yards, exterminate vermin, and force owners to make necessary repairs. The changing of ordinances and building codes would lead to the reduction of the number of rooming houses and the number of tenants or lodgers per structure. Liquor licenses should be revoked until they are down to a reasonable proportion. Reforms in community organization need centralization and integration and, of course, sufficient financial resources for such changes. The area is now served by more than 200 churches, social agencies, and medical centers. From the map it can be seen that seven district neighborhoods have been developed by settlement houses and other agencies. Once the population has been reduced to normal density, it should not be too difficult to rehabilitate the section both physically and socially.



FIG. 11. Map of the South End of Boston, showing neighborhoods organized by social agencies. (*Prepared by Gertrude Keefe and used by permission.*)

Key to Map

1. Neighborhood organized by Women's Service Club—Wellington Street Neighbors organized by Urban League
2. Neighborhood to be organized by Harriet Tubman House of South End Federation of Settlements
3. Neighborhood organized by Ellis Memorial of South End Federation of Settlements
4. Neighborhood organized by combined efforts of Lincoln House and Hale House of South End Federation of Settlements
5. Neighborhood organized by South End House of South End Federation
6. Neighborhood organized by Rutland Street branch of South End House
7. Chester Park neighborhood organized by worker from South End Planning Council
8. Areas only slightly residential and not organized into neighborhoods.

The third and most unpleasant type of slum is mainly a phenomenon of transition. Once the area around a main business district has become blighted, physical and social deterioration spreads rapidly. This kind of slum teems with flophouses, overnight accommodations for the destitute, houses of prostitution, and speak-easies. It is populated by transients, tramps, vagrants, chronic alcoholics, beggars, homeless men, and habitual criminals. Its "economic" activities are carried out by proprietors of saloons and poolrooms, pawnbrokers, fences, dope peddlers, procurers, and prostitutes. This type of slum clearly defies rehabilitation. The proper remedy is better administration. Stricter zoning laws, building codes, and a more severe condemnation policy would lead to the demolition of many buildings. Cheap lodgings would have to be replaced by public shelters or by accommodations provided by other social agencies. Liquor licenses would have to be revoked. Proper tax policies would make most of the present businesses unprofitable and their operators would move. Some buildings could be converted into offices for public or private use or for social agencies, others would have to go to make room for parks. The relocation of the comparatively few families living in the Zone in Transition is not too difficult a problem.

Slums differ physically; there are rooming house slums, tenement slums and slums of one-family homes. The buildings differ in their state of repair. Some simply lack the necessary equipment (central heating, bathrooms, and sanitary toilets) which can be supplied. Other structures are entirely faulty and should never have been erected. Others are well built and only suffer from neglect; they can be rehabilitated. Others are hopelessly decayed. Slum conditions vary in many other respects. Some dwellings are simply overcrowded; in this case the problem consists of finding other accommodations for part of the residents; others suffer from unsuitable locations (along railroad tracks, close to industries producing smog, excessive stench, or noise), and the inhabitants of these areas have to be moved to other locations. Still other buildings are hazardous to life and health (lack of fire escapes and sprinklers, wet walls, insufficient air and sunlight, etc.); they have to be demolished.

Poverty remains the basic problem. The Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report investigated living conditions in 1950 and found that 10½ million American families were living on an income of less than $2,000 a year. The report relates, for instance, the situation of a family in Providence, Rhode Island. The father, a truck driver, had to support himself, his wife, and ten children on a yearly income of $1,924. They lived in a four-room cold-water flat renting for $16 a month in the slum section of Providence. Even higher pay makes it difficult to house a large family. The following case was reported from New York.[8] An enlisted navy man, receiving $276 a month, had to support a wife and seven children, aged two to

[8] *The New York Times,* Aug. 8, 1951.

thirteen. They lived in a city-owned building on the Lower East Side. The building had a four-foot hole in one of its walls and the Department of Housing and Buildings described the structure as "in dangerous condition." The city had bought the building for demolition but let the family live there until emergency housing facilities would be available.[9] An even more extreme case was a family of sixteen in a New Jersey town.[10] According to newspaper reports, they lived in a chicken coop, which had been divided into two rooms. One was called a "parlor" and contained practically nothing but a television set. The second served as a bedroom for the parents and all the children, ranging from a newborn baby to a sixteen-year-old boy (who was tried for juvenile delinquency, thus bringing the family to the attention of the authorities).

While all these cases are shocking and contribute to the perpetuation of slums, it is clear that they have a bearing on slum problems only by implication. The navy man, for instance, was employed by the United States government, which pays the highest wages of all the public agencies in the world. But the support of nine persons in an urban environment is more than 95 per cent of the nation's wage earners can afford. Taking $600 a year as the minimum required to support a person within a family (which equals the income-tax exemption), the New Jersey family cited would need an income of $10,000 a year. Only 3 per cent of the population earned this much in 1950.

The total slum area in the United States is difficult to estimate. The standards set for physical qualities of homes, equipment, maximum occupancy, parks and other recreational facilities, and a number of other factors vary from country to country, from city to city, and even from generation to generation. The former administrator of the United States Housing Authority, Nathan Strauss,[11] stated that two-thirds of the nation needed better housing. The figure may have been exaggerated; at any rate, it included many dwellings outside slum areas, many families which lived with parents because of the housing shortage, and all those who were also living in crowded homes.

Slums are also unevenly distributed; they increase with the size of a city. The situation has been aggravated because some of the largest cities have been negligent in slum clearance for decades. There are also large slum areas in cities which underwent a fast growth because many buildings were hastily erected and reasonable zoning regulations limped far behind the building developments.

The Case against the Slums. It could be maintained—the argument is often voiced but seldom printed—that urban masses have always been poorly

[9] This case was solved by a well-meaning landlord who leased a low-priced apartment to the family.

[10] This case is incompletely documented.

[11] Nathan Strauss, *Two-thirds of a Nation,* New York, 1951.

housed and that a complete eradication of slums is beyond our financial capacity. The economic argument was used with equal force when free public education was proposed. That issue has long ceased to be controversial; no one would dream of abandoning our educational policy although school expenditures are the heaviest financial burden of the cities. Another argument, mostly used by real-estate interests, holds that public agencies are incapable of handling building construction and that free enterprise will clean up the slums in the course of ordinary business activities. Private enterprise has built all the slums and has never provided adequate housing for low-income groups. Quite a number of private builders have created slums by developing whole areas of substandard homes. A recent study by the Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies of Columbia University[12] flatly denies that there have been any beneficial effects on the part of private efforts in improving slums: "The prospects that areas of this type may regenerate themselves through the operation of market forces alone appear to be poor, on the evidence of the Lower East Side" (in New York).

Slum clearance is very expensive but, on the other hand, existing slums are one of the costliest propositions which a city administration has to face. The question is: Which is the heavier financial burden, the slum or its clearance? Unfortunately, an exact answer cannot be given although several studies have attempted to measure the cost of slums.[13] The investigations demonstrated that the costs of cities' services in slum areas exceeded the receipts from real-estate taxes or, in other words, the taxpayers of better sections had to subsidize the slum population. The facts are correct as far as they go but need to be amplified. All low-rent dwellings pay less in taxes than they receive in municipal services even if they are in excellent condition and in well-kept areas. Furthermore, the computations include all costs, including those which are regular city services, as, for instance, the expenditures for schools and sewers. Actually, slum costs are only those which are incurred because of the disorganization caused by substandard areas.[14] These are very difficult to determine. The areas where crime and vice abound, particularly in the Zone in Transition, necessitate the employment of large police forces. Slums also have a greater incidence of fires; the cost of the actual

[12] *Housing Market Behavior in a Declining Area,* New York, 1952.

[13] R. B. Navin et al. (in collaboration with Howard Green), *An Analysis of a Slum Area in Cleveland,* 1934; *Report on the Income and Cost of Six Districts in the City of Boston,* Boston City Planning Board, 1934; *Planning Commission,* Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, 1937; and Jay Rumney, "The Social Costs of Slums," *The Journal of Social Issues,* vol. 7, nos. 1 and 2, 1951.

[14] A study of Indianapolis, for instance, showed that a slum area containing 10.4 per cent of the total population accounted for 33 per cent of the cost of public relief (Mabel L. Walker, "Economic Costs of Slums and Blighted Areas," *Urban Blight,* papers presented at the Thirteenth Conference of the Government Research Association, 1942). But people are not on relief because they live in slums.

intervention of fire departments per building can be compared and expressed in accurate figures. Similarly, street cleaning, garbage collection, and refuse disposal are more expensive in slum areas. The supervision of dilapidated buildings, the demolition of abandoned homes, the cleanup of debris, the evacuation and relocation of tenants necessitate the maintenance of larger staffs and cause additional expenditures in slum areas.

Substantial as these expenditures are, they are dwarfed by costs indirectly caused by slum conditions. Our prisons, reformatories, hospitals, and mental institutions are filled with inmates from slums. Deserted families, truant and ungovernable children, orphans, and evicted people cause tremendous financial outlays in every single case and also create expenses because of the necessity for judges and their personnel, parole officers, private and public social workers and city employees. It is impossible to arrive at a reliable estimate of the cost of slums because in nearly every case slum conditions are contributing factors but are rarely the only cause. Eagerness in blaming everything on slums has obscured the issue. For example, suicides occur much more frequently in the slum Zone in Transition than elsewhere.[15] Those committing suicide are usually penniless; their burial and the inevitable police investigation have to be paid for from public funds. It is questionable that even a single suicide could have been avoided if the Zone in Transition did not exist. It is more likely that many potential suicides moved into the zone before they contemplated taking their lives. The case of certain mental disorders is similar. Studies have shown that schizophrenia decreases from the center to the periphery of the city.[16] There is not the shadow of a proof that slum conditions create schizophrenia; it is more likely that persons with schizophrenic tendencies are attracted to the Zone in Transition. Still more difficult to evaluate are cases of crime and vice, of tuberculosis and venereal diseases, all of which are found most frequently in slums. All cases of social pathology are very complex phenomena, but there is too much evidence to doubt that in most cases the slum has been a contributing cause. We can be reasonably sure that without slums there would be less crime, less vice, fewer desertions, less mental and physical diseases, and consequently, less waste of money, to say nothing of human tragedies. In addition, there is one special form of social pathology which is almost exclusively a slum feature: the juvenile gang. Adult gangsters also tend to concentrate in slum areas, although the successful leaders live in fashionable sections. To the costs directly involved in handling all these cases, we have to add the damage

[15] Calvin Schmid proved this for Seattle (*Suicides in Seattle*) and Minneapolis–St. Paul (*Saga of Two Cities*).

[16] For Chicago: Robert Faris and Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Cities*, Chicago, 1938; also, Warren Dunham, "The Ecology of the Functional Psychosis in Chicago," *American Sociological Review*, 1937. For St. Louis, Milwaukee, Kansas City, Omaha, and Peoria: Clarence W. Schroeder, "Mental Disorders in Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942.

to the property of private citizens, which cannot be measured with any degree of accuracy. A further substantial loss, directly attributable to slum conditions, is the decline of real-estate values in areas adjacent to slums. The loss is twofold: the city has to reduce property taxes and the owners lose part of their investment.[17] Despite the lack of reliable figures, we can be sure that the losses, inflicted on the nation by slum conditions year after year, must reach fantastic proportions. Yet this is no proof that the expenses for slum clearance are lower than the losses incurred by slum conditions. The acquisition of land and the erection of buildings are large capital investments which yield no satisfactory returns (in terms of sound business operations).

However, it would be a tragic mistake to consider only the material costs of slums. The great expansion of slums in recent times has become a most serious social problem because the areas demoralize a large segment of the urban population. There are many who are quite willing to disregard the human side of the problem and are unmoved by so much unnecessary human misery. While this is no treatise in ethics, it must be pointed out that the self-interest of the middle and upper classes imperatively demands a change. No society can stand, for a prolonged time, mass disintegration of family life, hordes of wayward youngsters, and organized crime on a large scale.

There are, in addition, political considerations. Sound living conditions are the basis of a stable society. The term "domestication" stems from the Latin *domus,* house or home. The Romans realized that a man without a home is not fully civilized. The United States has been spared many disorders which other less fortunate countries have suffered and this is greatly due to widespread homeownership. The French *pétroleurs* set fire to houses because they owned none and had to live in cellars, huts, and shacks. People without homes are the only ones who—in the language of the Communist Manifesto—have nothing to lose but their chains. They are a willing audience for rabble-rousers or neurotic utopian reformers. They form the cadres of which storm troops or action committees are made. According to times and conditions, they are equally willing to support revolts from the left or from the right. The rabble is a phenomenon of modern industrial society to which it is a constant threat. It will disappear only if it has become literally domesticated, that is, if people live in decent homes and in decent neighborhoods. Besides, attitudes of the slum population have changed. To be sure, there are still some who like slum life. Many disorganized people of the transitional zone are quite satisfied. The same is true of immigrants in segregated areas, because they have previously lived under even worse conditions. But the remainder of the slum population no longer takes the slum for granted. The

[17] There are exceptions. Zorbaugh (*The Gold Coast and the Slum*) has shown that in Chicago the most desolate area can border on the most fashionable section. Obviously, the land values in the latter were not impaired by the proximity of the slum.

medieval pauper did not expect to change from hut to palace and he believed more or less in class separation, ordained by divine command. The poor of today do not share this belief; they do not dream of palaces but they think it quite possible to live in a modest one-family home or a satisfactory apartment. They are also sufficiently intelligent to realize that they will never reach their goal by trying to save from wages which are barely sufficient to make ends meet.

Methods of Slum Clearance. Although the visible deterioration of dwellings is the most striking trait of slums, they are not a physical but a social phenomenon; the problem concerns people, not merely buildings. If a person suffering from tuberculosis works in a coal mine, he should be moved to a healthier environment. This is a prerequisite for his recovery but he still has to undergo medical treatment. Similarly, the replacement of dilapidated structures by satisfactory ones is hygienic but is not entirely a curative measure. Building programs alone will not clear the slums. Social treatment of the slum population is also necessary. Slum clearance involves many different measures which have to be coordinated. Since there are different types of slums, the treatment must vary according to type.

More radical rehabilitation procedures are needed in the Zone in Transition. Such zones are practically nonexistent in European cities, and there is no reason why they have to persist in America. In Europe there is very little social disorganization near the center except a certain amount of prostitution in the amusement area. The prerequisite for the elimination of the transition area is proper zoning. The central district should be limited to shopping centers, hotels, recreation establishments (theaters, motion-picture houses, and restaurants), office buildings, and public buildings, all subject to rigid building requirements. Light industry would be barred from the area. This would ease traffic congestion and remove the ugly industrial structures, contributing so much to blight. Cheap entertainment—poolrooms, shooting galleries, and the like—have to be removed from the center. This would stop the flow of undesirable elements to the central zone, which is a contributing factor in blighting the adjacent area. The Zone in Transition also must be subject to stricter regulations. The number of rooming houses should be limited and so should the number of occupants for each. In so far as the disorganization of the transitional zone is an ecological phenomenon, it can be changed by administrative measures.

But people do not cease to be what they are simply because their physical environment becomes more attractive. Disorganized persons—habitual criminals, neurotics, and psychotics—need treatment, not building regulations. Some smaller cities expel such persons on vagrancy charges, which only serves to shift the burden from one place to another and has very little effect since other vagrants quickly replace those who have been ousted. Such a practice also tends to put the burden of caring for these people on the larger cities

where they tend to concentrate. The usual method—arrest and jail sentence—is as expensive as it is futile. Treatment on a nationwide basis is the only effective remedy. People beyond the stage of rehabilitation (old, homeless, or unemployable persons without family ties) have to be taken off the streets and sent to welfare institutions rather than to prisons. Chronic alcoholics and severe cases of mental disorders must also be institutionalized. If psychiatric treatment or retraining will help to readjust stranded persons, they should be sent to rehabilitation centers. The most radical deviation from traditional procedures is necessary in those cases which, for lack of conclusive evidence, cannot be tried in court. Procurers, professional gamblers, leaders of dope rings, and racketeers are usually cautious enough to make their conviction nearly impossible. Among them are the most dangerously antisocial persons; their intelligence and organizational abilities have made them the leaders of the underworld. They frequently live in the best sections but their henchmen keep the slums populated with all kinds of undesirable types. Modernization of legal procedures is necessary before this problem can be eliminated. One possible solution would be the practice of having persons who cannot prove that they earn their livelihood in a legitimate way live in assigned areas where they would be subject to permanent supervision and obliged to work according to their abilities. This may sound like forced-labor camps, but abuses could be prevented by careful screening, by due process, and by hearings before a mixed commission consisting of jurists, psychologists, and social workers.

The treatment of natural areas again is different. No attempt should be made to disperse self-segregated minority groups. The clearance of natural areas should be limited to physical improvements and to extension of services rendered by social agencies.

There remain the slums of the poor, the largest of all. Considerable improvements could be achieved without municipal expense simply by rigid enforcement of existing building codes, zoning laws, and health-department ordinances. Either by administrative measures or by court orders, thousands of buildings could be rehabilitated; countless others would have to be demolished. In many cities the enforcement of existing regulations is notoriously lax, due either to favors through political or personal "pull" or outright bribery. In many cases repairs would be so extensive and expensive that the owner would prefer to abandon the building. Norwalk, Connecticut, started a slum-clearance program without cost, simply by enforcing existing building regulations. According to newspaper reports, the results are most gratifying.[18]

Another reason for prolonged slum conditions is the deplorable fact that the ownership of slum tenements is a profitable business. It is well known

[18] See "Norwalk's Tactics Wiping Out Slums," *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1953.

that the yield of invested capital decreases in inverse proportion to the quality of real estate. Good homes necessitate extensive maintenance costs and a variety of equally expensive services. A single vacancy causes considerable loss because the rents are high. In addition, good buildings are burdened with high property taxes, both the lots and the buildings having a high value. Conversely, slum houses can be bought for very small sums; vacancies cause little rent loss since they are quickly filled. The landlord makes a minimum of repairs and maintenance costs are low. So are the taxes. A change in tax laws [19] is the simplest solution to this problem.

Another prerequisite for slum clearance is an adequate condemnation law. Present laws vary greatly and some are entirely unsatisfactory. Ideally, legislation should make it possible to condemn a building either because of substandard conditions or because the space is needed for public projects. Further, compensation to the owner of the condemned property should not exceed the value for which the building is assessed.

The chief economic reason for the existence of slums is the inability of slum residents to pay for better housing. These conditions cannot be changed by any conceivable routine administrative act and of course municipalities cannot influence the distribution of national income. However, the present redistribution of income, which favors lower economic classes, is unlikely to be reversed. This redistribution is effected in two ways. Progressive taxation policies by the national government deprive upper economic groups of a substantial part of their income. At least a segment of the revenue thus obtained is used for services from which the lower groups benefit. The second source of redistribution is due to the increased power of organized labor, which has been constantly gaining better wages. Part of these wages of skilled workers has now surpassed the salaries of the lower and middle groups of clerical workers, and the wages of semiskilled workers are approximately equal to those of the bulk of clerical employees. In the long run this is the most hopeful prospect for slum clearance (without any public expenditures). Larger groups than ever before are now able to live in better quarters. This process is far from being stopped, since national productivity is steadily increasing, which permits labor to have higher real wages.[20] However, there are certain groups of unskilled workers who probably will always receive substandard wages. One need not be an orthodox adherent of the marginal

[19] Discussed in Chap. 17.

[20] Slichter, a keen as well as a cautious analyst, expects that by 1980 the output of goods and services will amount to $2,377 per capita, as compared with $1,684 per capita in 1948 (in terms of present prices). This is somewhat more than a 40 per cent increase in productivity (Sumner L. Slichter, "How Big in 1980?" *Atlantic Monthly,* November, 1949). If labor can keep at least its present proportional share in national income—and everything points this way—workers will have 40 per cent more to spend for rent.

productivity theory of wages to see that certain types of work can be paid only at a scale too low for a satisfactory income. If compensation is raised above a certain level, the services are discontinued because people cannot afford to pay for them. In times of depression unskilled workers, although they receive the lowest wages, are the first to lose their jobs because their services are least essential. The thousands of menial jobs—dishwashers, cleaners, messengers, deliverymen, redcaps, porters, doormen, domestic servants, night watchmen, etc.—are employed only because their services are cheap. Adequate housing for these groups leaves therefore only the alternative between slums or public housing at lower than actual costs. Without housing projects at the taxpayer's expense there will always be slums.

The replacement of buildings is only on initial step in slum clearance. New houses must be not only safe and hygienic; they must have equipment making it easy to keep the apartments, the buildings, and streets clean. Washable walls and windows which can be cleaned by the housewife are as necessary as washing machines and drying space in basements. Incinerators and frequent garbage collections, as well as effective police supervision to prevent littering of streets, are also indicated. In low-rent projects it is also desirable to break the rigid separation of residences and business.[21] The ground floor should be rented to stores or physicians and dentists. This has several advantages. Businesses, of course, must pay full rent, thereby decreasing the costs of housing subsidies. The proximity of stores and offices is an additional help to the time-pressed housewife. The stores in public-housing projects are subject to better supervision. Adequate clauses in leases can guarantee that the stores will be attractive and sanitary, that the operator will keep the sidewalk clean and not throw refuse, paper, cans, and boxes in the street. Even the size and form of shopboards and the display of merchandise can be regulated to give the street a good appearance. Deterioration of districts begins quite often with the intrusion of substandard, dirty stores.

As pointed out before, a slum is an area, not merely a group of buildings. Slum clearance therefore has to reduce the density of occupancy to a reasonable degree. It has to provide sufficient space for playgrounds. Experience has shown that this is not enough to keep children off the streets since mothers want them to play in sight of their windows. (Instead of chasing children away, parents must be fined and, after repeated violations, evicted.) Another step concerns regulations of eating and drinking places and amusement establishments; requirements for cleanliness, lighting, and avoidance of unnecessary noise must be as strict as in the best districts. Both the arrangement of streets and traffic regulations must be revised in such a way that

[21] This is the author's personal opinion. City planners usually take the opposite view.

through traffic is dispersed; adequate transportation facilities for the residents must be provided.

Since the slum is a phenomenon of social disorganization, the rehabilitated community must be organized with the help of social agencies. Day nurseries —again at reduced tariffs or even without charge—should be provided to enable mothers to do part-time work and relieve them from the nervous tension which is the inevitable effect of leaving mothers alone with small children. Hospitals and clinics should be within easy reach. Gra-Ys, Hi-Ys, YMCAs, YWCAs, sports clubs, and settlement house with expertly selected programs for all age groups, as well as child guidance centers and family social agencies, have to take care of all normal and abnormal needs of the community.

The example of the South End in Boston indicates that even an abundance of social agencies is of no value if the residents fail to avail themselves of their services. No slum clearance is complete without social reeducation of the residents. This education has to be carried out by various methods and on several levels; in grade and high schools, in churches, community centers, and public meetings, by teaching standards of living as ordinary classroom subjects, by illustrated leaflets, by demonstrations, by expositions showing model rooms, by movies, radio, and television, by assistance and advice in making family budgets and purchasing furniture and equipment.

Slum conditions are connected with ignorance and institutionalized, inferior standards of living. The low-paid clerical workers do not live in slums and do not blight areas although they have substandard incomes. Standards of living differ distinctly according to class, and the existing standards for the lowest classes neglect quite definitely decent housing. It is true that the manual worker needs a heartier diet and has to spend more for food than the clerical worker, thereby further reducing his ability to pay for a decent home. It is also true that the lowest groups incur additional expenses if they have many children. Even with these limitations the standards of living can be improved.

Slums and Social Disorganization. The popular opinion that slums are always disorganized areas is inaccurate. Only the Zone in Transition is entirely disorganized and, still worse, incapable of becoming organized. A population consisting of homeless people without families, of permanently unemployable persons, of chronic alcoholics and drug addicts, of prostitutes, beggars, and vagrants defies any organization. Some of these people can be rehabilitated but only after they have been removed from the area.

Conversely, "gangland" is unfortunately only too well organized. Gangs are led by persons of considerable leadership ability with initiative, inventiveness, energy, and courage far above the average. Their followers display loyalty and willingness to make much greater sacrifices than many decent

persons. Nowhere are group cohesion, mutual assistance, and community life as strong as with organized gangs. Not their lack of organization but their moral code makes them a threat to society.

The situation in natural areas is different. All segregated groups have a tendency to create very active community organizations of their own types. These minorities are not only excluded from the habitat of the majority but also from their churches, clubs, and social activities. The ecological segregation is accompanied by social segregation, a trend which receives an additional stimulus by the wish to retain national identity and Old World ties. We find, therefore, numerous associations of all kinds, some of them characteristic of specific groups such as the German *Turnverein,* glee clubs or the Czech *Sokols,* while others are replicas of ordinary American associations or are charitable institutions serving racial, national, or religious minorities. In addition, these people are quite well organized on an informal basis. They know each other, meet on sundry occasions, are tied together by the same kinds of sentiments, by the same languages and, above all, by their rejection by established society. Newly arrived immigrants are readily accepted. The main source of disorganization lies in the ambivalent position of the second generation discussed in Chapter 13.

The slums of segregation suffer from discrimination, rejection, and lack of integration rather than from disorganization. The slums of the poor are again different. Some organizations exist but they are not too effective. Churches are the leading organizations, but at least half of the slum population has no church affiliation. In recent times social activities of unions have increased in slum areas but they still concern only a segment of the population. The most frequent type of indigenous organizations are sports clubs. The greatest efforts to organize slum neighborhoods are made by social agencies, but only a fraction of the population avails itself of existing opportunities.

Informal social organization, however, is much stronger in slums than many are inclined to believe. As a rule the slum dweller is less socially isolated than many residents in middle- and upper-class districts. Many reasons for rejecting a neighbor are absent. The family next door does not have to belong to the right church and the proper club. They are neither discredited because their origin is suspicious nor respected for belonging to distinguished families. Consequently, there are fewer obstacles to neighborly contacts. On the other hand, the absence of barriers quite frequently causes conflicts which are easily avoided in other areas. Verbal clashes, even physical attacks in cases of disagreement are not rare and make the slums a district of constant quarrels. If they expand into feuds with several families participating on either side, we witness a type of disorganization unknown in better sections.

But there are other value differences which account for the specific slum

atmosphere. There is much less objection to noise. Shouting, roaring laughter, and loud songs are familiar features which everybody seems to enjoy. Most of all, nice homes are less appreciated. At least some negligence in maintenance is taken for granted. This is the grain of truth in the statement that people make slums.[22]

[22] According to Nathan Strauss, this is one of the "seven myths of housing" (see his book with that title, New York, 1942).

Part X. THERAPY

Chapter 21

HOUSING

An Old Problem. Next to the quest for food, the need for shelter has been paramount since man became so "denatured" that he could no longer sleep in the open. He used various devices such as caves, windbreaks, dugouts, igloos, and wattle huts, but none of them gave adequate protection. Finally the technological solution was found when man learned to build houses of wood, brick, stone, iron, and concrete. But the technical achievement only substituted a still more vexing problem for the original one. We know now how to build satisfactory houses but not at a price which the masses can afford. Satisfactory housing is still the privilege of a minority. Over all the world poor housing is the rule. In rural areas the penalty for inadequate housing is disease and a high mortality rate; these dangers, however, are reduced by the absence of other disadvantages. In the city the health hazards are only part of the many perils. Poor urban housing conditions, above all, are a social threat. The family, the neighborhood, and, indeed, the whole community suffer. From the very beginning of city life housing has always been inadequate. The excavations of the oldest cities indicate that large, solid castles and temples coexisted with wretched mud huts. The Roman masses were squeezed into tenements which make our own slums look princely. Despite the marble buildings for which the city was famous, Rome as a whole was so repulsive a sight that a mad and irate Nero burned it down. Housing conditions in medieval cities were equally unsatisfactory. With the rise of the middle classes, their housing situation began to improve, but the lower classes had no decent shelter. The cities paid a terrific toll: high mortality depopulated them; contagious diseases, among them the plague, were regular occurrences. As late as 1666 the Great Fire in London destroyed more than 13,000 houses but conditions at that time were so bad that Sir Walter Besant hailed the destruction as a "surgical operation absolutely essential if life were to be preserved." It is therefore neither true that the slums were created only by the Industrial Revolution nor that the housing situation has generally deteriorated. But while conditions have actually improved, they are still dangerous. Furthermore, before the Industrial Revolution those suffering from slum life in cities represented a small minority of the nation. Two facts add to the difficulties of the American city. One is the

disadvantage of an otherwise very beneficial institution, namely, that most homes are built of inexpensive wood, which permits the erection of more houses but also leads to rather rapid deterioration. The other is the swift change in land use with the subsequent blight of once well-kept areas.

> Gambling in land values has contributed to alternate booms and depressions, raising false hopes, encouraging ambitious structures, wiping out private investors, and, all in all, has been one of the major tragedies of American urban life. . . . The dispersive developments of recent years have left blighted vacuums in the interiors of our cities and have themselves been vitiated by land prices at a level too high to permit a desirable standard of urban development.[1]

Housing as an Economic Problem. Unlike other urban problems, housing is primarily an economic matter or, rather, a set of interrelated economic factors: the costs of the site, the costs of building and maintenance, and the costs of city services and transportation. But some difficulties have nothing to do with costs. Some well-meaning but unrealistic enthusiasts maintain that every family should live in a single home on a plot of not less than 7,500 square feet, which means six to seven homes per acre [2] or roughly 4,000 homes per square mile. The median number of persons per urban household in 1950 was 2.93. Thus a square mile would be inhabited by 10,720 persons.[3] The land area of Manhattan is 22.3 square miles. If the entire area were to be used only for one-family residences, 267,960 persons could dwell where 1,960,101 actually live. To provide "proper" housing, 1,692,141 persons would have to be removed which, even it if could be done, would create even more problems than would be solved. Moreover, all nonresidential functions would have to be abandoned and industry and business would be dislocated. The unfortunate residents of such a hypothetical Manhattan would find themselves without parks, hospitals, schools, churches, and shopping facilities—even without streets.

This example serves to emphasize the truism that cities are places of concentration, that dispersion has very narrow limitations, and that multiple dwellings and apartment houses are unavoidable concomitants of urban living. Purely financial considerations are equally convincing. In 1950 the number of urban dwellings amounted to 29,256,000 units. About four-fifths of them were made of wood and about one-third were over thirty years old,[4] which implies considerable depreciation and the necessity of replacement. A conservative assumption would be that at least 20 per cent of all urban

[1] *Our Cities,* National Resources Committee, p. 59.

[2] This is the density in the famous "Greenbelt" towns built as planned towns by the United States government.

[3] The population density for the entire United States is 50.7 persons per square mile.

[4] These two figures refer to conditions in 1936 as reported in *Our Cities,* p. 13. War and postwar factors aggravated the situation.

dwellings are either overcrowded or obsolete. Hence, about 6 million dwelling units should be replaced. If we do not count the additional dwellings which become necessary through the steady increase of households, and disregard the cost of repairs for the remaining 80 per cent of the units, the minimum financial outlay necessary to replace inadequate dwellings is approximately 60 billion dollars (taking $10,000 as the minimum cost of one dwelling unit). This is far in excess of the nation's financial strength. If such a building program could be carried out, it would cause a serious inflation and deplete our money resources to such an extent that it would impair production in other fields. It is doubtful whether we could produce enough steel, concrete, brick, and timber, and even if we could, there would still be a shortage of manpower. There are simply too few workers in the construction industry to build 6 million units in a comparatively short period. If, on the other hand, construction time is stretched, the number of buildings which become obsolete in the meantime would vitiate the entire undertaking. The errors of the past cannot be undone in a few years. Having shown what cannot be done, we shall try to find out what it is possible to achieve.

Objectives of Housing Policies. All housing policies have three main objectives: (1) to prevent the erection of substandard buildings, (2) to keep homes in a good state of repair, and (3) to prevent overcrowding. These goals can be largely achieved by legal and administrative measures. An effective building code and its strict enforcement are necessary, however. This may appear to be a simple task, but actually there are neither appropriate laws nor proper administration of existing regulations in many communities. Building codes usually incorporate minimum standard requirements minus the concessions which some powerful real-estate groups are able to wring from city councils. Some codes were enacted many years ago and are now outdated. Since many cities do not employ first-rate lawyers to draft their codes, their wording is sometimes a bewildering maze of equivocal and contradictory rules, permitting arbitrary interpretation. It is well known that the literal application of the law would mean ruin for many conscientious landlords, or at least cause them a considerable number of unnecessary expenditures. Consequently, the rules are seldom strictly enforced and, where corruption exists, officials close their eyes to manifest violations.

Effective Administration of Modern Building Regulations. Adequate drafting and administration of building codes will make it impossible to erect and maintain substandard buildings. They will not solve the main problem: to furnish everybody with a decent dwelling place. On the contrary, they will —in some respects—aggravate the existing housing shortage, because overcrowding will be banned and the construction of too-cheap, inadequate buildings will not be permitted. Good housing is expensive. Many families cannot afford to own a home. It is also true that the income of many persons is so low that they cannot rent adequate housing. Expenditures for rent in

the low economic brackets should not exceed 25 to 30 per cent of the net income. Assuming that the cost of a dwelling unit amounts to a minimum of $10,000, rent, which has to cover interest, profits, taxes, maintenance, and management, cannot be less than $75 per month and this cannot be paid by individuals having an income of less than $3,600 after taxes. There are now millions of people, sixty-five years and over, who have no other income than their social-security payments which, under the most favorable conditions, are barely more than the minimum rent as figured above. There are other millions who are gainfully employed but whose wages are below the level which permits them to rent a home of reasonable standards. The average person works 2,400 hours per year (computed at forty-eight hours per fifty weeks). If we accept the figure of $3,600 as the minimum income necessary for satisfactory housing, it follows that all those who work for an hourly wage of less than $1.50 (after taxes) must rent substandard living quarters. The situation is somewhat mitigated: in many families two persons are wage earners; single persons can rent satisfactory quarters for less than $75 a month; elderly couples who are homeowners and have paid off their mortgage can also manage with less. At present the situation is further confused because rent freezing has kept rents down.[5] But the fact remains that millions cannot afford decent homes. This is due to a variety of economic factors.

Rise of Tenancy. Homes as a regular market commodity appeared at a rather late stage. Houses were either self-built or, for a small minority, built to order by artisans. There were flourishing guilds of masons and carpenters in medieval cities but no entrepreneurs erected buildings for sale on the market; nor was there a sizable group of businessmen who rented homes to make a profit. Such instances occasionally occurred in the largest cities. Tenements first became a problem in ancient Rome. Toward the end of the Middle Ages we find greater numbers of tenants in larger cities. From the very beginning, familiar complaints about exploitation and the difficulties in obtaining houses were heard. The authorities intervened repeatedly. In 1470 Pope Paul II prohibited the eviction of tenants in Rome (save for default of rent or personal housing needs of the landlord). In 1562 the King of France released for one-quarter of the year a large group of Paris tenants from their obligation to pay rent. In 1564 the mayor of Madrid was empowered to fix the "just" rent for all leased homes.[6] But these instances were exceptional. As a rule, the urban dweller still owned his home. The situation changed for the worse during the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant rapid growth of cities. Tenements increased and homeownership declined until, in the largest cities, tenancy became the rule and ownership the excep-

[5] Thus, if we can believe the census, the median rent in the New York metropolitan area in 1950 was still as low as $42 a month.

[6] All examples taken from John W. Willis, "A Short History of Rent Control Laws," *Cornell Law Quarterly,* vol. 36, 1950.

tion. In the United States the ratio of homeowners is still much higher than in other fully industrialized countries, but is, of course, subject to wide variations. In 1940, of a total of 21,616,352 urban dwelling units, 7,714,960, or 37.5 per cent, were occupied by their owners.[7] However, in Hoboken, New Jersey (which is lowest in homeownership) only 12 per cent of the residents owned the houses in which they lived. In other communities the situation was even worse. In Vienna, for instance, 535,067 "parties" [8] lived in 43,895 buildings,[9] which meant a maximum ownership rate of less than 8 per cent, as compared with 19 per cent in New York City which, next to Hoboken, had the lowest percentage in the United States.

Lag in Industrialization. When "real estate" as a business came into being, housebuilding passed from the artisan to the entrepreneur. But, and this is another economic anomaly, the process of industrialization in housing construction has not been completed. The person who erects homes is ordinarily called a builder, not an industrialist, because he still is a "little" man confining his activities to a small number of housing units. There are, to be sure, some larger construction firms, but they build relatively few homes. There is no mass production for one of the most important mass commodities, housing. Technologically, the building industry is the most backward of all basic enterprises. Consequently, the great advantages of modern mass production, ample supply and low prices, are missing.

Another singular feature is the economics of land. It is the only commodity whose supply cannot be increased by man. As the population increases, and with it the demand for land, prices must rise and consequently housing becomes more expensive. Improved techniques can match higher labor costs with higher productivity; we can produce more capital and thereby lower the interest rates, and we can cut profits by competition, but the rise of land rents in an expanding economy cannot be prevented.

There are additional peculiarities. Land and buildings are immovable and, unlike other goods, cannot be shifted according to changing demands. They are the only mass-consumption goods which are not only expensive to acquire but also costly to maintain. Even their destruction is expensive.

Finally, building costs are rising. Stricter regulations concerning fire and health hazards necessitate the inclusion of items in the building program which did not exist in former times. In most cities legal stipulations forbid the use of an entire lot for a building. A considerable part must be left for air space, thereby reducing the available building area and the possible return from rent. Also, the wages of construction workers have increased more than the income of many other groups.

[7] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951,* pp. 729–730.

[8] That is, tenant families without counting lodgers.

[9] Figures for 1923. *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien, 1929.* Number of owner-occupied homes not given.

Lowering of Housing Standards. The increasing cost of housing has had effects which have received relatively little attention: living standards have been lowered and the process is still going on. For nearly a century practically no palace for private use has been erected in a European city. In the United States the process was delayed because the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of tycoons who copied the ways of European aristocracy. The end for America came with the First World War. However, rising building and maintenance costs are certainly not the only reasons for the decrease in construction of luxury housing. High taxes now make it difficult for even the richest to maintain former housing standards. However, the period of the "palaces" ended when taxes were still comparatively low. The less princely but still stately town houses, where the moderately wealthy used to live, also declined at the same time. Dwellings of the upper middle classes followed suit; large apartments were broken up and subdivided into smaller units. Recent luxurious city apartments rarely have more than six rooms; and new suburban de luxe one-family houses have scarcely more than eight rooms. Moreover, the building of individual homes according to special designs has been largely abandoned in favor of standard models. There are few who can afford to have their homes designed by Frank Lloyd Wright or some other renowned architect. As an economy measure, taste also has become standardized. This has tended to limit architects in their artistic opportunities and—through the commercialization of designs—hinders or delays the emergence of a new style representative of our period. Economy, however, has had some favorable effects. It has done away with many aberrations of taste for which the nineteenth century was notorious. The useless turrets and pillars, the horrid friezes, and other imitations of former periods have disappeared from contemporary architecture.

The lowering of housing standards has now reached the middle classes, the group which has been hardest hit by taxes and the redistribution of income. Their rooms have become smaller as well as fewer in number. Pantries and foyers have become rare. The dining room is disappearing and is replaced by breakfast nooks, dinettes, dining alcoves, and other euphemistic names for parts of the kitchen or the living room. The kitchen, once considered by prim parents as the proper place for naughty children, is more and more becoming the dining room for middle-class families. The reduction of rooms finds its logical limit in London's "service flats" and New York's "efficiency apartments," which consist of one room with cooking facilities and a bathroom. There are also hidden deteriorations of standards: cheaper material for one-family homes and curtailment of services in apartment houses. This has its social and cultural repercussions. Dinner is an important family function. All members meet around the table and the events of the day as well as family affairs or problems of general interest are discussed. If everybody is crammed into a "nook," the group breaks up as soon as the last dish has been

served. Chamber music, that unique phenomenon of Western civilization, had as its economic prerequisite a living room, large enough for up to eight players and an audience. The living rooms in many new apartments are too small for even a grand piano. Consequently, chamber music has become rarer and rarer as adequate "chambers" have decreased. A consideration of these circumstances leads to the search for measures which can be taken to improve the housing situation, to prevent further deterioration of standards, and to provide adequate homes for lower-income groups.

Problems of Improvement. Let us first deal with the extremists of both sides. According to one, free enterprise is the only solution; if there is something wrong, it is due to government interference, such as rent controls, public-housing subsidies, and other forms of interventionism. The very opposite view is held by dogmatic socialists. They maintain that capitalists produce for profit, not for use, that rents are unearned income and an exploitation of the worker, that at least all multiple dwellings should be nationalized and all construction should be planned and carried out by public agencies. Neither point of view is valid if closely examined. Free enterprise had its way for nearly three centuries. Some real-estate operators amassed fabulous fortunes, still others lost everything. Free enterprise succeeded in building luxury residences for the rich and comfortable homes for the well to do. Free enterprise probably satisfies the demand of the middle classes but at a price which is a strain on their budgets. Free enterprise has also produced some of the worst imaginable dwellings for the working classes; it did not invent the slums but it multiplied them. Free enterprise has been utterly incapable of building and operating inexpensive, satisfactory housing units; it does not even supply a sufficient number of dwellings. Free enterprise has nothing to offer for a very large segment of the urban population. It is also clear that the operations of speculators who ruin land values are no blessing, and that slum landlords who extort rents but withhold services are a threat both to their tenants and the community at large.

The fact that nationalization of housing is of no help has been amply demonstrated by the history of the last thirty years. The housing situation in Communist countries is, if anything, worse than in our own system. This is not only true of Russia (where the new government found already unbearable conditions) but of Czechoslovakia and other countries which have recently adopted Communism and where people are no better off than before. Socialistic planning has to confront the same problems as our own system: the scarcity of urban land and the high costs of building satisfactory homes. Socialists can confiscate the rent of the landlord but this gain is largely balanced by the higher operating costs which invariably accompany a bureaucratic administration.

It appears that there is no simple cure-all, and that not one but several policies have to be tried. There is no reason to interfere with private enter-

prise in the fields of luxury and upper-middle-class housing. Under ordinary circumstances the housing demands of these groups are fully met. Ingenuity of private builders and architects is bound to improve existing facilities and in due time some of the innovations will become accessible to people with lower incomes.

Cooperatives. For those who can afford to pay for a modest dwelling, but not at prices which woud be profitable for a private contractor, self-help is a device which has been rarely used in the United States. Housing cooperatives flourish in many European countries. They usually start as savings associations, acquire land, and finally develop buildings; sometimes the members do some of the work, thereby reducing the costs. Cooperative housing offers several financial advantages. If an entire area is developed, it is cheaper to buy one large site than many small ones. The simultaneous erection of many dwellings reduces the costs of building materials and permits the use of laborsaving construction procedures. Individual members save fees which would normally go to real-estate and mortgage brokers. These advantages can be easily lost if the officers of the cooperatives are inexperienced. It is therefore advisable either to get "sponsors" or to form national associations of cooperatives which can furnish experts at little expense. The latter method is widely used in several European countries. The National Housing Act distinguishes between "sales" and "management" cooperatives, otherwise known as "co-ventures" and "all-the-way cooperatives."

In the co-venture association members act collectively at one or several stages such as buying and developing the land, or constructing the houses. Those stages completed, such associations go out of business unless there are community facilities (water-distribution system, park or playground area, etc.) or other property owned in common by the entire membership. In the latter case the cooperative housing organization continues in existence to manage the facilities, or a new cooperative is formed for that purpose. In all the co-venture associations the individual member receives a fee-simple title to his dwelling once it is completed. "In the all-the-way cooperative, the whole property—dwellings and any community facilitates there may be—continues to be owned by the association. The member owns stock in the organization to the value of the particular dwelling he occupies, but never receives title to it; he has only a leasehold, for periods varying up to 99 years, or the right of 'perpetual use.' " [10]

Cooperatives are not very popular in America. There were no more than 160 in 1950; by that time they had built or nearly completed 22,000 dwelling units; their membership amounted to less than 25,000. It also seems that cost

[10] Florence E. Parker, *Cooperative Housing in the United States Mid-1950,* U.S. Department of Labor, Serial no. R. 2062 (reprinted in the *Monthly Labor Review,* September, 1951).

reductions were not spectacular. A two-bedroom dwelling with 810 square feet of living space averaged $11,000.[11] In Sweden, Great Britain, and some other countries the cooperatives are better organized, enjoy government support, and are quite successful.

In Holland a special type of "housing association" deviates from cooperatives in some ways; the tenants do not acquire ownership, nor are they in charge of the management; the associations remain owners and managers but on a nonprofit basis. At present there are more than 1,000 such associations. The building program is financed by the government but in an indirect, decentralized way. The capital is advanced by the local authority, which in turn is reimbursed by the government. But the local authority bears the risk. Loans for land purchase must be repaid in seventy-five years, loans for building construction in fifty years. The interest rate is usually equal to that for municipal bonds, at present 4 per cent. The associations are very successful and in 1947 owned almost 10 per cent of all dwellings. Most association homes are rented to workers.

One of the difficulties in setting up cooperatives is finding members. The easiest way is to organize members of already existing groups such as labor unions or employees of the same plant. Such projects were successfully carried out by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, CIO, and the United Workers Cooperative Association.

Housing Supplied by Employers. In an effort to keep rents at the lowest possible level and to supply additional dwellings where they are scarce, employers have sometimes built homes and rented them at cost to their employees. This is occasionally done by governments, colleges, and similar institutions, and to a larger extent, by industries. The latter have been of considerable help in many instances but there are limitations. Competitive enterprises cannot afford to invest large portions of their capital in anything which does not yield a return. They must either charge rents on a normal basis, in which case the worker does not benefit, or they must limit their building program. There is also the danger that management will use its position as a landlord to exert undue pressure upon its workers. Such was indeed the case with the Pullman Company, which built some of the earliest workers' communities. Although the accommodations were much better than those which the workers had before, the workers disliked the control by management; the venture was finally terminated, officially because of "legal" difficulties.[12] Experiences of workers in management-owned housing in mining and mill towns have led to even greater dissatisfaction on the part of workers. Recently managements have adopted more reasonable methods and overt conflicts rarely occur. But the most understanding employer cannot change

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] See Maurice R. Davie, *Problems of City Life,* 1932, pp. 164–165.

Table 25. Housing Census in the Netherlands, May, 1947

	Number	Per cent
Occupied by owner	573,871	28.0
Service dwellings	35,594	1.7
Private-tenanted houses	1,178,365	57.5
Local authority housing	67,000	3.3
Housing associations	189,282	9.2
Charitable institutions	5,891	0.3
	2,050,003	100

Source: *Housing Associations in the Netherlands,* Netherlands Government Information Service, 1951.

the fact that workers are under considerable pressure when their employer is their landlord. Very few can afford to lose their job and their dwelling at the same time.

Housing Legislation; Problems of Financing. It has taken a long time to impress people with the fact that some form of intervention by public agencies is necessary to cope with housing problems. Since some people still consider public housing a socialistic measure, it is well to remember that the first step in that direction was proposed by a Tory statesman, Sir Robert Peel. Indeed, only a few years ago, a stanch upholder of private enterprise, Senator Robert A. Taft, advocated Federal housing legislation in the United States. England took the legislative initiative, passing a law as early as 1851, but it was a long time before other countries followed suit: Belgium in 1893, France in 1894, Germany in 1895, Holland in 1901, Hungary in 1908, and Austria in 1910. All these laws have been replaced by more modern legislation; today there is no advanced country which has no housing laws. The most important Federal laws in the United States are the National Housing Act (1937), the National Housing Act Amendment (1938), the Housing Act of 1948, the Housing Act of 1949, and the Housing Act of 1950. In addition, individual states have their own housing legislation. The first Continental municipality which carried out a public-housing project (1876) in Europe was Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany).

Since the tremendous costs of public housing are among the most powerful arguments used by its opponents, it must be pointed out that some types of government intervention involve little or no expenditure. Tax reductions or tax exemptions for certain buildings fall in this category. Cities suffer no actual loss of revenue if they do not impose new taxes on remodeled and improved buildings. New housing projects, if they replace slum buildings, can be (and in some instances are) exempted from taxes for a number of years

if the landlord agrees in return to keep the rents at a certain low level. Instead of total tax exemption, partial reduction is sometimes sufficient to encourage new housing. Financing sometimes hampers construction and burdens the owner. The prospective buyer has to make a down payment in cash and obtains a mortgage to cover the remainder of the cost. Postwar legislation has provided—for veterans only—purchases without any down payments. Discussion of the problems resulting from the extension of such a policy to other buyers and of the question as to whether such would have adverse inflationary effects is beyond the scope of this book. Mortgages are usually granted by savings banks and insurance companies, which have to operate in accordance with sound banking principles. In other words, the interest rate on mortgages has to be considerably higher than the rate which banks pay on savings accounts so that their operating expenses, risks, and profits can be covered. In addition, moneylending institutions cannot afford to place all their capital in nonliquid assets, so they require amortization of loans in a shorter time than is warranted by the objective situation. Although the life span of a well-constructed frame building is at least sixty years, the mortgage normally has to be paid off within twenty years.

Let us examine the practical consequences of present housing financing.[13] At present most buyers of average homes will need a mortgage of $10,000. They have to pay $500 a year for twenty years as amortization, plus 5 per cent interest on the outstanding part of the loan. If the interest is due in advance, payments during the first year will be $500 in interest and an equal amount for amortization, bringing the total up to $1,000. Taxes, utilities, and upkeep will cost at least an additional $500. In the following years the interest will decrease, but this will soon be balanced by increasing costs for repairs and redecorating.[14] At any rate, ownership of a relatively modest home means a yearly expenditure of $1,500, which is more than most Americans can afford.

One way to alleviate the situation is to lengthen the duration of the mortgage. This has been done with great success in Sweden.[15] To amortize a loan in forty rather than in twenty years means a considerable reduction in yearly expenditures. To make loans available at 4 per cent rather than 5 per cent means another reduction. More people can buy and more homes can be built. If private banks cannot afford to make loans under these conditions, there is another way out. The government can raise the money by floating

[13] For the sake of brevity the following example is simplified. Actual payments vary according to market conditions, regions, and different policies of mortgage companies.

[14] For actual conditions in 1951 see Solomon Shapiro, "Purchasers' Income and New Home Financing," *Monthly Labor Review,* July, 1951. Various types of government-assisted loans helped the buyers. Yet the lowest average monthly payment for all mortgaged houses in fifteen metropolitan areas amounted to $45.10 (Miami) or $541.20 per year.

[15] See Leonard Silk, *Sweden Plans for Better Housing,* Durham, N.C., 1948.

bonds at 3.5 per cent or less. But there is no need to set up a government agency for granting the mortgages. These agencies, as experience shows, are slow and expensive. Such mortgages could be handled by private institutions which would receive the difference between what the government and what the borrower has to pay. The loans would be insured, just as savings accounts are now insured; the government would formulate the lending policies and the banks would be responsible for their observance. Extension or restriction of these loans would control deflationary or inflationary tendencies. As such mortgage loans balance the government's bonds, there would be no increase of public debt.

Subsidies. These and similar devices can stimulate building activities and are of substantial help to marginal middle-class people who otherwise could not afford to own a home. Slum tenants and low-income earners need more; we have to face the fact that some forms of public subsidies and consequently public expenditures are inevitable. These subsidies again can be of several types. One way, for instance, is to pay a cash sum for rent directly to the tenant. This is done in the case of relief recipients. There is no doubt that this kind of subsidy is undesirable and ineffective. Without rent control, the slum landlord, aware of the new income of his tenants, will raise the rent. Slums will be promoted because the rent returns are thus guaranteed by the government. The correct policy is not to keep the rents up but to keep them down by subsidies. One ingenious method, by which neither the tenant nor the landlord receives any money, was incorporated in the Housing Act of 1949 and helps to eliminate slums and also to reduce rents for new buildings. The municipality buys the slum land and, after all dwellings have been demolished, resells the building plots to any trustworthy builder at a reduced price. The builder may be a public agency or a private individual. The rent reduction is possible because the builder saves the expenditures (including considerable interest during the demolition) for razing the old homes and he acquires the land at a reduced price. Since the costs of land are a prime factor in the determination of rent, the latter can be substantially lowered. The expenditures for the subsidy are divided between the Federal government and the city on a 2 to 1 basis: for each $1 spent by the city the Federal government grants $2.[16] While this method represents the most modern approach to slum clearance and low-rent housing, its practical application unfortunately is limited. Apart from technical difficulties, it presupposes substantial financial sacrifices on the part of the cities at a time when most of them are in difficulties, and still larger contributions by the government, for which Congress declines to make sufficient appropriations. In some countries money for public housing is raised through government-controlled lotteries. American

[16] "Any city that does not take advantage of this redevelopment opportunity is foolish." Charles K. Agle, "Housing and Urban Redevelopment," in G. Breese and D. Whiteman (eds.), *An Approach to Urban Planning, Princeton,* 1953.

public opinion makes similar ventures impossible, although the nation wastes several billions yearly in diverse types of gambling.

Another technique for reducing rents in public-housing projects is the rental of the ground floors to stores, which pay full rent, including reasonable profits on the investment, thereby reducing the losses in renting residential



FIG. 12. Combination of apartments and a restaurant (Vienna). (*From a pamphlet issued by the City of Vienna.*)

apartments. This practice also has other advantages. It helps to decentralize business and thereby ease traffic congestion in business areas. Housewives can shop in the building where they live. Public resistance to the combination of residence and business is—at least in low-cost housing projects at public expense—wholly unwarranted. Other countries have no such objections. The city of Marseilles recently erected a fourteen-story building for 330 families. Its architect is one of the protagonists of modern architecture, Le Corbusier (Pierre Jeanneret). The building, known as "Cité Radieuse," is practically self-contained, for it includes, besides apartments, a complete shopping

center, gymnasium, swimming pool, motion-picture theater, a clinic, and a restaurant.[17] Less radical projects have had great success, for instance, in England and Austria.

"Limited-dividend housing" has been advocated as a means of solving the housing problems of the middle classes; it embodies a combination of private enterprise and public assistance. Some states, for instance, New York, have legal provisions promoting such projects. In the decade from 1920 to



FIG. 13. Cooperative project built with the assistance of New York State. Bell Park Manor Terrace, Queens, N.Y. (*From New York State Builds Lives and Homes, published by the State of New York, Division of Housing, 1952.*)

1930 some 5,800 families were thus accommodated in New York. The depression ended these ventures. After the Second World War the state tried to encourage limited-housing projects. Under the New York law the rents are subject to the approval of the State Commissioner of Housing and are limited to a 6 per cent return on the investment. The owner is exempted from all state taxes and fees and can apply to the city for tax exemptions for a specific period; but the exemption is granted only for the value of the improvements, while taxes on the value of the property as it existed before the new development must be paid; thus the city suffers no tax loss. The housing is privately financed and receives no subsidies or loans from public agencies.

[17] Despite Le Corbusier's great prestige, some features have been bitterly criticized by experts, for instance, whether it was a good idea to locate the shopping center on the seventh and eighth floors.

Private capital has not shown much interest in this kind of investment. But some unions are taking advantage of the law; two cooperatives (to which the law also applies) have availed themselves of this opportunity: Bell Park Gardens and Bell Park Manor Terrace, both in Queens, New York. The Bell Park Gardens is a cooperative project for 800 veterans' families who built under auspicious circumstances. Labor pledged maximum productivity. Builders limited their profits to a maximum of 7½ per cent and shared all profits between 5½ and 7½ per cent with the veterans. Bankers furnished mortgages at 3½ per cent, which at that time was about ½ per cent below the general market. The veterans had to make down payments of approximately $240 per room, their monthly carrying charges (as of 1951), including mortgage, interest and amortization, taxes, and maintenance, averaged $14.09 per room.[18] Although other projects would cost somewhat more, the proposition is still most advantageous and, at any rate, considerably below the rents even in public-housing projects. While this is being written, the New York City Committee on Slum Clearance Plans is trying to obtain Federal funds of 35 million dollars for a project, housing about the same number of families (840) as the veterans' cooperative. Of course the project is more expensive, involving the clearance of three blocks near New York University Medical Center and consisting of five fourteen-story buildings. But with the assistance of Federal and city funds rents are "estimated" at an average of $31 a room or $124 for a four-room apartment.[19]

Housing for Substandard Income Groups. However, it is clear that all such housing plans are of no benefit to the many recipients of substandard incomes who cannot even afford to pay rents on a cost basis. Unless these people continue to live in slums and to create new ones, the difference between what they can pay and the actual cost of their rent must be borne by the public. Although this proposition is under heavy attack, no other plan has been offered by its opponents. But we have to realize that the high costs of building and the limited means of municipalities, states, and the Federal government remain serious obstacles.

Production Problems. Thus we return to our proposition that the economic factor—the high costs of building—is the core of the housing problem. We have seen that some techniques lead to a reduction of costs, but the savings are too small to make a complete eradication of slums possible and the replacement of all obsolete dwellings within a reasonable time financially feasible. To stretch a building program over too long a period leaves many families without adequate housing; moreover, there is the danger that more buildings will become obsolete than can be erected during the same time. The obvious question is whether excessive building costs are inherent or

[18] All data from the pamphlet *Within This Framework,* State of New York, Division of Housing, 1951.

[19] *The New York Times,* June 22, 1953.

whether something can be done to lower them. In theory, there is not the slightest doubt that costs could be substantially lowered but the practical difficulties are enormous. These difficulties are not technological in nature but psychological. Ignorance, even stupidity, shortsighted policies of pressure groups, and an attitude of apathy by the population are barriers which are nearly impossible to remove.

The so-called capitalistic system, whatever its shortcomings, has achieved something which no other system ever has: it produces more goods, cheaper goods, and (with some exceptions) better goods than any other known form of production. For the first time in history, advanced countries (if not prevented by political catastrophes) can provide all necessary commodities for everybody. In some paradoxical instances we produce in excess of possible demand and producers cannot sell even at a loss. There is no secret about the reasons for this success: high productivity, coupled with low costs, is the result of mass production, the employment of machines, scientific organization and management of production, and the employment of labor- and time-saving methods.

As a result, the real income of the masses has risen spectacularly and the results would be even more striking if it were not for the fact that housing is the only major item in the budget of the common man which has become more expensive. While capitalism has succeeded in multiplying industrial and agricultural productivity, it has failed significantly to do so in producing homes. The reason is, as we shall presently see, that building is still largely precapitalistic, notwithstanding some exceptions. Capitalism replaced the artisan by the industrialist, the workshop by the factory; it developed the national and international market to the advantage of the consumer; it created mass products for mass consumption. There are no building factories, no national housing markets, and no mass production of homes.

However, these obstacles could be overcome by a modern reorganization of the building industry. Under present conditions almost every group concerned with the building of homes is in some way responsible for the lack of modernization.

There is first the large-scale entrepreneur, a characteristic figure in capitalism. His function is the initiation and operation of huge ventures which serve the public by supplying more goods than before. But with very few exceptions there is no such large-scale entrepreneur in building. While the names of such figures in mining and oil, in railroads, shipping, and aviation, in the steel, automotive, chemical, and textile industries are well known, it would be difficult for the outsider to name a single "big" businessman in building. There are, however, some building concerns which control a substantial capital, operate like other industries, and specialize in construction. Most of them concentrate on the creation of plants, office structures, giant de luxe apartment houses, and public buildings.

Ordinary apartment houses and one-family dwellings are still mostly built by local contractors, "the little man" in business. They have very little and nearly always insufficient capital. They need credit from banks and from the producers of raw materials and, since a home before its completion is not a sound basis for credit, they have to pay high interest rates to compensate for risks. Under these circumstances they can build only a few homes a year, and consequently the profit margin must be considerably higher than if they could produce thousands or more units annually. Manufacturers of building materials refuse to sell directly to the single contractor because they are too insignificant as individual customers to warrant factory sales. So they have to buy from middlemen, which again increases the costs. As weak capitalists who cannot delay the return of their investment and cannot stand the effects of a strike, they are no equal party in bargaining with well-organized unions. Their labor costs are therefore considerable. Their lack of capital makes the employment of expensive machines difficult and, as machines do not save much unless used for mass production, unprofitable. Bulldozers and concrete mixers are about the only machines which small builders can use; most of the work has to be done by hand, which is both expensive and inefficient. When the costs of all individual factors of production are excessively high, the price of the product must also be high.

To some degree, manufacturers of raw materials are also operating on a comparatively restricted production basis. Timber, brick, concrete, glass, and wallpaper are provided mostly by small and middle-sized enterprises and their goods are more expensive than necessary.

Labor is another source of excessively high costs in housing. Construction workers' wages are among the highest paid to skilled workers. That this is partially a reflection of a bargaining-power situation is indicated by the wages paid to construction workers building federally financed houses, as contrasted to private-building projects. In the former the average hourly earnings in 1950 were $1.74, while private builders, in a weaker bargaining position, had to pay $2.03.[20] These are average earnings of all construction workers, including the much lower-paid unskilled laborers. Skilled workers earn much more. For instance, bricklayers in Albuquerque, New Mexico, New York, and Pittsburgh earned as much as $3.20, in Newark, New Jersey, even $3.50 per hour.[21] Workers point out that they need high wages because they are seasonally unemployed and that their earnings should be measured in terms of their yearly income. The problem of "just wages" cannot be discussed here. The costs of homes are computed on the basis of hourly wages, not of total yearly income. The fact remains that nonconstruction workers (who are a huge majority) pay, hidden in the sales price or rents, higher wages to the construction workers than the latter pay for the goods which they buy.

[20] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951,* p. 203.

[21] As of October, 1951, U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin, Executive 2420, Oct. 30, 1951.

High labor building costs are, above all, borne by the working classes. However, this is a phenomenon inherent in our system of price formation.

There are additional building practices which increase costs and cannot be defended with any argument save that the free play of egoism is the correct economic policy. The following practices are particularly obnoxious:

1. Resistance against laborsaving methods. In an obviously defensive statement, the research director of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL, declared that his union "has never halted or obstructed technological change; but we believe it should not be ushered in as a whim of the moment—willy-nilly." Technological changes should not depend on the consent of interest groups which may consider such changes disadvantages.[22]

2. Featherbedding. In many instances unions insist on the employment of workers who do no useful job. In other instances contractors are forced to hire highly paid skilled workers for jobs which could be performed by unskilled workers at much lower rates.

3. Low productivity. The productivity of the workers has substantially increased in nearly all industries. In the building trade, productivity is lower than in former times. For instance, in some localities unions prevent painters from using brushes wider than 4 inches, but in other places brushes of 6½ inches are used, thus shortening the working time. The most revolting abuse is the reduction in bricklaying. A bricklayer can, without any physical strain, lay at least 800 bricks a day, and this was the normal rate before the Second World War. Since then workers have refused in many instances to lay more than 400 bricks a day.[23] Building costs have consequently soared and construction time, during which the overhead costs pile up, is much too long. What can be done with modern production methods and a more reasonable attitude on the part of workers has been demonstrated by the recent completion of a ten-story apartment house in Mannheim, Germany. It was started in August, 1952, and by mid-December the tenants had moved in. The structure was completed in thirty-five days, or seven working weeks. All the work was done by forty workers. The cost per apartment—two to three and one-half rooms—averaged approximately $2,000, which—with due consideration to differences in living costs and wage scales—is extremely low.

4. Jurisdictional disputes. As construction is not industrialized, there are also no industrial unions. Workers are organized in craft unions and every union jealously guards its special monopoly. New York's Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, an active member of the American Labor Party, once remarked that he could not build in New York without running into jurisdictional troubles. A leading socialist newspaper in Europe reported that in Ireland the short-

[22] *Survey Graphic,* April, 1944, p. 212.

[23] See also Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, *American Urban Communities,* New York, 1951, p. 390.

sighted policies of labor unions made slum clearance in Dublin impossible. Even worse than jurisdictional disputes are agreements between various craft unions protecting one another. They force the contractor to hire laborers from other unions for work which they could do themselves.

The attitude of the public is another contributing factor. The irrational aversion of the upper and middle classes against prefabricated homes induced many communities to adopt building regulations forbidding the use of prefabricated material in all better residential sections. The lower classes are guilty of apathy and unwillingness to join organizations for better and cheaper housing.

Prefabricated Homes. In concluding this review of high building costs, some remarks about prefabrication are appropriate. After the end of the Second World War, the appearance of prefabricated homes was greeted as the solution of all housing problems. There was great disappointment when it turned out that prefabricated homes were hardly cheaper than old-fashioned ones and that in many cases their quality was poor. Prefabrication was a new venture at a time when raw materials of good quality were scarce and expensive. As with all innovations, initial mistakes were inevitable but the successes should not be overlooked. An example is Pleasantville, a low-cost rental housing project for Negroes in Houston, Texas. The project consists of forty-two prefabricated buildings containing 197 units of two-bedroom apartments and was completed in less than five months. The houses are not too impressive but are incomparably better than the slums in which the Negroes had lived. The apartments rent for $10 a week.

Prefabrication itself is only the initial stage in building. The prefabricated parts have to be shipped to and assembled on a building site. The shipment of individual units involves high freight expenses and the subsequent assembling of the parts requires high labor costs. Moreover, substantial savings by prefabrication depend on mass production. The manufacturers of prefabricated homes control only moderate capital, their output is low, and their prices are still too high. In 1950 a total of 1,396,000 urban construction units were started. Of these, 55,000 dwellings were built with prefabricated materials.[24] This is a far cry from mass production. Sizable cost reductions can be expected only if parts are prefabricated for hundreds of thousands of buildings, if they are shipped in quantity, and if a whole area is developed at the same time.

Changing Building Methods. Formerly, nearly the entire plot was built upon; the results were homes without sufficient air and sunlight. Modern codes permit only partial use of lots for building purposes. Houses and

[24] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951,* p. 709, and "Build Better, Build Sooner with Prefabrication," leaflet, Prefabricated Home Manufacturers' Institute, Washington, D.C., 1951.

streets now get enough light and air but the costs and rents per unit are much higher.[25]

The Slum Begins from Within. Because of outdated methods of small contractors, many apartments are built in a way which is satisfactory only if high-quality, expensive materials are used. Plastered ceilings and painted or papered walls are very pleasant if the apartments are redecorated at short intervals. If this cannot be done, the plaster falls, the paint cracks, the wallpaper is torn, and the apartment deteriorates and becomes slummy. Oak floors can be beautiful but they are also expensive. Floor boards need scraping, scrubbing, waxing, and polishing, and even then they accumulate dust and dirt. The ordinary housewife has no time to do all these things, and again the result is deterioration. If building were done by large industries, we would have research laboratories which could develop more modern types of materials suitable for ceilings, walls, and floors, which are dust-resistant, easy to clean, and pleasant in appearance. If prefabricated on the assembly line, they also would be less expensive. Windows are an interesting case of "institutional resistance." The prevailing types of windows in apartment houses are impossible to wash without calling in professional cleaners with safety belts. The family is burdened with unnecessary expenses and windows often remain unwashed. French windows and similar types, prevalent in Europe, can be easily cleaned because they open into the room. But the public dislikes them on wholly irrational grounds.

Much poor housing is attributable to the necessarily abortive attempts of the middle- and lower-income groups to emulate the wealthy. Cheap imitations of period furniture, mostly too bulky, reduce the functional size of rooms. They are also difficult to clean and are dust collectors. The decorating habits, not only of the masses but of large middle-class groups, are detri-

[25] The effect of modern building codes on rent may be illustrated by the remarks of a real-estate investor who bought a New York skyscraper office building, erected before restrictions became effective: "Mr. G. said: 'Buildings erected before the present building laws and zoning requirements came into effect offer the best opportunities for successful real estate investment in New York. There is no better example than the building I have just purchased and resold. Here is a building of approximately 300,000 square feet which now rents for $950,000 or substantially $3.00 a square foot. The building has no setback and goes right up to twenty-one stories without a break. No similar building on a plot of 21,500 square feet could be erected without setbacks and in the twenty-one stories we have here we would under the new regulations have a building of not over 200,000 square feet. Incidentally, under the zoning regulations upper floors are always the smaller floors so this building carries with it the irrevocable license of 100,000 square feet of additional space and this space is all upper floor space. Due to increased cost of construction buildings today cannot be effected for less than $4.50 to $5.00 a square foot.' There is also a tremendous income leverage in 42 Broadway with its low rent base. An increase in rents from $3.00 to $3.50 per square foot (still considerably under the market as regards the newer buildings) will add $150,000 to the annual income." (*The New York Times,* June 21, 1951.)

mental to sensible modes of living, to say nothing of being in deplorable taste. Walls are adorned with pictures of actresses and baseball heroes torn from magazines, or they serve as ancestral galleries, filled with photographs of relatives. "Occasional" tables and other useless furniture keep people from moving freely in rooms where they are supposed to live. Rooms are crammed with souvenirs, knickknacks, vases, palm leaves, feathers, dried flowers (all welcome objects for destructive children). Goldfish, canaries, and cats claim the rest of the room. Thus the modern urban dweller exists in a home which is often less spacious and frequently more uncomfortable than the cave of his early ancestors. Some education in interior decoration and home life on the high school level would be of great help and should convince people that homes are made for human beings, not for furniture and adornments.

Aesthetic Values. This leads us to the much broader subject of the aesthetic values inherent in urban living and housing.[26] It is quite wrong to believe that these matters have nothing to do with social problems. In the first place, ugly surroundings are not conducive to a healthy home life. The urban masses do not love their homes; they spend their spare time elsewhere, to the detriment of family life and social relationships with friends. Second, taste is more than a pleasing gift; it is a state of mind. Even simple civilizations which never produced anything remarkable display good taste in their buildings, folklore, songs, dances, and ritual music. But no other civilization, no other period, has experienced such an orgy of tastelessness as our own contemporary culture. It indicates that the modern urban population is no longer sure of its own ground, and is oriented either to a time which is forever gone or a way of life which is attainable only for very few. Style is to culture what personality is to man. It is something unique and can be neither duplicated nor copied.

Finally, aesthetic values cannot be neglected because art in all its manifestations is the crowning achievement of all higher civilizations. A civilization has to produce more than material goods. Life becomes meaningless if oriented only toward necessities. However, after more than fifty years of rebellion against an inept eclecticism and vulgarities in taste, artists have finally succeeded in creating a style which is an expression of our own culture. There are many variations of this style, which is usually called "functionalism." The term is equally applicable to buildings, furniture, works of applied art, and interior decoration. The new style is less a product of original creativity than a child, begotten by artistic integrity and poverty. The reduced means of public and private builders no longer permit expenses for extraneous parts which served no useful purposes, such as spires, turrets, and telamones. On the other hand, artists revolted against the thoughtless employment of styles whose forms were borrowed while their spirit was irre-

[26] Urban sociology so far has neglected the problem. The most notable exceptions are the writings of James Ford and Svend Riemer.

trievably lost. But modern artists have displayed a lack of ingenuity in finding new forms adequate for our society. Sometimes the lack of ideas has been quite frankly admitted. So some architects began to strip buildings of all ornamentation, thereby arriving at a bare structure which merely fulfilled the utilitarian function for which it was erected. As an expression of honesty, this deserves our respect. But more extreme claims have been advanced: functionalism per se is considered as beautiful and all nonfunctional elements are considered as unartistic. This view is unacceptable, not on the ground of an individual value judgment but on the basis of historical evidence. All older styles have abounded with nonfunctional elements, be it the elaborately carved capitals of the Greek pillars, the gargoyles of the Gothic, the stone saints at the doors of the churches, or the luxuriant ornamentation of the Baroque. A railroad station which is built as a Moorish castle is a monstrosity but, on the other hand, it does not become an artistic masterpiece because it looks like a railroad station. To the sociologist it is also important that functionalism in its most radical form is not only rejected by the general public but has become an object of ridicule. This demonstrates that, contrary to exaggerated claims, these stark functional styles are not representative of our contemporary civilization.

The new style has scored its greatest triumphs in the field where one specific function, utility, is preponderant: in the creation of office buildings, hotels, sanitoriums, and factories. The American office skyscraper in its mature form is a work of beauty, and we may expect that it will stand the only objective test to which artistic creation is subject: the test of time. Similarly, functionalism has succeeded in producing furniture, rugs, and other household implements which in the opinion of all experts are perfect works of applied art. This is particularly true of the style which in this country is called "Swedish."

In the field of residential homes functionalism has been less successful. The evolution of the new style is still not completed and it is too early to come to a final evaluation. Meanwhile we have to build and to satisfy the more conservative masses. Regardless of the merits of functionalism, there is no reason to discourage those who do not like the new style from building in a traditional way. There is a fundamental difference between copying dead styles, which was done from 1860 to 1910 on a wholesale basis, and adhering to forms which have grown out of the culture of the country. Most of the homes in Sweden, Denmark, or Switzerland are not functional; they are Swedish, Danish, or Swiss. But they are pleasant and in good taste. Similarly, some of the early American types are still quite suitable for present purposes. In addition, the American West, especially California, has developed some types such as ranch houses, which are at least adequate and acceptable to the masses of homeowners and do not offend the taste of the sophisticated.

The problem of housing is not solved by building individual homes which satisfy reasonable standards of health, "livability," and taste. In an urban environment houses, like people, are in need of integration. The beauty of a city is not the beauty of single homes but that of the ensemble, which includes not only harmoniously coordinated homes but also the arrangement of the streets. This task needs more than the separate efforts of individual architects. The job of coordination and integration is part of planning, which can be done only by an agency in which public authority has been vested.

Chapter 22

PLANNING

There are two primary types of planning: physical planning (which deals with spatial patterns, land use, building, and communication lines) and social planning (which tries to establish a communion of all groups living together).

Systematic planning on a scientific basis is of recent date but some kind of planning existed since the first city was built.[1] Prehistorical sites show a clearly discernible design: the royal palace and the temple form the center toward which a system of streets leads from all directions. Their size is defined by the city walls; roads connect the place with other communities. The careful planning of Roman cities is well known. As the same design appears in all Roman colonial places, we may assume that some central planning agency trained and instructed the builders of new places. The Romans are also renowned for their excellent road system; their aqueducts represent the earliest known public utilities. They also provided their cities with recreational facilities: arenas and baths. The medieval cities abounded in regulations without which life in the more congested places would have been unbearable. These ordinances concerned such things as building codes, garbage disposal, water supply, use of the commons, and the like. While these things were usually done on a primitive level, there are a number of instances which show elaborate planning. In 1180, for example, Cologne made plans for an expansion of the city; the circular border-communication lines, which were part of the plan, served their purpose until 1882.

Social planning—the deliberate foundation of an urban place—is also very old although the first social purposes—mostly military and economic in character—bear no similarity to what is now the foremost concern of social planners: social reform. The Greeks and Phoenicians planned their colonies for the sake of commerce; the Romans planned military citadels; Alexander planned Alexandria as a symbol of his grandeur, Constantine rebuilt Byzantium as the administrative center of his empire. In the era of absolutism, kings planned residential cities with their palaces as the core.

[1] With the following compare Cecil Stewart, *A Prospect of Cities: Being Studies towards a History of Town Planning,* London, 1952. The book contains some rare plans, maps, and pictures of planned towns.

The early history of America is rich in examples of planned cities of all types. The outstanding example of social planning in the modern sense is Philadelphia, whose very name implies the lofty aims of its founder. Religious ideas (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania), nationality groups (Germantown, Pennsylvania; Holland, Michigan), and social movements (New Harmony, Indiana) have inspired the founding of American cities, perhaps to a larger degree than elsewhere. In physical planning, Washington, D.C., represents one of the earliest planned cities of the modern world.

In the Renaissance, architects, most of them Italians, began to develop "ideal" cities, utopian concepts which were mostly oriented toward military considerations and which bear little semblance to modern thought. Among these utopians were some of the greatest masters of their time, for instance, Palladio, Vasari, and da Sangallo. Nothing came from these speculations save the foundation of a fortress town, built by the Venetians on their eastern frontier as a protection against the Turks. This town, Palmanova, was planned by one of Venice's great architects, Scamozzi, and was the only attempt to translate the ideas of Renaissance planning into reality. The town still exists; the fundamental design and the street patterns are preserved, but it never assumed any importance.

The Industrial Revolution brought an end to comparative stability with the sudden growth of manufacturing cities; the emergence of a destitute class of urban laborers found the city administrations entirely unprepared and unconcerned with the problem which they presented. Slums became a mass phenomenon, cities expanded in a planless way, and suburbs of all varieties sprang up at random. It was some time before the rich found the squalor offensive and the conscience of social reformers broke through the walls of apathy and indifference. Planning has since grown into a full-fledged science. Every large city has a planning board, but the results of misplaced laissez-faire policies cannot be wiped out in a few years. In spite of "master" plans, we are still in the process of partial planning. The time for nationwide, coordinated planning in the United States has yet to come.

Early Planning Ideas: The Garden City. When the intolerable conditions of modern industrial cities could be ignored no longer, some reformers favored radical solutions which would have meant the end of all cities in the traditional sense. One of the earliest plans constituted a total "redevelopment" of cities. In 1849 John Silk Buckingham published a book entitled *National Soils and Practical Remedies,* which advocated the most radical decentralization of urban habitats. What Buckingham had in mind was a system of central or parent cities with "colonies" or satellite towns. Factories and all nuisance businesses (stockyards and cattle markets) would be located outside the city. The central cities were to cover an area of 1 square mile and the population was not to exceed 10,000. If that plan could have been carried out, Great Britain would have destroyed all her cities and be-

come a country of thousands of small towns. Since this is a consequence which escapes the attention of some modern advocates of complete decentralization, it is well to envisage the cultural catastrophe which would ensue if London were reduced to 10,000 inhabitants. While nothing came from the idea to relocate the entire urban population, similar but more realistic plans were advanced, namely, to withdraw parts of the population from overcrowded cities and to build planned communities for them, combining the advantages of urban and rural life. At first these new settlements were conceived as economic entities, consisting of food-producing farms, factories, and residences, but the actual outcome was the creation of residential suburbs. The protagonist of the idea was Ebenezer Howard,[2] who became the father of what is known now as the "garden city." Some of Howard's propositions were too radical to be acceptable to some of his followers. He advocated something which could be called "communal socialism." The land of the garden city was to be owned not by individuals but by the community, which thus would receive all profits gained from increase in land values. Howard's plan resulted in the founding of the "First Garden City, Limited" (1902). That corporation built the first town of this type, Letchworth, about 35 miles from London. Another town, Welwyn, where building began in 1921, may serve as an example of the extent to which Howard's ideas were capable of realization.

The site of Welwyn is divided into fairly two equal parts by a main railway, with secondary railways branching on either side. The two central bridges over the main railway govern the basic structure of the town plan; the roads on either side are articulated to them. The land on the eastward side of the railway was allocated to industrial development. The civic, shopping and commercial portions of the town were centered on the western side of the main railway; this was as far as possible screened by rows of trees. Around these nuclei were planned the residential areas. In laying out the residential area, much use has been made of "closes" or culs-de-sac; they provide privacy and do not require heavy road construction. [The town is surrounded by] agricultural belts which will never be built on. The rural belt is, in normal times, largely devoted to the production of milk, dairy produce, vegetables, fruit and poultry for the town.[3]

Welwyn has a population of 21,000, living in 4,396 houses; the recreation grounds cover 600 acres; there are thirty-six shops, one theater, one motion-picture house, twelve churches, and twenty-eight sports clubs.

Letchworth and Welwyn seem to be the only towns approximating Howard's conception. Other towns, going by the name of garden cities, are simply middle- or upper-class residential suburbs, beyond the city limits but within commuting distance, built on large garden lots, and permitting no industry

[2] Ebenezer Howard, *Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform,* London, 1898, republished under the title *Garden Cities of Tomorrow,* 3d ed., London, 1945.

[3] Excerpts from *Buildings of Britain,* British Information Services (no date).

or business establishments save shopping centers; as a rule they are restricted to one-family homes.

Industry-centered Developments. Another type of planned city is the industry-centered development, distinguished from the typical factory town by the reform tendencies of its founders. Two of them gained world-wide reputation: Bournville and Port Sunlight. In both cases the initiators were religious men who tried to translate the preachings of the gospel into social action. Bournville was founded in 1879 by the Cadburys, a Quaker family, who were engaged in the manufacturing of chocolate. They moved their factory from Birmingham to a countryside, about 5 miles from the city, and built spacious houses for workers, with the provisions that three-fourths of the lots must be free from building structures and that at least one-tenth of the land (not counting roads and gardens) should be reserved for parks and recreation grounds. No attempts were made to impose authority or paternalism on the workers. The land is owned by a trust and homes are also rented to people who do not work for the Cadbury firm. Port Sunlight was founded in 1888 by William Lever, whose soapworks are now among the leading firms of the world. He too moved his factory from a city, Warrington, to the country and built garden homes for his workers. Both experiments have been highly successful. They won much praise but counterparts were rare.

In the United States, according to the National Resources Committee, there were in 1939 144 planned communities of all types. About half were industrial developments, about twenty-five were built by the government, one-fourth by private enterprise, and a few by social agencies. Among the best-known factory towns is Hershey, Pennsylvania; among the government projects, the three "Greenbelts" in Maryland, Ohio, and Wisconsin; among the social experiments, Forest Hills Gardens in New York, planned by the Russell Sage Foundation. The first project of the pure garden-city type was Radburn, New Jersey. The project aimed socially at the establishment of a real community and physically at patterns which would reduce motor traffic to a minimum. The Great Depression made it impossible to carry out the entire plan and high expectations were not fulfilled. Radburn is now a pleasant residential suburb in the New York metropolitan region, with a population of less than 2,500, while its founders envisaged 25,000 residents.

Garden Cities No Solution. After the initial enthusiasm had abated, it became clear that the newly founded garden city, based on total planning, was not the solution of city problems but merely an escape by a privileged minority. The factory-centered ones have certain advantages (if the administration is controlled by the residents and management cannot exert pressure). This type disperses some industries, relieves congestion in the workingmen's zone, and provides decent quarters for lower-income groups. As the residents live where they work, they save the costs of transportation and ease traffic and

transportation problems in the city. All this means relief but not a general solution, since it is impossible to move all major industries from large cities to small specialized towns. A total decentralization of industries is neither feasible nor desirable.

The "real" garden cities are no help to existing cities. The wealthy people leave the cities to live in uncongested areas with satisfactory building conditions. While they continue to draw their income from the city, this income is now largely spent elsewhere. The city loses taxes because the exodus causes a decrease in land values, which affects primarily the best areas. As garden-city residents work in the city, they have to commute. If they go by car they increase traffic congestion in the city. If they use public conveyances, which are so often subsidized by the city, they receive subsidies without contributing to them. The effect on community life is equally undesirable. Leading men in the professions and in business leave the city after their work, thus depriving themselves of the right and the opportunity to participate in public affairs. Some persons who, by character, education, and experience, should hold public offices in cities are disqualified because they live elsewhere. As has been demonstrated in a previous chapter, it is impossible to house the entire urban population in one-family homes on lots of 7,500 square feet. It is equally impossible to house them on still larger plots plus gardens.

Routine Physical Planning. Thus the chief burden of creating sound urban conditions remains with the cities. At present the major part of their activities is physical planning, which in many instances is nothing more than administration on a larger scale and on a more rational basis than was formerly the case. This kind of planning can be roughly divided into three main components: areas, communications, and services. To begin with the latter, proper planning determines what steps are necessary to serve the city as completely and as economically as possible. These services mainly concern schools, parks, playgrounds, sewers, garbage collection and disposal, and utilities, if provided by the city. Communication planning concerns the street system, provisions for transportation, and the traffic problem. Area planning is divided into two parts: conservation and redevelopment. Conservation is the protection and preservation of satisfactory areas; redevelopment aims at the rehabilitation of deteriorating or substandard areas, above all, the elimination of slums.

The usual urban planning procedure is about as follows: [4] A planning commission is set up and a town planner is appointed. An inventory of the state of the community is made with the use of city maps, statistics, tax assessments, and census material and is checked by actual field inspections. The next step is to determine the desirable goals. A master plan is devised

[4] This is, of course, merely a scheme, outlining the logical phases of a complete planning program.

and a highly theoretical program is formulated which cannot be carried out within a reasonably short time. Therefore partial measures are recommended which will remove some of the existing shortcomings.

This kind of planning has had excellent results in small, well-kept communities, especially in high-class residential suburbs outside the city limits. It is of great help in fending off the encroachment of slums, it has provided good housing for thousands of low-income families, and it has made the traffic problem less burdensome than it would be without planned intervention. In all large cities, however, calamities continue. Present planning endeavors are hampered by a multitude of adverse factors, of which the following may be mentioned:

1. The dynamic character of our cities makes planning for a prolonged period a hazardous venture. Modern statistical methods enable us to forecast the future population of a town with reasonable precision, if no un-

TABLE 26. POPULATION PREDICTIONS AND ACTUAL INCREASES IN NEW JERSEY, 1930–1940

	1930 population	1940 predicted	1940 actual	1930–1940 per cent predicted increase	1930–1940 per cent actual increase
Morris County	110,445	105,732	125,732	−5.0	+14.0
Essex County	833,513	1,050,000	837,340	+18.0	+0.5
Union County	305,209	380,000	328,344	+25.0	+7.5
Bergen County	364,977	420,000	409,646	+16.0	+12.5
Passaic County	302,129	400,000	309,353	+33.0	+2.1

SOURCE: Predictions made by the Regional Planning Association in 1929; actual population, from United States census. The Great Depression and its effect on population changes were not foreseen.

predictable events interfere. The mass migrations of Puerto Ricans to New York, for instance, came quite unexpectedly and created a most difficult housing problem, to say nothing about the task of social integration. The significant point is that the limited authority vested in city governments makes it impossible to control the influx of migrants for whom the city cannot provide decent housing.

2. The unreasonable attitude of pressure groups often bars sound planning. The upper classes want the most rigid protection, sometimes to the disadvantage of the city. They oppose new thoroughfares if they seem too close to their "reservations." They do not want apartment houses, even in other sections of the town, because they do not want the town to grow. They dislike to break up segregated areas because they are afraid of neighbors who "do not fit." Many residential suburbs do not admit light industries because the upper groups fear that too many "low-class" persons may move in. This

thwarts attempts to decentralize the large cities. Real-estate interests, together with labor unions, insist on regulations which are aimed at the elimination of prefabricated houses. Speculators who have bought cheap land press for unnecessary but costly improvements so that land values may rise. Ward politicians are busy getting special advantages for their own areas at the expense of other sections. Industry and business want land which ought to be reserved for residences. The only expert, the planner, is an employee, while the decisions are made by political appointees. The actual program, at its best, is thus a compromise between reason and political pressure.

3. The financial difficulties are insurmountable. Nearly all large cities have an unbalanced budget with ever-increasing expenditures and have reached the legal limits of borrowing. Financial assistance by the Federal government and the states is given in forms of grants-in-aid, which depend on contributions by the cities but for which they have no funds.

Under these conditions planners cannot seek radical solutions and planning is usually reduced to the following measures:

1. Zoning. This is the part of planning in which the residents of "desirable" sections are most interested. They want to maintain their privileged position and to preserve their land values. The latter is indeed one of the purposes of zoning. The present trend in zoning mainly follows a combination of the Burgess and Hoyt pattern. The downtown district is reserved for public buildings, hotels, theaters, stores, and offices. The Zone in Transition, usually zoned for "mixed use," is left as it is, unless it is affected by slum-clearance projects. The third area is zoned for apartment houses. The fourth section is for "multiple" dwellings, which might be anything from two- to six-family homes and tenement structures. The remaining sections are reserved for one-family homes. Existing polynucleation and partial decentralization is maintained by designating certain streets in every district for business and mixed use. Ordinarily these streets are the main thoroughfares.

2. Traffic regulations. These are mostly of routine administrative nature. They concern such devices as one-way streets, parking bans, parking meters, facilities for off-street parking, banning commercial traffic in residential sections, and directing all through traffic to business streets. The latter is the result of combined pressure of residents and businessmen. The former want no vehicles because of their noise, the latter want all of them because they expect more sales. This solution increases traffic problems because automobiles and trucks are funneled into the same routes.

3. Communication planning. This concerns the building of streets, bridges, overpasses and underpasses, especially in newly developed sections, and transportation.

4. Service planning. This pertains to construction of new schools and modernization of old ones, one of the most expensive items in all city budgets, sewers, garbage collection and disposal, and parks and recreation services.

5. Redevelopment, essentially planning for rehabilitation of substandard sections and slum clearance.

6. Public-housing projects, provided that the city can manage to bear the costs.

A few examples may illustrate the actual methods of planning. Figure 14 shows the basic patterns of rezoning in East Orange, New Jersey, a middle-class suburb in the New York metropolitan area. Figure 15 is an example of a major street plan in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. Figure 16 is a proposition for the development of an almost unused area in Gladwyne, an upper-class residential suburb in a rural township near Philadelphia. Figures 17 and 18 demonstrate a plan to rehabilitate a substandard area in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Figure 19 illustrates neighborhood planning in Montclair, N.J.

Factors Affecting Efficient Planning. The effectiveness of present city planning is hampered by two factors. First, the city has no control over in-migration and out-migration. The better the economic conditions, the more low-income earners will flock to the city and crowd into existing slums and near slums. Conversely, earners of high incomes will move out of the city into new upper-class suburbs and their former quarters will decline in value, a process known as "filtering." [5] On the other hand, the city has hardly any power (save zoning) in directing new developments. A survey of twenty-two American cities showed that vacant lots averaged 44.7 per cent—nearly one-half of the city areas; vacancies varied from 14.4 per cent in Providence, Rhode Island, to 59.3 per cent in Duluth, Minnesota. A survey of Chicago in 1941 showed the following distribution of land use:

Streets and alleys	24.6%
Residences	24.1
Vacant land	21.4
Other uses	29.9

Only a fourth of badly crowded Chicago was used for homes; nearly as much land was vacant.[6] Of course not all vacant lots are suitable for residential purposes but a substantial part could be developed to the advantage of the city. But unplanned new developments on vacant land can be equally unwelcome. Some instances demonstrate clearly the fallacy of applying the "free" enterprise argument to urban real-estate operations. A baker is able to sell the same kind of bread for less than his competitors only because of his superior managerial qualities. The reduction in price is to the advantage of the total community and his profit is a socially desirable reward for personal efficiency. Sometimes a builder can offer cheaper houses for precisely

[5] For a discussion of this controversial notion cf. Ernest M. Fisher and Louis Winnick, "A Reformulation of the 'Filtering' Concept," *The Journal of Social Issues,* vol. 7, nos. 1 and 2.

[6] All data from Charles S. Ascher, "What Are Cities For?" in "Building the Future City," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 1945.

FIG. 14. Rezoning.



FIG. 15. Major street plan.



Fig. 16. Development plan for a vacant area.



FIG. 17. Planning for rehabilitation.



FIG. 18. Planning for rehabilitation.



FIG. 19. Neighborhood planning.

the same reasons, but actually this happens only in very few cases. The majority of the homes sold below standard prices are cheaper, not because of lower production costs, but because of lower land prices for which the builder is not responsible. Urban housing necessitates the cooperation of the city (and all its taxpayers) in indirect ways. Bread is ready for consumption the moment it has left the baker's oven. But a house is not usable after it has been built. The urban home is "unlivable" unless it is physically and socially accessible, that is, within reasonable reach from all important city points. It needs sewers, street lights, connections with water mains, gas, electricity, and telephone service. With the exception of the utilities, the city has to provide all these services, and the cheaper the land, the greater the probability that they are not yet available and that the city has to incur new expenditures. This is still not the whole story. Once residents have moved into a new, out-of-the-way development, they want all the advantages which, if they had already existed, would have deprived them of their housing bargain. They put pressure on the city administration to pave the roads, to line them with trees, to increase the frequency of garbage collections, street sprinkling, and snow removal, and they want schools or school buses. After all these services have been rendered, the city finds that its added expenditures are considerably in excess of what the new homeowners pay in taxes. This kind of development is a hidden subsidy to some builders and a small group of buyers; because of its costliness it is contrary to sound principles of planning.

Another factor impeding city planning is the impossibility of controlling the fringe area beyond the city limits. Industries of the more obnoxious sort, roadhouses, motels, and trailer camps, haphazardly develop and may adversely affect sound conditions in the adjacent areas and city land values as well.

Metropolitan Planning. For all the foregoing reasons it is clear that present planning methods are insufficient and must be supplemented by metropolitan, regional, and national planning. While there is no disagreement as to the desirability of metropolitan planning, there is very little which can be done under given conditions. The metropolitan area is not a legal entity; it has no officers and no authority. It sometimes comprises areas located in more than one state. Independent residential suburbs are reluctant to cooperate because they want separation from, not integration into, the metropolis. Nonetheless, several regional plans have been worked out, for instance, in Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., St. Louis, and Cleveland. The best known is the New York Metropolitan Plan, a gigantic undertaking whose recommendations were published in eight volumes.[7] Like nearly all

[7] *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1928–1931.* For an adverse opinion cf. Lewis Mumford, "Criticism of the Regional Plan for New York," *New Republic,* 1932, pp. 201 ff.

metropolitan planning, it was the work of private individuals, in this case with the support of the Russell Sage Foundation. The practical effects to date are almost nil.

National planning should have the advantage of legal authority but meets with great psychological resistance. Some people identify urban planning with economic planning and are afraid of "creeping socialism," while others oppose it as an infringement on states' rights or as an attempt to give the Federal government still more power.

As already pointed out, most of the techniques discussed above concern physical planning. An attempt at social organization is made by what is known as "neighborhood planning." The theoretical elaboration of the concept was a by-product of the Regional Plan for New York; a detailed scheme of a planned neighborhood was worked out by Clarence Perry of the Russell Sage Foundation.[8] In the main it is a combination of physical and social planning for the properly housed population of a school district; the physical features deal mainly with street systems, location of stores and institutions, the social feature with recreation facilities, medical care, nurseries, and kindergartens. The heart of the neighborhood is symbolized by the community center. There may be some flaws in the theoretical construction because a neighborhood thus conceived might favor the perpetuation of natural areas, but by and large the experts agree on the desirability of the project. Correspondingly, redevelopment plans usually recommend the setting up of such communities. As an example, Figure 19 shows "Suggested Neighborhood Units" in Montclair, New Jersey. The suggestions, however, are rarely carried out.

Special Planning. We now proceed to ambitious undertakings in planning and housing. The United States government has participated in planning in a variety of ways. It built for itself the city of Washington, D.C.; the building of the city was thus a political act. The government planned and built the "Greenbelt" cities but, again, not primarily for the sake of planning but simply in its role as an employer, as corporations are building company towns. It has also planned and built the various settlements at the sites where atomic projects are developed.

The Tennessee Valley Authority signifies a change in the concept of Federal responsibilities and functions. Although primarily an industrial enterprise in the field of utilities, the message in which the President requested Congress to establish the TVA made it unmistakably clear that the government wanted to assume "the broadest duty of planning . . . for the general social and economic welfare of the Nation." [9] However, most of this planning had to do with other problems than city planning. The TVA in the course of its activities has developed some urban settlements but, besides being inci-

[8] Clarence A. Perry, *Housing for the Machine Age,* New York, 1939.

[9] See *Regional Factors in National Planning,* National Resources Committee, p. 85.

dental, this part of the program is perhaps its weakest point and has hardly set an example. Facing adverse public opinion, the government has never proposed a supreme nationwide planning agency and is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. What has been done is the assistance and subsidization and, to a certain extent, the direction of slum-clearance and low-cost housing programs by other agencies. A variety of government agencies have been set up to carry out the various programs. In the course of the President's Reorganization Plan of 1947, the Housing and Home Finance Agency was created in order to provide a single agency, responsible for the principal housing programs and functions of the government and to supervise and coordinate the activities of the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Housing Administration, and Public Housing Administration. As can be seen from the enumeration, the number of agencies is rather bewildering; a simpler type of organization would be preferable.

The legal basis for government housing operations is furnished by the Housing Act of 1949 and its implementation, the Housing Act of 1950. The government measures adopted familiar patterns: grants-in-aid, subsidies, low interest rates, and help in obtaining mortgages. All are aimed at decreasing the housing shortage and facilitating low-cost housing projects. The Housing Act of 1949 tried a new approach; it encourages not only housing but planning by making financial assistance contingent upon the existence of a plan or rather two plans. Title I of the Act grants Federal funds for slum clearance if the local authority has worked out a redevelopment plan which in turn must conform to a general plan. The latter must meet certain specifications, namely, it must consist of a detailed plan for (1) land use, (2) circulation facilities, (3) public utilities, (4) community facilities, (5) public improvements, and (6) an over-all slum clearance and redevelopment program. In addition, the plan has to present zoning and subdivision regulations. While the government itself does not plan, it forces local authorities to develop a total plan if government assistance is to be obtained. Another peculiarity of the Act is the method by which the problem of slum clearance is approached. No aid is given for new buildings; the grant is aimed at removing slums. For that purpose the local authority has to buy the land and the buildings of the area which is to be rehabilitated, has to raze the structures and improve the sites. After this is done, the now redeveloped land has to be resold to persons, corporations, or agencies willing to build suitable houses. Resale is to be at a loss, not at a profit. One-third of the deficit must be borne by the local authority while the government pays the remaining two-thirds. Congress provided means to build 810,000 dwelling units in six years, that is, an average of 135,000 units a year. The Act also includes a low-rent public-housing program and provisions for housing research.

By authority of the Constitution housing falls within the jurisdiction of the states. Consequently, we have forty-eight different planning policies and

attitudes. Some states do very little; others engage in extensive programs. Since the authority for urban planning is vested in the municipal government, the role of the states in planning usually consists merely in aiding city planning in an indirect way. Direct intervention has to do with housing, slum clearance, safety measures, tenant protection, tax exemptions, and some minor matters of no relevance to this discussion. A brief review of some policies of the State of New York may serve as an example. New York operates mostly by aiding local housing authorities or limited-dividend housing projects or cooperatives. In addition, the Division of Housing of the State of New York has introduced some programs which are innovations in the field of public housing in the United States. One plan is concerned with the promotion of health. The first project of this kind will be carried out by the state agency in cooperation with the New York City Housing Authority and a private nonprofit institution, Mount Sinai Hospital. The State Commissioner of Housing describes the program as follows:

In rent-free quarters to be provided in the project, the hospital will operate a full-scale medical center in Carver Houses, a 1,200 family State-aided development. Mount Sinai Hospital, which is located opposite the project site, will staff, equip and provide operational funds for the undertaking, and generally conduct the center as an extension of its services.

The Hospital has already appropriated an initial sum. It is estimated that an annual outlay of $60,000 will be required, excluding expenditure for equipment.

The plan calls for Mount Sinai Hospital to over-see the health of 400 or more families occupying Carver Houses, whose family incomes are expected to average $35 to $45 weekly, and of a minimum of 100 families in the same economic bracket outside the development. Among other things, the hospital will study the effects of types of housing on family health. A comprehensive medical service, with emphasis on educational features, preventive medicine and preventive psychiatry will be provided. Fees will be on the usual hospital clinic basis, that is, most moderate, consistent with the reduced financial status of the very low income families who will benefit.

The program will include the following health services: minor ambulant medical care, pre-natal services (for expectant mothers not registered at a hospital for delivery), a well-baby clinic, nutrition guidance, environmental sanitation including home visits, pre-school preventive services, group health education, psychological guidance (pre-marital, pre-natal, pre-school, intra-family relationships, group conflicts and actual psychotherapy where indicated on a group or individual basis), annual family health inventory and biostatistical records. For continuing medical care and for major diagnostic and therapeutic services all enrollees will be referred to the clinics of the Mount Sinai Hospital located across the street. Some of these services will be supplemented by New York City health agencies.

Strangely enough, the proposal has met with opposition from some medical quarters. Apart from clinics for large housing projects, every low-cost public apartment building should contain at least one doctor-tenant. Low-

income families usually have no telephones and to get medical help is often a problem, especially at night. Another program concerns special provisions for old people in public-housing projects. According to the New York State commissioner, the main features are:

The special facilities to be included in apartments for the aging are as follows: bathrooms are to have non-slip floors; bathtubs are to be square with seats and hand grips in the wall to facilitate getting in and out of tubs; thresholds are to be eliminated to lessen the danger of tripping; electric instead of gas stoves will be provided for increased safety; shelves and cabinets will be placed at low, easy-to-reach levels to simplify housekeeping, and windows will have "mechanical operators" for easy and safe movement. Apartments will face the sunny side and more heat will be provided than in other apartments. Rentals in State-aided public housing projects average $9.00 per room monthly.

As part of our preventive program, activities designed to eliminate loneliness, mental insecurity and provide personal and social satisfactions will aid in promoting emotional and physical well being of the aging. Among the activities that are planned to be made available in the community centers for the aging, are discussion groups, lectures, both instrumental and vocal music, painting, sculpture, ceramics, table games, folk dancing, handicrafts for men and women, and other forms of indoor and outdoor recreation and enjoyment, some active, some passive in nature.

Housing elderly people is indeed a modern problem because the number of people sixty years and over is steadily increasing. Old-age homes are no solution except for the destitute or chronically sick. Housing facilities for older people are now provided by an increasing number of housing agencies, for instance, in Great Britain, Holland, Sweden, and Vienna.

Foreign Planning

We turn now to a brief review of planning and housing activities abroad. Some countries have no planning, hardly any public housing, and private building is haphazard; the architects borrow from the past or from foreign models and their work is uninspired. In some countries with intermittent dictatorships the leaders erect some spectacular buildings which are usually primarily a façade with nothing behind it. When Turkey was ruled by Kemal Pasha, a few fine examples of architecture were produced by foreign architects but the masses continued to live in huts. The financial difficulties of Latin-American countries have prevented any large building programs, although recently the republic of Colombia announced a low-cost housing project for the middle classes. Brazil is leading in modern architecture, much under the influence of Le Corbusier, who visited the country in 1936. Brazil has produced some of the most remarkable modern buildings, notably those of the Ministry of Education and of the Brazilian Press Association in Rio de Janeiro and of the Treasury in Recife. Political conditions and poverty in Asia and Africa are impeding planning of public and private housing.

The situation in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece is also stagnant and unsatisfactory.

Quite different from our system, for which urban planning is only a specific means to a specific end, urban development in Communist countries is a part in a system of total planning. All land and all apartment houses are owned by "the people," all building and renting is done by public agencies, everything, architecture included, is regimented from above. From what we know of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Albania, there has been no improvement at all. While Poland was subject to vast destruction, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Albania survived the war with little damage to buildings, but it seems that nothing of consequence has been done so far. Our information about Russia is extremely scarce and the few visitors who have been permitted to travel there were excluded from the most interesting projects, the new towns in eastern Russia, especially in Siberia. On the basis of available data the following remarks seem justified. The housing shortage continues to exist and housing standards for the masses are still below those of Western countries. For several reasons the Russians favor decentralization, often carried out by the "ribbon" method, which develops industries and quarters for workingmen in long, comparatively narrow strips, stretching far into the country. The main reasons probably are (1) conformity with Marx's idea that in a Communist state rural and urban areas will mingle, (2) partial defense against atomic attacks by spreading industries, (3) the desire to develop the vast spaces in the east, above all, in Siberia, and (4) decentralization in order to keep the workers where they are needed, a problem with which a Communist system is necessarily confronted. Neither decentralization nor the ribbon method were invented by the Soviets. Neither did they invent any laborsaving devices nor any new techniques in either planning or building. There is also no proof that their public management is in any way superior. In short, there is nothing to learn from them. Architects are directed to practice "realism," which is but the most unimaginative eclecticism, and, for that matter, in the best, or worst, tradition of Western "bourgeois" styles. No one could conclude from the photographs which have reached the outside world that the buildings are representative of a new system.

Between the two poles of complete regimentation by the government and the "hands-off" policy in stagnant countries are the various programs initiated by those countries which favor experiments and social reforms. As space does not permit a full discussion,[10] only a few selections will be presented.

[10] For this reason we omit a description of housing and planning in Sweden. This fortunate nation has perhaps solved its housing problems better than any other country. Methods and results have been frequently described and analyzed. Some representative literature is listed in the Selected Readings at the end of this book.

Housing in Vienna. As the building program of Vienna attracted worldwide attention, some remarks may be appropriate. Before the First World War Austria had no planning and, in spite of the endeavor of pioneer leaders, no public housing. It had a system of tax exemptions and reductions to encourage housing projects. Housing standards in Vienna were lower than in any other Western city. As late as 1934, when the city had made great progress in its program, two-thirds of the population lived in "apartments" consisting of one or two chambers, or one room or one and one-half rooms; 6,686 persons lived in kitchens, 116,000 either in a chamber or in a chamber and a kitchen, and 608,004 persons lived in a room and a kitchen. The latter figure exceeds the total population in all but thirteen American cities. Of the apartments, 80 per cent had not more than three rooms (including kitchen). Only 36 per cent had an inside toilet, only 33 per cent had an inside water outlet, and only 10.9 per cent had a bath. Central heating was practically unknown. A large proportion were basement apartments which had wet walls and insufficient air and light. The city teemed with slums but rents for these miserable quarters were cheap. Most manual workers paid no more than $3 or $4 per month for rent (without heat, hot water, decorating, or any other services).

Apartments were scarce even prior to the Second World War, which interrupted building activities for five years. Meanwhile many of the most shoddy structures had become obsolete. The end of the war found the erstwhile capital of a world power, as the center of an impoverished country, reduced to the size of Maine. An inflation shrank the currency to $\frac{1}{14.400}$ of its original value; rents, which at the outbreak of the war had been frozen, remained at the prewar level, while building costs—in stable currency—had almost doubled. The rents were not sufficient for even the most necessary repairs. They had to be raised, but never reached, as a rule, more than one-third of the prewar figure. New apartments could not be built for less than approximately twice the prewar cost. Consequently, private industry stopped building and the shortage of apartments became so serious that the few which were vacated had to be rented through a public office on the basis of emergency needs.

Under these conditions the city started a unique housing program. From 1920 to 1934 the city built 62,000 units. The magnitude of the undertaking can be seen from the fact that approximately 1 out of 10 apartments in Vienna was built, owned, and operated by the city. The apartments do not compare with the high standards in the United States. They have no elevators, no central heating, no running hot water and, with some exceptions, no bathing facilities. But they are sanitary, well aired, many of them with gardens, laundries, nurseries, and other facilities. The most controversial feature of the program was its financing policy. Some means came from public funds, provided by the government. The rest was raised by city taxes.

The city had almost unlimited taxing power and made the most drastic use of it. Among other levies, the salaries of all residents were subject to a 4 per cent tax, paid by the employer. In addition, a tax was imposed on all apartments, which was possible only because the rents were so low on account of freezing. Rents in the new buildings were substantially higher than in the prewar ones. They were, of course, much better. When the world crisis made



FIG. 20. Apartments built in Vienna from 1901 to 1940. The chart shows the impact of rent freezing below costs for new apartments. The majority of all new apartments were built by the city on a nonprofit basis. (*Chart prepared by Dr. Pospischil, Chief of the Statistical Bureau of the City of Vienna.*)

itself felt and unemployment increased sharply, the revenues fell. A hostile government cut its grant and building activities declined. The advent of an authoritarian system terminated the program.[11] Because of differences in rent and tax conditions, the policies of the program cannot be imitated elsewhere. While any appraisal of the methods used is dependent on the value judgment of the critic, there can be no question that the achievement was great. There were only two shortcomings: the administration of the program was rather expensive and, what caused much more opposition, the program

[11] During the Second World War the city lost 87,000 apartments, more than it had built before. Since the end of the war the city has resumed its program under somewhat changed conditions. It is still too early to evaluate the new venture.

prevented competition by private building activities since rents were so low that private builders could not compete. From Figure 20, which shows the



FIG. 21. Details from apartment houses built by the City of Vienna. (*From Josef Bittner, Kunst and Kunstgewerbe in den Neubauten der Stadt Wien, Vienna, 1930. By permission of Gerlach & Wiedling, Vienna.*)

erection of dwellings from 1900 to 1933, it can be seen that only a few dwellings were erected by builders other than the city.[12] But the program

[12] The chart is taken from an unpublished study by Dr. Pospischil, chief of the Statistical Bureau of the City of Vienna. Most of the statistical data in the text are also taken from this study.

deserves special praise for its architectural features. The city was able to enlist the help of some of its leading architects. Naturally, the buildings vary in artistic quality and some will not pass a strict examination. Others are of extraordinary beauty. For the first time in history low-income groups which previously had to live in architectural abominations found themselves in homes which were not only sanitary but aesthetically attractive. Great care was especially taken to avoid the impression of serial fabrication and to



FIG. 22. Housing in Europe. I. Sweden. Apartment buildings of the Swedish Housing Co-operative Society (H.B.S.). (*Courtesy Swedish Travel Information Bureau, New York.*)

relieve the monotony which so often is the bane of public-housing projects (see examples, Figure 21).

Artistic values, as well as respect for the past, are an important part of European planning. Special commissions are frequently set up, not only to protect historic landmarks and masterworks of architecture but also to prevent the marring of their environment by buildings which would not be in harmony with them. Similar protection is given to vista and other elements which give a city its individual appearance. When the Place d'Étoile in Paris was designed, all buildings had to conform to certain standards to bring the elements into a system. Sometimes the unity of the entire city is protected. Bern, Switzerland, for instance, has an ordinance subjecting all new buildings to an architectural examination.[13] Plans which do not fit into the tradi-

[13] In the United States, Savannah, Ga., has similar regulations.

tional patterns are denied permits. On the other hand, public housing is often used to promote modern forms of architecture. Le Corbusier's previously mentioned building is such an example. Figures 21 to 26 show housing projects in various European cities, demonstrating the attention given to architectural problems and aesthetic values.

FIG. 23. Housing in Europe. II. Holland. Part view of a housing project for low-income groups in suburban Vreewijk, Rotterdam. (*Courtesy Official Netherlands Information Bureau.*)

Planning in the Netherlands. Holland has one of the most comprehensive planning organizations in the world. It developed in stages. Municipal planning was introduced as early as 1901 (Housing Act). Regional planning was instituted in 1931 and the National Plan came into being in 1941. At present a new act is under consideration, aimed at unifying all physical planning activities. In spite of centralization, the planning units enjoy autonomy to a considerable extent. Figure 25 shows the organization of planning. Three types of plans—on the municipal, regional, and national level—are worked out. Regional planners work within the system of the national plan, and municipalities within the regional plan. Thus both coordination and a maximum of freedom are guaranteed. Because of extensive destruction during the war, all municipalities are engaged in large-scale projects. As an example of extensive planning, the development of Luidwijk, a part of Rotterdam, may be briefly sketched. It constitutes a project for a new, self-contained neigh-

borhood of approximately 6,000 households. The plan is reproduced in Figure 26.

The design has been prepared by a consultant town-planner in conjunction with the Municipal Departments of Housing and of Town Planning, after careful analysis of the needs of the people and households in all their life-phases. All the dwellings are to be managed by a Housing Corporation in accordance with the Housing Act and with government assistance.

FIG. 24. Housing in Europe. III. Denmark. Part of the "collective house" Høje Søborg. (*By permission of the architects Povl Ernst Hoff and Bennet Windinge M.A.A., Copenhagen and photographer Erik Hansen.*)

The dwellings are differentiated according to rent, size and sort (houses, flats), so that a reasonable intermingling of families of different ages, income-groups and preferences shall be possible. Special attention has been given to housing for aged people.

The plan has also taken into consideration all the amenities required for activities outside the home, and provides sites for churches, schools, club-buildings, playgrounds, shopping centers, etc. Some smaller industries will be permitted to settle within the neighborhood, to add some work-a-day liveliness to the scene, often lacking in purely domestic neighborhoods.[14]

[14] From *Rotterdam: Its Dwellings during the Last Ninety Years,* Department of Housing, Municipality of Rotterdam, 1950.



FIG. 25. Organization of planning in the Netherlands. (*From Physical Planning in the Netherlands, published by The Netherlands Government Information Service, The Hague.*)

Rebuilding Britain. The rebuilding of an entire country, the most systematic and ambitious planning ever to be undertaken in a free society, is at present being carried out in Great Britain.[15] The country where the Industrial Revolution started and where urbanization early reached a peak was also the land where social conscience soon began to realize that anarchic housing conditions had to be replaced by some kind of order. Planning legis-



FIG. 26. Development of a self-contained neighborhood. Planning sketch of Luidwijk, Rotterdam. (*From Rotterdam: Its Dwellings during the Last Ninety Years, Department of Housing of the Municipality of Rotterdam,* 1950.)

lation started after the turn of the century with the Housing and Town Planning, etc., Act of 1909. Like all pioneer ventures, the first solution was not entirely satisfactory and several amendments and additions followed: the Housing, Town, Planning, etc., Act of 1919, the Housing Acts of 1921 and 1923, the Local Government Act of 1929, and the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act of 1935. Further legislation was preceded by intensive investigations of conditions and research in planning principles. Parliament appointed three commissions which presented their findings and recommendations in elaborate accounts known as the Barlow (1940), Scott (1942), and

[15] Most of the following data are taken from two pamphlets published by the British Information Services: *Town and Country Planning in Britain and Buildings of Britain Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.*

Uthwatt (1942) reports. It is noteworthy that the investigations continued while the country was engaged in the most fateful war of its history. A Central Planning Authority was established by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning Act in 1943 while the war still raged. Research was expanded and resulted in the white paper *Control and Land Use,* and another Town and Country Planning Act was passed in 1944. It was followed by the Distribution of Industries Act of 1945, the New Towns Act of 1946, and several other pieces of legislation. The end of the war found England victorious but suffering from the destruction of large areas of her cities. The interruption of building activities because of the war had caused a shortage of approximately 1,500,000 houses; 220,000 houses were totally destroyed and 250,000 so severely damaged that they were uninhabitable. Adding the slightly damaged buildings, about 1 in 3 of Britain's 13,000,000 houses were destroyed or damaged by bombing. The remainder suffered deterioration from lack of repairs and maintenance work. In somewhat more than three and a half years almost 800,000 new houses were built (of which about 160,000 were only "temporary," that is, designed to last ten years). The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 [16] concluded the basic legislation, repealing or consolidating all former laws. It is impossible to discuss even the major parts of the law but some salient points will be briefly mentioned. The importance of planning is stressed by the fact that a cabinet position, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, was created. While this planning is centralized, local authorities make their own plans within the national framework. Of the regional undertakings, the County of London Plan (drafted in 1943) is the most remarkable project. It aims at a fundamental redevelopment of the world's largest city, including such features as planned reduction of the residential population of the industrial boroughs, the development of neighborhood units on the basis of elementary school districts,[17] and the preservation of historic "community structures" such as Westminster Abbey.[18] The core of the program is a thorough control over land and its use, including the rights of authorities to acquire for development purposes all land at a price which has been fixed at its "existing use" value.

In spite of strict centralization, the planning activities have avoided uniformity and monotony. The new England which is now emerging is less standardized in appearance than before. Decentralization of crowded areas is promoted but modern apartments, housing comparatively large groups, will

[16] For England and Wales. A similar act was passed for Scotland.

[17] This tallies with the proposition made in 1929 by Clarence Perry in *Regional Plan of New York,* vol. 7; see also Perry, *Housing for the Machine Age,* chap. 3, "The Neighborhood Unit Formula."

[18] The plan was published in a 200-page volume in 1943. Its authors are two of the world's greatest experts in planning, J. H. Forshaw and Patrick Abercrombie. For the view of a lone dissenter see Lewis Mumford, *City Development,* New York, 1945.

preserve and even accentuate concentration at a reasonable level. Quarry Hill, Leeds, for instance, is devised as a block of 2,500 apartments for approximately 8,500 people, a town in itself. But one- and two-family homes for low-income groups are also being developed. So are garden cities and related types of suburbs. A similar variety prevails in architectural design. Traditional and modern building styles receive equal attention. England tries



FIG. 27. Communication planning for a metropolis. The proposed road system of the County of London Plan. (*From Buildings of Britain, p. 62. Courtesy British Information Services.*)

to preserve her own artistic heritage but also borrows freely from other countries, especially from the United States. The influence of American functionalism is frankly admitted. Particular attention is given to the design of public buildings, hospitals, bridges, subway stations, and factories.

Concluding Remarks. Compared with stagnant countries, American public housing and planning is far ahead. But its weaknesses are also manifest. They lie primarily in absence of coordination, in the financial plight of large cities and their lack of control of the fringe areas beyond the city limits. Appropriations are frequently on a yearly basis, preventing systematic planning for longer periods. Much depends on the insight and interest of leaders in state and city governments and, as officeholders change, planning sometimes becomes haphazard. The most regrettable feature is the lack of interest displayed by the population and the rampant misconceptions about the nature

of planning. The first task is therefore to educate not only the masses but the influential upper and middle strata.

City problems change with time and from place to place. The intolerable conditions of medieval cities were due to inadequate techniques. The problems of the early industrial cities were caused by ignorance, unconcern, and incompetence. The present difficulties of cities are basically of a financial nature, notwithstanding public apathy, opposition because of false preconceived notions, and ineptitude on the part of some administrations. However, much is being done and still more can be done. Some fortunate nations such as the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland have hardly any pressing planning and housing problems. In other countries conditions are worse than in the United States. However, planning and housing are prerequisites for a socially healthy nation, just as health is a prerequisite for an individual. The city reflects to a certain extent the mind of its people. In this respect the existing problems are not of an objective, material nature but have their roots in a faulty system of values. Housing and planning are necessary but cannot achieve everything. It might be possible to build a perfect town, organized according to all accepted rules of physical and social planning. Yet the model city could still be an empty shell. What makes a city is its people, their human attitudes and values.

Chapter 23

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

Introduction

Some Strictures on Popular Notions. In popular presentations rural communities are pictured as being in sharp contrast to cities. According to these accounts, only rural life is well organized; cities are not "real" communities but mere amorphous agglomerations of masses. Such statements contain some truth but are grossly distorted. It is correct to say that any given farm area is characterized by a large number of primary groups because face-to-face relationships are established by necessity. But primary relationships are not always indicative of a healthy community life. In some countries peasants show very little community spirit; they oppose the building of schools and roads because they do not want to pay for them; their only communal recreation is provided by the village inn, which in some countries is merely a place to get drunk and to start quarrels and fights. No enmity is more bitter and more disorganizing than a feud between farmers; to view rural life through the romantic eyes of bucolic poets is highly unrealistic.

Small urban places are usually well organized; social control probably is nowhere stronger than in villages and small towns. There it is at least possible for the majority to maintain face-to-face relationships. Interpersonal contacts are more frequent than in the country; the city dweller cannot "keep to himself" as the farmer is able to do. The proximity of dwellings and the curiosity of people make it impossible to avoid scrutiny and criticism and social boycott is a very effective means of enforcing conformity. The nonconformist is sometimes "run out of town." This phenomenon is an indication that social organization as such is not an unmixed blessing. All well-organized units discourage deviations and favor uniformity. Since progress usually starts with dissent, there is little chance that the all-conforming community will thrive. People tend to be ultraconservative; they delay social change and oppose reforms. This partially accounts for the cultural lag which prevails in so many little towns.

On the other hand, a city of even moderate size can never be organized in the sense described above. Ten thousand persons, let alone millions, cannot possibly have face-to-face relationships with one another. The spatial near-

ness is not paralleled by social union. However, the absence of a total social organization is less dangerous than the total absence of any organization. The latter occurs in a minority of cases; the newcomer, the unwanted, the asocial, and the mentally deranged are sometimes entirely isolated, excluded from any relationship with others. The problem is therefore to provide opportunities for every group and every person to become organized. From this viewpoint the only problem is that of finding techniques which transform isolated individuals into members of well-organized groups. Indeed, such techniques have been devised and are being applied by professional social workers through agencies established for the promotion of community organization. But organization is not an end in itself nor can we assume a priori that any well-organized unit is an asset to the community. Nothing is better organized than a gang. This might be dismissed as a pathological perversion. However, there are a number of other organizations which operate within the limits of the law and are still objectionable. The main social function of urban organization is to establish a real community, that is, a group with a feeling of consensus, of belonging together. Since this cannot be done on a city-wide basis, it has to be done by dividing the city into smaller units which subsequently are coordinated. The easiest way to organize a group is to assemble all those who already have something in common, but the real purpose of community organization is to unify different people. Consequently, organizations in a heterogeneous society usually correspond to class, racial, religious, and cultural diversities; they thereby promote separation rather than integration. An aggravating circumstance is the fact that many "spontaneous" organizations are "selective," which means that they deliberately exclude large parts of the community. From the viewpoint of effective community organization any type of association which, by statute or practice, is not open to all members of the community is objectionable. Any attempt to organize existing segments of the population is bound to stress differences rather than similarities in the total community; the greater the gain in strength and cohesion of subgroups, the weaker the entire community. These types of organization are therefore divisive and particularistic; they perpetuate disintegrating differences; they separate and segregate; they prevent complete integration and cooperation; and they set up communities within a larger unit. These fractionated communities are sometimes indifferent toward each other; sometimes they practice "tolerance," a principle on which no real community can be based; and sometimes they are openly hostile. These divisions are reflected in spatial segregation, in restriction of recreational facilities, in occupational favoritism, and in discrimination. Yet despite all these serious shortcomings, partial community organization is still better than no organization at all. We face here a problem which defies an easy solution, a problem which confronts all heterogeneous systems.

Types of Social Organizations. The community cannot function if individuals are isolated. Likewise, the individual cannot function if he remains isolated; he will become neurotic or delinquent, or both. In particular, he needs primary relationships which satisfy emotional needs for affection and recognition. Broadly speaking, city people are organized along three different lines: first, in institutions which are "organic," meaning that they are inherent in the setup of a social system; second, in voluntary associations, created and maintained by the initiative of their members; and third, social agencies founded and directed by "outsiders," with the intent to remove disorganization and to set up facilities for those who are not able to organize themselves. The latter are, to use medical terms, either "prophylactic," in that they prevent a pathological state, or "therapeutic," in that they remove unsound social conditions. All three types can contribute toward a more satisfactory community organization, but no single one provides a perfect solution.

The Neighborhood

The "neighborhood" is a term which is difficult to define. It may be characterized as a primary informal group consisting of—at least potentially—all persons who live in local proximity.[1] The neighborhood area is usually but not always clearly delineated in space; it is always of comparatively small size so that face-to-face relationships between residents can be established and maintained. Such areas vary in size; sometimes the maximum limits are de-

[1] The text treats, in conformity with other writers, the terms "neighborhood" and (local) "community" as synonymous. Some experts, however, insist on a distinction. James A. Quinn (*Human Ecology,* p. 47) regards the community as the larger unit, consisting of two or more neighborhoods. (Since he deals with the problem in the chapter on rural areas, it is not quite clear whether he makes the same distinction for urban areas.) This is in line with Quinn's ecological emphasis on spatial patterns. If the larger community is still small enough to permit primary contacts between all inhabitants, the difference from the viewpoint of effective social organization is not very significant. Queen and Carpenter (*The American City,* p. 153) use a different approach. They limit the term community to a "relatively stable, homogeneous population, occupying a fairly well-defined, compact area and utilizing a distinctly local set of institutions or facilities." But in the case of the neighborhood, "instead of the area it is the social relations" which are stressed, namely, primary relationships. As definitions are a matter of convention, every author can use the terminology which is most suitable for his purpose. The present emphasis on social organization makes it preferable to stress connections between area and primary relationships rather than to dissociate them. The salient point is that local proximity establishes face-to-face contacts. It is therefore the area which is a causal factor in organizing a community. The local neighborhood becomes a social neighborhood. It is true, as Queen and Carpenter point out, that in some areas such as rooming-house districts, "local attachments are almost nil." This, however, is an indication of social disorganization; community planning attempts to transform these pathological agglomerations into true neighborhoods.

termined by nature; a geographical section is then identical with a social community. If there are no natural borders—rivers or hills—the area is not definitely fixed and may either shrink or expand. Generally it can be said that the neighborhood tends to increase in area in an inverse ratio to the size of the city. In very small settlements the town and the neighborhood are almost identical; in large cities a neighborhood may be only one block. Neighborhoods are not always sharply separated; they blend into one another and sometimes overlap. In large first-class apartment sections of big cities there is, technically speaking, no neighborhood; the tenants of the same apartment house do not know one another (which is precisely what many of them want). Some people live in such utter isolation that their death may remain undetected for weeks. Such instances strengthen the belief that larger cities have no neighborhood in the sociological sense. Available evidence refutes this assumption. Studying conditions in Philadelphia, generally considered a city in need of much better organization, Bossard [2] found that one-third of all couples applying for a marriage license lived within five blocks of each other and that the percentage of marriages decreased markedly as the distance between the residences of the contracting parties increased.

There is evidence that even in cities which are in the million population class neighborhoods create a real community among residents but, of course, not among all residents. The organizing power of the neighborhood is strong but not all-inclusive. Unfortunately, it sometimes is also exclusive. Most neighborhoods—and the better their organization the more so—insist on some measure of homogeneity. Some groups are unacceptable as neighbors and they are kept out by fair or foul means. This indicates that the best-organized units may create tension and that therefore the neighborhood per se is not necessarily an organization which promotes communal peace and consensus. At any rate, the neighborhood is the ecological reflection of institutionalized group preferences and antipathies. Inasmuch as this leads to an ecological selection indicating degrees of social distance, the neighborhood is strictly an urban phenomenon. In this sense neither peasant villages outside the United States nor American rural areas have a neighborhood. The ties between farmers or peasants do not depend solely on local proximity.[3]

The character of a neighborhood also varies with the economic status of its population. As a broad generalization, it may be stated that the importance of the neighborhood (as a means of social organization) decreases as economic conditions improve; the functions of a neighborhood depend on its class character. Neighborhoods of upper strata function mainly in a negative way by keeping "undesirables" out. While the upper-class neighborhood is

[2] J. H. S. Bossard, "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1932.

[3] Most authors take a different view and recognize rural neighborhoods; see references in Quinn, *loc. cit.*

stronger in this respect than other ones, it is, as a rule, much weaker in its positive aspects. This is because wealthy families are less dependent on neighbors for either assistance or social contacts. They achieve the latter by other means, i.e., by joining formal associations which may or may not be located in the neighborhood. Clearly, the poor have neither time nor means to join many clubs.[4] The absence of voluntary associations increases the functional importance of the neighborhood.

Viewing the neighborhood as a means of social hygiene and social therapy, the following aspects seem to be of greatest importance:

1. The neighborhood is a basic organizational unit in an urban community. Rural settlements can be well organized without stress on local subdivisions. Urban places cannot be organized as one total unit; the area is too large, the population too numerous, and the groups too diversified.

2. The main function of a well-organized neighborhood is to create consensus; a feeling of belonging together and having common interests.

3. The establishment of consensus is facilitated by the fact that people of the same kind tend toward local concentration; thus the well-organized neighborhood is more than a local group; it reflects a state of mind, standards of living, social prestige, class status, and a common set of values.

4. Consensus is strengthened by emotional ties established between a man and his neighborhood. He not only likes the people among whom he lives but he likes the locality. Certain places within the locality become symbols which, like all symbols, have a positive emotional connotation. Symbols themselves become an organizing force, creating and promoting consensus. This is not only true of places symbolizing great prestige and distinction but also of those which stand for the opposite. It is likely that the emotional connotations of "Park Avenue" are less strong than those of "Grand Street," one of the principal thoroughfares of New York's Lower East Side, because slum areas create a stronger "we-feeling" among neighbors than the sections of millionaires, who like to keep a certain distance even from their own kind. There are definite class differences in institutional behavior with implications as to the degree of intimacy in neighborhood relationships. Reserve, as opposed to intimacy, is a distinct upper-class trait. It manifests itself in various ways. Upper-class groups, for instance, avoid physical contacts to such a degree that even shaking hands is reserved for formal occasions. Backslapping is abhorred as vulgar. We may approve of such attitudes but they make social contacts more formal, and tend to enforce rather than to lessen the isolation of individuals and families. Similarly, upper-class people wait a long time before they call a new acquaintance by his first name, which in turn makes that person more reluctant to ask a favor. To inquire into personal matters is

[4] The majority of the lower classes belong to no associations, at least not in New York. See Mirra Komarowsky, "The Voluntary Association of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1946.

regarded as ill-mannered and to reveal them as indecent. To concern other people with one's own problems is embarrassing; a person is supposed "to keep these things to himself," he even has to control his facial expressions so as not to reveal any emotions. On such a basis, strong relationships cannot be established merely by living in the same district. However, in upper-class sections such relationships are less important. Upper-class groups are, as a rule, emotionally and economically secure; they have, or can establish, intimate relationships with compatible persons regardless of residential location; if they need help, they can, according to the occasion, hire baby sitters, nurses, repairmen, caterers, or even entertainers.

This type of intragroup social distance decreases with lower status until, at the bottom of the social scale, institutional behavior follows the very patterns which the upper classes detest. Everybody is called by his first name, people freely shake hands, link arms, pat backs, and invite, as well as expect, physical intimacy. Family problems are discussed without inhibition, as are financial situations. Lower-class individuals expect others to be interested in such matters and they ask and receive advice and assistance. They call on each other without being invited, they ask questions which upper-class people would consider impertinent. Such utter informality effectively removes the barriers which are erected by "proper" manners. In brief, social distance decreases with decreasing economic security and with increasing need for assistance. Consequently, neighborhoods vary according to class in both character and function.

From the viewpoint of community organization, the function of an upper-class neighborhood is almost nonexistent. The usual description of such neighborhoods as "exclusive" or "restricted" indicates that these neighborhoods do not organize; instead, they tend to prevent organization. People who "do not belong" are either kept out, or, if they can move in, are socially isolated. The homogeneity of the upper classes is a hindrance to the integration of outsiders. But even as a means of organizing a homogeneous group, the upper-class neighborhood is weak. Its residents maintain many outside contacts and therefore cannot concentrate on their neighbors. For an effective organization the upper-class neighborhood must rely on formal associations such as country clubs, private beach clubs, and athletic clubs with private tennis courts and swimming pools.[5] The value of upper-class neighborhoods does not rest on their ability to organize but, as discussed in an earlier chapter, on the standards which they set for higher and more desirable forms of living. Upper-class neighborhoods have little opportunity to display consensus formally; if they do so, it is mostly negative by entering into restric-

[5] The lack of cohesion is further accentuated by the fact that the upper classes tend to send their children to private schools which are not necessarily located in the area and are sometimes out of town. The younger generation is thereby deprived of early contacts with their neighbors, a factor which is very important for strengthening emotional ties.

tive covenants, by insistence on regulations prohibiting intrusion on privacy, by opposing bus stops or the erection of churches in residential areas.

It is hardly possible to speak of the middle-class neighborhood as such; there are too many variations and shades of middle-class groups. The typical upper-middle-class suburb represents—in a technical sense only—perhaps the best-organized community. It consists of well-kept one-family homes with equally well-kept gardens. They are built on lots large enough to ensure privacy and yet sufficiently close to the next home to facilitate frequent face-to-face contacts. Streets are tree-lined and pleasantly clean and quiet because nonlocal traffic is banned and children are not allowed to play in the streets. There are ample recreation facilities which ordinarily are not available to nonresidents: tennis courts, golf courses, and swimming pools. The business district is strictly separated from the residential area. The population is very homogeneous: mostly "old stock," businessmen, executives, doctors, and lawyers; they have comfortable incomes; they are psychologically secure but not to the same extent as the upper classes. The latter can afford to permit the occasional intrusion of an upstart or outsider whom they usually ignore. But no group is more sensitive to the infiltration of minorities than the upper-middle-class community. Their homogeneity is reflected in their value systems and their institutionalized behavior patterns of conformity.

This group has a high percentage of "joiners." For both professional and social reasons people belong to as many formal associations as possible. Personal contacts within the neighborhood vary within limits. Some real friendships spring up. Some persons become valuable business connections; some are partners at bridge, tennis, or golf. Participation in communal affairs is high; nearly everybody is a member of some civic committee, partent-teacher associations, or a welfare agency. Specific neighborly relationships ordinarily find expression in small services since real needs rarely exist and, if they arise, are kept secret lest prestige in the community be lost. Mutual help therefore consists in such little things as lending a lawn mower, taking care of mail during an occasional absence, exchange of cooking recipes, or the like. Although there are, to be sure, factions and frictions, harmonious relationships generally prevail. Crime, juvenile delinquency, suicide, and mental disorders are very low, prostitution is entirely absent. As a well-ordered, properly functioning social system the upper-middle-class suburban community is without a peer. This is also reflected in the comparatively low costs of administration: the police force can be kept at a minimum, fires seldom occur, public property is respected and damages are rare, and relief costs for unemployed and old persons are practically nil. In consequence, tax rates are comparatively low.

Despite this superficially splendid record, the foregoing description affords an excellent illustration of the fact that an effective social organization is a prerequisite for, but not the goal of, a meaningful society. To make a medi-

cal comparison: without proper hygiene a body cannot remain healthy; but, once health is assured, any evaluation is dependent on what the body does and it certainly is not enough if the body merely remains a body. Similarly, we have to conceive of community organization mainly in terms of social hygiene, that is, as a means for the prevention of pathological forms of social life. But a real community is in need of more than merely "correct" behavior. In fact, upper-middle-class life has been the favorite target of writers who have been critical of "bourgeois" institutions. Sinclair Lewis's *Babbitt* is perhaps the best-known example of these literary attacks. Even though there have been gross exaggerations and a display of undue resentment and even malice on the part of some critics, there is a considerable amount of truth in the accusations. There is something distinctly superficial and artificial in the character of upper-middle-class neighborhoods. The excessive stress on conventions (both in the formal sense and with regard to social values) stifles the "eternal spirit of the chainless mind," infringes upon freedom of thought and action, and hinders social experiments and innovations (which explains the resentment of intellectuals and their exodus from such areas). There can be no denial that appearance counts for more than essence and that intrinsic values yield to pretense and pretension in such neighborhoods. A torn blind is replaced not so much because it needs replacement but for fear of what neighbors will say. People go to church to be seen; they contribute to charitable institutions not for the sake of charity or to discharge social obligations but in order not to lose face among their neighbors; they join a political organization not so much because they agree with its philosophy but because that particular party in that particular area is the party of "good society."

All in all, the upper middle class places an undue emphasis on respectability, formalism, perfectionism, and propriety. It is because of this group that the word "genteel," which originally had a very positive meaning, is, to quote from a dictionary, "no longer used by good authors except in a sarcastic or humorous sense." In brief, we have here much more "society" (with which the type popularly is often identified) than "communion." [6] Conflict is excluded only by outward conformity and sometimes at the price of hypocrisy and arrogance. What is still more important, this kind of social organization is achieved by a rigid selection which perpetually excludes the majority of the community at large.

No other group shows as great a variety of neighborhoods as the middle classes. In fact, nearly all shades are represented. As homogeneity decreases, rigidity of behavior follows. Consensus is sometimes weak and sometimes strong. With lesser emotional security, greater amounts of tension are likely.

[6] In the sense of Toennies' dichotomy of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft." See C. P. Loomis's translation, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology,* New York, 1940, and his comments; cf. also Talcott Parsons, *Structure of Social Action,* pp. 686 ff.

So are group conflicts, whether due to infiltration or invasion or because of larger numbers of marginal persons who are not fully accepted, thereby being forced to form their own subgroups within a given neighborhood. Many middle-class neighborhoods are further weakened by religious heterogenity when different religious groups tend to remain separate rather than to become united. At the lower end of the middle-class scale we find the large apartment house areas, whose tenants are not interested in neighborhood organization. They frequently do not want contacts with their neighbors; consequently, the term neighborhood loses all social significance. However, if they have satisfactory family relationships, are members of friendship groups outside their area, participate in community affairs by other means, are emotionally stable and socially not isolated, there is—from the angle of social hygiene and therapy—no need for neighborhood organization.

The need for a properly functioning neighborhood is most apparent in low-income-group sections, particularly so in tenement areas and in a Zone in Transition. In the first place, the people in these areas cannot dispense with the free and voluntary services of their neighbors because they cannot afford to pay for professional services in contradistinction to high-income groups. Sometimes the poor are incapable of getting along without their neighbors. If a person is bedridden and all other members of the family must work, a neighbor can do the shopping and cooking. If a mother has an important errand, a neighbor will take care of her small children. Even if the situation is not desperate, the mutual assistance of neighbors is invaluable. There is little hesitation to ask for help, and great willingness to assist. Neighborly help replaces day nurseries, paid baby sitters, nurses for the sick, homemakers, and repairmen. Money, food, household articles, and gadgets are freely loaned and borrowed. These amenities, to be sure, have their price. Such informal and intimate relationships foster not only cohesion and consensus but also dissent and quarrel. The degree of intrustion into private affairs would be unbearable for persons of better education. Neighbors try to settle family disputes, freely criticize the behavior of adults and children, and make, usually hopeless, attempts to reform those who cause trouble. Lasting feuds between families are no rarity; in the more disorganized areas gang warfare is a frequent phenomenon. Furthermore, autonomous group recreation, although an expression of community consensus, follows lines which are often objectionable. Although the community is functioning, the results are not always desirable. Parents have a tendency to keep children in the streets, even if playgrounds are available, because they want them near home. Dingy bars, saloons, and poolrooms cement neighborly relationships, but they simultaneously promote alcoholism, the wasting of money, betting, fights, and other acts of violence.

The situation is at its worst in "disorganized" areas, some of which are only too well organized. There is no greater consensus than can be found

in gangland. Without thorough organization gangs cannot survive. Even those who are not too happy about the criminal activities of their neighbors still have a very strong feeling of neighborhood solidarity which, in many instances, induces them to protect criminals and to withhold information from the police. Again we find that community organization and solidarity are not ultimate values but merely means to an end. However, we must not overlook the fact that even criminals have to live and are in need of neighbors who treat them as humans, not as outcasts.

Finally, there are unorganized areas and unorganized persons. In these instances opportunities have to be created. Systematic and comprehensive work in this respect is done in only a few countries, especially in the United States and Great Britain, where the first projects to organize communities originated.

In summing up, we realize both the necessity for having well-organized neighborhoods as well as certain inherent dangers in them. The main goal of social organization is the integration of single individuals and families into a greater whole. The neighborhood is the given local unit. Yet the task is only half completed if the local units remain isolated. The mere coexistence of a multitude of unintegrated local units strengthens particularism and is a hindrance to a real community. Perhaps too often spatial segregation or local separation signifies the absence of real consensus between groups. A heterogeneous system, as modern urban society invariably is, urgently needs complete integration if it is to survive.

The Church [7]

In many respects the church is the most effective social organization. First of all, the church is practically the only organization which is open, on confession of faith to be sure,[8] to newcomers, outsiders, and other individuals without further qualification. There is one important exception: most white congregations accept no Negroes, at least not in the United States. Most American churches offer a large program, not directly connected with religious services, which extends throughout the whole week. The newcomer is thus provided with access to an organization; he is emotionally secure because, with some exceptions, he is not only formally admitted but socially accepted and

[7] The following discussion examines only the impact of organized religious life on organized communal life; consequently, the organizations are discussed on an entirely mundane level and this from only a single aspect. The question of dogmatic truth, of course, is outside the field of sociology; however, religious views do have social implications which are within the legitimate scope of social science.

[8] Some denominations require in addition some probation or other conditions which a person may not meet, but definite rejections are rare.

meets people who are willing to become his friends. Since most congregations are small, there is no difficulty in establishing primary relationships. At least insofar as information or other small but valuable services are concerned, the pastor is of great assistance to the newcomer. Thus no one who belongs to one of the major faiths has to be afraid of total isolation if he moves to a strange city where he has no acquaintances.

Several factors reduce the effect of churches on community organization. The unifying effects of church membership are offset by the divisive results of sectarianism. On the other hand, the organization of Protestant churches on the basis of creed rather than local proximity helps to bring people from different neighborhoods together, partially making up for the separation of residential neighborhoods. Conversely, the Catholic Church is organized in parishes on a strictly local basis. Consequently, all Catholics in a given neighborhood belong to the same parish. Thus the ties among Catholics are doubly strong; neighborhood and church are identical. This helps to promote solidarity among Catholics but tends to weaken bonds with non-Catholics. This is even truer of Jewish communities. For more than 2,000 years the local community and the religious community have been identical. Faith alone has kept Jews together. Although they have a tendency toward spatial concentration and sometimes segregation, the real unifying force always has been the synagogue. Its strength is the basis for Jewish community organizations.

Stronger organizations make integration into the larger community more difficult; this is sometimes denied, but on insufficient grounds. A strong subgroup does not allow as many actual contacts with outsiders as a weaker group. Religious groups are well aware of possible negative effects and try to counter them by establishing interdenominational organizations. Larger towns usually have some kind of interfaith association. They are invariably organizations of church leaders; the various denominations cooperate through their leaders but the rank and file of church members rarely participate. Such superorganizations can perform useful services in lessening tensions or in assisting nondenominational social agencies; they demonstrate good will, but they do not establish communities on an interfaith basis. The latter has not been tried for very good reasons. All monotheistic religions necessarily claim a monopoly of truth; such a claim implies that all other denominations believe in tenets which are fundamentally wrong and that they therefore should cease to exist. This monopolistic trait by its very nature excludes any real communion. Tolerance, then, is the best possible solution for interdenominational relationships, but tolerance is a poor means for achieving genuine concord. There can be no more than frigid politeness between persons who condescend to tolerate each other. Actually, it has not even been possible to unite all Protestant denominations in the National

Council of the Churches of Christ. Obviously, there is little chance of establishing a real community among members of different faiths on the basis of an interfaith organization.[9]

The School

The socialization of a person passes through several stages. The infant becomes a social being through and within the family. The young child, if permitted to play on the streets, increases the range of social contacts by becoming an integral part of a (spatially limited) neighborhood. He learns to adjust himself to conditions different from the family situation. A new role is added to the existing child-parent and, as the case may be, sibling relationships, that of a playmate in a neighborhood group. While this role implies both friendly and hostile relationships, the latter are, at this stage, usually not lasting. If children are forbidden to play on the streets and are sent to kindergartens, the neighborhood play contacts are mostly casual and of little consequence.

The school is a much more important stage in the development of a communal society. Relationships are no longer restricted to play groups; the children spend the larger part of the day together as a group engaged in common work; the group is no longer composed of a few members living by chance in the same block but comprises a real larger neighborhood, that is, in principle, the totality of all residents of the same age. As is well known, childhood ties, as so many other early experiences, are of a very lasting nature.[10] Thus the school, besides its primary educational purpose, assumes another extremely important function: it becomes an agent of community organization.

However, much of it is achieved as a by-product of recreation, especially through competitive games. Daily experience shows that nothing cements unity more, or is more effective in erasing group prejudices and lessening group tensions, than "our" team. Football, baseball, and basketball probably create more solidarity than any other community activity. Whether we deplore this as a symptom of immaturity or approve it as an expression of mental health, the social organizer cannot afford to ignore so effective a means. In addition, the urban school organizes not only its pupils but also their parents. Parent-teacher associations are a valuable help in organizing a neighborhood; their common concern for their children brings parents

[9] This not very popular view is shared by Queen and Carpenter, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

[10] This is borne out by Bossard's findings (see page 488) about the frequency of neighborhood marriages. Considering the socially endogamous character of our marriage mores, we may assume that not one factor—the neighborhood—but a combination of three factors accounts for the frequency: the community established by the neighborhood, the church, and the school.

closer together. Thus, in principle, the school is, or could be, a nearly perfect instrument of community organization. In actuality, the results are not always as gratifying as we might expect. A variety of factors sometimes makes success very difficult. Of these the following deserve attention:

1. Teacher selection. As is true of other occupations, teaching is not always conceived of as a calling but merely as a way of making a living. A teacher without great enthusiasm for his work is rarely successful. The low salaries paid in small towns are no incentive to gifted persons. Private influence or political connections are often used to secure teaching positions for unqualified persons in small towns.

2. Teacher training. The specialization of education and the establishment of separate departments or schools of education in institutions of higher learning has led to a hypertrophy of technical courses [11] at the expense of both scientific education and training in the socialization of the child. In addition, the present emphasis on psychoanalytic concepts often leads to an undue concentration on the individualistic aspects of personality to the neglect of social and cultural factors.

3. Public interference. Even the best teachers are hampered and occasionally intimidated by unsound demands and equally unsound criticism from persons and groups who, whatever their motives, have neither the training for, nor insight into, the problems with which the school has to cope. School boards, political parties, and sometimes hysterical pressure groups can wreck the best school program and actually may disorganize a community by splitting it into hostile factions.

4. Gerrymandering of school districts. Wherever homogeneous, especially segregated areas exist, the school has no opportunity to establish a community composed of heterogeneous groups. In addition, there are frequent efforts to exclude areas with a minority population from a school district in order to keep the children of an established group from having contacts with minorities. Thus the school is deprived of the opportunity to unite disparate elements within a community.

5. Parental dissension. Some parents counteract in various ways attempts to establish a community of all children in the same neighborhood. They insist that their children be seated in class next to children of "their own kind," whatever that may be. They forbid their children to have any contacts outside school with children belonging to other groups. Thereby they widen existing splits between groups and defeat attempts to create a community. Latent group tensions are brought into the open because juveniles do not hide their animosities and like to fight. Acceptance of such value systems of parents gives the aggressive tendencies of children a convenient justification. Sometimes such parents do not send their children to public

[11] For a very sharp criticism of these tendencies see Arthur E. Bestor, Jr., "Aimlessness in Education," *The Scientific Monthly*, August, 1952.

schools. In these instances, at least, there is less opportunity for open hostilities for the groups have no daily contacts. The private schools are either of the expensive, exclusive type frequented by "good society" and social climbers, or they are parochial schools.

In the first instance class barriers are erected which may never be removed. The child of the rich is closely sheltered from community contacts until school age is reached. Being sent to a private school, the child infers that something which is good enough for others is not good enough for himself and his own group. The private school becomes a means of identification, a membership tag of the upper classes. The question which he later has to answer so often is not "Did you go to a private school?" but "Where did you prep?" Attendance at a private school is assumed as a matter of course. From the preparatory school the child goes to one of the "appropriate" colleges where he joins an upper-class fraternity; after graduation he is admitted to exclusive clubs. Thus some upper-class people rarely, if ever, meet members of other classes on socially equal terms. In some instances there might be very good reasons for sending children to private schools, particularly so if the local public schools are inadequate. We are not concerned here with the respective educational values of private and public schools. Viewed solely as means of organizing a community, private schools fail to meet the test because they promote class divisions.

Parochial schools are less attended by children of the very rich.[12] The religious separation of educational institutions makes it possible for a child to attend in succession a Catholic nursery, kindergarten, elementary and high school, graduate from a Catholic college, go on to a Catholic university, and spend the rest of his life as a teacher in a Catholic school. In such an instance the person might never have had any but the most fleeting contacts with people of another faith. This is admittedly an extreme example but it shows the importance of the school in establishing community relationships in a heterogeneous society. The merits of religious schools are not discussed here; we only point out the disadvantages for the organization of an interfaith community.

6. Mobility. Even if a school succeeds in building up a community, great geographical mobility on the part of families is a disruptive element. A child often changes his residence several times while of school age and leaves the community after having finished his education. Moves of a great distance make it impossible to continue intimate relationships and ties of childhood friendships are severed. Yet with all the handicaps resulting from highly mobile students, a well-functioning school system remains one of the best available means to unite heterogeneous groups, to remove tensions, and to create genuine consensus.

[12] In the United States. This is not true of some predominantly Catholic countries where the titled aristocracy prefer to send their children to selected parochial schools.

Formal Associations

There are many types of associations but they all have certain common features: they are not a "natural" outgrowth in the sense that they are an unplanned result of living together, as is the case with the neighborhood; they are deliberately initiated and their activities are planned; they have a formal organization based on bylaws and are operated by officers; membership is voluntary; the purpose of the association is more or less clearly defined. Some of these associations promote religious, cultural, political, economic, or charitable purposes and are, for this discussion, of no relevance. But others are primarily created for "social" purposes, that is, to establish primary relationships of a friendly character among persons who previously have not known all members of the group. Formal associations are typical urban products. In former times peasants had no formal associations whatsoever. The American farmer is organized in churches, political parties, and economic associations such as the Grange; if he belongs to a "club," he does so only because his way of life has become partly urbanized.

The emergence of "social" associations is an indication that the urban settlement cannot discharge all the functions of a community without the help of artificial devices. The existence and persistence of formal associations prove the necessity of satisfying emotional needs for more primary relationships than the unorganized urban community can provide. It also reveals the lack or inadequacy of recreation facilities both at home and in the community at large. Institutional attitudes add to the difficulties in promoting primary relationships in Anglo-Saxon urban communities. Germans meet their friends in beerhouses, where they have tables reserved throughout the year; [13] the French, Italians, and Austrians have their cafés, where for the price of a beverage they can remain for hours, read newspapers and magazines, write letters, and see dozens of people without formal invitation: by being seen there at regular times they become known and are a visible part of the community. The Anglo-Saxon attitude of reserve and preference for privacy created the club,[14] a formal organization removed from observation by nonmembers, even for such inconsequential purposes as luncheons. Our main concern in this discussion is with two main types of clubs: fraternal organizations and the so-called service clubs (Rotarians, Kiwanis, Lions, etc.). From the viewpoint of community organization the differences between the two types can be disregarded.

Although all clubs try to serve the community in some specific way by supporting hospitals, establishing scholarships, contributing to charities, etc.,

[13] Such regular informal gatherings have played a considerable role: political parties originated there, artistic movements sprang up, and genuine friendships were created.

[14] The word "club" had no equivalent in any other language. which is indicative of the national character of the institution.

their real importance lies in the creation of groups which cut across the lines of spatial separation of residential sections. Thus a real community within a larger community is created. There is no doubt that these clubs function in a satisfactory manner but within rather narrow limits. Restriction is the essence of all genuine clubs. If no other restriction exists, membership must be restricted at least in numbers. Under such conditions no far-reaching effects can be expected. But practically all organizations, overtly or tacitly, impose more stringent restrictions. Racial segregation is even more thorough than in residential areas and discrimination against minority groups is quite frequent. Thus the clubs help organize the community while they simultaneously contribute to the perpetuation of splits among groups. They are as efficient in bringing together people of the same ilk as in keeping those of different backgrounds apart.

Perhaps the most serious drawback to any inclusive community organization through formal associations is their class character. Voluntary associations have no equal rank; each class has its own type of organization. Clubs are ranked like persons, and, like the latter, have a specific prestige which, quite similar to the prestige of human beings, does not rest on achievements but is of the "ascribed" type, depending on age, reputation, exclusivity or difficulty of admission, and class status of its members. This cannot be disregarded as mere snobbishness (which it is) for it has its effect on community organization. Membership is a symbol of status, admission is evidence of acceptance by a class; hence the frantic efforts of social climbers and marginal men to gain admission to clubs. However, the variations in organizational types are not only a matter of subjective evaluation; they are also objective expressions of differences in life style. A leading corporation lawyer is as unlikely to enjoy the program of a slum cellar club as it is improbable that his religious needs will be satisfied by a basement church or that he will patronize a poolroom. Conversely, a charwoman, if admitted, would hardly enjoy the social gatherings of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Prohibitive dues and blackballing are not the only means by which clubs preserve their class character. The upper classes have only a very few selective organizations. Apart from clubs which mainly provide restricted de luxe recreation facilities (swimming, tennis, athletics, and golf) of the same kind which are more or less desired by all classes, there are specific upper-class clubs which reflect a different class attitude. These clubs are usually without national affiliations, are highly individualized, and frequently have fancy names. The following examples are from London, which probably has more diversified clubs than any other city: Boodle's, Church Imperial, City of London, St. James', White's, and Windham. However, some London clubs are not merely social in nature but, more so than in the United States, are gathering places for people with a real interest in cultural matters; the best known example is the Athenaeum.

Members of the American middle classes seemingly delight in joining fraternal organizations and service clubs,[15] but the lower classes, although badly in need of organizations, rarely belong to clubs. This cannot be explained simply in economic terms, for many clubs have moderate fees which most people can afford. There are apparently two main reasons. One is an institutional attitude: aversion to formalities. Lower-class manners are informal in many respects; so it is not strange that formal organizations find little favor, in as much as mere social activities are involved (while interest organizations such as labor unions or sports clubs are readily accepted). But there are also indications that the lower classes—taken as a group and with individual exceptions—are lacking in initiative, and in organizational and administrative ability. The lack of formal organization is sometimes keenly felt but its reasons are not always understood. If initiative is missing, it has to be supplied from outside; for the spontaneous, voluntary association a still more artificial organization is substituted: the social agency.

Social Agencies

Rise of Social Consciousness. Modern social services evolved in a rather startling manner. Their beginnings can be traced back through nearly four centuries and even farther into medieval times. It is a long way from Elizabethan poor laws, the almshouse, and the workhouse to the social welfare legislation and the agencies of the twentieth century. Yet we have not reached the end of the road leading to an integrated community. Methods have changed as the philosophy on which they are based underwent many and often radical transformations. While social work is still expanding and there is a lack of unanimity among experts about its basic principles, all agree in rejecting views which were once predominant. It is no longer believed that these services are performed for the sake of charity; still less that the aim is repression (although both views are still held by large numbers of ill-informed and sometimes politically powerful groups who are against "giving something for nothing"). However, our discussion will be limited to those aspects which directly or by implication are related to community organization.[16] Even now efforts to organize low-income groups are very feeble out-

[15] The Masons are the only organization of this type with some upper-class membership. This is due to its history; in the eighteenth century the members were mostly upper class, including royalty, which accounts for the prestige (thirteen Presidents of the United States were also Masons). However, upper-class members seldom attend meetings.

[16] The term "community organization" is used by some social workers in a specific, technical sense, deviating from ordinary usage. They conceive the community organization as a process, not as a system of relationships; they refer to it in terms of resources for people, not as an entity of people. Fink, *The Field of Social Work,* New York, 1942, p. 443, defines it "tentatively" as a process "whereby welfare resources are developed, extended, maintained and coordinated." In other words, it denotes a technique of organiz-

side Anglo-Saxon countries, which not only initiated the movement but have retained the lead. Some organizations—notably the Young Men's Christian Association and the Boy Scouts—have spread to other countries but the extent of their work is more limited. The YMCA was founded in London by George Williams in 1844; the first American Y was opened in Boston in 1851. A decade later Cambridge students began to teach in the Workingmen's College, London, instituted by Frederick Maurice in 1860. Cambridge and Oxford students, earlier than "professional" reformers, began to realize the necessity of understanding the poor by living among them. Edward Denison, the historian John Richard Green, Samuel Barnett (later a canon of the Church of England), Arnold Toynbee, and others moved into the slums and conceived the idea of the settlement house, the first of which—Toynbee Hall—was established in 1884 (a year after Toynbee's early death at the age of 31). An American, Stanton Coit, who had lived in Toynbee Hall, founded the first settlement house in this country, The Neighborhood Guild (1881) in New York. Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr followed in 1889 by founding Hull House in Chicago. Today there are approximately 200 settlement houses in the United States; the YMCA has about 1,300 local units in the United States and Canada. The host of other agencies engaged in some type of group work defy enumeration. The origins of these activities clearly show the tendency of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism to conceive of religion as an obligation beyond the observance of rites, as well as the rejection of the view that charity is an adequate discharge of this obligation. Similarly, reformers who were religiously indifferent abandoned outmoded views of philanthropy and stressed social responsibility. Both groups were primarily concerned with the ills of industrial urban society and the sufferings of the underprivileged. The organization of a total community, including the upper and middle classes, was, and still is, mostly incidental to social work. Conversely, the benefits which the underprivileged derive from social agencies are of minor interest for the present discussion. We concentrate on two questions. First, are social agencies adequate for the prevention of pathological features of urban life? Second, are these agencies instrumental in organizing a community based on the consensus of all its inhabitants? The answer to the first question, in principle, is wholly affirmative: all social agencies, properly conducted, will have some prophylactic and therapeutic effects with respect to social disorganization. The second question cannot be answered before some implications of the agencies' activities have been analyzed.

Various Types of Services. Many agencies concentrate on a single service: they provide recreational facilities which otherwise could not be obtained. Low-income groups, living in overcrowded quarters, have no recreational

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ing communities. For a detailed discussion of this concept see Arthur Hillman, *Community Organization and Planning,* New York, 1950, especially chap. 1.

space, nor can they afford to buy the sometimes expensive equipment. Until recently the urban population had practically no recreational areas save the common (where it existed). Most parks were private or, in Europe, restricted; only the nobility was permitted to enter. At that time, however, the open countryside was within walking distance. In modern times recreation has become a public concern of all governmental branches, although as late as 1937 public agencies contributed less than 2 per cent of the total recreational expenditures.[17] National, state, and city parks provide picnic areas and playgrounds; all schools have recreational facilities. Many cities maintain additional playgrounds but they are not always adequate. In New York City some blocks are closed to traffic and designated as "play streets," an expedient the wisdom of which is debatable. Municipal recreation programs are generally meager, although public beaches and swimming pools are quite common institutions. In America the expenditures for these facilities are often considerable but many European cities, especially resort towns, are able to operate them without a deficit. Most towns have a public library usually founded, and frequently maintained, with the help of donors. In European cities, municipal theaters for the performance of operas, plays, and concerts are quite common; they are rarer in America, although many cities have an auditorium which can be rented.

American churches, on the other hand, probably offer a larger and more varied recreational program than anywhere else, but the number of participants is ordinarily small. However, these facilities are of great value to elderly or isolated individuals who have difficulty in finding suitable company.

Many labor unions have engaged in recreational programs. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) is noted for its extensive recreational activities which, in addition to the usual type of sports, plays, and dances, provide for remarkable opportunities in adult education and cultural programs. More recently management has become increasingly aware of recreational needs and most larger industrial plants are either operating or subsidizing recreational activities for their workers. In most cases this means only some kind of sport and, occasionally, dances, dinner parties, and outings.

However, all these facilities can at best serve only a fraction of the masses in large urban centers. Hence the programs of social agencies are of great potential importance. Concentrating on only one aspect, a community is theoretically adequately organized only if every individual is acceptable to an association which will take care of his social needs and if a sufficient number of such agencies exist to do so on a neighborhood basis. An analysis of actual situations reveals that it would be overoptimistic to believe in so easy a solution. In the first place, most existing agencies limit their activities to recreational services and specifically to physical recreation. It is easier to

[17] *Our Cities,* National Resources Committee, Washington, 1937, p. 20.

organize sports clubs than associations for other purposes. This at least is the case with males. A study of recreational activities in New York City[18] showed that of 4,246 young men, 46.8 per cent had engaged in some athletic activities but only 14.8 per cent in social dances; cultural activities, to be sure, were much lower except for reading, a rather uninformative item.[19] That the situation is not different in smaller places is shown by an investigation[20] carried out by the Graduate School of Social Work, University of Nebraska, in Weeping Water, a community of 1,070 persons.[21] Although the village had a number of recreational facilities and sports clubs, there was a demand for more. Both parents and children wanted a swimming pool, a skating rink, a supervised playground, a public tennis court, and an indoor recreation center.[22] Viewed as a means to organize masses, physical recreation, indeed, is a most effective device by which many persons are reached who would refuse to join any other organization. But that is not the whole story. It was not so long ago that Puritans considered this type of recreation as "idle" and "sinful." After the growth of cities and their failure to provide recreational facilities, which began to show detrimental effects, attitudes toward recreation were reversed. Recreation became a battle cry of reformers. The first nationwide recreational society chose the significant name of "Playground Association of America" (1907), which was changed to "Playground and Recreation Association" (1917), and again to "National Recreation Association" (1930). No less significant is the fact that several meetings, under the name of "Play Congress," were held. A new philosophy evolved, which considered recreation as a panacea for all social evils and for juvenile delinquency in particular. Such unlimited enthusiasm has since given way to more sober and realistic views. The therapeutic effect of sports activities, limited to a few hours a week, can hardly be more than superficial. The prophylactic accomplishment is much more in evidence; with these limitations in mind, the activities of recreational agencies are wholly justified. There are also obvious beneficial effects with respect to easing group tensions and discrimination. It is undeniably true that prejudices are more readily overcome in sports than in any other field. On the other hand, the overemphasis on physical recreation, especially competitive games, has begun to show some less desirable consequences.

[18] Nettie P. McGill and Ellen N. Mathews, *The Youth of New York City,* New York, 1940, p. 229.

[19] Nearly every New Yorker reads some pages in some newspaper. To regard this as "cultural" activity is a rather benevolent view.

[20] W. Gilson et al., *A Community Looks at Itself,* Nebraska Council on Children and Youth, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., 1952.

[21] The study calls Weeping Water a rural community; actually it is mixed, since portions of the population are engaged in limestone mining, railroad work, various crafts, and businesses.

[22] Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 23.

Play is certainly a psychological necessity; if satisfaction of the desire to play is denied, the resulting frustration must have undesirable effects. The part which play represents in the totality of life and its relative emphasis is subject to change during the psychological stages of man's development. In early childhood play and life are almost identical and play naturally dominates the total life situation. As a person grows, the play segment becomes smaller and gradually loses its central position until, with the fully mature adult, play occupies only a portion of his leisure time, and his main thoughts concern work, family, the problems of the community, and the cultural aspects of life. The overemphasis on competitive games, in which the masses enjoy only passive recreation, means the delay or prevention of psychological maturity. It is one thing if children cannot be children because they have no opportunity to play. It is another thing if adults behave like children because play monopolizes their thoughts and their spare time. A community in which every person belongs to a sports club but no one participates in a productive way in public affairs is not well organized.

On the other hand, direct approaches to the solution of the problem of more meaningful mass recreation have failed in the past and are unlikely to succeed in the future. Inducing the masses to participate in activities in which they are not interested is very difficult. Political organizations on the level in which mass participation is feasible, namely, ward clubs, often only help the machine politicians and bosses; they hardly ever create a real "grass-roots" movement, at least not in large cities (in rural areas the situation has been different in the past). The situation is similar with regard to cultural activities. Adult education programs fail to attain complete success because the groups at which they are primarily aimed do not attend in large numbers.

It is therefore important that agencies reach the masses in a roundabout way by inducing them to spend some of their leisure time in a socially more productive way. The doses are administered in small quantities and the effects are only slight, but the policies of these agencies are an attempt to organize the community on a much broader basis than mere physical recreation. This is mainly done by the YMCA and the YWCA, the settlement houses, and, more recently and most hopefully, by adult education programs.

In its over one hundred years of history the Young Men's Christian Association has undergone repeated changes in orientation and policies, although not in its basic philosophy. It has grown from a single agency to a world-wide organization, operating wherever political conditions permit its existence. It is a social agency which in principle can plan and coordinate its activities, although at present this kind of work is still in an embryonic stage. Originally, as indicated by the name, the Y served only young men; the founding of the Young Women's Christian Association eliminated the sex restriction but the separation of the sexes remains. Age limitations are a

thing of the past. The Ys are Christian in their motivation for the work which they carry out but not in the type of work which is aimed at satisfying the needs of all persons regardless of creed, and members are now recruited on a nondenominational basis. After the "direct" approach was relinquished, the Ys concentrated on physical recreation, which still is the core of most programs. More recently there has been a marked tendency to implement the offerings. The American Ys have set up two colleges, whose purpose it is to train professional leaders for the agencies. The process of enlarging the services is still not completed and we may expect more emphasis in the future on the other aspects besides physical recreation.

Viewed from the main point of our discussion, community organization, the Y is in a much better position to serve than more specialized agencies. In the first place, the programs are planned for all needs and tastes. They provide residences for single persons which are far preferable to dreary lodgings in boardinghouses. There is less danger of individual isolation as well as of undesirable contacts. Many activities are aimed at entire families, thus avoiding their separation during leisure time. Many who are not fit for physical recreation find relaxation and new interests in arts and crafts classes and other types of adult education, in social gatherings, choir groups, and the like. In principle, every person in the community could belong to a Y.

Second, and perhaps even more important, the Y is almost the only organization which is not stigmatized as "low class." [23] People are not reluctant to admit Y membership, while by joining some other organizations a person is bound to "lose face." The Ys are thus an ideal means to organize an entire community regardless of class status and other groups distinctions.

Reality, however, falls short of reaching the goal. In most instances the color line still holds, and Negroes have their segregated Ys. There is a certain amount of resistance from non-Protestants. Some Catholics are reluctant to join and some Jews prefer the Young Men's Hebrew Association. (The latter represents an interesting case of imperfect acculturation.) The great variety of services attracts a great variety of people but there is little chance of integrating different groups. A member attending a ceramics class for years may never meet another member who uses only the swimming pool. In other words, many groups are organized but a single community group is never formed. While all this detracts in no way from the great achievements of the Y, the main problem remains unsolved.

The second type of an all-inclusive agency is represented by the settlement houses, which have various names. They normally serve neighborhoods and are in a position to reach even those who are so poor that they cannot afford to pay carfare to travel to centrally located agencies. Sex separation is not inherent in their organization. But there are other limitations. The worst

[23] The Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts have a similar status but they organize only juveniles.

is that they are branded as "low class." The very existence of settlement houses stresses class divisions. Their structure often does not permit much alleviation of the needs of the isolated and the aged. Lack of interest sometimes accounts for meager programs in adult education.

Let us now examine the actual operation of agencies in a fairly typical middle-sized city. We have selected Schenectady, New York, on which two recent studies are available. Schenectady is part of the Albany-Troy metropolitan area; its population was 91,785 in 1950, a slight increase over the 1940 figure of 87,549, on which the two studies were based. Economically the city is diversified but depends to a large extent on the activities of the General Electric Company and the American Locomotive Company. The first of the two studies [24] concentrated on youth services and juvenile delinquency. In 1949 the number of children from seven to seventeen years old was 21,481. Of these, 75 were sent to the only existing private school, 1,962 to six parochial schools, and the rest attended the public schools. There was a large variety of facilities for all school ages. Four public youth agencies were maintained: Department of Parks and Recreation, the schools, the city museum, and the Young Adult Center. There were nine large parks, and six small ones, and twelve playgrounds. The following private agencies offered youth programs: Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Boys' Club, Girls' Club, Jewish Community Center, Carver Welfare League (a Negro institution), Schenectady Museum, 4-H Club, YMCA, Related Activities Council. Eighty-nine churches and four synagogues provided an unspecified number of social services. The Boy Scouts were particularly well organized and 1 out of 3 boys was a scout. How many of the remaining children participated in some other activities is not stated and is of minor importance. What really matters, the intensity of participation and its influence on the social integration of the child, cannot be determined by figures. The study concluded that there was some shortage of facilities in low-income areas, while some high-income areas had an excess of facilities. Generally, conditions seemed to be satisfactory except for a lack of trained leaders for girls. Data on juvenile delinquency were compiled on the total number of adjudicated juveniles during a five-year period. A child was counted only on his first appearance in a given year. Such data are not quite conclusive, for not all offenders are apprehended and not all apprehended offenders are tried. On the other hand, convictions for "acts of mischief," "truancy," and "being ungovernable" mean very little without greater specificity of charges. Altogether 234 boys and 38 girls were adjudicated which, in terms of one year, is an average of 56.8 male and 7.7 female offenders. This is a tolerably good record from which we may tentatively conclude that a substantial decrease of the still existing de-

[24] *How Schenectady Serves Its Youth.* The study was made by Roy Woodbury for the Related Activities Council of the Community Chest, Schenectady, N.Y., the coordinating agency of the city (mimeographed pamphlet, 1951).

linquency has to be achieved by other methods than by recreational activities. How far the latter contributed to the existing favorable conditions is, of course, impossible to determine. The same consideration applies to our main question: How well are these young people prepared to become members of a functioning community, composed of all heterogeneous groups living in the city?

The second investigation, conducted by Richard W. Billings,[25] supplements the first study, as it concerned only adults who are members of the Schenectady YMCA. There were approximately 1,700 members in 1951 but only 1,118 were living in the city. The Y was located near the northeastern city limits. The peripheral site was a disadvantage since membership usually decreases with increasing distance between agencies and potential participants. Of the total male population seventeen to seventy-five years old, only 4 per cent were members, a clear indication that, despite its popularity, the Y failed to organize the masses. In Ward 1, where the Y was located, about 17 per cent of the eligible male population were enrolled, while Ward 9, a congested area of low-income groups, had an enrollment of less than 2.7 per cent. Correspondingly, all other low-income areas showed very low participation, bearing out the fact that the Y is basically a middle-class institution. Of the members, 388 were employed by the General Electric Company, 60 by the American Locomotive Company, 42 stated that they were self-employed, and the rest were widely scattered as to employer. Less than 70 per cent of the members—730 persons—answered the question concerning their religion. Of these, 56.72 per cent were Protestants, 36.84 per cent Catholics, 4.79 per cent Jewish, and 1.65 per cent "others." Of 495 persons who gave their educational background, 63.9 per cent went to college, 33.7 per cent to high school, and 2.9 per cent had only a grade school education. The age groups were divided as follows:

17–19 years	78
20–24 years	181
25–29 years	157
30 years and over	496

Their occupations were widely diversified and ranged from bellboy to physicist; 25 were accountants, 35 business managers, 18 business owners, 31 clergymen, 34 clerks, 102 engineers, 19 executives, 10 foreman, 21 laborers, 11 lawyers, 13 newspaper employees, 17 salesmen, 64 students, 10 teachers, 10 welders, 10 laboratory assistants; all other occupations contributed fewer than 10 members. This distribution did not correspond to the general occupational pattern in the city. The Y failed to attract manual laborers. Indeed, the study itself raises the crucial question: "Should the YMCA's consti-

[25] *A Membership Study of the Adult Members of the Schenectady Y.M.C.A.*, mimeographed pamphlet, Schenectady, N.Y., 1951. Used by permission of Richard W. Billings.

tuency be drawn from the adult, white collar, higher income, better residential, higher educational, and Protestant groups? Or, should it be drawn from among young men, industrial workers, lower income, moderate and less than average residential neighborhood, and non-Protestant groups?" The study attempts no answers.

Review and Conclusion

We are now ready to give a final reply to the questions which have been asked in the foregoing discussion. Men live in primary groups with continuous intimate contacts. Under primitive conditions these primary groups are few but all-inclusive; they discharge all major social and nearly all important psychological functions. Social life is usually carried out within the framework of two groups: the family and the local community. If these groups fail to function properly, serious disturbances result, sometimes even disaster. The individual becomes disorganized and the community disintegrates. Under simple circumstances or in a highly traditionalized society whose system is accepted by all members, the danger of a crisis is slight; the population is culturally homogeneous, the economic order uncontested, and social control strict.

The city, the modern American city in particular, is quite different. One of the two basic primary groups, the local all-inclusive community, has disappeared. Face-to-face relationships among all or most of the residents is impossible. The family still exists but in a weakened state. Many individuals have no family ties. The population differs racially, culturally, and religiously; it is split into classes; status, prestige, occupation, and income vary greatly; life style is not uniform; and value systems are sometimes conflicting. Social control is ineffective. Groups are separated or segregated, individuals isolated. General consensus does not exist. The result is disorganization of individuals and groups, and the existence of urban settlements which represent mere agglomerations in space but are not communities in spirit.

Of all the institutions which we have discussed, the school is potentially the best agency to cope with these intricate problems. The school deals with individuals in their formative age; the prestige of the teacher can break prejudice and lessen tension and he can train future generations for community life. But those commendable activities are marred by several factors. Private and parochial schools underline class and religious divisions. Many teachers still lack the necessary training for, and interest in, education in community living. The churches function perhaps better than any other institution in organizing the unorganized and in establishing friendly primary relationships among strangers. But they never reach the entire population. Since they organize persons of the same faith, the gap between other faiths remains. Attempts to establish interfaith organizations, if they succeed,

foster only tolerance, which lessens conflicts but is no way to achieve complete integration. The effects of neighborhoods are subject to considerable variation. The neighborhood, as such, is not necessarily an integrating force. Its consensus rests mainly on the fact that the neighborhood is homogeneous.

Consequently, natural areas, if they house only a single minority group, the "respectable" middle-class suburban sections, and restricted upper-class districts are usually well-organized subgroups. But since they refuse to mingle with other groups (or are not permitted to do so), no integration is achieved and existing differences and tensions are perpetuated rather than eradicated. The same is true of voluntary associations which, in the main, serve upper and middle classes. Conversely, social agencies are set up primarily to help those who cannot help themselves. Many of these agencies concentrate on recreation, physical recreation in particular. The prophylactic effects are considerable but the stigma "low class" again prevents integration of all classes. The Y, which is free from that stigma, fails to organize the masses. Moreover, the wholesome effects of physical recreation have been exaggerated and some drawbacks overlooked. An undue stress on competitive games delays intellectual maturity. In critical times a nation cannot afford to spend its entire leisure time in play and pleasure and leave the most serious decisions to professional politicians, many of whom have no qualifications other than the ability to get the votes of the uninformed.

The principles underlying the organization of agencies (if there are any) have several serious consequences. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming is the failure to organize the most crucial age group, that is, those who have left school (or are about to leave) and have not yet found their definite place in life. These young people, vigorous, adventurous, inexperienced, rash, and easy to influence, are drifting and many go in the wrong direction. Any organization has to meet the legitimate psychological and social needs of its potential clientele if it is to succeed. The organizational success of the Boy Scouts—in terms of members as well as in bridging class divisions—rests on the fact that their program offers just what a healthy young boy wants within reasonable limits. For all other age groups no such all-inclusive program exists. With the exception of athletics, almost all programs suffer from lack of excitement and strong stimuli, and from "respectability," in the derisive sense of the word. A young girl who left her home to study music in Chicago vividly described the depressing atmosphere in the YWCA, where she found only elderly, isolated women who were either knitting or just making conversation. So she left and soon found more attractive diversions which finally led to catastrophe.

Those agencies which depend on the moral and financial support of the town cannot afford to antagonize public opinion. The fact remains that they have to exclude from their programs two things which are prominent to an age group that is no longer under the control of the school and not yet

concerned with losing a position: sex and alcohol. It is, of course, not possible to make substantial concessions in matters of sex. Here we will have to cope with an insoluble problem. But in fundamentalist communities agencies cannot even arrange dance parties, which help young people to establish more natural relationships between the sexes. The absolute taboo of alcohol dissatisfies not only the younger generation but also those older people who like to talk to friends over a glass of beer. Whatever one's personal attitude in these matters may be, we need to realize that the saloon and the poolroom have to be replaced by more satisfactory institutions. It would be naïve to assume that this can be done by preaching and advocating total abstinence. The masses who must be reached do not abstain from alcohol, they abstain from the agencies. The cellar clubs, which are self-governed and self-supporting, serve beer to their members without any bad effects.

Another difficulty faced by agencies is the impossibility of integrating even the relatively few who participate in their activities. A person may use the Y swimming pool for years without getting acquainted with any other person, or a family may use a public playground only once and become involved in a quarrel with another family. Moreover, the agencies are, save in a few instances, unable to overcome the apathy or passivity of the masses. Professional social workers do their best to encourage indigenous leadership and participation in administration and decisions, but the results are not very encouraging. Too many have a merely receptive attitude. The better an agency functions and the more the membership depends on the professional staff, the greater the lack of initiative, sense of responsibility, and autonomy of decision.

In summing up, we may say that most communities now provide ample and, by and large, satisfactory opportunities for all individuals to become members of organizations. Only unsocial individuals or cranks cannot find a group to join or an activity in which they can participate. In other words, much has been done to organize groups. But very little is done to help these groups become related to each other or to integrate all groups into one community. Groups tend to organize those who are similar. They thereby help cement the consciousness of a special kind at the expense of common consensus. The very fact that people belong to organizations which accentuate existing differences brings real or imagined distinctions even more sharply into focus instead of wiping them out. A directory of all social organizations is the best illustration of group heterogeneity. From this point of view we are overorganized because many voluntary associations owe their existence to attitudes of exclusiveness, arrogance, snobbishness, self-segregation, and prejudice.

We have to realize that lack of complete integration is inherent in any highly differentiated society. We may eradicate bigotry and intolerance; we may narrow the gap between the highest and the lowest economic levels; but

educational differences, together with different value attitudes and different interests, will remain. This appears to be true even if members of the upper classes identify themselves with workers; neither Marx nor Lenin consorted with manual laborers; they associated with persons having the same background. As Simmel has pointed out, a group can function completely only if it meets on the level of the member who has the lowest standards. This is, as a general rule, most undesirable.

In short, we have failed to reach a complete integration; thus no large American city is a real community. While the same is true of large cities abroad, they differ in the degree of consensus. This is quite high in many countries, notably in middle-sized communities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland. Consequently, there is less disorganization, crime, and corruption in these cities. There is, to be sure, greater homogeneity of the population. Before we can find a satisfactory solution for community organization we have, therefore, to reduce existing heterogeneity by speeding up assimilation. Attempts in that direction, however, are not only hampered by psychological blocks among members of minority groups and resistance by majority groups but also by objections from some professional quarters.

Part XI. EPILOGUE

Chapter 24

THE FUTURE OF URBAN LIFE

Unfounded Criticism. For centuries man has lived in the city without giving much thought to its future. If he thought of changes, he envisaged growth, technical improvements, and more beauty. He had neither the desire for, nor the vision of, a basically different way of urban life. It was only a short time before the advent of the twentieth century that people began to challenge the city as an institution, to doubt the chances of its survival, and to devise plans aimed at a radical transformation of the existing physical and (at least by implication) social structure of urban settlements.

There have been, and are, many prophets of doom, Spengler,[1] the most uncompromising of its accusers, regards the city itself as an evil which inevitably destroys everything and finally dies of its sins: "The birth of the city entails its death." This line of thought comes straight from Marx (and Hegel); it is strongly reminiscent of the dictum that the *bourgeoisie* produces its own gravediggers; it is uncontrovertibly refuted by the evidence from the past and by all available data indicating future trends. No city has ever been the victim of self-destruction; at present cities continue to grow in both size and number. The protagonist of pessimism in America is Lewis Mumford.[2] His views are less fantastic, his attack more moderate, and his prognostications less fatalistic. His criticism concentrates on the "bigness and power" of certain city types and stages, which he calls "metropolis," "megalopolis," "tyrannopolis," and "necropolis"; however, these types, according to Mumford, ruin civilization, cause wars, and destroy arts and sciences. That the city as an artifact, or urbanism as a mode of life, is responsible for such catastrophes is a statement devoid of any scientific proof. But even a sober, realistic and, in many respects, optimistic expert like Henry Churchill[3] declares that "our cities, great and small" are "falling apart, disintegrating." This is not correct even for those places which have

[1] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West,* New York, 1926, vol. 2, chap. 4.

[2] Especially *The Culture of the Cities,* New York, 1938. For a brief criticism from the sociological viewpoint see Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society,* New York, 1950, pp. 339–340.

[3] Henry S. Churchill, *The City Is the People,* New York, 1945.

suffered from the worst types of municipal corruption and maladministration. Even bankruptcy caused no "disintegration."

Contrary to all dire predictions, it is an indisputable fact that cities are thriving and that the urban population shows strength and vitality. There are many grave urban problems; they cause intense human suffering, create social difficulties, and tax economic resources. They do not, however, threaten the existence of cities. Urbanism is here to stay. It is not dying but is still expanding. It has been repeatedly noted that the urban way of life is no longer a monopoly of the city. It could be argued that it is the rural and not the urban society which is disappearing, because the former accepts more and more the attitudes, the techniques, and the mores of the city as it decreases in relative size.

We are living in a stage of transition and a dynamic, fast-moving world; like everything else, the city will undergo a metamorphosis. The transformation will be, in part, the result of social forces which we cannot hope to control; but, in part, intentional planning can do much to direct the development of future cities. Certain ideas and value judgments concerning desirable forms of urban life underlie all planning. An analysis of the ultimate goals of planning gives insight into the orientation of our society; an examination of the ultimate goals should clarify sociological implications for the trends of urbanism.

The Case of Canberra. Canberra, perhaps the most carefully planned city in the world, exemplifies the modern philosophy of city life—or at least the ideas prevalent among many outstanding planning experts.[4]

Canberra, the national capital of Australia, was founded under the most auspicious circumstances. Its location in a country with ample space could be determined at the will of the planners. After ten years of investigations, during which forty sites were examined, the present location was chosen. The site is of great natural beauty in a sparsely populated rural area, permitting planning for expansion. After the site was chosen, an international competition for planning was held. In all, 137 architects competed. After seven years of planning and modifying the accepted proposal, the final draft was adopted in 1918 and the city was built according to plan. Another advantage which Canberra enjoyed was the absence of financial difficulties; the city was built at the expense of the government, which owned the site, and thus excluded interference by land speculators. Another feature was the comparative homogeneity of the population. The residents were (and are) mostly government employees representing white-collar and middle-class groups. Thus there is no chance for the emergence of a sizable economic

[4] The following description and some of the criticism is based on an article by Benjamin Higgins, "Canberra: A Garden without a City," *Community Planning Review,* Ottawa, August, 1951. The author is Professor of Economics at McGill University. As a social scientist he approaches the problem from another angle than physical planners.

"elite" or of a poorly paid industrial proletariat. Poverty, crime, and slums [5] have been excluded from the beginning.

The physical planning of Canberra was dominated by two considerations: low density of population and strict spatial separation of urban functions. Low density has been achieved in a somewhat unorthodox way. The simplest method, advocated by many planners, is to build homes on large lots, using the larger part of the site for lawns or gardens. The government could not build large-sized homes on 1-acre lots without subsidizing its employees. Consequently, small houses, mainly with two bedrooms, have been erected. As a further consequence, the density of population in the residential sections, according to Higgins, "appears comparable to that of a middle-class Canadian suburb." The low density, as it appears in the statistics, is due to a unique spatial arrangement. The city, approximately 7 by 5 miles in size, is almost evenly divided in two by the Molonglo River, which flows through the central part. The areas on both sides of the river consist of lawns and parks; parts of them have been converted into golf links and a racecourse. Canberra is probably the only city in the world which has a race track in its very center. That the government found it advisable to build a race track for so small a town is in itself indicative of the ideas which guided the social planners. Thus Canberra has no geographical center where people are living or working. Nor is there a Zone in Transition. In fact, the first two urban zones, as defined by Burgess, are entirely missing. Since there are open spaces in other parts of the city, the statistical density of population is extremely low. The city was planned for a population of 40,000, with an envisaged density of seven persons per acre; at present the population is only 18,000 and the statistical density is as low as 0.8 persons per acre in the city proper. That the figure is misleading has been mentioned before; the bulk of the population lives in several residential suburbs under conditions which do not differ from the traditional dormitory type. In other words, residents can enjoy the open spaces only if they leave their homes.

The functional division is achieved by a tripartition: "Capital Hill," with Parliament and most of the government buildings, is south of the river. Two miles to the north, across the river and its surrounding unbuilt area, is "City Hill," the commercial center, where most of the shops, the post office, business offices, hotels, and the like are located. Elsewhere in the city there is only one much smaller shopping center and a few isolated shops in the suburbs. The rest of the city and the suburbs are restricted to residential use. Thus the spatial separation of functions has been carried to an extreme. Since the main features, low density, garden type of residence, functional separation, large parks with recreational facilities, absence of industries and "nuisance" establishments, are all in line with the propositions of physical

[5] There are some slum areas consisting of temporary quarters for the construction workers.

planners, it ought to be the ideal place to live. But Higgins calls it "the most inconvenient little town in the world." The reason is the extreme functional separation. As Higgins correctly points out:

> In a city of 18,000 people it should be possible for a good many residents to live where they can walk easily to their places of work and to the shopping and recreation centers. Others should be able to live near at least one of these focal points. Those who cannot walk easily to the points in the town which play the biggest role in their daily lives ought at least be able to reach them quickly and easily by public transport.

Instead, some people have to travel 5 miles or more from home to office. There consequently is, due to the physical layout, a traffic problem and buses are crowded. Higgins further remarks:

> Standing for twenty minutes on a crowded bus after a searingly hot summer's day in a busy and non-air-conditioned office, then walking several blocks across a dusty, sun-baked street to your home from the nearest bus-stop, is an exhausting experience. Even in going from one office building to another in the course of a normal day's work, a good deal of valuable time and energy is lost in transport. . . . The Canberra housewife may live a mile or more from the nearest shop. . . . If the unfortunate housewife lives on the periphery of one of the southern suburbs, her shopping . . . may involve a round trip of nearly fifteen miles.[6] . . . To live comfortably in Canberra, a family needs two cars.

Thus Canberra is a beautiful garden, but its residents have to travel for miles to work, to shop, to see a motion picture, to use a swimming pool, and to visit friends. The city is healthy but not "livable." These difficulties do not arise from hasty construction, lack of space, or strained economic conditions. They are the result of careful planning based on a faulty concept of life: total separation of work and home life.

The Problem of Functional Separation. Yet there can be little doubt that the now-prevalent trend of physical planning stresses this separation. It is basic in Howard's original concept of the garden city and, even more so, in its later versions. It is clearly recognizable in Frank Lloyd Wright's "Broadacre City," where each home will be built on its own acre of land; [7] it manifests itself in the emergence of more and more strictly residential suburbs and it is the core of all modern zoning ordinances. The final goal, it appears, is to scatter all industries, to concentrate business in special centers, and to spread the residential suburbs until everybody can live in a garden city.

However, there are many indications that this dream will not come true. In the first place, the ideas of planners and reformers are not necessarily the ideas of the people. The suburban and garden-city movement is not too popular outside Anglo-Saxon countries. That suburban one-family homes are not an unmixed blessing for low-income groups becomes increasingly clear.[8]

[6] In the case of buying merchandise other than foodstuffs.

[7] Frank Lloyd Wright, *When Democracy Builds,* Chicago, 1945.

There is no danger that Venice will be transformed into a garden city and the same is likely for all cities of the Old World; their history is represented not only in isolated buildings but in streets and entire districts; emotional resistance and respect for the past will prevent radical changes of existing patterns. In America another factor will by necessity curtail all attempts to decrease density beyond certain limits: the rising costs inherent in such a plan. It was pointed out in Chapter 17 that the development of new areas, especially the expansion of one-family homes, increases service costs for the entire city. But that is not the whole story. The transformation of large cities into groups of garden suburbs necessitates the decentralization of the main shopping center and the building of smaller polynuclear store districts for each suburb. Thereby the central district must lose customers; profits, land values, and taxes in the areas with the higest values must decline. Thus the city loses taxes at the same time that it incurs higher expenditures for increased service costs.[9] Under these circumstances the tax rates for residents must rise until large groups will be unable to pay for one-family homes and will return to multiple dwellings. It is physically impossible to house the millions of the giant cities in one-family homes even on 7,500 square-foot lots, let alone on a "broadacre." Unless new methods of rapid transportation are invented, it is also unlikely that the large cities with their suburbs will expand beyond certain limits; the maximum traveling time from home to work will hardly ever exceed an hour.

There remains the dispersal of industries. Some relocation and decentralization are both feasible and desirable. But radical dispersal is quite impossible. To remove, for instance, the automobile industry from Detroit would mean the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars invested in plants which would become useless and deserted. Decentralization would bankrupt the city, which would lose its major taxpayers and hundreds of thousands of its residents. But such attempts would also fail for technical reasons. A survey for the Twentieth Century Fund [10] has shown that dispersal of only the major

[8] "A London Council spokesman recently stated that in the experience of the council 95 per cent of people preferred apartments to houses, provided they were near the place of work. This is an interesting statement which probably indicates that a huge town like London is more apartment-minded than their cousins in the country or in smaller towns" (*Buildings of Britain,* p. 51). There is hardly a doubt that the common people in London like their city and have no intention of moving out. What they want are more satisfactory apartments, a task much easier to achieve than the dispersal of 8 million people.

[9] Holland, Mich., may serve as an illustration. Although its population is only 15,859, and consequently the service costs rather moderate, business has to pay more than its share to relieve the residents. In 1951 the services costs amounted to $203 per family but the average tax rate per family was only $145. The difference of $58 was paid by business. If business can no longer afford to pay high taxes, the residential rates must go up. (Data from a communication by Scott Bagby, town planner.)

[10] Albert G. Hart, *Defense without Inflation,* The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1951.

metropolitan centers would require more than ten years of work by the entire construction industry. We lack manpower and financial means to effect radical changes in present city patterns.

It is therefore safe to predict that present trends will be strong enough to promote further movement to the suburbs, to relocate and decentralize some industries, particularly new plants, but that the patterns of the future city will not radically differ from existing arrangements.

Supreme Values and the Future of Urban Civilization. But more important than the physical aspects of the future city is the question of the role which nonmaterial values will play in urban civilization. To answer this question, even with reservations, is hardly advisable, but certain existing trends may be singled out for brief discussion. The existing functional division between residential and business sections is most likely to become more marked. The functional separation indicates, in the first place, the existence of extraneous conditions, forcing man to divert his economic activities from his residence. But that is not the whole explanation. It is necessary that people live and work at different locations; that they live and work in different cities is a matter of choice. The aversion to living quarters within walking distance and the preference for suburban homes reveals a state of mind. There is, to be sure, not one reason but many which make people move to and beyond the periphery of the town. Rents are too high and suitable apartments are scarce; the large city cannot house all its people. But there are more subtle, hidden motives behind the exodus from the town to the suburb. Once the city, especially its center, was something like a large home for all its residents. In their spare time people used to walk through the streets to see the sights and familiar landmarks and to greet their friends. This is still done in the Old World. The Londoner strolls through Piccadilly or the Strand, the Parisians have their grand boulevards and the Champs Elysées, the Berliners Unter den Linden, the Venetians St. Mark's Square. Americans no longer have promenades and their pleasure strolls do not take them to the central areas. The city streets are used only as communication lines to reach a certain point; only strangers go out to see the sights and women go window-shopping. Consequently, the streets—save for the amusement area—are deserted after closing hours. The city as an entity does not live any more; life has retired behind the walls of the homes: the modern American urbanite rejects the city; whatever the reasons, this is not a hopeful sign for an urban civilization.

The trend toward living as far as possible from work is, by no means always but in many instances, a symbolic expression: spatial distance indicates a psychological distance. Not only the city as a place in which to live is rejected but also the work has lost its central position in the heart of men. Again, in a great number of cases this is due to extraneous forces; particularly extreme mechanization of work and a division of labor which deprive the

worker of psychological satisfaction. But the rejection of work is not limited only to tedious, exhausting, and meaningless types of jobs. This trend too is most likely to continue and its final outcome appears to be of crucial importance for future urban civilization.

Our productivity is constantly increasing, permitting the production of more goods in shorter time, which in turn makes shorter working hours possible. In some instances we have already reached a 35-hour week; other workers will reach it in the not too distant future (see Chapter 16). For the first time (since the invention of agriculture) man will have the chance to live his life as he desires. It is clear that the opportunities for a further development of a nonmaterial culture are enormous. Whether people will avail themselves of these opportunities is another question. There are some hopeful signs. The proportion of college-educated persons is rising, and groups, particularly in the low-income brackets, that have never sent their children to college before do so now in increasing numbers. But it also appears that more and more people desire only a better vocational training and care little for a general education. The decline of interest in the humanities and the liberal arts in general is indicative of this trend. The number of really creative persons has been exceedingly small, even in times when a civilization reached its peak, and there is no reason to believe that creativity will gain just because people have more leisure.

The success of the genius depends to a considerable extent on the audience which he finds, on the interest of large groups and their support. In this respect some symptoms are rather alarming. The times of generous private patronage for arts and sciences are over because of the equalization of incomes through taxation. It is no longer possible for individuals to own opera houses, as the emperors did, to have private orchestras like the aristocrats, to endow scholars, a custom which, for instance, enabled Adam Smith to write his masterwork. The times when rich patrons bestowed millions on colleges (so characteristic of the period from the end of the War between the States to the Great Depression in 1929) has also definitely passed. Private support has been largely replaced by public subsidies, but governments and municipalities—mostly due to public pressure—favor mediocrities and conventionalism. What is worse, there is a marked tendency to use patronage for thought control and the promotion of political issues. That control is complete in Soviet Russia but there are many symptoms of rising political interference with arts and sciences in other countries too. The masses show no indications of support for cultural activities. This is even true of college-educated groups. Experience indicates that a university has less difficulty in raising money for a new stadium than for a research laboratory. Some cultural activities which always were financial liabilities are already suffering because the old patrons are gone and new supporters are lacking: the production of a new opera is now a rare event; poetry seldom finds its way to the public; it is

becoming more and more difficult to publish scientific books which are not designed for classroom use.

It is not lack of money but lack of interest which accounts for these symptoms of a cultural crisis. A single match between two boxing champions still brings gate receipts of a million, a sum sufficient to subsidize a thousand volumes of poetry. We can only conclude that the large majority is not interested in arts and sciences. But without such interests, a civilization cannot thrive. What, then, do people do with their leisure time? The answer is "recreation." This term is beginning to change its original meaning. When people worked long hours until they were physically exhausted it was necessary to "re-create" their ability to work through rest, play, and entertainment. With shorter working hours and less exacting work, the emphasis began to change from physical to psychological recreation, which is still necessary to ensure mental health and ability to work. But the less time people spend on their economic activities, the more recreation ceases to be a regenerating process but, at the same time, unfortunately, it gains in importance. There are many signs that recreation, reversing its meaning, has become the central interest in the life of man. It is one thing to spend one or two hours for relaxation; it is another thing if the thoughts of people are mainly concerned with games, card playing, betting, and "social" parties, and if people spend most of their time in idle entertainment.

The lack of interest in vital problems is not only a hindrance to cultural achievements but also a danger to freedom and democracy. Some of these threatening aspects of modern urban mass society have already attracted widespread attention. There is agreement about the danger among authors who otherwise are far apart, as, for instance, Ortega y Gasset, who is a somewhat presumptuous aristocrat, and Emil Lederer, a scholar with distinct socialist leanings.[11] The unconcern of the masses is not the only danger; the apathy of the upper groups is also a threat. This apathy is symbolized in the "garden-city" ideal and has been justly criticized by a planning expert like Cecil Stewart: [12] "Howard's great ideal of linking the pleasures of the town with those of the country was reduced to the smaller ideal of linking the pleasures of a home with those of a garden." However, the fallacy has deeper roots and rests on an erroneous concept of urban life. A city is not nature but the very opposite of it, and nature is not a garden. The garden, with its peace, its harmony, its well-tempered beauty of artificially-bred flowers, symbolizes an emotionally and economically secure society which ceased to exist with the passing of the Victorian era. In our own age it symbolizes a threefold escape: from the city, from work, and from the problems of the world. After the office doors have been closed, the well-bred gentlemen and their

[11] José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses,* New York, 1932: Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses,* New York, 1940.

[12] Cecil Stewart, *A Prospect of Cities,* London, 1952, p. 179.

emulators retire to attend to their roses while the world is rife with conflict and struggles. If the urban population rejects the city, dislikes the work, neglects cultural values, refuses to face problems but indulges in recreation, whether athletics, entertainment, or gardening, urban life indeed becomes problematic. However, there is no reason to become overpessimistic. A difficult task of reorientation and reeducation lies ahead but it can be done. It is necessary to deflate the more materialistic aspects of urban civilization, the stress on shallow forms of pleasure, the emphasis on conveniences and gadgets, and to strengthen the sense of individual responsibility, to promote the concern for cultural values, the respect for arts and sciences, and the interest in social problems. The fate of urban civilization hinges on the success of these attempts. The city is not a mere artifact of streets and homes, of stones and parks; it is what people do. On man, not on matter, depends the future meaningfulness of urban life.

SELECTED READINGS

Lack of space made rigid restrictions imperative. The following principles were observed:

1. With a few exceptions only books and articles published in the United States are listed.
2. Since Wirth's bibliography (see below) covers the years up to 1925, works prior to 1925 are listed only in a few instances.
3. Publications covering material pertinent to more than one chapter are, as a rule, mentioned only once.
4. No attempt has been made to arrive at an exhaustive enumeration of all material published since 1925. In selecting titles some arbitrariness is inevitable. Some publications mentioned in the text are not listed again. A considerable amount of material could not be included. In no instance, however, is omission an indication of a negative evaluation.

ABBREVIATIONS

AJS: *The American Journal of Sociology*
ASR: *American Sociological Review*
Annals: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*
ESS: *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*
NRC: National Resources Committee

I. BIBLIOGRAPHY, STATISTICS, REFERENCE WORKS, PERIODICALS

The most exhaustive annotated bibliography is by Louis Wirth, "A Bibliography of the Urban Community," in Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (eds.), *The City* (see below). Additional bibliographical material can be found in the various articles in *ESS* mentioned below.

By their very nature statistics approach problems in terms of quantity rather than quality and are therefore most valuable in the fields of population and, to a somewhat lesser extent, housing. Cultural problems can hardly be analyzed by figures. Official statistics are compiled with a maximum of accuracy; the reliability of some privately collected statistics could be challenged.

Historical Statistics of the United States 1789–1945 (U.S. Bureau of the Census and Social Science Research Council), Washington, 1949.
U.S. Census, particularly the volumes on population and housing.
Statistical Yearbook.
Municipal Yearbook.

There is no journal of urban sociology. Relevant material appears regularly in *AJS, ASR, Social Forces, Sociology and Social Research,* and in:

The American City, New York.
National Municipal Review, New York.
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Cambridge, Mass.
Journal of Housing (National Organization of Housing Officials), Chicago.
Land Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

II. PIONEER STUDIES, GENERAL WORKS, COLLECTED ESSAYS

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René Maunier, *Essai sur les groupements sociaux,* chap. 5, "Le Village et la ville," Paris, 1929.

Adna F. Weber, *The Growth of the Cities in the Nineteenth Century,* New York, 1899. This work contains much more sociological theory than is indicated by the title.

Richard M. Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values,* New York, first published in 1903, latest edition 1924. Also contains more sociological theory than is indicated by the title.

Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City,* Chicago, 1925.

E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community,* Chicago, 1926.

Robert E. Park, *Urban Communities,* Glencoe, Ill., 1952. Some of the essays in this collection are reprinted from *The City* and *The Urban Community.*

Maurice R. Davie, *Problems of City Life,* New York, 1932.

Howard Woolston, *Metropolis: A Study of Urban Communities,* New York, 1938.

Our Cities, NRC, Washington, 1937.

William Munro, "City," *ESS.*

III. TEXTBOOKS AND READERS

(*In chronological order*)

Nils Anderson and Eduard C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology,* New York, 1928 and 1935.

Pitirim Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* New York, 1929.

Pitirim Sorokin, Carle C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology,* Minneapolis, 1930. Contains, despite its title, valuable material on urban sociology.

Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life,* New York, 1931.

Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society,* New York, 1933, and later editions.

Earl Muntz, *Urban Sociology,* New York, 1938.

Stuart A. Queen and L. F. Thomas, *The City,* New York, 1939. See also below.

Paul Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Reader in Urban Sociology,* Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, *American Urban Communities,* New York, 1951.

T. Lynn Smith and C. A. McMahan, *The Sociology of Urban Life,* New York, 1951.

Svend Riemer, *The Modern City,* New York, 1952.

Stuart A. Queen and David B. Carpenter, *The American City,* New York, 1953. A revised edition of the above-mentioned book by Queen and Thomas.
E. Gordon Ericksen, *Urban Behavior,* New York, 1954.
William E. Cole, *Dynamic Urban Sociology,* Harrisburg, 1954.
The variations in titles are sometimes indicative of differences in approach and emphasis.

For comparison some texts on rural sociology should be consulted, for instance:

J. H. Kolb and E. deBrunner, *A Study of Rural Society,* Boston, 1935.
Paul Landis, *Rural Life in Process,* New York, 1948.
T. Lynn Smith, *The Sociology of Rural Life,* New York, 1953.

CHAPTER 1

Definitions

For the statistical approach see:

United States Census 1950, Population, vol. 1, pp. xv ff.
Walter F. Willcox, "A Redefinition of 'City' in Terms of Density of Population," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City,* Chicago, 1929.

A discussion of various definitions will be found in:

René Maunier, "The Definition of the City," *AJS,* 1910.

Community

Studies on the community cover to a great extent problems of urban sociology; compare
Robert M. MacIver, *The Community,* London, 1927.
John A. Kinneman, *The Community in American Society,* New York, 1947.
Jessie Bernard, *American Community Behavior,* New York, 1949.
E. Lindeman, "Community," *ESS.*

Urbanization

Warren S. Thompson, "Urbanization," *ESS.*
John G. Thompson, *Urbanization: Its Effects on Government and Society,* New York, 1927.
H. Tisdale, "The Process of Urbanization," *Social Forces,* 1942.
Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "World Urbanization," in Hatt and Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology.*

For a sample study in urbanization outside the United States see:

Kingsley Davis and Ana Casis, "Urbanization in Latin America," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1946.

Urbanism

Pierre Clerget, *Urbanism: A Historic, Geographic, and Economic Study,* Annual Report, Smithsonian Institution, 1913.
Charles A. Beard, "The City's Place in Civilization," *National Municipal Review,* 1928.
V. Gordon Childe, "The Urban Revolution," chap. 7, in *Man Makes Himself,* London, 1948.
Ralph Beals, "Urbanism, Urbanization, and Acculturation," *American Anthropologist,* 1951.

William Diamond, "On the Dangers of an Urban Interpretation of History," in Eric F. Goldman (ed.), *Historiography and Urbanization,* Baltimore, 1941.
Howard Woolston, "The Urban Habit of Mind," *AJS,* 1912.
Louis Wirth, "Urbanization as a Way of Life," *AJS,* 1938.
Louis Wirth, "The Urban Society and Civilization," *AJS,* 1940.
Louis Wirth and Ray Lussenhop, *Urban and Rural Living,* National Education Association, 1949.

For criticism see:

Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West,* vol. 2, chap. 2, New York, 1926–1928.
Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities,* New York, 1938.
Elmer J. Peterson (ed.), *Cities Are Abnormal,* Norman, Okla., 1946.

Ecology and Related Fields

A wealth of bibliographical material will be found in the following two studies:

James A. Quinn, "Topical Summary of Current Literature on Human Ecology," *AJS,* 1940.
Emma Llewellyn and Audrey Hawthorn, "Human Ecology," in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), *Twentieth Century Sociology,* New York, 1945.

A "presociological" view of a botanist is given by:

J. W. Bews, *Human Ecology,* London, 1935.

The position of the geographer is stated by:

Jean Brunhes, *Human Geography* (translated from the French), Chicago, 1920.

About methods and problems see:

R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City,* Chicago, 1925.
R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," in E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community,* Chicago, 1946.
R. D. McKenzie, "The Field and Problems of Demography, Human Geography, and Human Ecology," in L. L. Bernard (ed.), *The Fields and Methods of Sociology,* 1934.
Carl A. Dawson, "Sources and Methods of Human Ecology," in L. L. Bernard (ed.), *The Fields and Methods of Sociology,* New York, 1934.
James A. Quinn, "The Nature of Human Ecology: Re-examination and Re-definition," *Social Forces,* 1939.
James A. Quinn, "Human Ecology and Interactional Ecology," *ASR,* 1940.
Warner E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Social Forces,* 1940.
Louis Wirth, "Human Ecology," *AJS,* 1945.
August B. Hollingshead, "A Re-examination of Ecological Theory," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1947.

A critical view of early concepts is taken by:

Milla A. Alihan, *Social Ecology,* New York, 1938.

Examples of the ecological approach to specific social problems are:

James A. Quinn, "Ecological and Social Interaction," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1939.
Rudolf Heberle, "The Ecology of Political Parties," *ASR,* 1947.

An admirable systematic summary is presented by:

August B. Hollingshead, "Human Ecology," in Robert E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology,* New York, 1939.

Two comprehensive texts are:

Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950.
James A. Quinn, *Human Ecology,* New York, 1950.

CHAPTER 2

So far sociological interest in the origins of city life has been scarce. Most of the available material has to be gathered from the works of historians.

Ancient Cities

The reader is referred to the relevant chapters in the *Cambridge Ancient History* and the *Cambridge Economic History.*

The classic treatment, but now outdated and open to serious objections, is

N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (translated from the French), Boston, 1889.

Within a broader framework the subject is treated by:

Ralph Turner, *The Great Cultural Traditions,* vol. 1, *The Ancient Cities,* especially chaps. 3–4, 6, 9–10, New York, 1941.
Michael Rostovtseff, "Cities in the Ancient World," in R. T. Ely (ed.), *Urban Land Economics,* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1922.

Compare also:

André Piganiol, "City-State," *ESS.*

Some sociological material concerning probably the oldest city will be found in:

C. Leonard Woolley, *Ur of the Chaldees,* New York, 1929.

For the situation in Greece see:

Gustave Glotz, *La cité greque,* Paris, 1928. An English translation by N. Mallison appears in the "History of Civilization Series," London, 1929.

Medieval Cities in Europe

The trade theory of origin is summarized by:

Henri Pirenne: *Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade,* Princeton, N.J., 1925.
Shepperd B. Clough and Charles W. Cole, "Commerce Based on Towns," chap. 3, in *Economic History of Europe,* Boston, 1952.

See also the discussion of various theories of origin in:

Robert L. Reynolds, "Town Origins," in Kenneth M. Selton and Henry R. Winkler (eds.), *Great Problems in European Civilization,* New York, 1954.
Charles Seignobos, "Foundation of the Towns," chap. 8, in *The Rise of European Civilization,* New York, 1938.

Samples of studies on special territories are:

Flemish Cities

Henri Pirenne, *Belgian Democracy: Its Early History,* Manchester, 1915.

Great Britain

F. W. Maitland, *Township and Borough,* Cambridge, England, 1898.
Carl Stephenson, *Borough and Town: A Study of Urban Origins in England,* Cambridge, Mass., 1933.

Germany

Georg von Below, *Territorium und Stadt,* Munich, 1923.

The Modern City

Relevant material is surprisingly scarce. The two standard works for the United States are:

Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of the City,* New York, 1938.
Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America,* New York, 1938.

CHAPTER 3

Curiously enough, there is an abundance of sociological literature on smaller cities but practically none in English on New York (or Manhattan) and Paris. There are many monographs on history, population, organization, and fine arts, and also guidebooks which contain a certain amount of sociological information.

New York

Federal Writers' Project, *New York City Guide,* New York, 1939.
John Atlee Kouwenhoven, *The Columbia Historical Portrait of New York City,* New York, 1953.

Reflections of an architect on New York will be found in Le Corbusier, *When the Cathedrals Were White,* New York, 1947.

Paris

Lucien Gallois, "The Origin and Growth of Paris," *Geographical Review,* 1923.
Gaston Bardet, *Paris: Naissance et méconnaissance de l'urbanisme,* Paris, 1952.

Other Cities

Since the Lynds pioneered in the social analysis of an actual city, a host of writers have followed, describing various urban places, mostly under fictional names. According to personal preferences, the authors stress ecology, social organization or disorganization, social change, stratification, population problems, and the like. Here are some examples in chronological order:

Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown,* New York, 1929, and *Middletown in Transition,* New York, 1937.
Calvin Schmid, *Social Saga of Two Cities,* Minneapolis, 1937.
P. Klein, *A Social Study of Pittsburgh,* New York, 1938.
E. J. Salenger, *An Ecological Study of Omaha,* Omaha, Nebr., 1938.
O. K. Falmer, *Greenbelt,* Washington, 1941.

Angie Debo, *Prairie City,* New York, 1944.
Harlan W. Gilmore, "The Old New Orleans and the New: A Case for Ecology," *ASR,* 1944.
Calvin Schmid, *Social Trends in Seattle,* Seattle, Wash., 1944.
James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.,* New York, 1945.

A multiple description is given by:

George S. Perry, *Cities of America,* New York, 1947.

A systematic attempt to analyze all important aspects of urban life is undertaken by the monumental "Yankee City" series:

W. Lloyd Warner et al., *The Social Life of a Modern Community,* six vols., New Haven, Conn., since 1941.

An illustration of varied research is given by:

T. V. Smith (ed.), *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research,* Chicago, 1928.

Some examples of literature on foreign cities are:

Francis Violich, *Cities of Latin America,* New York, 1947.
Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology,* New York, 1948. Chap. 10 contains an excellent discussion of the ecological aspects of Montreal.
Norman S. Hayner, "Mexico City: Its Growth and Configuration," *AJS,* 1945.
Norman S. Hayner, "Oaxaca: City of Old Mexico," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1944.
Theodore Caplow, "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City," *Social Forces,* 1949.
Olen E. Leonard, "La Paz, Bolivia: Its Population and Its Growth," *ASR,* 1948.
Harvey B. Hawthorn and Audrey E. Hawthorn, "The Shape of a City: Some Observations on Sucre, Bolivia," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1948.

Cities of Asia and Africa

Sidney G. Gamble, *Peking: A Social Study,* New York, 1921.
Horace Mann, *The Primitive City of Timbuctoo,* New York, 1953.

CHAPTER 4

The problem of location is investigated within a broader framework in the classical French work by:

Paul M. Vidal de la Blanche, *The Influence of Geographic Environment,* New York, 1926.

Also:

Griffith Taylor, *Urban Geography,* New York, 1949.
Arthur E. Smailes, *The Geography of Towns,* New York, 1953.
Robert E. Dickinson, *The West European City: A Geographical Interpretation,* London, 1951.

And more specialized studies:

Alfred Weber, *Theory of Location of Industry,* Chicago, 1929.
Edgar M. Hoover, *The Location of Economic Activity,* New York, 1948.
Chauncy D. Harris and Edward E. Ullman, "The Nature of Cities," *Annals,* 1945.
Edward L. Ullman, "A Theory of Location for Cities," *AJS,* 1941.

The "break-in-transportation" thesis is found in:

Charles H. Cooley, "The Theory of Transportation," in *Sociological Theory and Social Research,* New York, 1930.

On the influence of transportation see:

William F. Ogburn, "Inventions of Local Transportation and the Patterns of Cities," *Social Forces,* May, 1946.

CHAPTERS 5 AND 6

Differentiation, Centralization, and Decentralization

Homer Hoyt, "Forces of Urban Centralization and Decentralization," *AJS,* 1941.
Noel P. Gist, "Developing Patterns of Urban Decentralization," *Social Forces,* 1952.
Leslie Kish, "Differentiation in Metropolitan Areas," *ASR,* 1954. A "quantitative statistical approach."
Donald J. Bogue, *Metropolitan Decentralization: A Study of Differential Growth,* Oxford, Ohio, 1950.

Class Separation

Little has been written on spatial differentiation of classes. One of the few examples is:

W. Lloyd Warner et al., "The Houses of Yankee City," chap. 11, in *The Social Life of a Modern Community* ("Yankee Series," vol. 1), New Haven, Conn., 1941.

Segregation

Ernest W. Burgess, "Residential Segregation in American Cities," *Annals,* 1928.
Julius Jahn, Calvin Schmid, and Clarence Schrag, "The Measurement of Ecological Segregation," *ASR,* 1947.

Invasion

Maurice H. Krout, "A Community in Flux," *Social Forces,* 1926. Description of successive invasions in Chicago.
Clifton R. Jones, "Invasion and Racial Attitudes: A Study of Housing in Border City," *Social Forces,* 1949.
William K. Brussat, "Incidental Findings on Urban Invasion," *ASR,* 1951.

Succession

Robert E. Park, "Succession: An Ecological Concept," *ASR,* 1936.
Paul F. Cressey, "Population Succession in Chicago: 1898–1930," *AJS,* 1938.
Richard G. Ford, "Population Succession in Chicago," *AJS,* 1950.
Robert W. O'Brien, "Beale Street; A Study in Ecological Succession," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1942.
Rose Hum Lee, "Occupational Invasion, Succession, and Accommodation of the Chinese of Butte, Montana," *AJS,* 1949.
Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii,* Chicago, 1938.

Land Value and Land Uses

The pioneer work was done by Hurd (see above).

Harland Bartholomew, *Urban Land Uses,* Cambridge, 1932.
Homer Hoyt, *One Hundred Years of Land Value in Chicago,* Chicago, 1933.

J. Rowland Bibbins, "The Economic Topography of the City: Urban Land Values," chap. 17, in R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community,* New York, 1933.
Arthur Weimer and Homer Hoyt, *Principles of Urban Real Estate,* New York, 1954.
Current Information on Urban Land Policies, publication of the United Nations, New York, 1952.

Concentric-zone Theory

Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City,* Chicago, 1925.

Sector Theory

Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities,* Federal Housing Administration, Washington, 1932.
Homer Hoyt, "The Structure of American Cities in the Postwar Era," *AJS,* 1943.

Theory of Natural Areas

Harvey W. Zorbaugh, "The Natural Areas of the City," in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community,* Chicago, 1926.
Paul K. Hatt, "The Concept of the Natural Areas," *ASR,* 1946.

Theory of Symbolic Values

Walter Firey, *Land Use in Boston,* Cambridge, 1947.
Walter Firey, "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables," *ASR,* 1950.
John James, "A Critique of Firey's Land Use in Central Boston," *AJS,* 1948.

Statistical Approach

Calvin Schmid, "Generalizations Concerning the Ecology of the American City," *ASR,* 1950.
Rudolf Heberle, "Ecology and Methods of Quantitative Analysis," Part IV, in *Social Movements,* New York, 1951.
Donald F. Foley, "Census Tracts and Urban Research," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 1953.

Selected Studies on Specific Natural Areas

Howard W. Green, "Cultural Areas in the City of Cleveland," *AJS,* 1932.
Eshref Shevsky and Marilyn Williams, *The Social Areas of Los Angeles,* Berkeley, Calif., 1949.
Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto,* Chicago, 1928.
Andrew W. Lind, "The Ghetto and the Slum," *Social Forces,* 1930.
Harvey Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum,* Chicago, 1929.
Carolyn Ware, *Greenwich Village,* New York, 1935.
Franklin E. Frazier, "Negro Harlem: An Ecological Study," *AJS,* 1943.

CHAPTER 7

The extremes—the small town and the metropolis—have attracted more attention than the "average" city; here are a few examples:

H. Paul Douglass, *The Little Town,* New York, 1927.
Walter Burr, *Small Towns,* New York, 1929.
Albert Blumenthal, *Small Town Stuff,* Chicago, 1932 (about "Minneville," Mont.).
A. Morgan, *The Small Community,* New York, 1942.

Granville Hicks, *Small Town,* New York, 1947.
Wayland J. Hayes, *The Small Community Looks Ahead,* New York, 1947.
Richard W. Poston, *Small Town Renaissance,* New York, 1950.
Roderick D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community,* New York, 1933.
Roderick D. McKenzie, "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities," *Recent Social Trends,* vol. 1, New York, 1933.
Donald J. Bogue, *The Structure of the Metropolitan Community: A Study of Dominance and Subdominance,* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949.
Robert F. Dickinson, *City, Region, and Regionalism,* New York, 1947. Describes metropolitan regions in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States.
Thomas H. Reed, "Metropolitan Area," *ESS.*

"Satellite" Cities

H. Paul Douglass, *The Suburban Trend,* New York, 1925.
Chauncy D. Harris, "Suburbs," *AJS,* 1949.
H. Paul Douglass, "Suburbs," *ESS.*
J. Ellis Voss, *Ocean City: An Ecological Analysis of a Satellite Community,* Philadelphia, 1941.

CHAPTER 8

William F. Ogburn, *Social Characteristics of Cities,* Chicago, 1937.
Chauncy D. Harris, "A Functional Classification of Cities," *Geographical Review,* 1943.
Grace Kneedler, "Functional Types of Cities," *Public Management,* 1945.
Grace Kneedler, "Economic Classification of Cities," *Municipal Yearbook, 1945.*
Grace Kneedler Ohlson, "Economic Classification of Cities," *Municipal Yearbook, 1949.*
Victor Jones, "Economic Classification of Cities," *Municipal Yearbook, 1953* and *1954.*

Hollywood

Leo C. Rosten, *Hollywood,* New York, 1941.
Hortense Powdermaker, *Hollywood: The Dream Factory,* Boston, 1950.

CHAPTER 9

For a supposedly classless society, the literature on class is enormous. The following is a cross section of widely varying views.

On the theoretical problems of the class concept see:

Talcott Parsons, "Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *AJS,* 1940.
Kingsley Davis, "A Conceptual Analysis of Social Stratification," *ASR,* 1942.
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *ASR,* 1945. This essay is criticized by:
Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Class Stratification," *ASR,* 1954 (with replies by Davis and Moore).
Harold F. Kaufmann, "An Approach to the Study of Urban Stratification," *ASR,* 1952.
Hans Speier, "Social Stratification in the Urban Community," *ASR,* 1936.
Gerhard W. Lensi, "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups?" *AJS,* 1952.
Milton M. Gordon, "Social Class in American Sociology," *AJS,* 1949.

For systematic treatment see:

W. Lloyd Warner et al., *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (vol. 2, "Yankee Series"), New Haven, Conn., 1942.

Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes,* Princeton, N.J., 1949.
Paul K. Hatt, "Stratification in the Mass Society," *ASR,* 1950.
John F. Cuber and William F. Kenkel, *Social Stratification in the United States,* New York, 1954.

More specialized studies are:

W. Lloyd Warner et al., *Democracy in Jonesville: A Study of Quality and Inequality,* New York, 1947.
August B. Hollingshead, "Selected Characteristics of Classes in a Middle Western Community," *ASR,* 1947.
William H. Form, "Status Stratification in a Planned Community," *ASR,* 1945.
Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," *AJS,* 1950.

On the problem of class and caste see:

John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town,* New Haven, Conn., 1937.
Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South; A Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class,* Chicago, 1941.
Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race,* New York, 1948.

Analysis of actual classes in America is mostly concerned with the middle classes, for example:

Alfred Meusel, "Middle Classes," *ESS.*
C. Wright Mills, "The Middle Classes in Middle-sized Cities," *ASR,* 1945.

The history of class concepts in America is analyzed by:

Charles H. Page, *Class and American Society: From Ward to Ross,* New York, 1940.

A critical bibliographical survey is given by:

Harold W. Pfautz, "The Current Literature on Stratification: Critique and Bibliography," *AJS,* 1953.

A review of foreign literature on the class problem is included in the present author's study:

The Class Phenomenon, doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 1942.

For methods of empirical research see:

W. Lloyd Warner et al., *Social Class in America: A Manual of Procedure for the Measurement of Social Status,* Chicago, 1949.

CHAPTER 10

The literature on the ethnic composition of the United States falls into three groups: description and analysis; attack and criticism; defense and apology. Theory and value judgment are not always clearly separated; for this reason the following titles are listed without subdivisions:

T. J. Woofter, *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life,* New York, 1931.
Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples,* New York, 1932.
Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America,* New York, 1939.
Francis J. Brown and Joseph T. Roucek, *One America,* New York, 1946.

Richard A. Schermerhorn, *These Our People: Minorities in American Culture,* New York, 1949.
Charles F. Marden, *Minorities in American Society,* New York, 1952.

Ethnic Descriptions of Specific Places

Bessie B. Wessel, *Ethnic Survey of Woonsocket, R.I.,* Chicago, 1931.
C. A. McMahan, *The People of Atlanta,* Atlanta, Ga., 1950.

Special Minority Groups

Maurice R. Davie, *Negroes in American Society,* New York, 1949.
Franklin E. Frazier, *The Negro in the United States,* New York, 1949.
St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis,* New York, 1945. A study of Negroes in Chicago.
Clarence Senior, "The Puerto Ricans of New York City," in C. W. Mills et al., *Puerto Rican Journey,* New York, 1950.
E. F. Roberts, *Ireland in America,* New York, 1931.
Pauline Young, *Pilgrims of Russian Town,* Chicago, 1932.
Edwin G. Burrows, *Hawaiian Americans,* New Haven, Conn., 1947.
W. I. Thomas and F. Zaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* New York, 1918.

CHAPTER 11

Population Growth and Decline

General works:

Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems,* New York, 1954.
T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis,* New York, 1948.
Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems,* New York, 1954.
Walter F. Willcox, *Studies in American Demography,* New York, 1940.

Population changes:

The Problems of a Changing Population, NRC, Washington, 1938.
Kingsley Davis, "The World Demographic Transition," *Annals.*
Kingsley Davis, "The Demographic Equation" and "World Population in Transition," chaps. 20–21, in *Human Society,* New York, 1949.
W. S. Thompson, "The Demographic Revolution in the United States," *Annals,* 1949.
The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends, United Nations Population Commission, New York, 1953 (with bibliography).

Urban growth:

Donald J. Bogue, *Population Growth in Standard Metropolitan Areas: 1900–1950,* Washington, 1953 (with an explanatory analysis of urbanized areas).
Lewis Mumford, "The Intolerable City: Must It Keep Growing?" New York, 1926.
Otis D. Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities," in Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology,* Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

Domestic Migration

Some facts and figures:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Internal Migration: 1935 to 1940,* 1943.

The Milbank Memorial Fund specializes in population research and its publications are most helpful; for instance:

Philip M. Hauser and Hope T. Eldridge, "Projection of Urban Growth and Migration to Cities in the United States," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1947.
Daniel O. Price, "Estimates of Net Migration in the United States," *ASR,* 1953.

On rural-urban migration:

Jane Moore, *Cityward Migration,* Chicago, 1938. Swedish data.
Rudolf Heberle, "The Causes of Rural-Urban Migration," *AJS,* 1938.
C. Horace Hamilton, *Rural-Urban Migration in North Carolina, 1920–30,* Raleigh, 1934.
Daniel O. Price, "Non-white Migration to and from Selected Cities," *AJS,* 1948.
A. H. Hobbs, *Differentials in Internal Migration,* Philadelphia, 1947.
Postwar Problems on Migration, Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, 1947.
Walter Firey, "The Optimum Rural-Urban Population Balance," *Rural Sociology,* 1947.

On intracity migration:

William Albig, "The Mobility of Urban Population," *Social Forces,* 1933.
William Albig, "Regarding Urban Residential Mobility," *Sociology and Social Research,* 1937.
Ronald Freedman, "Distribution of Migrant Population in Chicago," *ASR,* 1948.
Ronald Freedman, *Recent Migration to Chicago,* Chicago, 1950. Concerning migration within the metropolitan area.

On selective migration:

Carle C. Zimmerman, "The Migration to Towns and Cities," *AJS,* 1927.
Wilson Gee and Dewees Runk, "Qualitative Selection in Cityward Migration," *AJS,* 1931.
J. C. McCormick, "Urban Selection and Educational Selection," *AJS,* 1933.
Otto Klineberg, *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration,* New York, 1935.
Otto Klineberg, "The Intelligence of Migrants," *ASR,* 1938.
Dorothy S. Thomas, "Selective Migration," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1938.
W. Parker Mauldin, "Selective Migration from Small Towns," *ASR,* 1940.
A. H. Hobbs, "Specificity and Selective Migration," *ASR,* 1942.
Noel P. Gist and Carroll J. Clark, "Intelligence as a Selective Factor in Rural-Urban Migration," *AJS,* 1933.
Noel P. Gist, C. T. Pihlblad, and C. L. Gregory, *Selective Factors in Migration and Occupation,* Columbia, Mo., 1942.
Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, "Selective Migration," chap. 12, in *Urban Society,* New York, 1950.

CHAPTER 12

Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration,* New York, 1928.
L. G. Brown, *Immigration,* New York, 1933.
Marens Lee Hanson, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607–1860,* Cambridge, Mass., 1941.
William S. Bernard, *American Immigration Policy—A Reappraisal,* New York, 1950.
"Reappraising Our Immigration Policy," *Annals,* 1949.

For readings and bibliographical material see:

Benjamin M. Ziegler (ed.), *Immigration* ("Amherst Series"), Boston, 1953.
Anne L. Baden, *Immigration in the United States: A Selected List of Recent References,* Washington, 1943. Compiled for the Library of Congress.

CHAPTER 13

D. F. Bowers (ed.), *Foreign Influences in American Life,* Princeton, N.J., 1944.
Hannibal G. Duncan, *Immigration and Assimilation,* New York, 1933.
Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants 1760–1865: A Study in Acculturation,* Cambridge, Mass., 1941.

An example of an attack (mostly on Irish and Italians) is:

Edward A. Ross, "Immigrants in Politics: The Political Consequences of Immigration," *Century Magazine,* 1914; reprinted in B. Ziegler, *Immigration* (see above).

A much-neglected topic is investigated by:

R. Bierstedt, "Sociology of Majorities," *ASR,* 1948.

On conflict, accommodation, and integration see:

Alfred M. Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot,* New York, 1948.
Robert M. MacIver, *The More Perfect Union,* New York, 1948.
A. Rose and C. Rose, *America Divided,* New York, 1948.
Brewton Berry, *Race Relations,* Boston, 1951.
George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, *Racial Minorities,* New York, 1953. An analysis of prejudices and discrimination.
Ralph H. Danhof, "The Accommodation and Integration of Conflicting Cultures in a Newly Established Community," *AJS,* 1943.
Philip David (ed.), *Immigration and Americanization,* Boston, 1920.

On intermarriage see:

M. L. Barry, *People Who Intermarry,* Syracuse, N.Y., 1946.
Ruby J. Reeves Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting-pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven 1870–1948," *AJS,* 1944.
August B. Hollingshead, "Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *ASR,* 1950.
Simon Marcson, "A Theory of Intermarriage and Assimilation," *Social Forces,* 1950.
John L. Thomas, "The Factor of Religion in the Selection of a Marriage Mate," *ASR,* 1951.

On cultural pluralism see:

Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States,* New York, 1924.
E. George Payne, "Education and Cultural Pluralism," in Brown and Roucek, *One America* (see Chap. 10 above).
Clyde V. Kiser, "Cultural Pluralism," in "Reappraising Our Immigration Policies," *Annals,* 1949.
Brewton Berry, "Pluralism," chap. 13, in *Race Relations* (see above).

CHAPTER 14

There is no monograph on the urban family but textbooks on the family provide ample materials. See, for instance:

Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family,* chap. 4, New York, 1953.
Ruth S. Cavan, *The American Family,* chap. 4, New York, 1953.

For comparison with other systems see:

Stuart A. Queen and John B. Adams, *The Family in Various Cultures,* Philadelphia, 1952. A survey of eleven family systems throughout the world.

On changes in structure and function see:

Ernest W. Burgess, "The Family in a Changing Society," *AJS,* 1948.
Paul H. Landis, "The Changing Family," *Current History,* 1950.
William F. Ogburn, "The Changing Functions of the Family," *Journal of Home Economics,* 1933.
J. Ray Leevy, "Contrast in Urban and Rural Family Life," *ASR,* 1940.

The problems of urban family life are analyzed from the viewpoint of social services in:

The Family in a Democratic Society, Community Service Society, New York, 1949.

For investigation of the impact of economic factors on the urban family see:

Ruth S. Cavan, *The Family and the Depression,* Chicago, 1938. A study of one hundred Chicago families.

Perhaps the most thoroughly discussed subject is the number of children in urban families; see, for instance:

A. J. Jaffee, "Urbanization and Fertility," *AJS,* 1942.
Clyde V. Kiser, *Group Differences in Urban Fertility,* Baltimore, 1942.
T. J. Woofter, "Trends in Rural and Urban Fertility Rates," *Rural Sociology,* 1948.
Charles F. Westoff, "The Changing Focus of Differential Fertility Research: The Social Mobility Hypothesis," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1953.
Charles F. Westoff, "Differential Fertility in the United States: 1900 to 1952," *ASR,* 1954.

The two latter essays also contain bibliographies.

CHAPTER 15

The following list mentions only works dealing with the impact of religion on urban life in America. As can be seen, the relevant literature concerns mostly Protestantism, which has felt the changes more than other religious bodies.

Religious Bodies: 1936, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1941.
"Organized Religion in the United States," *Annals,* 1948.
Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, "The Organization of Religion," chap. 25, in *American Urban Communities,* New York, 1951.
H. Paul Douglass, *One Thousand City Churches,* New York, 1926.
H. Paul Douglass, *The Church in a Changing City,* New York, 1937.
F. Stuart Chapin, "The Protestant Church in an Urban Environment," chap. 11, in *Contemporary American Institutions,* New York, 1935.
Samuel C. Kincheloe, *The American City and Its Church,* New York, 1938.
Murray H. Leiffer, *City and Church in Transition.* A study of the medium-sized city and its organized religious life.
A. I. Abell, *Urban Impact on American Protestantism,* Cambridge, Mass., 1943.

CHAPTER 16

The literature on recreation is abundant but much of it concerns the technical aspects of recreational activities. Examples of studies oriented to social problems are:

George Lundberg et al., *Leisure: A Suburban Study,* New York, 1934. Deals with recreation in Westchester County.
Martin H. Neumeyer and Esther S. Neumeyer, *Leisure and Recreation,* New York, 1936.
Howard G. Danford, *Recreation in the American Community,* New York, 1953.

Some studies concerning special social aspects of service institutions (including non-recreational services) are:

Amos H. Hawley, "An Ecological Study of Urban Service Institutions," *ASR,* 1941.
Reginald R. Isaacs, "Educational, Cultural, and Recreational Services," *Annals,* 1942.

An example of investigating conditions in a specific area is:

Chicago Recreation Survey, Chicago, 1937–1939.

CHAPTER 17

On organization and administration see:

Urban Government, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, 1939.

Examples of comprehensive texts:

William B. Munro, *The Government of American Cities,* New York, 1929.
William Anderson and Edward Weidner, *American City Government,* New York, 1951.
Austin F. MacDonald, *American City Government and Administration,* New York, 1941.
Arthur Bromage, *Introduction to Municipal Government and Administration,* New York, 1950.
Henry G. Hodges, *City Management,* New York, 1939.
Thomas H. Reed, *Municipal Management,* New York, 1934.

On the problem of integrating city governments through metropolitan government see:

Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government,* Chicago, 1942.
P. Studenski, *Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States,* National Municipal League, New York.
Betty Tableman, *Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas,* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951.

On the city-manager plan see:

Harold A. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States,* Chicago, 1940.
Charles P. Taft, *City Management: The Cincinnati Experiment,* New York, 1933.
Edwin O. Stene and George G. Floro, *Abandonment of the Manager Plan,* Lawrence, Kans., 1953.

The *Municipal Yearbook* regularly publishes information concerning city-manager administration.

On the problem of proportional representation see the textbooks listed above and:

F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy,* Notre Dame, Ind., 1941.

On city finances see:

Municipal Finance Administration, International City Managers' Association, Chicago, 1949.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census periodically publishes statistics about municipal finances under the title of *City Finances.* See also its publication *Large City Finances in 1951,* 1952.

CHAPTER 18

General Pathology of Urban Life

George C. Homans, "Social Disintegration: Hilltown," chap. 13, in *The Human Group,* New York, 1950.

Carle C. Zimmerman, *The Changing Community,* New York, 1938.

Carle C. Zimmerman et al., "Littleville: A Parasitic Community during the Depression," *Rural Sociology,* 1936.

Death and Diseases

Vital Statistics, U.S. Bureau of the Census, published periodically.

Special Investigations

Dorothy G. Wiehl, "Mortality and Socio-environmental Factors," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 1948.

Lambert Molyneaux, *Differential Mortality in Virginia,* Charlottesville, Va., 1947.

Mental Disorders

Frank G. Boudreau and Jean Downes (eds.), *Interrelations between the Social Environment and Psychiatric Disorders,* Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, 1953.

H. Warren Dunham, "Social Psychiatry," *ASR,* 1948.

Robert E. Faris, "Demography of Urban Psychotics with Special Reference to Schizophrenia," *ASR,* 1938.

Robert E. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas,* Chicago, 1939.

Stuart A. Queen, "The Ecological Study of Mental Disorders," *ASR,* 1940.

Clarence W. Schroeder, "Mental Disorders in Cities," *AJS,* 1942.

H. Warren Dunham, "Current Status of Ecological Research in Mental Disorders," *Social Forces,* 1947.

E. Gartley Jaco, "The Social Isolation Hypothesis and Schizophrenia," *ASR,* 1954.

Suicide

The classic study, now available in an English translation is:

Emile Durkheim, *Suicide,* Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

See also:

Calvin F. Schmid, *Suicides in Seattle, 1914 to 1925,* Seattle, Wash., 1928.

Ruth S. Cavan, *Suicide,* Chicago, 1928. Data on Chicago.

CHAPTER 19

Vice

Most textbooks on social disorganization furnish ample material, for instance:

Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization,* 3d ed., New York, 1950.
Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago,* 1933.

On drug addiction see:

A. R. Lindesmith, "A Sociological Theory of Drug Addiction," *AJS,* 1938.
Don Bingham, *Opium Addiction in Chicago,* Chicago, 1933.
C. E. Terry, "Drug Addiction," *ESS.*

On alcoholism see:

Haven Emerson (ed.), *Alcohol and Man,* New York, 1932.
George E. G. Catlin, "Alcohol," *ESS.*

On prostitution the literature is endless but few studies are of interest to urban sociology, for instance:

Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Prostitution," *ASR,* 1937.
W. C. Waterman, *Prostitution and Its Repression in New York City,* New York, 1932.
Geoffrey May, "Prostitution," *ESS.*

On gambling see:

"Gambling," *Annals,* 1950.

Crime

There are many texts on this subject, for instance:

Ruth S. Cavan, *Criminology,* New York, 1948.
Thornton Sellin, "Crime," *ESS.*

See also:

Marshall B. Clinard, "The Process of Urbanization and Criminal Behavior," *AJS,* 1942.
Frederic M. Trasher, *The Gang,* Chicago, 1927.
Clifford R. Shaw et al., *Delinquency Areas,* Chicago, 1929.
Report on the Causes of Crime, Commission on Law Observance and Enforcements, Washington, 1931.

On juvenile delinquency see:

Walter C. Reckless, *Juvenile Delinquency,* New York, 1932.
Paul W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency,* New York, 1949.
Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas,* Chicago, 1942.

Political Corruption

"The Tammany in New York City," vol. 2, chap. 88, in James B. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth,* New York, 1910.
H. F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model,* Chicago, 1937.
Denis T. Lynch, *Boss Tweed: The Story of a Grim Generation,* New York, 1927.

D. D. McKean, *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action,* Boston, 1940.
R. V. Peel, "The Political Machine of New York City," *The American Political Science Review,* 1933.
J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics,* New York, 1935.
Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States,* Durham, N.C., 1930.
Lincoln Steffens, *Autobiography,* New York, 1941.
Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities,* New York, 1949.

CHAPTER 20

The enormous literature permits listing of only a few representative studies; they all include extensive bibliographies. For additional literature see also the two following chapters.

James Ford, *Slums and Housing,* Cambridge, Mass., 1936.
Edith Abbott, *The Tenements of Chicago,* Chicago, 1936.
Henry M. Shulman, *Slums of New York,* New York, 1938.
Mabel L. Walker, *Urban Blight and Slums,* Cambridge, Mass., 1938.
W. F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum,* Chicago, 1943.
Edith E. Woods, *Slums and Blighted Areas in the United States,* U.S. Housing Authority, Washington, 1938.

CHAPTER 21

For the literature on housing see also the Selected Readings for Chaps. 20 and 22. There is necessarily much overlapping. The following list mentions only a few representative works and some lesser-known studies:

Charles Abrams, *The Future of Housing,* New York, 1941.
Miles Colean et al., *American Housing: Problems and Projects,* The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1944.
Guy Greer and Alvin H. Hansen, *Urban Redevelopment and Housing,* Washington, 1941.
Henry Wright, *Rehousing Urban America,* New York, 1935.

The case for public housing is most vigorously presented by:

Nathan Strauss, *The Seven Myths of Housing,* New York, 1944.
Nathan Strauss, *Two Thirds of a Nation,* New York, 1952.

For a critical approach see:

John P. Dean, *Home Ownership: Is It Sound?* New York, 1945.
John P. Dean, "The Myths of Housing Reform," *ASR,* 1949.

A large variety of problems is discussed in:

"Social Policy and Social Research in Housing," *The Journal of Social Issues,* vol. 6, nos. 1 and 2, New York, 1951.

Examples of some less frequently discussed topics are:

Clyde E. Murray, "Democratic Values in Urban Redevelopment: The Story of Manhattanville," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review,* vol. 7, no. 3, New York, 1952.
Walter A. Nelson, *An Analysis of the Operation of 35 Permanent Housing Projects Con-*

trolled by the New York City Housing Authority, mimeographed thesis, Rutgers University, 1951.

Edwin L. Scanlon, *Public Housing Trends in New York City,* mimeographed thesis, Rutgers University, 1952.

Low-cost housing in America is discussed and compared with conditions in foreign countries by:

Herbert Gray, *Housing and Citizenship: A Study of Low-cost Housing,* New York, 1946.

A survey of the efforts made by the Nordic countries of Europe is found in:

George R. Nelson (ed.), "Housing," chap. 5, in *Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Nordic Countries of Europe,* New York, 1953. Sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

On prefabricated homes see:

Burnham Kelly, *The Prefabrication of Houses,* New York, 1951.

On statistics see:

Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington. Published monthly.

CHAPTER 22

Government Publications

Regional Factors in National Planning and Development, NRS, Washington, 1935.
Regional Planning, NRS, Washington, 1936.
Urban Planning and Land Policies, NRS, Washington, 1939.
Better Cities, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, 1942.
A Handbook for Urban Redevelopment for Certain Cities in the United States, Federal Housing Administration, Washington, 1941.

Some Representative Monographs

Austin B. Gallion (with Simon Eisner), *City Planning and Design,* New York, 1950.
L. Hilbersheimer, *The New City,* Chicago, 1944.
L. Justement, *New Cities for Old,* New York, 1946.
H. MacLean Lewis, *Planning the Modern City,* New York, 1949.
Lewis Mumford, *City Development,* New York, 1945.
Steen Eiler Rasmussen, *Towns and Buildings,* Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
S. E. Sanders and A. J. Rabuck, *New City Patterns: The Analysis of and a Technique for Urban Reintegration,* New York, 1946.
Clarence S. Stein, *Towards New Towns for America,* University of Liverpool Press, Liverpool, 1951.
Robert A. Walker, *Urban Planning,* Chicago, 1941.
Robert A. Walker, *The Planning Function in Urban Government,* Chicago, 1950.
Louis Wirth et al., *Community Planning for Peacetime Living,* Stanford, Calif., 1946.
Coleman Woodbury, *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment,* Chicago, 1953.
"Building the Future City," *Annals,* 1945.

The View of the Architect

The pioneer of modern planning is Camillo Sitte, an Austrian architect, who published his book (see below) as early as 1881. That his ideas are still timely is shown by a recent English translation.

C. Sitte, *The Art of Building Cities,* New York, 1945.

Other works by leading architects are:

Le Corbusier (Charles E. Jeanneret-Gris), *The City of Tomorrow and Its Planning,* London, 1947.
E. Saarinen, *The City: Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future,* New York, 1943.
Josef Louis Sert, *Can Our Cities Survive?* Cambridge, Mass., 1942.
Frank Lloyd Wright, *When Democracy Builds,* Chicago, 1945.

The View of the Town Planner

Patrick Abercrombie, *Planning in Town and Country: Difficulty and Possibilities,* London, 1937.
Patrick Abercrombie, *Town and Country Planning,* New York, 1943.

The Approach of the Social Scientist

Charles E. Merriam, "The Possibilities of Planning," *AJS,* 1944.
Svend Riemer, "Social Planning and Social Organization," *AJS,* 1947.
Brian Hackett, *Man, Society, and Environment: The Historical Basis of Planning,* London, 1950.

Readings and Bibliographies

Theodore Caplow (ed.), *City Planning* (readings), Minneapolis, 1950.
Gerald Breese and Dorothy E. Whiteman (eds.), *An Approach to Urban Planning* (with a carefully annotated bibliography.
Samuel Spielvogel, *A Selected Bibliography on City and Regional Planning,* Washington, 1951.
Dorothy E. Whiteman (ed.), *The Urban Reference.* Published bimonthly by Princeton University.

For neighborhood planning see Chapter 23.

CHAPTER 23

Neighborhood

Spatial and social neighborhood theory and planning are treated here as one unit:

Niles Carpenter, "Neighborhood," *ESS.*
Richard Dewey, "The Neighborhood, Urban Ecology, and City Planning," *ASR,* 1950.
Roderick D. McKenzie, *The Neighborhood: A Study of Local Life in the City of Columbus, Ohio,* Chicago, 1923.
Reginald R. Isaacs, "The 'Neighborhood Unit' Is an Instrument for Segregation," *Journal of Housing,* 1948.
Reginald R. Isaacs, "Are Urban Neighborhoods Possible?" *Journal of Housing,* 1948.
Clarence A. Perry, *Housing for the Machine Age,* New York, 1939 (containing a discussion of Perry's "neighborhood unit formula").

Planning the Neighborhood. The Committee on the Hygiene of Housing in the American Public Health Organization, Chicago, 1948.

Frank Sweeter, *Neighborhood Acquaintance and Association: A Study of Personal Neighborhoods,* New York, 1941.

Bibliography

James Dahir, *The Neighborhood Unit Plan: A Selective Bibliography with Interpretive Comments,* Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1947.

Community Organization

For works mainly theoretical see:

Saul D. Alinsky, "Community Analysis and Organization," *AJS,* 1941.

Robert C. Angell, *Integration of American Society: A Study of Groups and Institutions,* New York, 1941.

Robert C. Angell, "The Moral Integration of American Cities," *AJS,* 1951.

Robert C. Angell, "The Social Integration of Selected American Cities," *AJS,* 1947.

Robert C. Angell, "The Social Integration of American Cities of More than 100,000 Population," *ASR,* 1948.

Robert C. Angell, "Moral Integration and Interpersonal Integration in American Cities," *ASR,* 1949.

For emphasis on social work and actual planning see:

James Dahir, *Communities for Better Living,* New York, 1950.

David F. De Marche and Roy E. Earl, *Community Organization and Agency Responsibility,* New York, 1951.

Arthur Hillman, *Community Organization and Planning,* New York, 1950.

Clyde E. Murray, Marx G. Bowens, and Russell Hogrefe, *Group Work in Community Life,* New York, 1954.

J. F. Steiner, *Community Organization,* New York, 1930.

Wayne McMillen, *Community Organization for Social Welfare,* Chicago, 1945.

On membership problems in the YMCA:

The YMCA has issued periodical reports since 1942. A recent one is:

The Third Study of YMCA Constituency, New York, 1953.

For additional bibliography see:

Herbert H. Stroup, *Social Work,* New York, 1948, pp. 653–656.

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